ORDER : By way of instant application, a prayer has been made to condone the delay of 1019 days in filing the appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against award dated 01.09.2017, passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla, H.P. in M.A.C. Petition No. 73-R/2 of 2016/2015. 2. Applicant contends that she had met the counsel representing her in the instant application in January, 2021 and was advised that the award passed by learned Tribunal was on lower side and she could take the chance of enhancement in compensation by preferring the appeal before this Court. 3. As per averments made in the application, the applicant had filed execution petition after passing of the award and had received the awarded amount in August, 2020. It is also submitted that applicant was under mental depression on account of death of her young son. 4. As per applicant, the delay in filing the appeal was not intentional. She, otherwise, was not aware about the period of limitation prescribed to file the appeal. It is further contended that applicant would have achieved nothing by delaying the filing of the appeal. 5. The prayer of the applicant is contested on behalf of respondent No.3, on the ground that the application is abuse of process of law as no cogent and satisfactory reason has been assigned for condonation of huge delay of 1019 days. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 7. The plea that applicant was under depression as she had lost her son, has remained unsubstantiated. Except for the bald assertions made in the application, nothing has been placed on record to prove the same. The reason, so assigned, otherwise, also does not appear to be convincing as there is nothing to infer as to when applicant had lost her son. If the reference is to the death of son of the applicant, for whom, she has been compensated through award sought to be impugned, the same dates back to the year 2015. Applicant had filed the petition herself under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. She had contested the same and thereafter received the awarded amount after preferring execution. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicant suffered from the depression, as claimed. 8. Applicant had filed the petition herself under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. She had contested the same and thereafter received the awarded amount after preferring execution. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicant suffered from the depression, as claimed. 8. Another fact that cannot be ignored is that applicant was throughout represented by a counsel right from the date of filing of petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act till the culmination of execution proceedings in August, 2020. Even after the passing of award, applicant had contacted her counsel for filing execution. The counsel, who had contested the claim of the applicant had not advised her to file appeal for enhancement of compensation. 9. As per the case of applicant, she decided to prefer the appeal as well as instant application only when she was advised by another counsel to take a chance by preferring the appeal. Thus, applicant has filed the appeal accompanied by present application on the advise of a counsel, who had not represented her before the learned Tribunal. 10. Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, Advocate, learned counsel for the applicant has contended with vehemence that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and the Court should take lenient and pragmatic view while deciding the present application. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. MST. Katiji and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 , in which it was observed as under:- “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 11. Mr. Bhardwaj, has also placed reliance on judgment passed by three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brahampal alias Sammay and another Vs. National Insurance Company (2021) 6 SCC 512 and has laid stress on the observations made as under :- “10. Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay. 11. Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion. 1 It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and implies discretion.2 “It is used in a statute to indicate that something may be done which prior to it could not be done”. 12. The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section 173 of the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. 12. The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section 173 of the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. The pertinent issue before us relates to what the extent of such discretionary power is. 13. In order to understand the extent of conferment of power by the usage of the word “may”, we may observe Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P.) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166 , wherein this Court held: “10. The principle laid down above has been followed consistently by this Court whenever it has been contended that the word “may” carries with it the obligation to 1 Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn.,page 519 2 Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder, (1982) 1 SCC 159 , 3 Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., 1962 Supp (3) SCR 973 exercise a power in a particular manner or direction. In such a case, it is always the purpose of the power which has to be examined in order to determine the scope of the discretion conferred upon the donee of the power. If the conditions in which the power is to be exercised in particular cases are also specified by a statute then, on the fulfilment of those conditions, the power conferred becomes annexed with a duty to exercise it in that manner”. 14. This Court has firstly held that purpose of conferment of such power must be examined for the determination of the scope of such discretion conferred upon the court. [refer to Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120 ; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2 SCC 806 ]. Our analysis of the purpose of the Act suggests that such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities. 15. Secondly, it has been held that if the specific conditions wherein the power could be exercised is also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statute itself. 15. Secondly, it has been held that if the specific conditions wherein the power could be exercised is also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statute itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that Court has the power to condone delay only if it is satisfied that there existed “sufficient cause”. 16. At this juncture, we need to interpret the term “sufficient cause” as a condition precedent for the granting of the discretionary relief of allowing the appeal beyond the statutory limit of ninety days. Although this Court has held that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, but it is relevant to note that even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act Courts have taken a liberal interpretation. This Court in the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321 , observed that: “13.…The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” 17. The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 , wherein this Court held that: “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 18. The Court in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties. 19. The aforesaid view was taken by this Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 wherein the Court held that: “23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 20. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a beneficial legislation, must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object. Keeping in view the substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly, as compared to commercial claims under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.” 12. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant are distinguishable for the reason that in the matter of Mst. Katiji (supra), the delay was only of four days and in Brahampal @ Sammy (supra), the delay was of forty five days, whereas the delay in the instant case is of two years and eight months. 13. Undoubtedly, the Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial legislation its provisions have to be considered and construed liberally. However, it does not mean that the right of appeal provided under Sub-Section 1 of Section 173 of the Act, is to be construed, in such a manner that the second proviso thereof is rendered nugatory or redundant. Even in Brahampal @ Sammy (supra), the three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the underlined value of law of limitation as substantive law and having definite consequences on the right and obligations of the parties. In the cases of inordinate delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “18. The Court in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In the cases of inordinate delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “18. The Court in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.” 14. Liberal interpretation does not mean that the party can be allowed to approach the Court, at any time, without showing any cause which can be termed to be sufficient. Considering such aspect, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Braham Pal @ Semi (supra) address the issue as under:- “22. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief.” 15. The question, thus, arises as to whether the belated advise of a counsel can be considered as sufficient cause prescribed in second proviso to Section 173 of the Act. The facts of the case in hand reveal that no such advise was rendered to the applicant by the counsel, who had conducted her compensation case before learned Tribunal and also had rendered assistance to her during execution proceedings. It was only, when applicant allegedly met another counsel that she was advised to take a chance. This cannot be said to be sufficient cause. It was only, when applicant allegedly met another counsel that she was advised to take a chance. This cannot be said to be sufficient cause. Such interpretation would be too absurd and will open flood gates for all litigants to file the appeal at their whims by taking shelter of legal advise. By applying the criteria of reasonableness, the case in hand fails. After huge delay of two years and eight months, the other side has acquired legal vested rights which cannot be taken away lightly by raising the plea of liberal interpretation. 16. In light of above discussion, there is no merit in the application and the same is dismissed.