JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. 1. The petitioner, owner of a building bearing door Nos. VI/1702 and VI/1703 (old Building No. IX/1810), seeks to quash Ext. P6 assessment order dated 06.10.2016 issued by the Tahsildar, Ottapalam Taluk, respondent No. 2, under the provisions of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 (‘Act 1975’ for short), whereby the petitioner was directed to remit an amount of Rs. 9,79,200/- in 4 instalments starting from 05.11.2016 and ending on 05.08.2017. 2. According to the petitioner, the building having a plinth area of 798.83 sq. meters was constructed for running a rice mill after securing permit from the Cherpulassery Grama Panchayat on 02.02.2008. Subsequently he obtained a permit for the construction of a godown adjacent to the rice mill and after completion, the building having a plinth area of 2431.79 square meters, was allotted door No. IX/1903 by the Panchayat in the year 2011 and the same was subsequently re-numbered as VI/1703, as is evident from Ext. P2 receipt for the property tax paid by the petitioner. Later, the petitioner decided to use the building as an auditorium. However, when the petitioner submitted the application for licence before the local authority, he was directed by the local authority to submit a plan for change of occupancy of the building from commercial to assembly occupancy. Accordingly, he submitted a conversion plan and later approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 10098 of 2014 and secured a judgment dated 11.04.2014, directing the Secretary of the Panchayat to consider the application for change of occupancy. 3. The Secretary has rejected the same and being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Appeal No. 718 of 2014 before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. During the pendency of the said appeal, the petitioner had approached the Sub Collector, Ottapalam under clause 6 of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 and the Sub Collector, by order dated 01.01.2015, permitted the conversion of the petitioner's property for utilization of other purposes. In the light of the order dated 01.01.2015 passed by the Sub Collector, Appeal No. 718 of 2014 was disposed of by the Tribunal by Ext. P3 order dated 16.07.2016 directing the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat to reconsider the conversion plan submitted by the petitioner. 4. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat, as per Ext. P4 order dated 12.08.2016, granted occupancy change. P3 order dated 16.07.2016 directing the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat to reconsider the conversion plan submitted by the petitioner. 4. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat, as per Ext. P4 order dated 12.08.2016, granted occupancy change. The case of the petitioner is that he has not made any addition or alterations to the building in question. However, the Tahsildar, Ottapalam, respondent No. 2, as per Ext. P6 order dated 06.10.2016, made an assessment directing the petitioner to pay the amount towards the building tax under the Act, 1975. 5. The paramount contention advanced by the learned Senior counsel is that the petitioner has not been issued with an assessment notice as contemplated under Section 7(3) of the Act, 1975, nor was he afforded an opportunity of being heard as contemplated under Sections 9(2) and (3) of the Act, 1975 before passing an order of assessment. It is also contended that the plinth area of the building in question is only 2431.79 sq. meters; whereas in Ext. P6, the Tahsildar calculated the plinth area of the building as 2875.48 sq. meters. 6. That apart, it is contended that Section 6 of the Act, 1975 provides that the plinth area of a building for the purpose of imposition of building tax is the plinth area of the building as specified in the plan approved by the local authority; and according to the petitioner, Ext. P5 is the plan approved by the local authority and therefore, the assessment made by the Tahsildar is against the provisions of the Act, 1975. Accordingly, petitioner seeks interference with Ext. P6 order of assessment. 7. The Tahsildar has filed a detailed counter affidavit refuting the allegations and the claims and demands raised by the petitioner. According to the Tahsildar, the petitioner has constructed a commercial building having a plinth area of 2755.07 sq. meters in his property situated in survey Nos. 290/1, 290/4 in Block No. 42 of the Cherupulassery Village, Ottapalam Taluk, Palakkad District. 8. It is also pointed out that the Village Officer, Cherupulassery Village, submitted a report in form No. 1 with regard to the building along with the line sketch of the building dated 21.07.2015 showing the plinth area as specified above. The petitioner has also filed Ext.R2(a) return in Form II under the Act, 1975. Thereafter, Ext. 8. It is also pointed out that the Village Officer, Cherupulassery Village, submitted a report in form No. 1 with regard to the building along with the line sketch of the building dated 21.07.2015 showing the plinth area as specified above. The petitioner has also filed Ext.R2(a) return in Form II under the Act, 1975. Thereafter, Ext. R2(b) notice under Sections 9(2) and 9(4) of the Act, 1975 was issued to the petitioner requiring him to appear for hearing on 26.10.2015. However, he did not appear for the hearing and hence, Ext. R2(c) notice dated 03.02.2016 was issued to the petitioner to appear for hearing on 23.02.2016. 9. Pursuant to Ext. R2(c) notice, the petitioner appeared for hearing and raised a dispute regarding the plinth area. Hence, for further verification of the plinth area, the file was transferred to the Charge Officer, who submitted a report on 23.06.2016 along with a line sketch and according to the said report, the plinth area was 2875.48 sq. meters. It is further submitted that the Village Officer verified the records maintained by the Municipality and reported that the date of completion of the building was 27.11.2014. Therefore, according to the Tahsildar, it was taking into account the factual circumstances and after carrying out the measurement of the plinth area alone, the assessment was made in accordance with law after providing a notice of hearing to the petitioner. 10. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sri. S. Sreekumar and the learned Government Pleader Smt. Resmitha R. Chandran and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner basically submitted that the plinth area pointed out in Ext. P6 order of assessment is not correct, since as per Ext. P5 approved plan, the plinth area of the building is only 2431.79 sq. meters. That apart, it is pointed out that Ext. P6 order of assessment is violative of the principles of natural justice, since the measurement alleged to be taken by the Tahsildar through the Village Officer/Charge Officer is not in the presence of the petitioner. 12. P5 approved plan, the plinth area of the building is only 2431.79 sq. meters. That apart, it is pointed out that Ext. P6 order of assessment is violative of the principles of natural justice, since the measurement alleged to be taken by the Tahsildar through the Village Officer/Charge Officer is not in the presence of the petitioner. 12. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the plinth area was determined as provided under Section 6 of the Act, 1975, which specifies that the plinth area of a building for the purposes of the Act,1975 shall be the plinth area of the building as specified in the plan approved by the local authority or such other authorities as may be specified by Government in that behalf and verified by the assessing authority in such manner as may be prescribed. 13. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, on an analysis of Section 6 of the Act, 1975, it is not only the approved plan of the local authority that has to be taken into account, but the assessing authority is vested with powers to verify the area of the building. It is also clear from the counter affidavit filed and the documents produced along with the same that the petitioner has submitted a return as per the provisions of the Act, 1975 and it was after providing a notice of hearing to the petitioner that Ext. P6 order of assessment was passed by the Tahsildar. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the procedure prescribed under the Act, 1975 was followed by the Tahsildar and there is no manner of arbitrariness or illegality in the order of assessment. 14. I have evaluated the rival submissions made across the Bar. This writ petition was admitted to the files of this Court as early as on 15.11.2016 and granted a stay of further proceedings of Ext. P6 order of assessment, on the petitioner remitting an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- within four weeks. I am informed that the said amount was paid by the petitioner. 15. This writ petition was admitted to the files of this Court as early as on 15.11.2016 and granted a stay of further proceedings of Ext. P6 order of assessment, on the petitioner remitting an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- within four weeks. I am informed that the said amount was paid by the petitioner. 15. The learned Government Pleader submitted that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the assessment made, he had the remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 11 of the Act, 1975, and therefore, since the statutory procedures were followed by the Tahsildar, the petitioner ought to have filed an appeal before the appellate authority and there is no scope for interference with the order exercising the power of judicial review. 16. On the other hand, as I have pointed out above, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the plinth area of the building was measured without the presence of the petitioner. In my considered opinion, now the petitioner cannot be relegated to file an appeal under Section 11 of the Act, 1975 for the basic reason that sub-Section 3 of Section 11 prescribes a special limitation. Section 11(3) of Act, 1975 reads thus: “...(3) The appeal shall be presented within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or the date of service of the order, as the case may be, but the appellate authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the said period if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within the said period, provided however that no such appeal shall be admitted after a period of six months from the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or the date of service of the order, as the case may be.” 17. Therefore, it can be seen that the appeal ought to have been preferred within 30 days and if the same has not been presented within the said period, the appellate authority, if satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within time, may admit the appeal within a period of six months from the date of service of demand relating to the assessment or the date of service of the order, as the case may be. 18. 18. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would come into play and it reads thus: “29. Savings: (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” 19. Therefore in view of the special limitation contained under Sub-Section (3) of Section 11 of Act 1975, at this distance of time, the petitioner cannot be directed to seek the statutory remedy. This I say because, the appellate authority has the power to condone the delay only up to a maximum period of six months. The question as to whether, when a special limitation is prescribed under any statute, can the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoked and the statutory restrictions be bypassed, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Rermal Padmanabhan vs. Tribunal for LSGI, 2015 (3) KLT 201 while considering a question under the provisions of the Tribunal for the Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999; and after taking into account the judgment of the Apex Court, it is held that the statutory restrictions cannot be bypassed by exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portions of the said judgment reads thus: 4. In order to resolve the controversy involved in this Writ Petition, it is necessary to refer R.8(3) and the proviso thereto of the Tribunal for Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999, which reads thus: “8(3). The relevant portions of the said judgment reads thus: 4. In order to resolve the controversy involved in this Writ Petition, it is necessary to refer R.8(3) and the proviso thereto of the Tribunal for Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999, which reads thus: “8(3). Petitions under sub-rules (1) and (2) shall be in Form ‘C’ and the same shall be submitted before the Tribunal within thirty days from the date of the notice or order or proceedings against which the petition is filed or within ninety days in cases where decision has not been taken within sixty days of filing appeal before the Local Self Government Institutions: Provided that the Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within one month after the said time limit, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the time limit.” 5. A reading of this rule shows that a revision, as in this case, should have been filed within 30 days from the date of the order. The proviso to the rule also empowers the Tribunal to admit a petition submitted within one month after the expiry of the one month period prescribed in R.8(3), if the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within one month period specified in R.8(3). In this context, it is also relevant to state that the one month period prescribed in R.8(3) is in terms of the provisions contained in S.276(6) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 also. 6. In so far as the judgment in the case ‘Thomas Thomas’ (supra) is concerned, after referring to the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court and distinguishing the judgment in Pushpakaran vs. Union of India, 2008 (1) KLT 161 in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, this Court held thus: “11. From the aforesaid judgments it is clear that once the statutory period of limitation has expired, the party looses its right of appeal. Thereafter it is not open to him to invoke the power of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution and bypass the statutory restrictions and get the delay condoned or to have the matter examined by this Court. Admittedly, proviso to R.8(3) authorizes the Tribunal to condone delay of only one month if it is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the delay. Admittedly, proviso to R.8(3) authorizes the Tribunal to condone delay of only one month if it is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the delay. The power conferred on the Tribunal being restricted, in my view, the above two judgments of this court gives a complete answer to the contentions of the petitioner. 12. As rightly contended by the counsel for the Municipality if a special statute has prescribed a period of limitation, to that extent, the provisions of the Limitation Act will stand excluded as provided in S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. This contention of the learned counsel for the Municipality is fully supported by the judgment of the Apex Court in (2008) 7 SCC 169 and Para-20 (mistakenly shown in the referred judgment as Para-10) to the extent relevant, reads as under: “When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section (3) of S.34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court of the opinion that the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. (Emphasis supplied) 13. Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision reported in Pushpakaran vs. Union of India, 2008 (1) KLT 161 . That was a case arising under the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989. However, on going through the Rules, it is seen that unlike R.8 of the Tribunal Rules, where the maximum condonable period is one month, no such limitation is provided for in R.18 of the Rules referred to above, which came up for consideration of the Division Bench in the above case. In view of this factual difference this judgment of the Division Bench does not help the petitioner.” 7. In view of this factual difference this judgment of the Division Bench does not help the petitioner.” 7. A reading of the above paragraphs show that this Court has held that R.8(3) authorized the Tribunal to condone delay of only one month, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for the same and that the said power conferred on the Tribunal is a restricted power. 8. However, the learned counsel for the appellant sought to canvass the correctness of this judgment, placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Pushpakaran vs. Union of India, 2008 (1) KLT 161 . That was a case arising under the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 and the Railway Claims (Procedure) Rules, 1989. 9. Rule 18 of the Procedure Rules provides for action on application for applicant’s default and this rule reads thus: “18. Action on application for applicant’s default: (1) Where on the date fixed for hearing of the application or on any other date to which such hearing may be adjourned, the applicant does not appear (when the application is called) for hearing, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, either dismiss the application for default or hear and decide it on merit. (2) Where an application has been dismissed for default and the applicant files an application within thirty days from the date of dismissal and satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for his nonappearance when the application was called for hearing, the Tribunal shall make an order setting aside the order dismissing the application and restore the same: Provided, however, where the case was disposed of on merits the decision shall not be reopened except by way of review.” 10. Taking note of the above provisions, the Division Bench held thus in paragraph 6 of the judgment: “6. R.18 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules prescribe the time limit of 30 days in filing an application for setting aside an order dismissing the application for default. But, there is no specific exclusion or prohibition in the section for extending the time. Hence, considering the mandate of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, S.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. But, there is no specific exclusion or prohibition in the section for extending the time. Hence, considering the mandate of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, S.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that before Mukri Gopalan’s case (supra) there were large number of decisions to the effect that S.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to a civil court and not to courts or tribunals or quasi judicial authorities which has though all trappings of the court but not being a civil court. Now it has been consistently held that in the absence of specific exclusion or prohibition, if limitation is prescribed in a special law for filing an application, by virtue of S.5 read with S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, tribunal which has all the trappings of court can condone delay on sufficient reasons. This is all the more applicable to the Railway Claims Tribunal in setting aside any order of dismissal for default of the applicant in view of S.18(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.” 11. A reading of the statutory provisions relied on by the Division Bench show that though in R.18 of the Procedure Rules, provision has been made for the filing of an application to set aside an order dismissing an application and for restoring the application, within 30 days from the date of dismissal, there is no further provision in the rule providing for condonation of delay or any period up to which delay can be condoned, as in the proviso to R.8 of the Tribunal Rules. It was taking note of this peculiar nature of R.18 that in paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Division Bench held that the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act would apply to an application made under R.18 and the Railway Claims (Procedure) Rules, in our view, in the light of the difference in the provisions of R.8 of the Tribunal Rules and R.18 of the Railway Claims (Procedure) Rules, the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in ‘Pushkaran’s case (supra) cannot be relied on to get over the proposition laid down by this Court in ‘Thomas Thomas’s case (supra). 12. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that in order to exclude S.5 of the Limitation Act, there should be a specific provision under the special statute, viz., the Tribunal for Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999, excluding expressly S.5 of the Limitation Act. 13. The said contention was resisted by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent by referring to the decision reported in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court had occasion to consider the limitation prescribed under the proviso to S.34(3) and S.43(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with respect to condonation of delay as contemplated under Ss. 5, 14 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. After evaluating the facts and circumstances of this case, in paragraph 20 of the said judgment [incorrectly shown as paragraph 10 in the judgment reported in ‘Thomas Thomas’s case (supra)] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “20. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act inter-alia provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section (3) of S.34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court of the opinion that the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. However, merely because it is held that S.5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application filed under S.34 of the Act for setting aside an award, one need not conclude that provisions of S.14 of the Limitation Act would also not be applicable to an application submitted under S.34 of the Act of 1996.” From the paragraph referred above, it is categoric and clear that so far as the special limitation prescribed under a statute is concerned, Sec.5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable. 14. Further, one of the Hon’ble Judges of the Bench, concurring fully with the findings, rendered separate reasons and in paragraphs 53 and 54, it is clearly held that whenever there is a period prescribed for condoning the delay, then S.5 of the Limitation Act is clearly excluded, and these paragraphs are quoted hereunder: “53. Sub-Section (3) of S.34 of the A.C. Act prescribes the period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an award as three months from the date on which the applicant has received the arbitral award. The proviso thereto vests in the court discretion to extend the period of limitation by a further period not exceeding thirty days if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause for not making the application within three months. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that even if a sufficient cause is made out for a longer extension, the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that even if a sufficient cause is made out for a longer extension, the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. The purpose of proviso to S.34(3) of the A.C. Act is similar to that of S.5 of the Limitation Act which also relates to extension of the period of limitation prescribed for any application or appeal. It vests a discretion in a court to extend the prescribed period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. S.5 of the Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to the period of extension, whereas the proviso to sub-section (3) of S.34 of the A.C. Act places a limit on the period of extension of the prescribed limitation. Thus the proviso to S.34(3) of the AC Act is also a provision relating to extension of period of limitation, but differs from S.5 of the Limitation Act, in regard to period of extension, and has the effect of excluding S.5 alone of the Limitation Act. 54. On the other hand, S.14 contained in Part III of the Limitation Act does not relate to extension of the period of limitation, but relates to exclusion of certain period while computing the period of limitation. Neither sub-section (3) of S.34 of the A.C. Act nor any other provision of the A.C. Act exclude the applicability of S.14 of the Limitation Act to applications under S.34(1) of the A.C. Act. Nor will the proviso to S.34(3) exclude the application of S.14, as S.14 is not a provision for extension of period of limitation, but for exclusion of certain period while computing the period of limitation. Having regard to S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, S.14 of that Act will be applicable to an application under S.34(1) of the A.C. Act. Even when there is cause to apply S.14, the limitation period continues to be three months and not more, but in computing the limitation period of three months for the application under S.34(1) of the A.C. Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is excluded, provided the proceeding in the wrong court was prosecuted bona fide, with due diligence.” 15. Apart from this, we have come across a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Others, 2010 (2) KLT SN 34 (C. No. 43) SC : (2010) 5 SCC 23 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the special limitation prescribed under S.125 of the Electricity Act, 2003. S.125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 reads thus: “125. Appeal to Supreme Court - Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.” 16. On a reading of the said provision, it is clear that a person aggrieved by any decision of the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Electricity Act, 2003 is to prefer an appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the appellate Tribunal to him. There the proviso enables the Apex Court to condone delay of 60 days on showing sufficient cause. After considering various judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court and various High Courts with regard to the limitation with specific reference to Ss.5 and 29 of the Limitation Act, it was held that whenever there is a special limitation prescribed under a special statute, that is clearly an exclusion as contemplated under S.29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. 17. Paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the judgment reads thus: “25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to S.125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. Proviso to S.125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Ss.111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression “within a further period of not exceeding 60 days” in the proviso to S.125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Ss.111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts (S.145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction. 27. It is thus evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and provisions contained in Ss.4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.” 18. So also, yet another judgment in Om Prakash vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, 2010 (3) KLT Supp. So also, yet another judgment in Om Prakash vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, 2010 (3) KLT Supp. 120 (SC) : JT 2010 (9) SC 162, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider Ss.5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act visavis S.13(b) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and held as follows in paragraph 17 of the said judgment: “17. Section 13B is a power given to a Non-Resident Indian owner of a building to obtain immediate possession of a residential building or scheduled building when required for his or her use or for the use of any one ordinarily living with and dependent on him or her. The right has been limited to one application only during the life time of the owner. S.18A(2) of the aforesaid Act provides that after an application under S.13B is received, the Controller shall issue summons for service on the tenant in the form specified in Schedule II. The said form indicates that within 15 days of service of the summons the tenant is required to appear before the Controller and apply for leave to contest the same. There is no specific provision to vest the Rent Controller with authority to extend the time for making of such affidavit and the application. The Rent Controller being a creature of statute can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power.” 19. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others, 2008 (1) KLT SN 62 (C. No. 65) SC : (2008) 3 SCC 70 held that S.35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would override the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act. Paragraph 8 of the judgment reads thus: “8. xxx xxx xxx The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days’ time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of S.35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of S.5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days’ period.” 20. In yet another decision in Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, (2013) 10 SCC 765 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized the need for strict compliance with the statutory scheme and held that it is not permissible to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds if statute does not permit the same. Taking into account the facts, circumstances and law involved in the case before us, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Tribunal, refusing to condone the delay in excess of the period prescribed under the proviso to R.8(3) and the affirmation of the same by the learned Single Judge is correct and no interference is called for.” 20. Therefore, it can be seen that the contention advanced by the learned Government Pleader that the petitioner should be relegated to seek the remedy of appeal cannot be sustained at this distance of time. However, the petitioner has a contention that the measurement of the building was taken without his presence and has forcefully and assertively submitted that the building is only having a plinth area of 2431.79 sq. meters; and therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the said contention is bordering violation of the principles of natural justice. However, the petitioner has a contention that the measurement of the building was taken without his presence and has forcefully and assertively submitted that the building is only having a plinth area of 2431.79 sq. meters; and therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the said contention is bordering violation of the principles of natural justice. Viewed so, it is only fair and proper that the matter be remitted to the Tahsildar for giving the petitioner an opportunity to participate in the measurement to be taken by the Tahsildar, and accordingly I do so. 21. In that view of the matter, the petitioner is directed to be present before the Tahsildar, Ottapalam, Ottaplalam Taluk Office, Palakkad District on 19.08.2022 at 11 a.m. The Tahsildar shall take measurement of the plinth area of the building either on the same day or any immediately convenient day in the presence of the petitioner. Till such time, the interim order of stay granted by this Court against Ext.P6 assessment order would continue to be in force and thereafter, the parties would be guided by the decision so taken by the Tahsildar. 22. The writ petition is allowed to the above extent.