JUDGMENT : This intra court appeal under Section 4 of Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 has been filed against an order dated 12.02.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge by which the preliminary notification dated 16.12.2006 and the notification under Section 28(3) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') have been held to be abandoned and lapsed and the writ petition preferred by Respondent No.1 has been allowed. 2. Facts leading to the filing of this appeal briefly stated are that the appellant No.1 is Board constituted under Section 5 of the Act and is engaged in promoting and assisting in the rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries. The appellant also develops the industrial areas and provides industrial infrastructure facilities and amenities in industrial areas. The respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society' for short) is a society established for religious and charitable purposes for the benefit of Christian community. 3. One Nanjappa was the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.100/2 and Sy.No.101/2 measuring 1 Acre and 28 Guntas each, situate at Hoovinayakanahall, Jala Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, who got the aforesaid lands converted, by an order dated 07.02.2004, for non agricultural residential purposes. One Smt. Hanumakka was the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.95/2 measuring 3 Acres. Aforesaid Smt.Hanumakka and her children got the land converted vide orders dated 17.03.2004 and 05.06.2004 for non agricultural purposes. The Society purchased the lands bearing Sy.Nos. 100/2, 101/1 and 95/2 (hereinafter referred to as the lands in question' for short) vide registered sale deeds dated 17.02.2004 and 26.02.2004. 4. Section 28 of the Act deals with acquisition of land. Section 28 of the Act is reproduced below for the facility of reference: 28. Acquisition of land.- (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. Acquisition of land.- (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. (2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired. (3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. (4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect. (5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under subsection (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. (6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. (7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under subsection (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. (8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired. 5. (8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired. 5. The Board was in need of the lands in question as well as several other lands measuring 907.10 Acres for the development and establishment of industries by the Board. Accordingly, a notification under Section 28(1) of the Act was issued on 16.12.2006 and thereafter, final declaration under Section 28(4) of the Act was issued on 10.04.2008. The Society filed a writ petition namely WP No.9176/2008 seeking quashment of notification dated 10.04.2008. The said writ petition was allowed by a bench of this Court by an order dated 17.06.2010 by which the notification dated 10.04.2008 and 09.04.2008 were quashed insofar as it relates to the land in question. However, the Board was granted the liberty to proceed from the stage of notice under Section 28 (2) of the Act and to take a decision after affording an opportunity of hearing to the Society. 6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order the Board issued notices to the Society on 11.10.2010 and thereafter on several dates upto 02.05.2016 the enquiry was concluded. An order dated 02.02.2012 was passed under Section 28(3) of the Act by which objection preferred by the Society to the acquisition of the lands in question was dismissed and the lands in question were directed to be acquired by issuing a notification under Section 28(4) of the Act. 7. The Society filed a writ petition on or about 07.08.2019 in which quashment of the preliminary notification dated 16.12.2006 in respect of the lands in question was sought. The society also sought a writ of mandamus directing the Board not to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Society. The learned Single Judge by an order dated 12.02.2020 inter alia held that the though for issuance of a declaration under Section 28(4) of the Act, no time limit has been prescribed in the statute yet two years period is a reasonable period within which the final declaration is to be issue. Since, the final declaration has not been issued within a period of two years therefore, the preliminary notification as well as the land acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed. Since, the final declaration has not been issued within a period of two years therefore, the preliminary notification as well as the land acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed. The learned Single Judge accordingly held that the preliminary notification dated 16.12.2006 and the notification dated 02.05.2016 issued under Section 28(3) of the Act were held to be abandoned and lapsed and the same were quashed. 8. The Board, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order has filed this intra court appeal. A bench of this court by an order dated 15.02.2021 had stayed the order dated 12.02.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge. The board during the pendency of this appeal has issued a notification dated 04.11.2021 under Section 28 (4) of the Act. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the lands in question are not recorded in the name of the Society and therefore, it had no locus to file the petition. It is further submitted that the Society is guilty of protracting the acquisition proceedings as despite issuance of several notices between the period from 11.12.2010 till 30.04.2016, it did not participate in the proceeding pending before the Special Land Acquisition Officer. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in holding that since final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act was not issued within a period of two years therefore, the same had been abandoned/lapsed. It is urged that the time limits prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not apply to the acquisition initiated under the Act and there was no delay on the part of the Board. It is further submitted that a large extent of land measuring 869.01 Acres is required by the Board for the formation of an industrial area and the Society has purchased a small extent of land for construction of a church. It is further submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. In support of the aforesaid submissions P NARAYANAPPA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA (2006) 7 SCC 578 , SLAO, KIADB MYSORE VS ANASUYA BAI DEAD BY LRS. (2017) 3 SCC 313 , HN SHIVANNA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA (SLP CIVIL NO. It is further submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. In support of the aforesaid submissions P NARAYANAPPA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA (2006) 7 SCC 578 , SLAO, KIADB MYSORE VS ANASUYA BAI DEAD BY LRS. (2017) 3 SCC 313 , HN SHIVANNA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA (SLP CIVIL NO. 27380-27397/2013 DATED 13.01.2017), BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS STATE OF KARNATAKA (2018) 9 SCC 122 , JALAJA VS UNION OF INDIA WA 1105/2019 DATED 24.08.2021 and ANANTHASWAMY VS STATE OF KARNATAKA WA 1451/2018 DATED 02.03.2021. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Society has locus to question the land acquisition proceeding. It is further submitted that objections were filed by the Society on 23.10.2010 itself and the delay in concluding the enquiry has not been caused on account of the society. It is further submitted that notification under Section 28(4) of the Act has not been issued within a reasonable time and therefore, the same has rightly been quashed by the learned Single Judge. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on division bench decision in ‘KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER VS. K.H.SHIVANNA AND OTHERS’, W.A.NO.557/2021 DATED 23.03.2022. 11. We have considered the arguments made on both sides and have perused the record pertaining to enquiry produced by learned counsel for the Board. The Supreme Court in M. NAGABHUSHANA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA (2011) 3 SCC 408 it was held that the Act is a self contained code and is a law relating to acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. It was further held that once the proceeding for acquisition of land is initiated under the Act, the provisions under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 do not apply to the acquisition under the Act. The aforesaid decision was relied upon in SLAO, KIADB MYSORE VS ANASUYA BAI DEAD BY LRS. (2017) 3 SCC 313 . Thus, it is evident that the Act is a self contained code and the time limits prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 do not apply in respect of the land acquired under the Act. The aforesaid decision was relied upon in SLAO, KIADB MYSORE VS ANASUYA BAI DEAD BY LRS. (2017) 3 SCC 313 . Thus, it is evident that the Act is a self contained code and the time limits prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 do not apply in respect of the land acquired under the Act. The proceeding under the Act cannot be held to have been lapsed if the award is not passed within a period of two years in view of the timeline prescribed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 12. However, The right to hold the property is a constitutional right which is guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and no citizen can be deprived of his property without following the due process of law. It is well settled legal proposition that where a statute does not provide for time limit for doing an Act, such an Act has to be done within a reasonable time, and what would be reasonable time has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of the Act. [See: 'MEHER RUSI DALAL V UNION OF INDIA', (2004) 7 SCC 362 , 'P.K.SREEKANTAN V P. SREEKUMARAN NAIR', (2006) 13 SCC 574 AND 'K.B NAGUR V UNION OF INDIA', (2012) 4 SCC 483 ]. Therefore, in the facts of the case, we have to ascertain whether the Notification under Section 28(1) of the Act stands vitiated in law on account of the delay caused in issuing the final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act within reasonable time. 13. In the instant case, notification under Section 28(1) of the Act was issued on 16.12.2006 and thereafter a final notification was issued under Section 28(4) on 10.04.2008. The said notification was quashed in a writ petition which was allowed by a bench of this court vide order dated 17.06.2010 and the matter was remitted to the Board to proceed from the stage of Section 28(2) of the Act after affording an opportunity of hearing to the Society. 14. In pursuance of the order passed by this court, notice was issued to the Society on 11.10.2010 and the next date for appearance of the Society was fixed for 23.10.2010. On the said date, the Society appeared and filed objections. Thereafter, on 18.11.2010 since the Society was not present, therefore, the case was adjourned to 18.11.2010. 14. In pursuance of the order passed by this court, notice was issued to the Society on 11.10.2010 and the next date for appearance of the Society was fixed for 23.10.2010. On the said date, the Society appeared and filed objections. Thereafter, on 18.11.2010 since the Society was not present, therefore, the case was adjourned to 18.11.2010. The matter was adjourned between 28.11.2010 till 30.03.2011 on the ground that the Presiding Officer was engaged in another work. The parties did not appear before the Land Acquisition Officer on 19.04.2011, 03.05.2011, 30.05.2011, 25.06.2011, 23.07.2011 and 02.09.2011. Thereafter, on 27.02.2012, the case was adjourned on the request of revenue record holder and on 11.12.2012, the case was adjourned on a prayer being made by counsel for the society. On 20.12.2012, the proceeding were adjourned to 08.01.2013. Thereafter, on 23.01.2013, the case was reserved for orders. On 09.02.2015, the case was adjourned awaiting the report of Development Officer. Thereafter, the order under Section 28(3) of the Act has been passed on 02.05.2016. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a delay in concluding the enquiry initiated at the instance of the society itself solely on account of delay on behalf of the Board. 15. Even though an order under Section 28(3) of the Act was passed on 02.05.2016, the Society maintained a stoic silence and filed a writ petition only on 07.08.2019, in which the order dated 02.05.2016 was not challenged. The prayers made in the writ petition read as under: (i) issue an appropriate writ declaring that the acquisition proceeding initiated vide preliminary notification bearing No. CI.649.SPQ.2007 dated 16.12.2007, issued by the 2nd respondent at Annexure-G, in respect of the petition schedule properties are concerned as lapsed. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the petitioners peaceful possession and enjoyment of schedule property and pass such other orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit, in the interest of justice and equity. Thus, in the writ petition preferred by the Society no challenge was made to the order dated 02.05.2016 passed under Section 28(3) of the Act. The notification under Section 28(4) of the Act was issued on 10.04.2008, which was quashed at the instance of the society itself and thereafter an enquiry was held in which an order was passed on 02.05.2016 rejecting the objections preferred by the Society. The notification under Section 28(4) of the Act was issued on 10.04.2008, which was quashed at the instance of the society itself and thereafter an enquiry was held in which an order was passed on 02.05.2016 rejecting the objections preferred by the Society. Thereafter, only the notification under Section 28(4) of the Act was required to be issued. Therefore, in the facts of the case, it cannot be said that there was any inordinate unexplained delay. 16. The learned Single Judge has quashed the notification dated 16.12.2006 on the ground that the final notification was not issued within the reasonable period of two years. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that at the instance of the society, an enquiry was initiated which remained pending up to the year 2016. Even though rights of the Society in respect of land in question were adjudicated by an order passed under Section 28(3) of the Act on 02.05.2016, yet no challenge was made to the said order in the writ petition. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay cannot be said to be unexplained and inordinate delay. During the pendency of this appeal, a notification under Section 28(4) has been issued on 04.11.2021. 17. So far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the Society in a Division Bench decision of this Court in WA No.557/2021 is concerned, suffice it to say in the said decision, this Court quashed the notification issued under Section 28(1) of the Act on the ground that there was a delay of 14 years in issuing the notification under Section 28(4) of the Act which was not explained. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the Society in the facts of the case. So far as submission that Society has no locus to challenge the proceeding for acquisition of land is concerned, it is noteworthy that order dated 17.06.2010 passed in W.P.No.9176/2008 has attained finality and pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Board has conducted the enquiry. Therefore, the aforesaid contention does not deserve acceptance. In the instant case, the delay caused in issuing the notification under Section 28(4) has been explained and the same is not inordinate. Therefore, the aforesaid contention does not deserve acceptance. In the instant case, the delay caused in issuing the notification under Section 28(4) has been explained and the same is not inordinate. In any case, large chunks of land has been acquired for establishment of an industrial area and therefore, no interference is called for, at the instance of the society which owns a small piece of land. In view of preceding analysis, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed.