ORDER : R.DEVDAS J. Though notice sent to respondent No.3 Gram Panchayat is awaited, having regard to the fact that for deciding the case on hand, the presence of the third respondent may not be necessary, therefore, with the consent of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned HCGP, the matter is taken up for Final Disposal. 2. The petitioner who was elected as the Adhyaksha of the third respondent-Gram Panchayat on 04.02.2021 is before this Court, aggrieved of the impugned meeting notice dated 13.05.2022 issued by the second respondent-Assistant Commissioner, Harapanahalli, Vijayanagar District. 3. A representation dated 11.05.2022 is said to have been given by 15 members of the Gram Panchayat to the Assistant Commissioner, requesting for holding a meeting to consider motion of No-Confidence against the Adhyakasha. The Assistant Commissioner, having satisfied himself as to the requirement contemplated under Rule 3 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Motion of No-Confidence Against Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayat) Rules, 1994, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ for the sake of brevity) issued the impugned notice dated 13.05.2022, fixing the meeting for consideration of No-Confidence on 01.06.2022. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the meeting notice falls short of 15 clear days as contemplated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules and therefore, on that ground alone, the impugned meeting notice is required to be quashed and set aside. In this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks to place reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Smt.Roopa Vs. The State of Karnataka, rep. by the Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayat Raj and Others, reported in ILR 2019 KAR 1373. Learned Counsel submits that this Court has taken note of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of C.Puttaswamy Vs. Smt.Prema reported in AIR 1992 KAR 356 , wherein it was held that the Rules governing the procedure of a motion of No Confidence against Adhyaksha and Upadhyakasha of the Gram Panchayat (earlier Mandal Panchayat) are mandatory in nature. In that context, Rule 3(2) of the Rules, 1994, fell for consideration before this Court in the case of Smt.Roopa (supra) and it was held that the provisions are mandatory in nature and deficiency if any, are not curable. 5. In that context, Rule 3(2) of the Rules, 1994, fell for consideration before this Court in the case of Smt.Roopa (supra) and it was held that the provisions are mandatory in nature and deficiency if any, are not curable. 5. The learned Counsel, however, submits that the other grounds raised in the writ petition, such as there being no allegation as contemplated under subsection (2) of Section 49 of The Karnataka Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, may not survive for consideration, since Sub-rule (2) of Section 49 which was inserted by Act No.44 of 2015 with effect from 25.02.2016 was omitted by subsequent amendment Act No.49 of 2020 and deemed to have come into effect from 31.03.2020. 6. After notice was issued to the respondents and the learned HCGP was directed to secure the original records to ascertain as to when the impugned notice was despatched or sent by the Assistant Commissioner and when it was received by the petitioner, the learned HCGP has furnished the original records. 7. On perusal of the original records, it is evident that the notice dated 16.05.2022 was personally served on the petitioner on 17.05.2022. The petitioner has acknowledged receipt of the notice by affixing her signature in the acknowledgement form along with the other members of the Gram Panchayat. All the signatures are also identified by the Panchayat Development Officer of the Gram Panchayat. The original records were shown to the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the petitioner accepts the fact that the notice dated 16.05.2022 was served on the petitioner on 17.05.2022 personally. The records would also show that the meeting notice was also sent through Registered Post Acknowledgement Due on 18.05.2022. It is the contention of the petitioner that she received the notice by RPAD on 20.05.2022. 8. Having accepted the fact that the petitioner received the meeting notice on 17.05.2022, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that having regard to the mandatory provision contained in the second part of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules, 1994, which contemplates fifteen clear days notice, it is submitted that there is noncompliance of the requirement of the Rules. Learned Counsel submits that having regard to the decision in Smt.Roopa (supra), the date on which the notice was served on the petitioner is required to be excluded and similarly the date on which the meeting is scheduled to be held is also to be excluded, in order to meet the requirement of sub-rule (2). Learned Counsel submits that 15 clear days notice would contemplate exclusion of the date on which the notice was served and the date on which the meeting is scheduled to be held. In that view of the matter, it is submitted that notice of 14 days is given to the petitioner and therefore this Court should hold that there is noncompliance of the requirement of the Rules, when there is deficiency of providing 15 clear days notice and therefore, the impugned meeting notice is required to be quashed and set aside. 9. Per contra, the learned HCGP seeks to place reliance on Venkataram and Another Vs. The Assistant Commissioner, Kolar SubDivision, Kolar District, reported in 2010 (5) Kar.L.J. 76 which is a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court. 10. Learned HCGP submits that in paragraph 13 of the decision, it has been held that the notice envisaged for making No-Confidence motion is directory in nature and violation of the same does not vitiate the proceedings. It was held that the date of receipt of notice is not a determining factor, but, the date of giving notice is to be considered for reckoning the period of notice. It was held that the words used in sub-rule (2) is ‘giving of 15 clear days notice’ and ‘not the service of notice’. Having regard to the decision in Venkatram’s case, the learned HCGP submits that the provisions contained in Rule (3) are not mandatory in nature and they are only directory and even if there is any shortfall, it is held to be a curable defect. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks to place reliance on Jai Charan Lal Anal Vs. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks to place reliance on Jai Charan Lal Anal Vs. State of U.P.and Others reported in AIR 1968 SC 5 to contend that in somewhat similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that since the provision considered therein requires the District Magistrate to ‘send’ by registered post not less than seven clear days notice, the crucial requirement is the date of despatch of the notice and not the date when which the notice was received. However, the learned Counsel submits that unlike the provision which fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in sub-rule (2) the word used is “give” and not “send”, as found in the provision. 12. Heard the learned Counsels and perused the petition papers, including the original records. 13. As regards the question as to whether the provisions contained in the Rules are mandatory or directory in nature, this Court need not be detained any further. Since the full bench of this Court in the case of C.Puttaswamy (supra) considered similar provisions contained in Section 47(3) of the Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats & Nyaya Panchayats Act, 1983, having analysed the provisions contained in Section 47(3) of Act, 1983 and Rule 3(2) of the Rules, this Court in the case of Smt.Roopa (supra) has held that there cannot be any doubt with regard to either the expression or phraseology used in these two Sections/Rules to arrive at a conclusion that they are in parimateria. It was therefore held in Smt.Roopa that the provisions contained in the Rules are mandatory in nature and not directory. The decision of the Full Bench has not been noticed in the case of Venkatram (supra). 14. One factual difference which was pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, which may require further consideration, is that having regard to the mandatory nature of the provision of the Rules, there may be a deficiency of one day and therefore this Court is required to consider as to whether there is 15 clear days notice as provided in the Rule. No doubt, in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Charan Lal Anal (supra), the emphasis in the provision which fell for consideration therein was the use of the word “send” by registered post and whereas in the present context, in the place of the usage of the word ‘send’, what is found in the Rule is the usage of the word ‘give’. To that extent, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is right in his submission that since the terminology used in sub-rule (2) is that the Assistant Commissioner shall “give” 15 clear days notice to the members of the Gram Panchayat, the notice sent to the petitioner through RPAD, having been sent on 18.05.2022 and the petitioner receiving the same on 20.05.2022, it can be clearly held that it does not fulfill the requirement of the Rule of 15 clear days notice. However, since it is not disputed having regard to the original records being furnished to this Court that the notice dated 16.05.2022 was personally served to the petitioner on 17.05.2022, this Court is required to consider the applicability of the principles enshrined in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Charan Lal Anal (supra). 15. The definition of the word “give” as found in P.Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon Fifth Edition is “make another the recipient of something; bestow gratuitously”. It is also provided that the word “given” or “giving a notice” means not only giving a notice, but it indicates when it is received. In the present context, it is clear that the petitioner was given the notice and he received the same personally on 17.05.2022. But the requirement of the Rule is 15 clear days notice. Again, in the Law Lexicon mentioned above, the words ‘clear days’ is defined as ‘if a certain number of clear days be given for the doing of any act, the time is to be reckoned exclusively, as well of the first day as the last’. But the requirement of the Rule is 15 clear days notice. Again, in the Law Lexicon mentioned above, the words ‘clear days’ is defined as ‘if a certain number of clear days be given for the doing of any act, the time is to be reckoned exclusively, as well of the first day as the last’. “Clear days” as used in a statute requiring the Court to allow three clear days in a criminal case to intervene between the verdict and the rendition of the judgment, mean “days exclusive of the day the verdict was rendered and the day upon which judgment should be pronounced…….” “Where the term “clear days” is used, its effect is to exclude also the last day. It is therefore clear, as provided in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3, while computing the period having regard to the usage of the word “clear days”, the two days viz., the date on which notice is given to the petitioner and the date on which the meeting is scheduled, are required to be excluded for the purpose of calculation of 15 clear days notice. This, is commensurate with the declaration of law made at the hands of the Full Bench in the case of C.Puttaswamy, wherein it has been held that the provisions of the Rules are mandatory in nature. On facts, therefore, it has to be held that there is noncompliance of 15 clear days notice. 16. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the notice issued by the second respondent-Assistant Commissioner falls short of the requirement of the Rule and consequently, the impugned meeting notice cannot be sustained. 17. Consequently, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER i) The writ petition is allowed. ii) The impugned meeting notice dated 13.05.2022 at Annexure ‘B’ is hereby quashed and set aside. iii) Needless to observe that the members of the third respondent-Gram Panchayat are free to move the Assistant Commissioner seeking motion of No-Confidence against the petitioner in accordance with law and the Assistant Commissioner shall also consider such motion or representation which could be given at the hands of the members of the Gram Panchayat in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly.