ORDER : 1. By way of instant petition, petitioner has assailed order dated 10.11.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. in Criminal Case No. 13/2 of 2018, whereby the direction has been issued to register an FIR against petitioner and others for commission of offences under Sections 465 and 471 of IPC. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the petition are that respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Complainant’) filed a complaint before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan with a prayer to direct the SHO, Police Station, Nahan under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, ‘the Code’) to investigate the allegations made in the complaint in accordance with law. 3. Complainant alleged in the complaint that petitioner was her real brother. A civil suit in respect of immoveable property filed by the petitioner against the complainant and her another brother named Gulam Sabir was pending before the Civil Court at Nahan. Petitioner had failed to obtain interim injunction in the said suit. His appeal against order of rejection of interim application was also dismissed. Having failed to obtain favourable order, petitioner conspired with two other persons named as co-accused in the complaint and manufactured a forged document in the shape of compromise deed dated 14.04.2012. On the basis of aforesaid averments, a prayer was made as noticed above. 4. On 05.05.2018, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan ordered the registration of complaint and called for report under Section 202 of the Code. On receipt of the report of police, the matter was put up for consideration on 30.07.2018. After adjourning the matter on various dates, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate taking notice of the fact that the dispute had roots in a suit pending before the Civil Court, the complaint was transferred to the Court seized of the suit, to decide the same in exercise of its powers as Judicial Magistrate First Class. 5. Thereafter, from 27.09.2018 till 13.08.2019 except for adjourning the matter, from time to time, no effective orders were passed. On 13.08.2019 and 04.09.2019, after hearing the parties, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan directed the complainant to lead preliminary evidence. Again, the matter was repeatedly adjourned for enabling the complainant to lead preliminary evidence, but no evidence was led. 5. Thereafter, from 27.09.2018 till 13.08.2019 except for adjourning the matter, from time to time, no effective orders were passed. On 13.08.2019 and 04.09.2019, after hearing the parties, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan directed the complainant to lead preliminary evidence. Again, the matter was repeatedly adjourned for enabling the complainant to lead preliminary evidence, but no evidence was led. Lastly, on 24.03.2021 another adjournment was granted to the complainant to lead evidence with direction to close the evidence of the complainant on the next date, in case she failed to produce the same. The matter was adjourned to 28.04.2021. Record reveals that the matter was not taken up on 28.04.2021 and was taken up on 12.07.2021. Yet again, the matter was listed for complainant’s evidence and was adjourned to 24.08.2021. On 24.08.2021, an order to the following effect was passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, which was un-connected with the previous proceedings held in the matter: “24.08.2021 Present: Sh. Navneet Aggarwal, Adv. Learned vice counsel for the applicant. The present application has been filed under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for getting an FIR registered against the accused. Till date no status report has been called from the police. Let status report regarding this complaint be called from the concerned SHO for 10.11.2021. A copy of the complaint be sent to the concerned SHO and his report be called back for 10.11.2021.” 6. Finally, on 10.11.2021, the impugned order came to be passed in following terms: - “10.11.2021 Present:- Sh. Navneet Aggarwal, Ld. Vice counsel for the applicant. 1. The present application has been filed by the applicant under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., 1973 for getting an FIR registered for the commission of offences punishable under Section 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC. 2. Status report against this application was called from the police against this application. On perusal of the status report and this application, it is seen that offences punishable under Section 465 and 471 of IPC are made out. 3. In these circumstances, I deem it fit to direct the SHO of the concerned Police Station to register an FIR for the commission of offences punishable under Section 465 and 471 of IPC and proceed as per law. Copy of this order, application and the status report be sent to the concerned Police Station for compliance. 4. 3. In these circumstances, I deem it fit to direct the SHO of the concerned Police Station to register an FIR for the commission of offences punishable under Section 465 and 471 of IPC and proceed as per law. Copy of this order, application and the status report be sent to the concerned Police Station for compliance. 4. Application stands disposed of accordingly. After due completion, be consigned to records.” 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case carefully. 8. While examining the legality and propriety of impugned order dated 10.11.2021, it will be necessary to examine various facets of Magistrate’s jurisdiction vested under the code, once he is in receipt of a complaint. 9. On receipt of complaint from complainant, learned trial Court as Judicial Magistrate First Class, had more than one options to proceed. It either could have taken the cognizance and by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 190 of the Code, would have further proceeded under Chapter XV thereof or alternatively could have without taking the cognizance, simply issued directions for registration of the case to the police. Thus, the course to be followed depends upon whether the Magistrate on receipt of complaint applies his mind to deal with the matter as complaint case or without such application disposes of the same directing police to register a case and investigate in accordance with law. In case Magistrate adopts first course it necessarily implies the taking of congnisance and to draw further proceedings as per mandate of Chapter XV of the Code. 10. At this stage, it will be gainful to notice following observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gopal Das Sindhi and others vs. State of Assam and another, reported in AIR 1961 SC 986 : 9. When the complaint was received by Mr Thomas on August 3, 1957, his order, which we have already quoted, clearly indicates that he did not take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint but had sent the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code to the Officer Incharge of Police Station Gauhati for investigation. Section 156(3) states “Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such investigation as abovementioned”. Mr Thomas was certainly a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 190 and he was empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint. Section 156(3) states “Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such investigation as abovementioned”. Mr Thomas was certainly a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 190 and he was empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint. He, however, decided not to take cognizance but to send the complaint to the police for investigation as Sections 147, 342 and 448 were cognizable offences. It was, however, urged that once a complaint was filed the Magistrate was bound to take cognizance and proceed under Chapter XVI of the Code. It is clear, however, that Chapter XVI would come into play only if the Magistrate had taken cognizance of an offence on the complaint filed before him, because Section 200 states that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of the filing of the complaint. We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word ‘may’ in Section 190 to mean ‘must’. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offence is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so, then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code. Numerous cases were cited before us in support of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. Certain submissions were also made as to what is meant by “taking cognizance”. It is unnecessary to refer to the cases cited. If he does so, then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code. Numerous cases were cited before us in support of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. Certain submissions were also made as to what is meant by “taking cognizance”. It is unnecessary to refer to the cases cited. The following observations of Mr Justice Das Gupta in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee [ AIR 1950 Cal 437 ] : “What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a) of the Cr PC, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter —proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” were approved by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh [ 1951 SCR 312 ] . It would be clear from the observations of Mr Justice Das Gupta that when a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. The observations of Mr Justice Das Gupta above-referred to were also approved by this Court in the case of Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal [ 1960 (I) SCR 93 ] . The observations of Mr Justice Das Gupta above-referred to were also approved by this Court in the case of Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal [ 1960 (I) SCR 93 ] . It will be clear, therefore, that in the present case neither the Additional District Magistrate nor Mr Thomas applied his mind to the complaint filed on August 3, 1957, with a view to taking cognizance of an offence. The Additional District Magistrate passed on the complaint to Mr Thomas to deal with it. Mr Thomas seeing that cognizable offences were mentioned in the complaint did not apply his mind to it with a view to taking cognizance of any offence; on the contrary in his opinion it was a matter to be investigated by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The action of Mr Thomas comes within the observations of Mr Justice Das Gupta. In the circumstances, we do not think that the first contention on behalf of the appellants has any substance. 11. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid exposition that the cognizance is stated to be taken by the Magistrate on complaint if the mind is applied and decided to be deal with the same under Chapter XV of the Code. 12. Coming to the facts of the case, initially the order passed on 05.05.2018 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan and then the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan on 04.09.2019, clearly implies that learned Magistrates had applied their mind and had thereafter proceeded to take preliminary evidence of complainant. It clearly denotes that learned Magistrate had taken cognizance and had then proceeded further firstly by calling for report under Section 202 of the Code and on subsequent occasion requiring the complainant to lead preliminary evidence. 13. Once, such course had been adopted, could the same be subsequently deviated is the question that arises for determination in the instant petition? The answer has to be in negative for the reason that for an offence, cognisance is not permitted to be taken more than once. In the case in hand the Magistrate had taken the cognisance as noticed above and then by way of impugned order direction was issued to Police under section 156(3) of the Code. The answer has to be in negative for the reason that for an offence, cognisance is not permitted to be taken more than once. In the case in hand the Magistrate had taken the cognisance as noticed above and then by way of impugned order direction was issued to Police under section 156(3) of the Code. Now, if the proceedings are allowed to be followed in terms of impugned order, the Police will file its report under section 173 of the Code before the Magistrate requiring him to take cognisance and then the Magistrate will be confronted with a situation where he may decide either to take cognisance or not. If he decides to take cognisance on Police report it will amount to taking cognisance second time and if he decides otherwise, it may not be permissible under section 362 of the Code. 14. After having taken cognisance, the only course available to learned trial Court was to deal with the matter as complaint case. The stage to issue direction/order under section 156(3) of the Code had passed. It could have been issued in the first instance, after receiving the complaint and before taking the cognisance. The following observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Lakshminarayna Reddy Vs V Narayana Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672 can be referred in the context of issue being discussed: 13. It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words “may take cognizance” which in the context in which they occur cannot be equate d with “must take cognizance”. The word “may” gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. 14. 14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by “taking cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190 (1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV to the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning to Section 190(1)(a). It, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. 15. This position of law has been explained in several cases by this Court, the latest being Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal [ (1973) 3 SCC 753 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 521] . 16. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction, to send a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence — whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session — to the police for investigation under Section 156(3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. 16. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction, to send a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence — whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session — to the police for investigation under Section 156(3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. The distinction between a police investigation ordered under Section 156(3) and the one directed under Section 202, has also been maintained under the new Code; but a rider has been clamped by the first proviso to Section 202(1) that if it appears to the Magistrate that an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session has been committed, he shall not make any direction for investigation. 17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption : “Information to the Police and their powers to investigate”; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading: “Of complaints to Magistrates”. The power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the precognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or chargesheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section an investigation “for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. 15. In light of above discussion, impugned order dated 10.11.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan in Criminal Case No. 13/2 of 2018 is set aside with directions to learned trial court to decide the matter as complaint case in terms of provisions of Chapter XV of the Code. Since the disposal of matter has already been delayed inordinately, learned trial court is expected to expedite the early disposal of the matter. 16. The petition is accordingly disposed of, so also all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. Parties are directed to appear before learned trial court on 21.11.2022.