Sujit Kumar, S/o. Sri Jitendra Kumar Dubey v. State of Jharkhand
2022-06-20
RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 12th November 2014 passed in W.P(S) No.6225 of 2009. 2. Writ petition was filed against the order of dismissal from service dated 10th August 2009. It appears that during pendency of the writ petition the appeal preferred by the delinquent police constable was dismissed and the same came to be challenged before the writ Court by filing I.A No. 3705 of 2013. 3. The appellant was served charge-memo dated 6th April 2009 on an allegation of unauthorized absence from duty. Before that, by an order dated 1st April 2009 the appellant was placed under suspension without subsistence allowance. It appears that the departmental proceeding was conducted in absence of the appellant and the enquiring officer submitted a report on 8th June 2009 holding the charge levelled against the appellant proved. The disciplinary authority issued 2nd show-cause notice dated 11th June 2009. Observing that inspite of opportunity granted to him, the appellant did not submit any explanation against the proposed punishment of dismissal from service, the disciplinary authority passed the final order on 10th August 2009. Against the aforesaid order of dismissal from service, the appellant filed an appeal on 22nd September 2009 which was dismissed by the appellate authority by an order dated 29th January 2010. 4. Mr. Ravi Kerketta, the learned State counsel has tried to support the writ Court's order submitting that the conduct of the appellant who is a part of the disciplined force has rightly not been condoned by the employer. 5. In the order dated 12th November 2014, the writ Court has observed as under : “The petitioner, admittedly, is a member of a disciplined force. He was granted leave for 10 days, but subsequently after lapse of period of leave, he had not reported to the office. From the record, it appears that the petitioner has taken a plea that he was suffering from Tuberculosis and he was under treatment of the Doctor and as such it was beyond his control to report to the office. This plea of the petitioner does not appear to be reasonable because Tuberculosis is not such a disease that he cannot be able to report to the competent authority regarding his illness.
This plea of the petitioner does not appear to be reasonable because Tuberculosis is not such a disease that he cannot be able to report to the competent authority regarding his illness. Moreover, the point has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the disciplinary authority has passed the order without hearing him, which is not correct because the appellate authority after discussing the entire aspect of the matter, which the petitioner had raised in the memorandum of appeal, has passed the appellate order confirming the order of the disciplinary authority. This Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappraise the evidence and cannot disturb the facts and the findings given by the disciplinary authority, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Raj Kishore Yadav & Anr. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 , at Paragraph-4 that "it is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and consequent order of punishment of dismissal from services should not be disturbed.” 6. On a glance at the writ Court's order, we gather that even though the defence set up by the appellant before the appellate authority was not properly considered by the appellate authority but this error in the decision making process was overlooked by the writ Court. The appellant took a specific plea before the appellate authority that from time to time he forwarded medical certificates which were not considered by the disciplinary authority and the domestic enquiry against him illegally continued in his absence. 7. This plea has been dealt with by the appellate authority in paragraph no. 3 of the order dated 29th January 2010. 8. Paragraph no.
7. This plea has been dealt with by the appellate authority in paragraph no. 3 of the order dated 29th January 2010. 8. Paragraph no. 3 of the order dated 29th January 2010 reads as under : ^^3- vH;kosnd dk dguk gS fd os le;≤ ij vkosnu ,oa fpfdRlk izek.k i= Hkstrs jgs gSaA lekns"Vk us vius dafMdkokj fVIi.kh esa mYys[k fd;k gS fd ;s euekuhiwoZd vius dk;Z ls 187 fnuksa rd yxkrkj vuqifLFkr jgsA bUgsa vko';drkuqlkj dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr gksdj viuh ifjfLFkfr dks j[krs gq, vodk'k dk vkxzg djuk pkfg, Fkk ijUrq dk;kZy; ds vuqns'kksa dks utjvankt djrs jgsA** English Translation : “3. The petitioner says that he continued to send applications and medical certificates from time to time. The Commandant has mentioned in his para-wise notes that he was continuously absent from his duty for 187 days without any reason. He should have come to the office and made request for leave as per requirement showing reasons but he continued to ignore the instructions of the office.” 9. The aforesaid observations of the appellate authority do not indicate that the stand taken by the appellant was found incorrect. The department did not controvert that the delinquent employee continued to transmit medical certificates from time to time, or, that he set up a false defence of illness. The medical certificates submitted by the appellant are not found forged and fabricated and, moreover, he had proceeded on leave on due approval of the competent authority. 10. Mr. Rajiv N. Prasad, the learned counsel for the appellant who has raised manifold submissions to challenge the order of dismissal from service would submit that there were other substantial grounds raised before the appellate authority which, however, were not addressed by the appellate authority and only on the basis of the comments provided by the disciplinary authority the appeal preferred by the appellant has been dismissed. 11. It is well settled that the powers of judicial review conferred on the writ Courts are not that of appellate authority but are confined only to decision-making process. The writ Court would interfere in the matter where the departmental authority committed manifest error of record or procedure. 12. In “B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India” (1995) 6 SCC 749 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
The writ Court would interfere in the matter where the departmental authority committed manifest error of record or procedure. 12. In “B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India” (1995) 6 SCC 749 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 12th November 2014 passed in W.P(S) No. 6225 of 2009 is set aside. The appellate order dated 29th January 2010 is also quashed and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority for a fresh decision in the matter. The appellate authority shall issue notice to the appellant within a period of six weeks fixing a date for appearance of the appellant before it who may file his written submissions. The appeal preferred by the appellant shall be disposed of on or before 20th October 2022. 14. L.P.A No. 79 of 2015 stands allowed, in the aforesaid terms.