JUDGMENT : R.M. Chhaya, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 12.07.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.11366 of 2000 rejecting the writ petition, the original petitioner has preferred this intra Court Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. Following facts emerge from the record of this appeal : 2.1. The appellant (hereinafter described as “original petitioner”) was appointed as Clerk in District School Board on 16.6.1954 and was directed to resume the duty on 17.6.1954. As recorded by the learned Single Judge by an order dated 23.08.1956, the original petitioner was asked to work against the post of Senior Clerk and from 18.12.1956 the original petitioner was directed to work as an Accountant by way of stopgap arrangement. As the record unfolds upon passing School Board Accountant Clerks’ Examination, the original petitioner was promoted as a Senior Clerk on 09.09.1957 in the grade of Rs.100-8-140 w.e.f. 20.08.1957. By an order dated 28.07.1961 passed by the Administrative Officer, District School Board services of the original petitioner came to be terminated w.e.f. 29.07.1961. The said order of dismissal was challenged by the original petitioner by way of filing an appeal before the Tribunal under Section 24(2) of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947. By an order dated 20.12.1961 the Tribunal was pleased to dismiss the appeal filed by the original petitioner. The original petitioner challenged the said order of Tribunal before the State Government, however the same was not entertained. As the record indicates the original petitioner preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 40 of 1963 and prayed for declaration, that the termination of the original petitioner is null and void and original petitioner be treated in service without any break and also prayed for a decree of Rs.3652.89 towards arrears of pay. By an order dated 30.11.1964 Regular Civil Suit came to be dismissed, against which, the original petitioner preferred Regular Civil Appeal before the District Court, which was ordered to be dismissed on 13.1.1966. By an order dated 30.11.1964 Regular Civil Suit came to be dismissed, against which, the original petitioner preferred Regular Civil Appeal before the District Court, which was ordered to be dismissed on 13.1.1966. The said orders were challenged by the original petitioner before this Court by way of filing Second Appeal No.450 of 1966, which came to be allowed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 15.2.1972 and this Court was pleased to quash and set aside the order in original passed by the trial Court as well as Appellate Court and was pleased to remand the matter back to the trial Court. On such remand, the trial Court decided the suit vide judgment and order dated 29.10.1975 and decreed the suit in favour of the original petitioner. The said judgment was challenged by the respondent by filing Regular Civil Appeal No.92 of 1975, which came to be dismissed vide judgment and order dated 6.5.1978. The respondent herein filed Second Appeal before this Court being Second Appeal No.55 of 1980 and this Court vide judgment and order dated 17.8.2000 was pleased to dismiss the Second Appeal. After the said order, the original petitioner issued notice dated 9.10.2000 through his advocate and demanded the accrued dues, which was denied by the respondent by reply dated 17.10.2000. Thereafter, the original petitioner filed present petition being Special Civil Application No.11366 of 2000 and inter alia prayed as under : “(A) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction declaring the non-payment of accrued dues of pay, pension and gratuity – illegal and be further pleased to direct the respondent to make the payment of full back wages, pay and pension and gratuity with 18%interest till payment; (B) Pending admission and final hearing of this petition, be pleased to direct the respondent to deposit the amounts of back wages/pays, pension and gratuity with interest with the Hon’ble Court and be further pleased to permit the petitioner to withdraw the same upon such conditions as may be deemed just and appropriate. (C) Be pleased to pass such other and further reliefs, as the facts and circumstances of the present case may require. (D) Be pleased to grant the cost of this petition.” During the pendency of this petition, the original petitioner passed away on 26.01.2008 and thereafter his heirs were brought on record. (C) Be pleased to pass such other and further reliefs, as the facts and circumstances of the present case may require. (D) Be pleased to grant the cost of this petition.” During the pendency of this petition, the original petitioner passed away on 26.01.2008 and thereafter his heirs were brought on record. The learned Single Judge considering the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent and relying upon para 6 thereof was pleased to reject the petition, against which, present appeal is filed. 3. Heard Ms. Mini Nair, learned advocate for the appellants – original petitioner and Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent. 4. Both the learned counsel for the respective parties have also submitted their written submission which are taken on record in the appeal and same is made basis of this judgment and order. 5. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hindustan Times Limited vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1998 SC 688 and in the case of State of Uttaranchal and Anr vs. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi reported in AIR 2008 SC 2026 , it was contended by Ms. Nair learned counsel for the original petitioner that the learned Single Judge has passed an order without giving any reason and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.1. Referring to the Regular Civil Suit No. 40 of 1963, it was contended by Ms. Nair that the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge (SD), Palanpur is confirmed right upto Second Appeal before this Court. It is however contended that while passing the said order this Court rejected the cross objection filed by the original petitioner claiming seniority, promotion, pension, gratuity, LTC, salary etc. on the ground that the reliefs raised in the Cross Objections are beyond the scope of the suit. It was contended by Ms. Nair that once the suit is decreed fully in favour of the original petitioner and is declared to treat in service, without any break, he is entitled to all consequential benefits and it was therefore, contended that the petition filed by the original petitioner deserves to be allowed with consequential benefits along with interest. It was contended by Ms. Nair that once the suit is decreed fully in favour of the original petitioner and is declared to treat in service, without any break, he is entitled to all consequential benefits and it was therefore, contended that the petition filed by the original petitioner deserves to be allowed with consequential benefits along with interest. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs. Bharat Electronics Ltd reported in (1981) 3 SCC 225 , it was contended by Ms. Nair that once the termination of service is held to be void ab-initio and inoperative there is no question of granting reinstatement because there is no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that he continues to be in service will all consequential benefits. It was also contended by Ms. Nair that while exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court has jurisdiction and power to grant appropriate relief in the interest of justice and even if the said reliefs are not given in earlier proceedings. It was also contended that the original petitioner was driven to the Court on account of the illegal action of the respondent, which came to be set aside and thus the respondent should have automatically granted him the relief instead of raising technical grounds and driving him to the Court once again. Ms. Nair has also relied upon following judgments to buttress her argument that once dismissal order was declared null and void, the original petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits as if the original petitioner continued in service. (1) (2015) 4 SCC 458 (2) (1984) 3 SCC 384 (3) 1997 (1) GLR 720 (4) 1988 SCC Online Kar 207 (5) 1994 SCC Online Del 769. 5.2. Referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Ors. vs. Mangalam Timber Products Limited reported in (2004) 1 SCC 139 and in the case of Hathisinh Madhavsinh vs. Amarsinh Parvatsinh and Ors reported in 1994 (2) GLR 417, it was contended by Ms. Nair that the State cannot take advantage of its own wrong/ omission and it was contended that it is well settled principle of law that no party can be penalized by inaction or omission or default on the part of any authority or government authority. Nair that the State cannot take advantage of its own wrong/ omission and it was contended that it is well settled principle of law that no party can be penalized by inaction or omission or default on the part of any authority or government authority. Relying upon the dates and events, it was contended by Ms. Nair that present petition is not barred by limitation and that execution petition was filed by the original petitioner in time. Ms. Nair also submitted that the original petitioner was enrolled as an advocate in the year 1970 however, there is nothing on record to show that he established himself as a competent lawyer. Relying upon the judgment in the case of Mayank Desai vs. Sayaji Iron and Engg Co Limited reported in 2011 (5) GLR 4330 , it was contended that the Court granted 2.50 lakhs towards compensation and in the present case the original petitioner has worked for more than 7 years. On the aforesaid grounds, Ms. Nair contended that the appeal deserves to be allowed. 6. Per contra, Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent has opposed the present appeal. Relying upon the chronology of events as mentioned herein above, it was contended by Mr. Munshaw that the original petitioner joined the legal profession as advocate in the year 1970. Referring to the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 29.10.1975, it was contended by Mr. Munshaw that no order for backwages and other monetary benefits was passed. Mr. Munshaw also contended that the original petitioner issued legal notice for recovery of Rs.1,07,216/- towards arrears of salary on 31.3.1979 and later on filed Special Civil Suit No.56 of 1979 before the Civil Court for recovery of Rs.1,12,514/- towards arrears of salary. Mr. Munshaw also contended that the original petitioner preferred Execution Petition No. 75 of 1979 for recovery of Rs.1,29,563/- in pursuance to the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.40 of 1963. It was contended by Mr. Munshaw that no prayer for monetary benefits were made before the trial Court. It was also pointed out by Mr. Munshaw that the original petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.12.1992. Mr. Munshaw contended the original petitioner having enrolled as advocate in 1970 and after making representation for backwages and consequential benefits and ultimately filed writ petition. Mr. Munshaw that no prayer for monetary benefits were made before the trial Court. It was also pointed out by Mr. Munshaw that the original petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.12.1992. Mr. Munshaw contended the original petitioner having enrolled as advocate in 1970 and after making representation for backwages and consequential benefits and ultimately filed writ petition. Mr. Munshaw extensively referring to the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent contended that all the facts on record including that there was no order of the Civil Court in any proceedings regarding backwages and monetary benefits were passed, were pointed out to the learned Single Judge. It was also contended that this Court dismissed the Cross Objection with a specific observation that cross objections raised by original petitioner were beyond the scope of suit. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Second Appeal No. 55 of 1980, it was contended by Mr. Munshaw that this Court observed that reliefs which were not prayed for could not have been granted by the Court below. It was therefore, contended that while rejecting the cross objections preferred by the original petitioner and while rejecting the Second Appeal No. 55 of 1980 filed by the District Panchayat, this Court has concluded the issue qua backwages and other monetary benefits by way of holding that the same were not prayed for before the trial Court and there was no reason to grant the same. It was contended that the learned Single Judge while rejecting the writ petition has considered all these aspects and more particularly facts relating to the earlier proceedings including order passed in Second Appeal which came to be disposed on 17.8.2000 and only because it is not part of record of the writ petition, it cannot be said that the same was not considered by the learned Single Judge. It was contended by Mr. Munshaw that pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court an amount of Rs.24287/- being salary from 1967 to 1972 can only be paid to the original petitioner. On the aforesaid grounds, it was contended by Mr. Munshaw that the appeal being meritless, deserves to be dismissed. 7. No other and further submissions/ contentions/ grounds have been raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties. 8. On the aforesaid grounds, it was contended by Mr. Munshaw that the appeal being meritless, deserves to be dismissed. 7. No other and further submissions/ contentions/ grounds have been raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties. 8. It is a matter of fact that the present writ petition was filed by the original petitioner who was by then a practicing advocate since 1970 for the benefits of pay, pension, gratuity and full backwages with 18% interest till payment. The learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with the Second Appeal No. 55 of 1980 has observed that no order of reinstatement has been made by either of the Courts below nor plaintiff is ordered to pay backwages except sum of Rs.3652.80 which was demanded in the plaint. While considering the Cross objection the learned Single Judge has observed thus : “Mr. Jhaveri has drawn my attention to an application made by him (he is not aware whether the said application is numbered or not, or whether it was earlier decided or not) under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a permission to lodge cross-objections. Under the said Cross Objections, the plaintiff has sought a relief that in view of the declaration given by the courts below, the plaintiff should be held to be entitled to seniority, promotion, pension, gratuity, LTC, salary with due increase thereof and other benefits etc. on the basis of his being in continuous service. The cross objections raised in obviously beyond the scope of the suit. The reliefs which were not prayed for could not have been granted by the court below. The cross objection is, therefore, dismissed, if already not dismissed.” It appears from the record that thus decree which became final in 2000 was executable only for the limited prayers which were prayed for and prayers for which the suit came to be decreed. It appears that by a fresh notice dated 9.10.2000 at Annexure J to the writ petition demands were raised qua prayers which are prayed for in the present petition, which was replied by the respondent District Panchayat. Even in affidavit in reply filed by the respondent, as rightly relied upon by the learned Single Judge, respondent has averred thus : “6. Even in affidavit in reply filed by the respondent, as rightly relied upon by the learned Single Judge, respondent has averred thus : “6. It is humbly stated that the petitioner who has never worked after 1961 and as such was enrolled as an advocate in the year 1970 is not entitled to any relief of reinstatement with back wages or any other consequential benefits pursuant to the quashing of the termination order dated 28.8.1961 by the trial Court. It is submitted that by way of filing the present petition, the petitioner is trying to overcome the defect or lacuna of the earlier proceedings as well as to come out the clutches of the judgment and decree of the trial Court, confirmed by the appellate court. It is always open for the petitioner to approach the trial Court if permissible for the execution of the decree but by way of the present petition the petitioner cannot pray for the relief which is denied to him after more than 40 years without putting any work.” 9. Thus, original petitioner having been dismissed in the year 1961 was never back in service and in fact in the year 1970 he started practice as an advocate. In the suit, there were no prayers prayed, which are prayed for in the writ petition and indirectly original petitioner made an attempt to not only execute the decree but to get over the relief other than which were sought for and / or prayed for in the suit. It appears that this Court even in writ petition being Special Civil Application No.4124 of 2008 filed by the original petitioner challenging the order dated 2.11.2007 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Palanpur below Exh.36 and 48 in Darkhast Application No. 18 of 1993 observed thus : “4. Considering the above, when the Executing Court has dismissed aforesaid applications by observing that Executing Court cannot go beyond decree, in that case, it cannot said that the impugned order is in any way illegal and / or the learned Trial Court has committed any error. Under the circumstances, there is no substance in the present Special Civil Application, same requires to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed, Notice discharged.” 10. Under the circumstances, there is no substance in the present Special Civil Application, same requires to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed, Notice discharged.” 10. Referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hindustan Times Limited (supra) and in the case of State of Uttaranchal and Anr (supra), it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge has not given any reason may be brief but learned Single Judge has relied upon the relevant para of the affidavit which is uncontroverted and therefore, it cannot be said that no reason are given and hence both the judgments would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In facts of this case, the judgment in the case of Mohan Lal (supra), in the case of Hathisinh Madhavsinh (supra) and in the case of State of Orissa and Ors (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case as it cannot be said that the respondent District Panchayat as a State has taken advantage of its own wrong. Having failed to get relief in execution petition and having failed in cross objections filed in Second Appeal No. 55 of 1980 merely by issuing a fresh notice, the original petitioner cannot be permitted to pray for the reliefs which was denied to him, after more than 40 years without putting any work, as rightly contended by the respondent in their affidavit in reply and rightly relied upon by the learned Single Judge while rejecting the writ petition. 11. At this juncture, it also deserves to be noted that during the course of the final hearing, an attempt was made to see that the original record may be looked into and amount due and payable be paid to the heirs of the original petitioner, Mr. Munshaw, learned counsel for the respondent has placed on record a communication dated 11.4.2022 which shows that an amount of Rs.24287/- was payable to the original petitioner between 1967 to 1972 and except that amount, heirs of the original petitioner would not be entitled to any amount. However, at the same time, this Court is of the opinion that if an amount of Rs.24287/- was due and payable to the heirs of the original petitioner, respondent ought to have paid the same as per the interim order passed by this Court. However, at the same time, this Court is of the opinion that if an amount of Rs.24287/- was due and payable to the heirs of the original petitioner, respondent ought to have paid the same as per the interim order passed by this Court. Respondents are therefore, directed to pay the amount of Rs.24,287/- to the heirs of the original petitioner within a period of four weeks from today. If the said amount is not paid within a period of four weeks from today, same shall entail interest at the rate of 6% pa from the date of this judgment till its actual payment. On merits, we are in total agreement with the observations made by the learned Single Judge and learned Single Judge having rightly relied upon the relevant para 6 of the affidavit in reply. No interference on merits is called for except aforesaid direction of payment of Rs.24,287/-. Judgment of the learned Single Judge stands confirmed. With the aforesaid directions, appeal is disposed of accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs. In view of disposal of Appeal, Civil Application stands disposed of.