ORDER : Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 26.2.2021 passed by Director-General of Police, Himachal Pradesh, whereby he though upheld the order dated 4.1.2020 passed by IGP Southern Range, Shimla whereby punishment of permanent forfeiture of three years of service passed by Superintendent of Police 31.1.2020 was upheld but taking lenient view modified the punishment of permanent forfeiture of three years to 1 year of service, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, praying therein for following relief. “That in view of the above mentioned facts and circumstances, the enquiry report, impugned orders dated 31.1.2020, 4.8.2020, 26.2.2021 whereby the petitioner was found guilty may kindly be quashed and set aside and whereby, the penalty imposed upon the present petitioner may kindly be quashed and set aside.” 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record, are that in the year 2019, while petitioner was posted as Station House Officer Police Station Parwanoo, a case FIR No. 12, dated 12.1.2019, under S. 307, 323, 506 and 34 IPC was registered on the complaint of one Shri Sukhvinder Singh, at Police Station Parwanoo, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. Since an audio clip purportedly revealing conversation between the petitioner, the then Station House Officer, Police Station Parwanoo and an unknown person surfaced, wherein petitioner was allegedly telling one Sandeep Chauhan to settle the matter before expiry of period of police remand of accused Deepak, matter came to be reported to the police by the complainant Sandeep Chauhan, as such, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Southern Range, Shimla directed Additional Superintendent of Police Shri Praveer Thakur vide order dated 30.3.2019 (Annexure P-1) to conduct an enquiry. Aforesaid officer, after having conducted enquiry submitted report to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Southern Range, Shimla, wherein though Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the petitioner, the then Station House Officer Police Station Parwanno had made telephonic call to Sandeep Chauhan but no proof was found with regard to demand of money/bribe, if any, by the petitioner. Annexure P-2. 3. On the basis of aforesaid preliminary enquiry report, Deputy Inspector-General of Police vide order dated 14.5.2019, ordered to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner/delinquent official. by Superintendent of Police through a GO as per provisions of Rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. 4. Annexure P-2. 3. On the basis of aforesaid preliminary enquiry report, Deputy Inspector-General of Police vide order dated 14.5.2019, ordered to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner/delinquent official. by Superintendent of Police through a GO as per provisions of Rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. 4. Superintendent of Police, Shimla after having received aforesaid order from the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Southern Range, Shimla, further delegated enquiry to Deputy Superintendent of Police, Theog. Aforesaid officer, in compliance to order issued by Superintendent of Police, Shimla, served the petitioner with charge sheet on 26.9.2019, Annexure P-4, alleging therein, while the petitioner was posted as Station House Officer Police Station Parwanoo, he persuaded the complainant to settle the matter with the accused. Petitioner filed reply to the aforesaid charge sheet but interestingly, Inquiry Officer after having received reply, again served charge sheet upon the petitioner dated 26.9.2019 (Annexure P-4) containing similar set of allegations, as were contained in the initial charge sheet. After completion of evidence of prosecution, petitioner was afforded opportunity to lead evidence, which was availed by him, but after completion of proceedings, Inquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of charges framed against him and accordingly recommended disciplinary action (page 64). On the basis of aforesaid Inquiry Report, Superintendent of Police, Shimla straightaway, proceeded to pass order (Annexure P-7) imposing penalty of forfeiture of three years service permanently. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, petitioner filed an appeal before Inspector-General of Police, Southern Range, Himachal Pradesh but vide order dated 4.8.2020,(Annexure P-8) same was dismissed. Since the petitioner was not satisfied with the order in appeal passed by appellate authority, he preferred a revision petition against the same before Director-General of Police, Himachal Pradesh, who though upheld the findings of misconduct against the petitioner but taking lenient view, reduced the penalty of forfeiture of three years service to forfeiture of one year service permanently. 6. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the impugned order. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record. 8. 6. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the impugned order. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record, vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned order, following questions have fallen for adjudication before me: a. Whether charge sheets dated 3.6.2019 (Annexure P-6) served upon the petitioner could be issued by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Theog, especially when Appointing Authority/Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner is/was Deputy Inspector-General of Police? b. Whether the Inquiry Officer could issue second charge sheet dated 26.9.2019 (Annexure P-4) stating therein that since all charges framed against the petitioner stand proved, he may file reply or adduce evidence in support of his claim? c. Whether the penalty of forfeiture of one year service permanently imposed upon the petitioner commensurates with the offence alleged to have been committed by him? 9. Before exploring answer to the aforesaid questions, this court finds it necessary to deal with question whether the court is competent to interfere in disciplinary proceedings, while exercising power vested in it under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 10. By now it is well settled that High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the Disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority, but that does not mean that in no circumstance court cannot interfere. The power of judicial review is available to the High Court under the Constitution and it can interfere with the conclusions reached in the disciplinary proceedings if it has reason to believe that there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case Kuldeep Singh versus Commissioner of Police and others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , wherein it has been held as under:- “6. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case Kuldeep Singh versus Commissioner of Police and others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , wherein it has been held as under:- “6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority. 7. In Nand Kishore vs. State of Bihar, (1978) 3 SCC 366 , it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which, and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would be perverse. 8. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rama Rao. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rama Rao. 1964 (2) LLJ 150 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain, 1969 (2) LLJ 377 and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 518 . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.” 11. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that normally the High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded in enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse findings and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. “14. Similar view has been taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others (2009) 2 SCC 570 , wherein it has been held as under:- “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence”. 23. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence”. 23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” 12. If the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court are read in its entirety, there is no complete ban for this Court to interfere in disciplinary proceedings while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but before exercising this jurisdiction this court is to satisfy itself whether enquiry report submitted by enquiry officer, which ultimately came to be made basis by Disciplinary authority to impose penalty upon the delinquent officer, is based upon evidence or there is no evidence to support the finding. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that no charge sheet could be served by Deputy Superintendent of Police Theog, District Shimla, because, he was neither the appointing authority nor the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, same could only be served by Deputy Inspector-General, being Appointing Authority/Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that no charge sheet could be served by Deputy Superintendent of Police Theog, District Shimla, because, he was neither the appointing authority nor the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, same could only be served by Deputy Inspector-General, being Appointing Authority/Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner. He further submitted that similarly, penalty of forfeiture of three years of service could not be imposed by Superintendent of Police, rather same could be imposed by Deputy Inspector-General, being Appointing Authority./Disciplinary Authority. While placing reliance upon rules 13.2 and 14 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Disciplinary Authority is only competent to issue charge sheet to the delinquent officer and no order can be passed by such authority, if the enquiry is not conducted as per procedure prescribed under rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. 14. While inviting attention of this court to judgment rendered by this court in case Vinoj Kumar Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, CWPOA No. 4250 of 2019, decided on 1.9.2022, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the issue raised in this petition is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment, wherein this court, taking note of various judgments passed by Hon'ble Apex Court, has held that Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority is only competent to serve charge sheet and thereafter, penalty can also be imposed only by the Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority. 15. Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned Additional Advocate General, while supporting the impugned action of the respondents, contended that since disciplinary proceedings were initiated on the orders passed by Disciplinary Authority/competent authority, mere fact with regard to issuance of charge sheet by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Theog, shall not render entire disciplinary proceedings vitiated. He further submitted that bare perusal of material available on record clearly reveals that serious allegations were leveled against the petitioner, who telephonically shared details of investigation with the accused and persuaded complainant to settle the dispute with accused, as such, does not deserve any leniency. 16. Bare perusal of the material available on record reveals that the petitioner was serving as Station House Officer, Police Station Parwanoo, when complaint with regard to misconduct was lodged against him and Deputy Inspector-General, Southern Range was his Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority. 16. Bare perusal of the material available on record reveals that the petitioner was serving as Station House Officer, Police Station Parwanoo, when complaint with regard to misconduct was lodged against him and Deputy Inspector-General, Southern Range was his Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority. Though, Deputy Inspector-General, Southern Range Shimla having taken note of complaint received against the petitioner, appointed Additional Superintendent of Police to conduct preliminary enquiry but after having received the report of preliminary enquiry, directed Superintendent of Police to conduct disciplinary proceedings. Superintendent of Police, without there being authority vested in him, delegated the matter to Deputy Superintendent of Police Theog, who without being competent authority, served charge sheet upon the petitioner, accusing therein the petitioner of misconduct. Precise case of the petitioner as is reflected in the pleadings and further canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner is that no charge sheet could be issued by Deputy Superintendent of Police rather, same ought to have been issued by Deputy Inspector-General, Southern Range. 17. At this stage, learned Additional Advocate General, while inviting attention of this court to order of appointment issued in favour of the petitioner, contended that the appointing authority of the petitioner was Superintendent of Police, however, having perused aforesaid communication, this court finds that when the petitioner was offered appointment as a Sub Inspector, appointment order was issued by Superintendent of Police. It is not in dispute that at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, petitioner was Sub Inspector and at that time, as per clause 12.1 of Punjab Police Rules, Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority in his respect, though was Superintendent of Police, but since at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector, Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority in respect of said post is Deputy Inspector-General of Police. 18. While making this court peruse Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid provision deals with authorized punishment. As per same, No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. It would be apt to take note of Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules.. “16.1. Authorized punishments. - (1) No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. As per same, No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. It would be apt to take note of Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules.. “16.1. Authorized punishments. - (1) No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. (2) The departmental punishments mentioned in the second column of the subjoined table may be inflicted on officers of the various ranks shown in the heading Nos. 3 to 6, by the officers named below each heading in each case, or by any officer of higher rank :- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sr. No. Departmental punishment Inspectors Sergeants, Sub Inspectors and Assistant Sub Inspectors Head constables Constables 1. Dismissal xx xx xx xx 2. Reduction xx xx xx xx 3. Stoppage of increment or forfeiture of approved service for increment Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police; Superintendent of Police; Assistant Inspector-General of Police (Traffic) Superintendent of Police Commandants of Punjab Armed Police. Also Deputy Superintendent ((Administrative), Government Railway Police, and (as regards Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors only), Deputy Superintendent-incharge of Railway Police Sub-Division and Officer-in-charge of the Police Recruits Training Centre, Amritsar, Deputy Superintendent of Police Punjab Armed Police, Lahaul and Spiti and Officer-in-charge of the Constables Training Centre Superintendent of Police, Commandants of Punjab Armed Police also Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore, Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police, Deputy Superintendent-incharge of Railway Police Sub-Division and Officer-in-charge of the Police Recruits Training Centre, Amritsar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Punjab Armed Police, Punjab Armed Police, Lahaul and Spiti and Officer-in-charge of the Constable Training Centre. Superintendent of Police Commandants of Punjab Armed Police, Deputy Superintendent (Administrative) Government Railway Police, Deputy Superintendent-incharge of Railway Police Sub-Divisions, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore; Officers-in-charge of Recruits Training Centres; Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahaul & Spit, District and Officer-in-charge of the Constables Training Centre xx xx (3) For the purposes of these rules the term “major punishment” shall be held to mean any authorized punishment of reduction, withholding of increments, forfeiture of approved service, dismissal and every judicial conviction on a criminal charge.” 19. He also invited attention of this court to rule 13.2 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, to submit that Disciplinary Authority is only competent to issue charge sheet against petitioner and no if enquiry is not conducted in the mode and manner as provided in rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules is sustainable in the eye of law. 20. It is quite apparent from aforesaid discussion that at time of serving charge sheet, Deputy Inspector-General Southern Range was Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority of the petitioner as such, charge sheet if any could have been only issued by the said authority, but in the case at hand, as discussed above, charge sheet not once but twice came to be served by Deputy Superintendent of Police Theog, who was otherwise not competent to do the same. Question, whether an officer other than Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority could issue charge sheet stands discussed by this Court in Vinoj Kumar Sharma supra. Relevant paras of the same are reproduced herein below: “20. Now, question which remains to be decided at this stage is “whether procedure followed by Superintendent of Police, who is/was Disciplinary authority of the petitioner after putting petitioner under suspension is as per law or aforesaid authority adopted procedure unknown to the law?”. As has been taken note hereinabove, Superintendent of Police being Disciplinary authority of the petitioner ought to have issued charge sheet, but in the instant case he delegated such authority to District Inspector, who is subordinate to him. Apart from above, District Inspector being appointed as an enquiry officer in terms of order dated 13.11.2006 (Annexure P-2) passed by Superintendent of Police otherwise could not have issued charge sheet that too on two occasions, rather he being enquiry officer was only to ascertain correctness of the charges framed against the petitioner by way of charge sheet, if any, framed by the Disciplinary authority. However, in the instant case charge sheet was never submitted by Disciplinary authority but such power was delegated to District Inspector, who thereafter in the capacity of enquiry officer conducted disciplinary proceedings in most casual manner. However, in the instant case charge sheet was never submitted by Disciplinary authority but such power was delegated to District Inspector, who thereafter in the capacity of enquiry officer conducted disciplinary proceedings in most casual manner. As per Rule 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules, after framing of charge opportunity is required to be given to the delinquent officer to file reply and in case Disciplinary authority is not satisfied with the reply, it can proceed to appoint an enquiry officer, who with a view to ascertain correctness of the charge shall hold enquiry. Enquiry officer while affording time to prosecution to prove its case would also afford opportunity of cross-examination to the delinquent officer. After recording of evidence enquiry officer would draw enquiry report and shall submit the same to the Disciplinary authority, who after being satisfied with the correctness of the enquiry report would proceed accordingly. Disciplinary authority may agree or disagree with enquiry report but in case it agrees it shall issue notice to the delinquent officer to explain that why penalty proposed be not awarded. Disciplinary authority after having received reply, if any, on behalf of the delinquent officer may pass appropriate orders. 21. In the instant case, no proper procedure appears to have been followed by Disciplinary authority before initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. First of all, no charge sheet could be issued by District Inspector, who subsequently came to be appointed as an enquiry officer. There was no occasion, if any, for enquiry officer to first record evidence and thereafter serve another charge sheet to petitioner, calling upon him to adduce on record evidence, if any, in support of his claim. Rather, he after having recorded evidence of prosecution witnesses ought to have afforded an opportunity to the delinquent officer to cross-examine and lead evidence in defence and thereafter after closure of the evidence should have directly placed the enquiry report before the Disciplinary authority, enabling him/her to pass appropriate orders. Interestingly, in the case at hand enquiry officer served two charge sheets, firstly he served charge sheet dated 27.12.2006 (Annexure P-3) and thereafter ignoring reply to the aforesaid charge sheet filed by the petitioner, recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses and thereafter again served petitioner with another charge sheet dated 10.5.2007 (Annexure P-6), calling upon him to adduce evidence, if any, in support of his case, which procedure is totally unknown to the law. Moreover record reveals that while conducting enquiry pursuant to first charge sheet dated 27.12.2006, no opportunity of cross-examination was granted to the petitioner and as such, he was compelled to write to the Inquiry officer, who subsequently while issuing second charge sheet called upon petitioner to furnish evidence in support of his claim and cross-examine prosecution witnesses. 22. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, first two questions formulated by this Court stand answered with the conclusion that it is only disciplinary authority which can issue charge sheet to the delinquent officer and there is no provision under service jurisprudence to issue two charge sheets that too after appointment of enquiry officer and by the enquiry officer. 23. Though, Mr. Narender Guleria, learned Additional Advocate General while making this Court to peruse the record of enquiry made serious attempt to persuade this Court to agree with his contention that due procedure as prescribed under law was followed by the Disciplinary authority but having scanned entire material available on record, this Court finds no reason to agree with aforesaid submission made by learned Additional Advocate General. His second submission that mere issuance of second charge sheet will not vitiate the inquiry proceedings, is also liable to be rejected because it is not only factum of issuance of second charge sheet, which has weighed with this Court while answering first two questions but very first action of Superintendent of Police, who is disciplinary/ appointing authority of petitioner, to delegate the power of issuance of charge sheet to his subordinate i.e. District Inspector, which is not permissible under law, has persuaded this Court to agree with the submission of the petitioner. 24. Rule 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules clearly provides that whenever departmental proceedings are held against the Government servant under Rule 14 and Rule 15, Disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the charge sheet. Rule 14(4) clearly mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. Rule 14(4) clearly mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. Procedure as provided under Article 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules is strictly in conformity with the provisions contained under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and as such, if same is not followed, it would be violative of provisions contained under Section 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, which clearly provides that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following fair procedure in which he/she is to be given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Since in the case at hand, aforesaid procedure has been not followed, entire departmental proceedings stands vitiated and cannot be allowed to sustain. 25. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and Ors v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351 (alongwith connected matters), which reads as under: “40. Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India ensures that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service can be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The overwhelming importance and value of Article 311(1) for the civil administration as well as the public servant has been considered stated and re- stated, by this Court in numerous judgments, since the Constitution came into effect on 19th January, 1950. Article 311(2) ensures that no civil servant is dismissed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. To effectuate the guarantee contained in Article 311(1) and to ensure compliance with the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2), the Government of India has promulgated CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. “41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein were initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule 14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the charge sheet. “41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein were initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule 14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the charge sheet. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. We are unable to interpret this provision as suggested by the Additional Solicitor General, that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge sheet can be drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Such a charge sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance Minister. 45. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules provides for holding a departmental enquiry in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Clause (8) also makes it clear that when the Finance Minister is approached for approval of charge memo, approval for taking ancillary action such as appointing an inquiry officer/presiding officer should also be taken. Clause (9) in fact reinforces the provisions in clause (8) to the effect that it is the Finance Minster, who is required to approve the charge memo. Clause (9) relates to a stage after the issuance of charge sheet and when the charge sheeted officer has submitted the statement of defence. It provides that in case the charge sheeted officer simply denies the charges, CVO will appoint an inquiry officer/presiding officer. In case of denial accompanied by representation, the Chairman is to consider the written statement of defence. It provides that in case the charge sheeted officer simply denies the charges, CVO will appoint an inquiry officer/presiding officer. In case of denial accompanied by representation, the Chairman is to consider the written statement of defence. In case the Chairman comes to a tentative conclusion that written statement of defence has pointed out certain issues which may require modification/ amendment of charges then the file has to be put up to the Finance Minster. So the intention is clearly manifest that all decisions with regard to the approval of charge memo, dropping of the charge memo, modification/ amendment of charges have to be taken by the Finance Minister. 51. Ms. Indira Jaising also submitted that the purpose behind Article 311, Rule 14 and also the Office Order of 2005 is to ensure that only an authority that is not subordinate to the appointing authority takes disciplinary action and that rules of natural justice are complied with. According to the learned Addl. Solicitor General, the respondent is not claiming that rules of natural justice have been violated as the charge memo was not approved by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, according to the Addl. Solicitor General, the CAT as well as the High Court erred in quashing the charge sheet as no prejudice has been caused to the respondent. 52.In our opinion, the submission of the learned Addl. Solicitor General is not factually correct. The primary submission of the respondent was that the charge sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority is without authority of law and, therefore, nonest in the eye of law. This plea of the respondent has been accepted by the CAT as also by the High Court. The action has been taken against the respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS(CCA) Rules which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The term “cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge sheet”. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalized upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in the case of P.V.Srinivasa Sastry & Ors. Vs. Comptroller and Auditor General & Ors., has held that Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, at the same time it is pointed out that “4……However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority.” It is further held that “4…….Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holders of a civil post.” 26. Though, this court is of the definite view that entire disciplinary proceedings was vitiated on account of framing of charge sheet by incompetent officer but even if it presumed that disciplinary proceedings has acted in accordance with law, penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner does not commensurate with the offence alleged to have been committed by him. In the case at hand, charge against the petitioner was that he remained willfully absent from duty. This court having scanned entire charge sheet vis-à-vis evidence led on record, has no hesitation to conclude that petitioner by way of placing medical record attempted to prove that he had rendered immobile on account of slip disc but interestingly department for no plausible reason rejected all the documents and without calling upon the petitioner to explain the documents rendered on record by him proceeded to dismiss him from service. Penalty of dismissal imposed by Disciplinary authority cannot be said to be justifiable in the case at hand, rather same being conscious shocking deserves to be interfered with. 21. Having scanned facts as well as other material available on record and the law on the subject taken into consideration, entire disciplinary proceedings stand vitiated on account of framing of charge sheet by an incompetent officer and as such, is not sustainable in the eye of law. 21. Having scanned facts as well as other material available on record and the law on the subject taken into consideration, entire disciplinary proceedings stand vitiated on account of framing of charge sheet by an incompetent officer and as such, is not sustainable in the eye of law. Even if it is presumed that Disciplinary Authority has acted in accordance with law, penalty of forfeiture of one year permanent service does not commensurate with the offence allegedly committed by petitioner. In the case at hand, charge against the petitioner was that he unauthorizedly shared information with accused and persuaded him to settle the matter with the complainant but evidence led on record if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests that prosecution was able to prove factum with regard to demand/taking of bribe if any by the petitioner. Penalty of forfeiture of three years reduced to one year, cannot be said to be justifiable in the case at hand, otherwise being conscious shocking, deserves to be interfered with. 22. It is the classic case, wherein not only Disciplinary authority failed to apply its mind rather Appellate authority as well as revisional authority in stereotype manner passed the order without bothering to look into the correct position of law as well as ground taken in the appeal and the revision. Both the authorities without there being any application of mind and without there being cogent and convincing reason rejected the appeal and revision and upheld the order of forfeiture of service with permanent effect passed by Superintendent of Police, who otherwise also is no the Disciplinary Authority or the Appointing Authority, which is otherwise not sustainable being based upon the charge sheet furnished by incompetent office. 23. Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi (supra), has categorically held that departmental enquiry is a quasi-judicial proceedings. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function and as such, it has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. 23. Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi (supra), has categorically held that departmental enquiry is a quasi-judicial proceedings. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function and as such, it has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. If the orders passed by the Appellate authority and revisional authority are read juxtaposing each other, there is nothing to suggests that both the authorities while considering appeal and revision filed by the petitioner made an attempt if any, to look into the legal grounds raised by the petitioner qua the competence of Deputy Superintendent of Police to issue charge sheet and thereafter procedure followed by him while conducting disciplinary proceedings. 24. In the case at hand, the Superintendent of Police, who issued impugned penalty order, thereby ordering forfeiture of three years of service of the petitioner, permanently, is/was not the Disciplinary Authority/appointing authority of the petitioner, since the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector at the relevant time, and Disciplinary Authority/appointing authority in respect of post of Inspector, as per Rule 12.1. of Chapter 12, “Appointments and Enrolments” of Punjab Police Rules”, the appointing authority of Inspectors is the Deputy Inspector- General of Police, as such, Superintendent of Police had no power or authority to issue the impugned order of penalty. It may be apt to take note of Rule 12.1 supra, which is reproduced as under: 1 2 3 Class of Government servants Authority to whom the power of appointment is delegated The extent of the delegation Inspector Deputy Inspectors-General of police, Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police, Assistant Inspector General, Provincial Additional Police, (designated as Commandant, Provisional Additional Police), and the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Traffic) Full powers subject to rules governing the conditions of service as defined in Police Rules 25. Further S.88 of the Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007, provides as under: “88. Disciplinary Penalties: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and in the manner as may be prescribed, any Gazetted Police Officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or above, can award any of the major penalties to any Non-Gazetted police Officer for whom such Gazetted Officer is an appointing authority.” It is evident from the above provision that an appointing authority can only impose major penalty. In the case at hand, penalty imposed vide impugned order is definitely a ‘major penalty’ as defined in Rule 16.1 (3), which has been reproduced above, thus, it is only the ‘appointing authority’, which can impose major penalty upon an employee. 26. Thus, in view of the detailed discussion made above, it is clear that the penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner, by an authority, which is neither disciplinary nor appointing authority in respect of the post held by the petitioner at the relevant time, i.e. Inspector and even charge sheet has been issued by an officer, who was not competent to do so, thus, the entire disciplinary proceedings stand vitiated and therefore, there is sufficient scope for this court to exercise power of judicial review/scrutiny in the case at hand. 27. Consequently in view of detailed discussion made above, as well as law taken into consideration, this court finds merit in the petition and same is allowed. Impugned orders, Annexures P-7, P-8 and P-9, are quashed and set aside. All pending applications also stand disposed of.