JUDGMENT : 1. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the notice of No-confidence issued by the respondent No.2 for holding the No-confidence Motion on 04.02.2022. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the proceedings holding it to be violative of Rule 3 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat ke President and Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994. According to the petitioner, the proceedings initiated by the respondent No.3 does not reflect acknowledgement of the receipt of the complaint from the Panchas, nor is there any particular date provided so far as receipt of the complaint by the respondent No.2 is concerned, which is required as per Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules of 1994. 3. The further contention of the petitioner is that the further requirement under Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 3 of convening a meeting within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the respondent No.2 also has not been followed in this case and a meeting now has been proposed to be convened much beyond the 15 days period provided under Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 3. 4. Perusal of the pleadings with the writ petition particularly the proceedings that have been drawn by the respondent No.2, it reflects that the order sheet for the first time was recorded on 19.01.2022. In the said proceedings also there is no reflection of the date and time on which the respondent No.2 had received the notice from the Panchas for initiating appropriate proceedings under Section 21(3) of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam. Further, even if 19.01.2022 is accepted to be the date on which the Sub-Divisional Officer has received the notice from the majority of the Panchas for initiating the No-Confidence Motion, even then 15 days time had to be adhered to from 19.01.2022. In the instant case, the No-Confidence Motion is said to be held on 04.02.2022, which is much beyond 15 days even from 19.01.2022. 5. In the instant case, the No-Confidence Motion is said to be held on 04.02.2022, which is much beyond 15 days even from 19.01.2022. 5. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of Sub-Rule (2) and Sub- Rule (3) of the aforesaid Rules of 1994, which for ready reference is quoted hereinunder: “(2) The prescribed authority, on receiving the notice under sub-rule (1) shall sign thereon a certificate stating the date on which hour and at which the notice has been given to him and shall acknowledge its receipt. (3) On receiving the notice under sub-rule (1) the prescribed authority shall satisfy himself about the admissibility of the notice with reference to sections 21(3), 28(3) and 35(3), as the case may be. On being thus satisfied, he shall fix the date, time and place for the meeting of the Gram Panchayat, Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat, as the case may be, which shall not be more than fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The notice of such meeting specifying the date, time and place thereof shall be caused to be dispatched by him through the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat or Chief Executive Officer of the Janpad or Zila Panchayat, as the case may be, to every member of the Panchayat concerned seven days before the meeting.” 6. The plain reading of the aforesaid provision of law clearly gives an indication that on receipt of a notice by the competent authority, there has to be a certificate issued stating the date and time on which at which the notice was received by him and there also has to be an acknowledgment of receipt issued in this regard. Prima facie this fact seems to be missing from the proceedings as the petitioner has furnished the certified copy of the entire proceedings drawn by the respondent No.2. 7. Further, Sub-Rule (3) also emphatically mandates that the Prescribed Authority shall fix the date, time and venue for the meeting on the No- Confidence Motion within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the Prescribed Authority. If 19.01.2022 is the date on which the Sub- Divisional Officer has received the notice from the Panchas, even then the date of meeting is beyond 15 days as is otherwise required under the Rules of 1994. 8. If 19.01.2022 is the date on which the Sub- Divisional Officer has received the notice from the Panchas, even then the date of meeting is beyond 15 days as is otherwise required under the Rules of 1994. 8. True it is that the petitioner has not been able to show any prejudice that would be caused to the petitioner's interest upon the meeting being held beyond 15 days, but the fact remains that under Rule 3 of Rules of 1994, the requirement of law at the first instance is to hold a meeting within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice. In the instant case, the date and time of receipt of notice itself is missing and thereafter from the date the respondent No.2 initiates the proceedings, the meeting proposed to be held is also beyond 15 days from that. There is no specific reason assigned by the authority concerned, as to why the meeting could not be convened within 15 days to justify his action for deviating from the requirement of law. 9. The Government counsel opposing the petition referring to a judgment of this Court in the case of “Gopi Lal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh & others” WPC No. 3723/2019 argued that, since the petitioner has failed to show any prejudice therefore only because a meeting is ordered to be convened beyond 15 days the proceedings cannot be vitiated. The entire action on the part of the respondent No.2 hence cannot be held to be bad. Learned State counsel submits that once when the Sarpanch has lost his confidence of the other Panchas, in the public interest at large he should not be permitted to remain in office on the post of Sarpanch as that would be detrimental to the society at large. 10. Perusal of the said judgment in the case of “Gopi Lal Sahu” (supra), when compared to the proceedings in the present case, it reflects that in the said matter the proceedings had already been concluded and thereafter the action was subjected to challenge before the Collector, the Commissioner and later it travelled to the High Court. But in the instant case it is only at the initial stage that the petitioner has approached this Court highlighting the proceedings to be in contravention to the Rules itself. The meeting has till date not been held. But in the instant case it is only at the initial stage that the petitioner has approached this Court highlighting the proceedings to be in contravention to the Rules itself. The meeting has till date not been held. In that event, if the technical error so far as the requirement under Sub-Rule (2) and Sub- Rule (3) of the Rules of 1994 which is prima facie visible from the proceedings to have been deviated, it is something which should be cured immediately. This Court is therefore of the opinion that it is at this juncture that this Court can and should interfere with the proceedings so that the defects, if any, can be cured and a proceeding strictly in accordance with law is followed. 11. The view taken by this Court in the case of “Gopi Lal Sahu” (supra) cannot be accepted in a straight jacket manner. The requirement under Sub-Rule (2) and Sub-Rule (3) cannot be given a go by without any justifiable reasons and as a matter of routine. Once when the statutes prescribes a mechanism of convening a meeting, which specific time limits being granted for issuance of notice and also for holding of the meeting, the authorities concerned are required to adhere to the said requirement of the statutes. Only on the basis of the judgment in the case of “Gopi Lal Sahu” (supra) the requirement of law cannot be diluted. 12. Given the fact that the entire proceedings is only at the issuance of notice stage, this Court is of the opinion that it would be more appropriate if the matter stands remitted beck to the authorities with liberty to the respondents No.5 to 23 to initiate a fresh proceeding strictly in accordance with the Rules of 1994. The respondents No.2 & 3 also in turn shall abide by the requirement under the Rules for the purpose of holding of the meeting. The impugned notice thus deserves to be and is accordingly set-aside reserving the right of the respondents including the private respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings if they so want afresh in accordance with law. 13. The writ petition therefore stands allowed and disposed of.