JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual quality. I.A. No. 1163 of 2020 2. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 145 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Heard. 4. No counter affidavit has been filed opposing the prayer for condoning the delay. 5. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 6. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1163 of 2020 is allowed and delay of 145 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 80 of 2020 7. The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 13.08.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 532 of 2011, whereby and whereunder, the writ petition has been allowed with a direction upon the respondent State to pay the arrears of salary for the period from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009 within the stipulated period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 8. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder: The writ petitioner was found to be successful in the process of recruitment, in terms of the advertisement being Advertisement No. 1/98. His height was measured at the time of recruitment as 169.5 cm. He was appointed on preferential basis as he was possessing Home Guard Training Certificate. The respondent authorities, on the basis of complaint made by one successful candidate, namely, Bhagwan Mahto, re-measured the height of the writ petitioner, wherein, it was found to be 167.5 cm. The respondent authorities, in consequence of the same, has initiated a disciplinary proceeding by issuing memorandum of charge which ultimately culminated into proving of charge against the writ petitioner of committing the irregularities in the measurement of his height for the purpose of getting appointment as Constable. The Disciplinary Authority, while accepting the finding recorded by the enquiry officer, has inflicted punishment of dismissal from service, vide, order as contained in memo no. 1942 dated 25.08.2001. The Disciplinary Authority, while accepting the finding recorded by the enquiry officer, has inflicted punishment of dismissal from service, vide, order as contained in memo no. 1942 dated 25.08.2001. The writ petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Headquarter, Jharkhand at Ranchi on 06.09.2001 but the same was rejected vide order dated 01.02.2003. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order passed by the Administrative Authority has preferred a writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 which was disposed of vide order dated 05.12.2008, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 25.08.2001, by which, the writ petitioner was dismissed from service, has been quashed by allowing the writ petition. The writ petitioner, thereafter, has filed a representation dated 19.12.2008 for acceptance of his joining. The respondent authorities have allowed the writ petitioner to be reinstated in service but only annual increment was calculated and fixed from 01.05.2001 to 01.05.2008 but no order was passed with respect to arrears of salary. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with such decision of having not passed any order of back wages for the intervening period i.e. from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009, has again preferred a writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 532 of 2011. The respondents have appeared and filed counter affidavit denying the claim by taking the plea that on the basis of the principle of “no work no pay” and as also, since there is no direction by this Court while disposing of the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 about the disbursement of the salary for the aforesaid intervening period, the writ petitioner is not entitled to get the arrears of salary for the said period. The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, has allowed the writ petition with a direction upon the respondents to release the salary for the period from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009 within the period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order, the aforesaid order is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal preferred by the State of Jharkhand. 9. Mr. 9. Mr. Devesh Krishna, learned SC (Mines)-III appearing for the State appellant, has submitted that the writ petitioner is not entitled to get the salary for the period from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009 since he has not discharged duty during the relevant time and as such, the principle of “no work no pay” will be applicable, but, the learned Single Judge without appreciating the aforesaid fact has passed the order of disbursement of salary for the aforesaid period, which is not sustainable in the eyes of Law. It has been submitted that once the writ petitioner has not discharged his duty, he cannot claim his salary as a matter of right, rather, the writ petitioner, although, has been granted benefit of annual increment giving him the continuity in service but so far as the arrears of salary is concerned, the respondent authorities while denying the said claim have taken into consideration the applicability of the principle of “no work no pay.” Learned counsel for the appellants, on the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of Law and as such, the same is fit to be quashed and set aside. 10. Per contra, Mr. Suraj Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent writ petitioner has submitted by referring to the order passed by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003, which was disposed of on 05.12.2008, wherein, the order of termination was quashed by allowing the writ petition which suggests that once the writ petition has been allowed, wherein, the prayer, apart from the order of termination to be quashed, the other relief pertaining to disbursement of arrears of salary has also been made and once it has been allowed, it simply goes to suggest that the writ petitioner has become entitled to get the salary for the intervening period i.e. from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009. It has further been submitted that once the respondent authorities have taken decision while terminating the writ petitioner from service vide order dated 25.08.2001 which being a composite order, since the writ petitioner has been held entitled only to get the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension, which has also been quashed and set aside, meaning thereby, the writ petitioner will be entitled to get the salary after the writ petition having been allowed vide order dated 05.12.2008. Further, submission has been made that once the writ petition has been allowed and the annual increment from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement has been granted by the respondent authority, then there is no stretch of imagination, the arrears of salary for those periods can be withheld. It has further been submitted that it is not a case where the principle of “no work no pay” will be applicable as because the writ petitioner was forced to remain out of service while he was willing to discharge his duty. According to the learned counsel, learned Single Judge on the basis of the aforesaid fact is correct in passing the aforesaid order by allowing the writ petition directing the respondent authorities to release the arrears of salary for the aforesaid period within the stipulated period and as such, the same may not be interfered with. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 12. The fact which is not in dispute in this case that the writ petitioner was appointed in terms of advertisement being Advertisement No. 1/98. It is evident from the advertisement that the minimum required height for a candidate to qualify in the physical examination, is 165 cm. The writ petitioner had participated in the physical examination and his height was recorded by the respondent concerned as 169.5 cm. The measurement of height of the writ petitioner was re-examined, since, a complaint was received by one successful candidate in which the height of the writ petitioner was found to be 167.5 cm. The respondent authorities have issued a show cause notice and thereafter, departmental proceeding has been initiated against him for alleged commission of fraud by manipulating the height in the official record. The respondent authorities have issued a show cause notice and thereafter, departmental proceeding has been initiated against him for alleged commission of fraud by manipulating the height in the official record. The writ petitioner had participated, but, the enquiry officer has found the charge proved. The disciplinary authority has accepted the aforesaid finding and passed the order of dismissal from service vide order dated 25.08.2001. The writ petitioner had preferred an appeal against the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority but the same has also been rejected vide order dated 01.02.2003. The writ petitioner has approached to this Court by filing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003. The case was contested by the State respondent. The writ petition was allowed vide order dated 05.12.2008, whereby and whereunder, the order of punishment dated 25.08.2001 has been quashed. The writ petitioner has submitted a representation thereafter. The respondent authorities have reinstated the writ petitioner in service, as also, granted due increment from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement, as would appear from the order of reinstatement appended as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, but, the arrears of salary for the period from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009 has not been released. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the decision of the authority, wherein, no decision has been taken for disbursement of arrears of salary, has preferred another writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 532 of 2011 praying therein, for issuance of direction upon the respondents to release the arrears of salary for the period from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009. The respondent authorities have contested the case by filing the counter affidavit, wherein, the plea of principle of “no work no pay” has been taken. The learned Single Judge has discarded the contention of the respondent State of Jharkhand, mainly on the basis of the fact that the another Coordinate learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 has also quashed the order of termination of the writ petitioner, but the said order has not been challenged by the State authority. According to the learned Single Judge that the order of termination has been quashed which has not been assailed by the State authority, meaning thereby, the allegation of commission of fraud has not been proved and once the fraud has not been proved and the said order has been accepted by reinstating the writ petitioner in service, the principle of “no work no pay” will not be applicable. The said order is under challenge in the instant intra-court appeal preferred by the respondent State of Jharkhand taking the plea of applicability of the principle of “no work no pay.” 13. Argument has been advanced that once the writ petitioner has not performed his duty, it is not available to him to claim the salary for the aforesaid period but the learned Single Judge since has not considered this aspect of the matter, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of Law. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent writ petitioner has taken the plea by defending the order passed by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the principle of “no work no pay” will not be applicable as because, it is the respondents who have forcefully not allowed the writ petitioner in discharging his duty which has been found by this Court while allowing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003, meaning thereby, the allegation of fraud, basis upon which, the writ petitioner was dismissed from service has not found to be sustainable by this Court and once the allegation of fraud has not been proved and the order of dismissal has been quashed which itself suggests that the writ petitioner was ready to discharge his duty but he was forcefully not been allowed to do it and in that circumstances, the principle of “no work no pay” will not be applicable. 15. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid rival submissions, is proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned order. 16. 15. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid rival submissions, is proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned order. 16. There is no dispute about the fact that the principle of ‘no work no pay’ is applicable in a case where the employee has not discharged his duty but it has got exception and it will not be applicable in a case where the employee was willing to work but had not been allowed to discharge the duty and if such a condition would be there, the principle of no work no pay will not be applicable, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court (three judges) in the case of Union of India and Others vs. K.V. Jankiraman and Others, (1991) 4 SCC 109 , at paragraph 25, relevant passage of which reads as under: “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” Likewise, in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board vs. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689 it has been held at paragraph 34 as hereunder: “34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay.” In appropriate cases, however, a Court of law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering “as if he had worked.” It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.” (Emphasis supplied) Further, in Jasmer Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2015) 4 SCC 458 , at paragraph 21 and 22, it has been held as under: “21.The said relief in favour of the appellant-workman, particularly the full back wages is supported by the legal principles laid down by this Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, wherein the Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member, after considering three-Judge Bench decision, has held that if the order of termination is void ab initio, the workman is entitled to full back wages. 22. The relevant Para of the decision is extracted hereunder: “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra-vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” Thus, it is evident that larger Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. K.V. Jankiraman (supra) has held that although no work no pay is the normal rule, but it has got exception and it will not be applicable in a case where the employee was willing to work but had not been allowed to discharge the duty and if such a condition would be there, the principle of no work no pay will not be applicable. Likewise, in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board vs. C. Muddaiah (supra), similar view has been taken holding therein that an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law, cannot be said to be acceptable. 17. So far as the fact of the given case is concerned, the question which requires to be considered, as to whether the writ petitioner is not entitled to get the arrears of salary for the intervening period i.e. from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009 by making the principle of “no work no pay” applicable? 18. 17. So far as the fact of the given case is concerned, the question which requires to be considered, as to whether the writ petitioner is not entitled to get the arrears of salary for the intervening period i.e. from 25.08.2001 to 12.01.2009 by making the principle of “no work no pay” applicable? 18. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was appointed as Constable but at the time of physical examination, his height was measured to be 169.5 cm. Subsequently, his height was re-measured to be 167.5 cm. The advertisement contains a condition about minimum eligibility criteria, so far as the height of one or the other candidate is concerned, to be 165 cm. The respondent authority, although, has dismissed the writ petitioner from service vide order dated 25.08.2001 but the said order has been quashed by the Coordinate learned Single Judge of this Court while allowing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003. The respondent authorities have reinstated the writ petitioner in service vide order dated 12.01.2009 as would appear from Annexure-6 to the writ petition as also given the benefit of additional increment. The order dated 05.12.2008 passed in W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 has never been questioned by the State respondent rather, it has been acted by reinstating the writ petitioner in service, therefore, according to our considered view, once the order of dismissal dated 25.08.2001 having been found to be unjust and improper which led the Coordinate learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 to be not sustainable, accordingly, quashed and set aside, meaning thereby, the order in entirety has been quashed and set aside and by virtue of that, the writ petitioner is also entitled for the salary for the period of suspension, since the impugned order of dismissal dated 25.08.2001 also contains the decision of denial of salary for suspension period. Further, the issue of disbursement of salary from the date of dismissal to reinstatement is concerned, according to our considered view, the writ petitioner will be entitled for salary for the following reasons: (i) Once the order of dismissal has been quashed and set aside by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 which itself suggests that there is no ingredients of fraud committed by the writ petitioner, which was accepted by the State respondent, to further corroborate this fact. Therefore, we are not hesitate in holding that the writ petitioner was forcefully deprived from discharging his duty which subsequently has been found to be correct by this Court while passing the order in W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003. (ii) Further, the writ petitioner is pursuing his litigation before this Court right from the date of his termination and as such, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner was not willing to discharge his duty, observation is being made, on the basis of the fact that once the litigant is contesting the case for reinstatement in service by quashing the order of dismissal, it cannot be said that he was not interested to discharge his duty. Therefore, the principle of “no work no pay” as has been pleaded by the learned counsel appearing for the State appellant, is not applicable in the facts of the given case. This Court, after considering the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and Others vs. K.V. Jankiraman and Others (supra), wherein, it has been laid down that the principle of “no work no pay” will not automatically be applicable, rather it will not be applicable in the fact where the concerned employee is willing to discharge his duty but deprived forcefully by the end of the respondent, is of the view that herein, also the writ petitioner was forcefully deprived from discharging his duty and the moment he has been reinstated in service, he was discharging his duty. Further, he has also given the benefit of additional increment from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. Further, he has also given the benefit of additional increment from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. (iii) The question of “no work no pay” will also not be applicable because once the State authority has taken decision of granting additional increment as would appear from Annexure-6 dated 12.01.2009 appended to the writ petition, the denial of salary for the aforesaid period cannot be said to be justified. 19. We, have discussed the fact in its entirety as above as also gone across the order impugned, wherefrom we have found that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the effect of the order passed by the Coordinate learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 1659 of 2003 which had led the learned Single Judge to come to the conclusion that when the order of termination itself has been quashed and set aside, there is no question of further deliberation upon the issue. 20. This Court, after going through the aforesaid finding coupled with the discussions made hereinabove, is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted with. 21. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed. 22. In consequent to dismissal of this appeal, I.A. No. 1164 of 2020 also stands dismissed.