JUDGMENT : 1. This petition under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Act”) challenges a common order dated 14 February, 2022 passed by the learned sole arbitrator on two applications, firstly, on an application as filed by the respondent under Section 17 of the Act and secondly, on an application filed by the petitioners, treated as an application under section 17 of the Act, in pursuance of the liberty granted by this Court (B.P. Colabawalla, J.) by an order dated 20 September, 2021. 2. The grievance of the petitioners is primarily on the directions as made by the arbitral tribunal on the disclosure of the assets to be made by the petitioners pending the arbitral proceedings. The operative portion of the impugned order reads thus:- “ORDER 21. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and considering the submissions made by the Ld. Counsels, I deem it fit to grant an order of disclosure in favour of the Claimant and against Respondent No.1. Furthermore, considering that Respondent No.1 had not filed his Affidavit of Disclosure pursuant to the Section 9 Order, the Claimant is today kept in the dark as to whether or not Respondent No.1’s assets would be sufficient to secure its Claim and further; that whether or not Respondent No.1 has any / sufficient assets to secure the Claim amount. I see no reason as to why and how any prejudice whatsoever will be caused to Respondent No.1 in making a true and correct disclosure of his assets in these proceedings. 22. Accordingly, Respondent No.1 is directed to disclose on Affidavit, the true and complete details of all the assets (both movable and immovable including the bank accounts and other assets) held and owned by Respondent No.1 and the encumbrances and charges, if any, on these assets within a period of (7) days from the date of this Order. 23. I also deem it appropriate to restrain Respondent No.1 from selling, transferring, disposing off or alienating or encumbering or mortgaging or charging or parting with possession of Respondent No.1’s assets pending the hearing and final disposal of the Arbitral proceedings. 24. 23. I also deem it appropriate to restrain Respondent No.1 from selling, transferring, disposing off or alienating or encumbering or mortgaging or charging or parting with possession of Respondent No.1’s assets pending the hearing and final disposal of the Arbitral proceedings. 24. Needless to state, should the quantum of Respondent No.1’s assets once disclosed be found to be far in excess of the Claimant’s claim in these proceedings, Respondent No.1 would necessarily be at liberty to seek exclusion of such assets (which are far in excess of the Claimant’s claim in these proceedings) from the purview of the present order of injunction. 25. Thus, the Section 17 Application is allowed in the above terms, and the Modification Application is accordingly dismissed. 26. In the aforesaid circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.” 3. Briefly, the relevant facts are :- Disputes and differences had arisen between the parties under a Put Option Agreement dated 19 March, 2020 executed between the respondent as a Debenture Holder and petitioner no.1 as a promoter and petitioner no.2 as a confirming party. An arbitration agreement between the parties is contained in clause 10.2 of the said Put Option Agreement. The respondent had earlier approached this Court in Commercial Arbitration Petition (L.) No.18859 of 2021 praying for interim measures pending the arbitral proceedings. This Court (B.P. Colabawalla, J.) disposed of the said petition by an order dated 20 September, 2021. The operative order reads thus: “20. This being the law laid down by this Court and considering the fact that there is no real defence to the payability of the amounts under the Put Option Agreement in relation to the said CCDs, I am of the opinion that a case for an order of deposit is made out against Respondent No.1. In these circumstances, the following order is passed:- (i) Pending the Arbitral Proceedings and until the execution of the Arbitral Award, Respondent No.1 is directed to deposit in this Court a sum of Rs. 1,15,78,764/- within a period of eight weeks from today. In these circumstances, the following order is passed:- (i) Pending the Arbitral Proceedings and until the execution of the Arbitral Award, Respondent No.1 is directed to deposit in this Court a sum of Rs. 1,15,78,764/- within a period of eight weeks from today. (ii) Over and above this, there shall be interim relief in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) which read thus:- “(a) pending the arbitral proceedings, making of the Arbitral Award and until execution of the Arbitral Award, each of the Respondents be directed to disclose on Oath/Affidavit, the true and complete details of all the assets (both movable and immovable including the bank accounts and other assets) held and owned by them and the encumbrances and charges, if any on these assets; (b) pending the arbitral proceedings, making of the Arbitral Award and until execution of the Arbitral Award, the Respondents be restrained by an Order and injunction from in any manner dealing with, selling, transferring, disposing off or alienating or encumbering or mortgaging or charging or parting with possession of their assets; (iii) It is clarified that the interim relief granted in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) is only against Respondent No.1 and not against Respondent No.2. (iv) If the aforesaid deposit order is complied with, the Respondents shall be at liberty to file an application seeking recall of the interim reliefs granted in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b), either before this Court or before the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. If the same is filed, it shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. (v) If the sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- is not deposited in this Court within a period of eight weeks from today, the Petitioner shall be entitled to execute this order under Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to ensure that the said monies are brought in this Court. 21. It is needless to clarify that all observations made in this order are only prima facie and tentative and will not bind the Tribunal as and when it decides the lis between the parties. 22. The above Section 9 Petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 23. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/Personal Assistant of this Court. 22. The above Section 9 Petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 23. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.” (emphasis supplied) 4. The petitioners being aggrieved by the above order passed by the learned Single Judge filed an appeal (Commercial Appeal (L.) No.24838 of 2021) which was disposed of by an order dated 27 October, 2021, passed by the Division Bench of this Court, whereby the Division Bench modified the said orders passed by the learned Single Judge and directed that the petitioners furnish a bank guarantee of the amounts as directed to be deposited by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench also referred the parties to arbitration by appointing a sole arbitrator. The said order passed by the Division Bench needs to be extracted, which reads thus:- “1. Not on board. Upon mentioning, taken on board. 2. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 3. Appellant No. 1 / Applicant No. 1 undertakes to this Court : i. to furnish a bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- of ICICI Bank payable at Bombay in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court, Bombay on or before 15th November, 2021 and not to seek any further time to furnish the said bank guarantee. The undertakings are accepted. ii. That the bank guarantee shall be to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court. iii. The said bank guarantee shall be in force until the arbitration proceedings are concluded and the Arbitrator passes his Award and also for a period of four weeks thereafter. The undertakings are accepted. 4. The following Order is passed by consent of the parties : i. Mr. Naushar Kohli, Advocate is appointed as the sole Arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties arising out of the Put Option Agreement dated 19th March, 2019. ii. The disclosure under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 shall be submitted by Mr. Naushar Kohli, Advocate in the office of the Prothonotary and Senior Master within a period of one week from today and a copy of the disclosure shall be provided to the Advocates for the parties. iii. Naushar Kohli, Advocate in the office of the Prothonotary and Senior Master within a period of one week from today and a copy of the disclosure shall be provided to the Advocates for the parties. iii. The parties and / or their Advocates shall appear before the learned Arbitrator in his chambers on 29th October, 2021 at 10.30 a.m. and obtain necessary directions. iv. The learned Arbitrator shall not grant any adjournment to either side unless absolutely necessary. v. All contentions of the parties are kept open. vi. The cost of arbitration shall initially be borne by the parties equally. vii. The fees payable to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be as prescribed under the Bombay High Court (Fees Payable to Arbitrators) Rules, 2018. viii. The venue of arbitration shall be at Mumbai. 5. The above Appeal as well as Interim Application are accordingly disposed off.” 5. After the Division Bench disposed of the petitioners’ appeal, the petitioners in pursuance of the liberty granted in the order dated 20 September, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, moved before the Court an Interim Application (L.) No.26131 of 2021 praying for recall of the orders dated 20 September, 2021 passed on the Section 9 petition, insofar as the directions were made in the said order, to the effect the petitioners were ordered to file an affidavit of disclosure of assets, as also an order of temporary injunction which restrained the petitioners to deal with the assets. On such application of the petitioners, the learned Single Judge by an order dated 1 December, 2021 recorded the consent of the parties and ordered that the said interim application be converted into an application under Section 17 of the Act, and be treated as such by the arbitral tribunal and disposed of on its own merits and in accordance with law. The said order reads thus:- “1. The above Interim Application has been filed seeking the following reliefs: “(a) Recall the interim relief granted to the Petitioner as stated in para 20 (ii) of the order dated 20th September, 2021.” 2. By this Court’s order dated 20th September, 2021, Respondent No.1 was directed to deposit in the Court the sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- within a period of eight weeks from the said date. In addition thereto, interim relief was also granted against Respondent No.1 in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the above Petition. By this Court’s order dated 20th September, 2021, Respondent No.1 was directed to deposit in the Court the sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- within a period of eight weeks from the said date. In addition thereto, interim relief was also granted against Respondent No.1 in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the above Petition. It was further recorded that if the aforesaid deposit order is complied with, the Respondents shall be at liberty to file an Application seeking recall of the interim relief granted in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b), either before this Court or before the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. It was clarified that if such an Application is filed, it shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. 3. The order passed by this Court on 20th September, 2021, was subjected to an appeal. The Division Bench of this Court (in Commercial Appeal (L) No. 24838 of 2021) modified the order to the limited extent that Respondent No.1 was allowed to furnish a bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- of ICICI bank instead of depositing the said sum in this Court. By the said order of the Division Bench, the Arbitral Tribunal was also constituted and a Sole Arbitrator was appointed to decide the disputes between the parties arising out of the Put Option Agreement dated 19th March, 2019. 4. It is not in dispute that a bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- has been furnished in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court. It is in light of this development, that the present Application is filed seeking vacating the Interim order passed in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b) of the Petition. 5. After hearing the parties for some time and considering that the Arbitral Tribunal is already constituted, both parties agreed that the aforesaid Interim Application can be converted and treated as an Application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act and be heard and disposed of as such by the Arbitral Tribunal. 6. In view of the aforesaid consensus, it is directed that the above Interim Application shall be converted into an Application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act and shall be treated as such by the Arbitral Tribunal and disposed of on its own merits and in accordance with law. 6. In view of the aforesaid consensus, it is directed that the above Interim Application shall be converted into an Application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act and shall be treated as such by the Arbitral Tribunal and disposed of on its own merits and in accordance with law. If the parties wants to file any Affidavits and/or documents in the above Interim Application, they may do so but only with the leave of the Arbitral Tribunal. 7. The Interim Application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs. 8. All parties to act on an authenticated copy of this order digitally signed by the Personal Assistant /Private Secretary/Associate of this Court.” 6. Before the arbitral tribunal, the respondent also filed its independent Section 17 application. Thus, along with petitioners Interim application [Interim Application (L.) No.26131 of 2021] as filed before this Court and converted into a Section 17 application, also the respondent’s application filed under Section 17 fell for adjudication before the arbitral tribunal. It would be necessary to note the prayers as made in the Section 17 application filed by the respondents, which read thus : “(a) pending the hearing and final disposal of the arbitral proceedings, this Hon’ble Tribunal be pleased to direct respondent no. 1 to forthwith comply with the directions of the Hon’ble Court set out in order dated 20 September, 2021 in Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 18859 of 2021 and order dated 27 October, 2021 in Commercial Appeal (L) No. 24838 of 2021 and; (I) Forthwith disclose on oath/affidavit, the true and complete details of all the assets (both movable and immovable including the bank accounts and other assets) held and owned by respondent no. 1 and the encumbrances and charges, if any, on these assets; (II) restrain in any manner from dealing with, selling, transferring, disposing off or alienating or encumbering or mortgaging or charging or parting with possession of respondent nos.1’s assets; and (III) furnish a bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/- of ICICI Bank payable at Bombay in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court, Bombay on or before 15 November, 2021; (b) for ad-interim reliefs in terms of payer clause (a).” 7. From the reading of the above prayers, it becomes clear that the respondent was of the clear opinion that the order of disclosure of assets as also the order of temporary injunction as granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court had come to an end. In the absence of the above prayers, seeking the same relief could not have been made as these prayers were already made before this Court in the Section 9 application of the respondent. 8. By the impugned order, the two Section 17 applications of both the parties stand adjudicated. The learned sole arbitrator considering the rival contentions has come to a conclusion that the petitioners need to file an affidavit of disclosure inter-alia on the premise, as also observed in paragraph 21 of the impugned order, that the petitioner no.1 had not filed his affidavit of disclosure pursuant to the order dated 20 September, 2021 passed by the learned Judge of this Court on the Section 9 petition and that the respondent (claimant) was kept in the dark as to whether or not the petitioners have any assets, sufficient to secure the claim amount as made by the respondent, and accordingly the learned sole arbitrator has directed the petitioners to file a disclosure affidavit and disclose all assets movable and immovable including the bank details and other assets. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners in assailing the impugned order, has drawn the Court’s attention to the Statement of Claim as filed by the respondent. He contends that the principal claim as made by the respondent was for an amount of Rs.1,27,91,717/- as set out in paragraph 24(i) of the Statement of Claim. It is submitted that by an order passed by the learned Single Judge on the section 9 proceedings and modified by the Division Bench by its order dated 27 October, 2021, the petitioners had secured the principal claim of the respondent by furnishing a bank guarantee, which is valid and subsisting. It is submitted that by an order passed by the learned Single Judge on the section 9 proceedings and modified by the Division Bench by its order dated 27 October, 2021, the petitioners had secured the principal claim of the respondent by furnishing a bank guarantee, which is valid and subsisting. It is hence his submission that when the principal claim of the respondent itself, is secured in the facts of the case, the petitioners ought not to be saddled with an order of disclosure of its assets, only to secure an interest claim on the principal claim as made by the respondent in paragraph 24(ii) of the Statement of Claim, namely, an interest claim at the rate of 20% p.a. from the date of filing of the Statement of Claim till the payment of amounts and/or its realization thereof. This more particularly when the petitioners at this stage of the proceedings would not mind continuance of the temporary injunction on the petitioners assets, however, keeping open the petitioners’ contention to seek vacating of the same as and when the need so arises. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that such claim for penal interest is seriously disputed by the petitioners and is subject matter for adjudication before the arbitral tribunal. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the context of the claims as made by the respondents would draw the Court’s attention to the prayers as made in the Statement of Claim which read thus:- “24. The Claimant states that as per the terms of the Put Option Agreement, the Respondent No.1 has agreed to pay to the Claimant, (i) the total subscription amount of the said Debentures alongwith (ii) all accrued and unpaid interest amounts at the rate of 15% p.a. which the Respondent No.2 Company has guaranteed to pay to the Claimant on the said Debentures and (iii) all accrued and unpaid default coupon/interest at the rate of 2% p.a. on the entire amount of the default interest. As on the date of filing of the present Statement of Claim, the Respondent No.1 is liable to pay to the Claimant: (i) a total amount of Rs.1,27,91,717/- which comprises of the Put Option Consideration of Rs. As on the date of filing of the present Statement of Claim, the Respondent No.1 is liable to pay to the Claimant: (i) a total amount of Rs.1,27,91,717/- which comprises of the Put Option Consideration of Rs. 1 crore plus interest applicable at the rate of 15% p.a. for the three quarters starting from January, 2021 along with default coupon at the rate of 2% for the Respondents’ failure to pay such due interest as per Clause 2.1 of the Put Option Agreement, amounting to Rs.16,24,314/- and additional interest at the rate of 20% for the failure on part of the Respondent No.1 to pay the entire Put Option consideration as per Clause 3.9 of the Put Option Agreement, amounting to Rs.11,67,403/-. (ii) Further interest at the rate of 20% p.a. from the date of filing of the Statement of Claimant till the payment of amounts and/or its realization thereof; (iii) The amounts of all the costs that the Claimant will incur in the present arbitration proceedings including but not limited to the amounts to be spent towards fees and expenses of this Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal, Claimant’s legal fees and expenses incurred in the course of the arbitration, administration and miscellaneous fees of this Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal and any other and further expenses incurred in relation to the present arbitration proceedings as per the provisions of section 31A of the Act. The detailed breakup of the Claimant’s total claim of Rs.1,27,91,717/- is set out in the Particulars of Claim that is annexed as EXHIBIT - “V” hereto.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Thus, the contention as urged on behalf of the petitioners is that in the present situation when the first prayer as made by the respondent in the statement of claim stands secured by the petitioners by furnishing of the bank guarantee as ordered by this Court, it was not appropriate for the respondent to pray for interim measures of disclosure merely on the alleged interest claim, as if such claim has already stood crystallized. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that such an order is totally unwarranted in view of the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court, protecting the arbitral interest of the parties. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that such an order is totally unwarranted in view of the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court, protecting the arbitral interest of the parties. In short, it is his submission that such a relief of disclosure in the present facts could have been granted only in the execution proceedings, that is in the event the respondent was to succeed in the arbitral proceedings. It is hence his submission that the impugned order needs to be set aside. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order. He submits that the learned arbitrator has set out appropriate reasons as to why such a disclosure was necessary in the facts of the case. He submits that these are findings which are recorded on the merits of the rival contentions as also considering the position in law, it was necessary to protect the arbitral interest of the parties by securing the interest amount. It is his submission that learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 20 September, 2021, had already ordered disclosure to be granted along with the relief of an injunction and deposit of the claim amount as directed, which according to the learned counsel for the respondent, has not been disturbed by the Division Bench in its order dated 27 October, 2021, passed in disposing of the appeal filed by the petitioners. Hence, it is submitted that the petition be dismissed. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned order, I am not satisfied that the situation in hand before the learned sole arbitrator required any order of disclosure to be made by the petitioners at this interim stage of the arbitral proceedings. This for more than one reason. It can be clearly seen that the learned Single Judge by an order dated 20 September, 2021 passed on the Section 9 petition filed by the respondent at the pre-arbitral stage had granted a three fold relief to the respondent. Firstly, the learned Single Judge ordered the petitioner to deposit the claim amount, secondly an order of temporary injunction was granted against the petitioner interalia, restraining it from dealing/transferring or party with the possession of its assets and thirdly, the petitioners were directed to make a disclosure of all its assets as noted above, including the bank details. Firstly, the learned Single Judge ordered the petitioner to deposit the claim amount, secondly an order of temporary injunction was granted against the petitioner interalia, restraining it from dealing/transferring or party with the possession of its assets and thirdly, the petitioners were directed to make a disclosure of all its assets as noted above, including the bank details. 14. It cannot be overlooked that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was subject matter of consideration before the appeal Court in the appeal as filed by the petitioners. A perusal of the order passed by the appeal Court indicates that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was modified by the Division Bench ordering that the petitioners be permitted to furnish a bank guarantee of the amounts directed to be deposited by the learned Single Judge and by consent of the parties, the disputes were referred for arbitration keeping open all contentions of the parties. It is thus clearly seen that the order passed by the learned Single Judge stood modified to the extent as observed by the Division Bench. Such order being an order passed in appeal, the order passed by the learned Single Judge stood merged in the order passed by the appeal Court. It is not the contention as urged on behalf of the respondent before this Court, that the appeal of the petitioners, was confined and/or restricted only to the directions in respect of the deposit of the amounts namely a sum of Rs.1,15,78,764/-. It was an appeal against the order dated 20 September, 2021 in its entirety. In such situation, the Division Bench taking into consideration the lis between the parties permitted the petitioners to furnish the bank guarantee as observed in the order. The Division Bench protected the arbitral interest of the respondent by securing the amounts by directing the petitioners to furnish a bank guarantee. The order of the Division Bench certainly brought about legal consequences, qua the order passed by the learned Single Judge, namely, that the orders passed by the learned Single Judge stood merged in the orders passed by the appeal Court. 15. In my opinion, in the present case, the order dated 20 September, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, had clearly merged into the order dated 27 October, 2021 passed by the Division Bench in the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said order. 15. In my opinion, in the present case, the order dated 20 September, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, had clearly merged into the order dated 27 October, 2021 passed by the Division Bench in the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said order. 16. The principles of law in regard to the orders passed by a subordinate forum being merged into the orders passed by the superior forum in appeal are well settled. When a superior Court exercises an appellate jurisdiction over the orders passed by the subordinate Courts and when the superior court passes an order in appeal, it is the appellate order that is to be considered, as the original decision merges in the appellate decision. In such a situation, it is the appellate decision alone which could subsist and is operative and capable of enforcement. In this context, a reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay vs. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co., AIR 1958 SC 868 wherein the Supreme Court in the context of merger of the orders has held thus : “There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement; but the question is whether this principle can apply to the Income-tax Officer's order granting registration to the respondent.” 17. In Kunhayammed and Ors. vs. State of Kerala and Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359 , the Supreme Court has observed that the doctrine of merger is merely a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. Considering the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Vs. M/s Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. (supra), decision in M/s Gojer Brothers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Considering the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Vs. M/s Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. (supra), decision in M/s Gojer Brothers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shri Ratanlal, AIR 1974 SC 1380 and a decision of the seven Judges Bench in the case of S.S. Rathor Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, it was held that when a decree or order is passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum, then although the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. It was observed that once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, which is final, binding and operative decree or order, wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, tribunal or the authority below. The relevant observations are required to be noted, which reads thus : “10. In M/s Gojer Brothers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shri Ratanlal, AIR 1974 SC 1380 this Court made it clear that so far as merger is concerned on principle there is no distinction between an order of reversal or modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority; in all the three cases the order passed by the lower authority shall merge in the order passed by the appellate authority whatsoever be its decision whether of reversal or modification or only confirmation. Their Lordships referred to an earlier decision of this court in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 wherein it was held: “A judgment pronounced by a High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing in the presence of both the parties would replace the judgment of the lower court, thus constituting the judgment of the High Court the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the courts below.” 11. In S.S. Rathor Vs. In S.S. Rathor Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 10 a larger Bench of this Court (Seven-Judges) having reviewed the available decisions of the Supreme Court on the doctrine of merger, held that the distinction made between courts and tribunals as regards the applicability of doctrine of merger is without any legal justification; where a statutory remedy was provided against an adverse order in a service dispute and that remedy was availed, the limitation for filing a suit challenging the adverse order would commence not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority disposing of the statutory remedy was passed. Support was taken from doctrine of merger by referring to C.I.T. Vs. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. (supra) and several other decisions of this Court. 12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” (emphasis supplied) 18. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Be that as it may, despite such legal consequences being brought about, by the order of the learned Single Judge having merged into the order passed by the Division Bench, in pursuance to the directions as made by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 20(iv) of the order dated 20 September, 2021 the petitioners availed of the liberty to file an application seeking recall of the interim reliefs granted in terms of prayer clause (a) [disclosure] and (b) [temporary injunction] by filing Interim Application (L.) No. 26131 of 2021 praying for recall of the said directions on disclosure and injunction. The learned Single Judge by an order dated 1 December, 2021 directed that such application be considered by the arbitral tribunal. Interestingly, it appears that the respondent was quite aware of the consequences brought about by the orders passed by the Division Bench namely that the directions of the learned Single Judge in the order dated 20 September, 2021 had merged into the order passed by the Division Bench, hence the learned Single Judge’s order qua the directions of disclosure and injunction no more subsisted. This is clear from the fact that the respondent filed another independent application, and again prayed for a relief of disclosure and injunction as evident from the prayers as made in the respondent’s section 17 application as noted above, except for this situation, it is difficult to conceive as to how the respondent could have made a second application praying for similar reliefs, with fresh Section 17 application, which were earlier prayed before the High Court. 19. On the above conspectus, in my opinion, the prayers as made in the respondent’s application were certainly misconceived, as certainly it was a case that the respondent was praying for the same relief for the second time, when earlier such reliefs being granted by the learned Single Judge were not continued by the Division bench. 19. On the above conspectus, in my opinion, the prayers as made in the respondent’s application were certainly misconceived, as certainly it was a case that the respondent was praying for the same relief for the second time, when earlier such reliefs being granted by the learned Single Judge were not continued by the Division bench. Consequently, such prayers as made by the respondent were completely oblivious to the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court, in which the order dated 20 September, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court has been merged. 20. Also from the perusal of the record, it appears that although the order passed by the learned Single Judge having been merged with the order passed by the appeal Court, was never realized by the petitioners, however, the respondent was clearly conscious about it, as seen from the prayers as made in its application under section 17 filed before the arbitral tribunal. 21. Apart from the above discussion, even otherwise, in my opinion, in the facts of the case, the respondent was not entitled to an order of disclosure. This for the reason that the primary claim as made in terms of paragraph 24 of the Statement of Claim was secured by the Division Bench of this Court directing the petitioners to furnish a bank guarantee. It is quite clear that there is a serious dispute in regard to the prayer for interest at the rate of 20% as being made by the respondent in the Statement of Claim. Certainly at this stage, it was not possible to come to any prima facie conclusion whether the respondent had any strong chances to succeed on its claim on interest. This more particularly when the contention of the petitioners is that such a claim is in the nature of penal interest which would be in the nature of damages, which ultimately would be required to be proved in a manner known to law. 22. There is yet another aspect of the matter which also cannot be overlooked. This more particularly when the contention of the petitioners is that such a claim is in the nature of penal interest which would be in the nature of damages, which ultimately would be required to be proved in a manner known to law. 22. There is yet another aspect of the matter which also cannot be overlooked. From the perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the entire thrust of the learned arbitrator to pass an order of disclosure, is on the ground that the petitioners need to comply with the order dated 20 September, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court when such order itself was subject matter of consideration by the appeal court having merged into the order passed by the appeal Court. Even in the order dated 1 December, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, the matter in its entirety was left to the disposal of the learned sole arbitrator. If such was the position, then certainly for the reasons as set out in the impugned order, such a direction could not have been passed so as to revive as to what the Court had directed in its order dated 20 September, 2021. Such primary consideration for the learned sole arbitrator to issue the impugned directions can be clearly seen from the observations as made in paragraphs 18 to 21. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order to the extent it directs the petitioner to make a disclosure of its assets (movable/immovable) cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. The petition is accordingly allowed in the above terms. No costs.