JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. D. Laji, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms. T.Jini, learned Addl. P.P, for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 2. That the present petition has been jointly filed by the petitioner No. 1 & 2 under section 482 Cr. P.C to set aside and quash the Bomdila Session Case No. 13/2016 arising out of Seppa P.S Case No. 51/2011 under section 366/354 IPC which is pending trial before the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila. 3. The petitioner No.1 is the accused in the case and the petitioner No.2 is the informant/victim. Both the petitioner No. 1 & 2 are stated to be related by marriage. The elder brother of the petitioner No.1, Mr. TachungRiang being married to Smti.YatakRimo, the elder sister of the petitioner No.2. 4. That on 12.06.2011, the petitioner No.2 lodged a complaint stating that on 11.06.2011 at about 15:00 Hrs, the petitioner No. 1 who was the president of the All Kameng District Student Union on the pretext of discharging some student works took the petitioner No.2 to Lumdang road and physically assaulted her. The police accordingly registered the Seppa P.S Case No. 51/2011 under section 366/354 IPC against the petitioner No.1 and arrested him. 5. The police have completed the investigation of the case by complying with all the legal formalities and has thereafter submitted the charge sheet against the accused/petitioner under section 366/354 IPC and the case is presently pending disposal before the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila. In the course of the trial, the learned Sessions Court has completed recording the evidence of the petitioner/informant and the other prosecution witnesses and also that of the accused/petitioner.The accused/petitioner has also been examined by the court under section 313 of Cr. P.C and the case is pending for final argument. 6. That on17.05.2022, the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner No.2 has signed a Deed of Mutual Settlement. The terms and conditions of the mutual agreement is reproduced as under; i). That 1st party has tendered unconditional apology to 2nd party (Miss LungneRimo). ii). That the first party has also undertaken that he shall never misbehave with the second party in coming future, nor he shall recall aforesaid incident or tell others about the case or any bad words against the second party by taking local ordeal. iii). That the 2nd party had already forgiven the 1st party of incident for which was registered. That the first party has also undertaken that he shall never misbehave with the second party in coming future, nor he shall recall aforesaid incident or tell others about the case or any bad words against the second party by taking local ordeal. iii). That the 2nd party had already forgiven the 1st party of incident for which was registered. Moreover, both the parties and their family members are already living peacefully and harmoniously. iv). That the 2nd party agreed that she shall never objection, if 1st party is discharged in Bomdila Sessions Case No. 13/2016 u/s 366/354 IPC, arisen out of Seppa P.S Case No. 51/2011, u/s 366/354 IPC or the same is closed. And she does not wish to pursue the case anymore. 7. That the petitioner No.2 has also sworn an affidavit on 21.05.2022 stating that the petitioner No. 1 & 2 have settled the case outside the court as per the Nyishi customary law and as such, the petitioner No. 2 shall have no objection if the Hon’ble Court discharges the accused from the criminal liability of the case. 8. That on the basis of the mutual settlement and the affidavit both the rival parties has jointly filed the present petition under section 482 Cr. P.C to set aside and quash the criminal trial pending before the learned Sessions Court, Bomdila. 9. Mr. D. Laji, learned counsel for the accused/petitioners at the outset submits that both the petitioners are closely related by marriage and as such, both used to visit and stay together at the residence of Mr. Tachung Riang and Smti. Yatak Rimo and the quarrel and misunderstanding between the petitioner No. 1 & 2 was the fallout of the election for the post of the President, All East Kameng District Student Union (AEKDSU) where the elder brother of the petitioner No.2 contested against the petitioner No.1. Since then, the petitioner No. 1 & 2 started having an acrimonious relation. Mr. D. Laji also makes a faint submission that both the petitioners being closely related, the question of the petitioner No.1 kidnapping and assaulting the petitioner No.2 cannot be countenance. Mr. Since then, the petitioner No. 1 & 2 started having an acrimonious relation. Mr. D. Laji also makes a faint submission that both the petitioners being closely related, the question of the petitioner No.1 kidnapping and assaulting the petitioner No.2 cannot be countenance. Mr. D. Laji then submits that since the settlement and the affidavit has been signed by the parties for the purpose of continuing their close family ties and for a peaceful co-existence amongst them, this Hon’ble Court may be gracious to accept the settlement executed between the parties and to quash the criminal trial pending before the learned Sessions Court, Bomdila. 10. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner No. 1 has relied in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh -versus-Laxmi Narayan & Others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 and the case of Kumol Tayeng -versus-State of Arunachal Pradesh, reported in 2017 (4) GLT 702 to submit that since the rival parties have amicably settled the matter there may not be any possibility of recording a conviction against the petitioner No.1. The learned counsel has also relied in the case of Unnikrishnan @ Unnikuttan -versus-State of Kerala, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 343 and the case of Guhan -versus-State represented by Inspector of Police decided in Criminal Appeal No. 884 of 2022 (S.L.P (Crl.) No. 5512 of 2022) to buttress the point that even after the conviction, the court can compromise non compoundable offence in view of the settlement entered between the parties. 11. Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. P.P. for the State of Arunachal Pradesh opposing the petition submits that the offence charge against the accused/petitioner No.1 is serious in nature. The crime is not personal to the petitioner No.2 or restricted to the personal dispute between the rival parties but is against the society at large. Ms. T. Jini has taken this Court to the medical examination report of the petitioner No.2 where the nature of injury has been clearly stated and the impression of the Doctor is “Rape attempt and assault”. The learned Addl. P.P further submits that the case is in the fag end of the trial with only the final argument remaining and therefore it may not be in the interest of justice to quash the trial at this stage. The learned Addl. The learned Addl. P.P further submits that the case is in the fag end of the trial with only the final argument remaining and therefore it may not be in the interest of justice to quash the trial at this stage. The learned Addl. P.P. accordingly submits that irrespective of the settlement entered between the parties which is solely executed for frustrating the trial of the case, the court below should be allowed to hear the case and conclude the trial in accordance with law. Accepting the settlement at this stage of the trial and quashing the criminal proceedings, the learned Addl. P.P. submits, would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. The learned Addl. P.P. has also referred to the case of Laxmi Narayan (supra) to substantiate that heinous crimes which have serious impact on the society should not be quashed in exercise of the powers under section 482 Cr. P.C only on the ground that the parties have resolved the dispute amongst themselves. Relying on the said case, the learned Addl. P.P also further submits that where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence and the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its powers under section 482 of the code but allow the trial court to decide the case on merit and come to the logical conclusion. 12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. This Court has perused the petition and the records of the case called for from the court below. The accused/petitioner has been charged with the offence under section 366/354 IPC. Section 366 IPC is a non-compoundable offence, while section 354 IPC is compoundable with the leave of the court before which the prosecution is pending. The offence under section 366 IPC is heinous in nature and a crime against the society. 13. Consequent to the complaint lodged by the victim to the police against the accused on 12.06.2011, the victim was on the same day medically examined by the Doctor of District Hospital, Seppa, East Kameng District. This Court has perused the medical report and the nature of injuries inflicted on the victim. The impression in the medical report states “Rape attempt and assault.” 14. This Court has perused the medical report and the nature of injuries inflicted on the victim. The impression in the medical report states “Rape attempt and assault.” 14. Subsequent to the arrest of the accused/petitioner in the case, the police in the course of the investigation has recorded the statement of the accused, the victim and the other witnesses under section 161 Cr. P.C. The confessional statements of the accused and the victim has also been recorded under section 164 Cr. P.C. The police on completion of the investigation have submitted the charge sheet against the accused under section 366/354 IPC. In the course of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila, has recorded the evidence of the accused, the victim and 7(seven) other prosecution witnesses. The accused has also been examined by the court under section 313 Cr. P.C. The record reveals that evidence in the case is concluded and the case is in the stage of final argument. The records of the case also shows that the case was fixed for final argument on 17.05.2022, 26.05.2022 & 27.05.2022, however the hearing of the case could not proceed either due to the absence of the accused or his counsel. 15. It is only on 17.05.2022 that the accused and the victim has executed the belated settlement and has come before this Court under section 482 Cr. P.C to quash the criminal trial pending before the court below. The content of the agreement however makes it clear that the object of the settlement is to scuttle the trial and absolve the accused from the criminal liability of the case. This Court is accordingly of the view that the mere settlement between the parties will not be a ground to quash the proceedings before the trial court inasmuch as the settlement of such heinous crime cannot have the imprimatur of this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decision has categorically held that in heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape, dacoity etc.,such offences cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute with the accused as such offences are not private in nature but have serious impact on the society. In making such an observation, this Court does not mean that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, which can be proved only during the trial of the case but the offence charged against the accused is serious in nature affecting the society at large. This Court is therefore not inclined to accept the settlement executed between the rival parties to quash the criminal proceeding pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila. 16. Another factor for which this Court refuses to quash the trial of the case is because of the fact that the evidence before the trial court has already completed and the matter is at the stage of the final argument. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that it may not be proper at this stage to stifle a legitimate trial and occasion a miscarriage of justice. Quashing of the criminal trial pending before the court below in the facts and circumstances of the case and at this juncture will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. 17. This Court has also considered the submission of the learned counsel for the accused/petitioner that even after the conviction by the Court the parties can be allowed to compromise non-compoundable offences on the basis of settlement arrived at between the rival parties. In the case of Unnikrishnan @ Unnikuttan (supra) cited by the petitioner, the Supreme Court in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, reduce the sentence imposed while maintaining the conviction. So also in the case of Guhan (supra)in view of the marriage within the family of the injured and the accused, the Supreme Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India compounded the offence and the sentence as directed by the High Court was modified to the period undergone and directed the accused who was in jail to be released forthwith. The citation referred to, by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accordingly not relevant for deciding the present case. 18. On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise the inherent power under section 482 Cr. P.C to set aside and quash the criminal trial pending before the learned court below. 19. 18. On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise the inherent power under section 482 Cr. P.C to set aside and quash the criminal trial pending before the learned court below. 19. In the case of Shiji @ Pappu& Another-versus-Radhika & Another, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 705 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that; “18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal of Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.” 20. In the case of State of Rajasthan -versus-Shambhu Kewat & Another, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 149 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that; “15. We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused persons was a crime against an individual, on the other hand it was a crime against the society at large. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving social control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities within the society. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving social control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be non-compoundable, is because the Code has identified which conduct should be brought within the ambit of non-compoundable offences. Such provisions are not meant just to protect the individual but the society as a whole. The High Court was not right in thinking that it was only an injury to the person and since the accused persons (sic victims) had received the monetary compensation and settled the matter, the crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal justice system has a larger objective to achieve, that is safety and protection of the people at large and it would be a lesson not only to the offender, but to the individuals at large so that such crimes would not be committed by any one and money would not be a substitute for the crime committed against the society. Taking a lenient view on a serious offence like the present, will leave a wrong impression about the criminal justice system and will encourage further criminal acts, which will endanger the peaceful co-existence and welfare of the society at large.” 21. In the case of Varala Bharath Kumar & Another -versus-State of Telangana & Another, reported in (2017) 9 SCC 413 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that; “7. While exercising power under Section 482 or under Article 226 in such matters, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down under Section 482 itself. It is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone courts exist. The court must be careful and see that its decision in exercise of its power is based on sound principles. The inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.” 22. The inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.” 22. So also in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir @ ParbatbhaiBhimsinhbhaiKarmur& Others -versus-State of Gujarat & Another, reported in (2017) 9 SCC 641 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that; “12. In Narinder Singh, Dr Justice A K Sikri, speaking for a bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the state to punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrence. In such a case, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised: (SCC p.484, para 29.7) "29.7...Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits..." 16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised;(i) to secure the ends of justice, or(ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. …………” 23. Further, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh -versus-Laxmi Narayan & Others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that; “11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this Court in Shiji, the High Court has observed that there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the FIR. 11.1. However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the State of Maharashtra v Vikram Anantrai Doshi, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions. Even, the quashing of the FIR by the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions. 11.2 ……………………………… 11.3 ………………………… 11.4.…………………………. 11.5. In Manish , this Court has specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that where the accused are facing trial under Sections 307 read with Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society, the accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence. 11.6. In Deepak, this Court has specifically observed that as the offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the case of Kalyan Singh and Dhruv Gurjar.” 24. In the light of the discussions made above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme of India, this Court is not inclined to accept the settlement executed between the rival parties to set aside and quash the criminal proceeding/trial which is pending in the court of the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila in Session Case No. 13/2016 corresponding to Seppa P.S Case No. 51/2011 under section 366/354 IPC by exercising the inherent power under section 482 Cr. P.C. 25. The criminal petition is accordingly dismissed. No cost. 26. The learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila, West Kameng District shall hear and dispose the case pending before it in accordance with law. 27. Send back the LCR forthwith