JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction to the respondent No. 2 to pay the full salary to the petitioner from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017 i.e. the date when the petitioner was dismissed from service till the date of reinstatement. Petitioner has further prayer for quashing the part of order dated 26.06.2017, passed by respondent no. 2, whereby the salary for the period i.e. from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017 has not been denied to the petitioner on the ground of ‘no work no pay’. 3. As per the factual matrix, when the petitioner was posted as Constable in the district of Gumla, a memo of charge was framed against him and he was put under suspension. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 09.07.1998 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. On the basis of enquiry report, the disciplinary authority directed the petitioner to submit the last defence as to why he should not be dismissed from service, as is evident from letter dated 20.07.1998. The disciplinary authority dismissed the petitioner from service and said decision was communicated to the petitioner by memo dated 11.09.1998. The petitioner having no option left, preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, South Chotanagpur Range, Ranchi on 27.09.1999, however, the said appeal was also rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, by memo dated 10.03.2004. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred writ petition being W.P.(S). No. 423 of 2010 and this Court vide judgment dated 21.04.2017 quashed the penalty order as well as appellate order. Thereafter, the petitioner represented before the respondent No. 2 on 02.05.2017. Upon his representation, the final order was passed on 26.06.2017, whereby though the petitioner has been reinstated in service but the salary for the period running from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017 has been denied to the petitioner on the ground of ‘no work no pay’. Thereafter, the petitioner joined his service immediately but the facts remains that the salary for the period running from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017 has not been paid to the petitioner. Hence, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 5. Mr. Thereafter, the petitioner joined his service immediately but the facts remains that the salary for the period running from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017 has not been paid to the petitioner. Hence, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 5. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assiduously urges that once the dismissal order was set aside by this Court and the petitioner has been reinstated in service by the respondents, the petitioner is entitled for the payment of salary for the period running from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017 i.e. the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. Learned counsel further argues that the part of the impugned order whereby the salary for the interregnum period has been denied to the petitioner is fit to be quashed and set aside on the ground that the petitioner was not in gainful employment during that period. The petitioner has been ordered to be reinstated in service, the respondents are duty bound to pay the salary to the petitioner from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. Learned counsel further argues that the impugned order to the extent that the petitioner has been denied salary for the aforesaid period is violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Achyut Keshav, learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that charge has been constituted on the ground of absconding of the petitioner from the duty without information or leave application, which amounts to misconduct. The charges levelled against the petitioner has also been proved in the departmental proceeding and thereafter, after providing opportunity to the petitioner to present his case, the order of punishment has been inflicted against the petitioner. Learned counsel further argues that the petitioner was absent from his duty without any information or any permission hence, he is not entitled for the payment of salary for the period from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017, i.e. the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement and accordingly, the respondent No. 4 has passed the order on the principle of ‘no work no pay’. Learned counsel for the respondents further argues that the petitioner being a member of disciplined force has committed gross error but taking sympathetic consideration, he was reinstated though he has remained absent unauthorizedly. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents further argues that the petitioner being a member of disciplined force has committed gross error but taking sympathetic consideration, he was reinstated though he has remained absent unauthorizedly. 7. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties across the bar, this Court is of the considered view that the case of petitioner needs consideration for the following facts and reasons: (I) Petitioner had earlier moved this Court in W.P.(S). No. 423 of 2010 and vide order dated 21.04.2017, this Court was pleased to quash the enquiry report, order of disciplinary authority as well as the order passed by the appellate authority and the matter was remitted back to the disciplinary authority to consider the case of petitioner on quantum of punishment. (II) In compliance of the Court’s order, the disciplinary authority by modifying the order of dismissal passed order of withholding of annual increment for one year amounting to one black mark and further direction was passed for non-payment of salary for intervening period on the principle of ‘No Work No Pay’. The theory of ‘No Work No Pay’ cannot be applied as a rule of thumb. It has to be seen in what circumstances, the employee was prevented from discharging his duties. In the instant case, it was compelling circumstances, because of the order of dismissal, the petitioner was kept out of service and did not allow to perform his duties. It appears that it was the respondents who were responsible for keeping the petitioner out of service. (III) It is not a case that charges have not been proved by the enquiry officer, rather, the petitioner has been found guilty of the charges but the said enquiry report was found non est in the eyes of law and was quashed and set aside by this Court. Based on that enquiry report, which has been set aside by this Court as non est in the eyes of law, the disciplinary authority could not have proceeded further. (IV) Further, once order of dismissal has been quashed and the petitioner has been ordered to be reinstated into service, he was also entitled for salary of the period of dismissal to reinstatement. 8. (IV) Further, once order of dismissal has been quashed and the petitioner has been ordered to be reinstated into service, he was also entitled for salary of the period of dismissal to reinstatement. 8. Here, the enquiry report has been found to be non est in the eyes of law and hence, the disciplinary authority was precluded from coming into any conclusion regarding guilt of the petitioner. In view of the order passed by this Court earlier, it was open for the disciplinary authority to consider the case of petitioner only on quantum of punishment. Earlier this Court in W.P.S. No. 423 of 2010 had clearly held that in the departmental proceeding obviously there has been departure from compliance of the Rule 826 of the Police Manual, which amounted to procedural irregularities. Hence, it would be profitable to quote Rule-826 of the Police Manual, which reads as under: “826. Discrimination necessary in awarding punishments.— The punishment awarded should be in confirmity with the gravity of offence with which the officer is charged and offences involving moral turpitude shall be carefully discriminated from smaller wrong doings. It should also be borne in mind that the previous record of service of the officer concerned, if it is not already included in the charge of the proceeding shall not be taken into account for determining the quantum of punishment. The objective of awarding punishment is firstly to keep a record of the wrong doing of the officer-and secondly as a measure of correction to alert him to improve his work and conduct. Several punishments awarded in one lot such as dining inspections which do not provide an opportunity to the delinquent officer to improve himself are not likely to be helpful, In any case, the punishment cannot be awarded without carefully considering the defence of the delinquent officer. Before issuing orders of minor punishment, it is necessary to apprise the delinquent of the substance of the charges against him and he should be given adequate opportunity for defence. Alter this has been ensured, the punishment can be awarded. Before issuing orders of minor punishment, it is necessary to apprise the delinquent of the substance of the charges against him and he should be given adequate opportunity for defence. Alter this has been ensured, the punishment can be awarded. However in the case of major punishments (see Rule 828) formal proceedings in P. M. Form No. 178 will have to be drawn up.” From the perusal of the said rule, it can comfortably be inferred that before passing an order of punishment whether it is minor or major, it is the requirement of law that the petitioner was put to notice. However, in instant case neither in the earlier proceeding nor in the present proceeding, any notice was given to the petitioner before passing the order of punishment. 9. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondents that petitioner has been denied salary of the period because he did not produce any certificate regarding ‘not gainfully employed during the period of dismissal till reinstatement’ as per Rule-96 of the Service Code. The said argument of learned counsel for the respondents is also not tenable in the eyes of law as it was equally incumbent upon the respondents to prove that the petitioner was gainfully employed. Since the same has not been proved by the respondent-State, the argument of learned counsel for the respondents in this regard is not acceptable to this Court. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 has held as under: “38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments.” 11. The sole issue in the instant case and as per the relief sought for by the petitioner is as to whether the petitioner is entitled for full back wages of the period from dismissal to reinstatement or not ? The principle of law gets reflected from a decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in G.T. Lad v. Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd., reported in (1979) 1 SCC 590 , wherein the Hon’ble Court has held that where reinstatement has been directed by the Court, the entire back wages must fall as a matter of course. The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under: “10. A point which requires to be clarified and has been brought to the notice of the Court after the judgment was delivered relates to back wages from September 19, 1972 to the date of reinstatement. The rule in such cases is that where reinstatement has been directed by the Court, the entire back wages must follow as a matter of course. Of course there is a discretion in the Court having regard to special circumstances if any to modify this normal rule. In the present case the period stretches over six years and Shri Sachin Chaudhary brings to our notice the fact that back wages have to be computed, if ordered in full, on a much higher scale because of two settlements which have raised the scales of wages substantially. While there is no case specifically put forward that the workmen concerned have been employed elsewhere during this period, still we take a total view of the whole case and direct that for the entire period from 1972 to the date of reinstatement, 75 per cent of the wages will be paid to all the workmen concerned on the scales and revised scales as the case may be.” In case of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., reported (1979) 2 SCC 80 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a straitjacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the Rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (see Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield [(1891) AC 173, 179]). Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109 has held as under: “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Dayanand Chakrawarty, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 595 . Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. Ram Bahadur Yadav, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 389 has held as under: “19. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. Ram Bahadur Yadav, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 389 has held as under: “19. Opposing the award of back wages, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] . Grant of back wages depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In the aforesaid case, while dealing with grant of back wages, this Court has held that in the case of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is normal rule and the adjudicating authority to take into consideration the length of service of the employee, nature of misconduct, financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. Coming to the case on hand, the respondent was not given any opportunity to defend his case at all. It is clearly well settled that any amount of suspicion cannot be equated to proof. Keeping in mind ratio in the judgment of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] , we are of the considered opinion that grant of 50% of back wages is just and fair in the facts and circumstances of the case. The judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would not, in any way, support their case.” 12. Admittedly, the petitioner was a member of disciplined force and any kind of misconduct whatsoever cannot be tolerated in a disciplined force. The petitioner, after reinstatement was entitled for full salary but in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to grant only 25% of the back wages to the petitioner i.e. from 31.08.1998 to 19.06.2017. The Hon’ble Apex Court in plethora of judgments has held that as and when the order of termination is set aside, the workman is entitled for back-wages but as far as quantum is concerned, it depends upon the judicial discretion taking into consideration the nature of charges against the employee and the pleadings based on the evidence regarding gainful employment. 13. 13. Let the amount of 25% of back wages be paid to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. If the same is not paid within the said period, the amount shall carry a statutory interest of 6% per annum. 14. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.