JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. 1. Legality, propriety and correctness of Order dated 30.04.2022, passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Biswanath Chariali, is put to challenge in this Criminal Revision Petition, under Section 397 read with Section 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, the learned Court below has dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner namely, Md. Offijol Hoque, seeking custody of one seized Tractors, bearing Registration No. AS-12-BC-2124, being the registered owner of the same. 3. The factual background leading to the filing of this present Revision Petition is briefly stated as under: “On 23.03.2022, at about 10.30 A.M. the Forest Range Officer, Crime Investigation Range, Biswanath Chariali received information about killing of one wild Asiatic Buffalo, which was coming out of the 6th Addition area, in search of food and was killed by some people of Balidubi area. Based on said information, he conducted search operation with local police in Balidubi area, adjoining the 6th Addition area of Kaziranga National Park and Tiger Reserve and during the search operation, fresh meat and full skin of the wild Asiatic Buffalo was recovered from the house of one Md. Hazarat Ali, who is the brother of one Rahmat Ali of Balidubi Village, and seized the same in presence of witnesses. Thereafter on 13.04.2022, the Forest Range Officer, Crime Investigation Range, Biswanath Chariali seized the tractor from the petitioner’s house bearing Registration No. AS-12-BC-2124, preparing Seizure List. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed one petition before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate Biswanath Chariali, seeking custody of the seized Tractor bearing Registration No. AS-12-BC-2124. But, the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, after perusing the case record and also perusing the report of the I.O. has rejected the petition.” 4. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court challenging the impugned order passed by the learned Court below on the ground that: (1) The learned court has committed error both in law and in facts by holding that the Zimma petition cannot be allowed as the seized vehicle will be required for the purpose of investigation. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court challenging the impugned order passed by the learned Court below on the ground that: (1) The learned court has committed error both in law and in facts by holding that the Zimma petition cannot be allowed as the seized vehicle will be required for the purpose of investigation. (2) The learned court below has failed to appreciate that the vehicle was seized on 13.04.2022 and the investigating agency got sufficient time for investigation and that unless the vehicle in question is released in the custody of the petitioner, the same would be damaged completely and thereby the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss. 5. Heard Mr. N. Uddin, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. D. Gogoi, learned Standing counsel for the Forest Department. 6. Mr. N. Uddin, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after seizure of the vehicle on 13.04.2022, the same has been lying unattended in the P.S. Campus and exposing to the sun and rain, and its value is diminishing day by day. Mr. N. Uddin further submits that the petitioner has been seeking only interim custody of the Tractor and in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283, the petitioner is entitled to the same and that he will produce the same before the Court as and when necessary. Mr. Uddin, therefore, contended to allow the petition. 7. On the other hand, Mr. D. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel, Forest Department has vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the Authorized Officer has already started confiscation proceeding of the seized Tractor and informed him about the same vide Letter No. B/WBC/OFFENCE/935-37, dated 11.05.2022, and notice has been issued to the petitioner asking him to show-cause as to why the seized vehicle should not be confiscated to the State within seven days. Mr. Gogoi further submits that neither the learned Court below nor this Court can release the seized vehicle after initiation of the confiscation proceeding. Mr. Gogoi, therefore, contended to dismiss the petition. Mr. Gogoi has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Karnataka vs. K. Krishnan, (2000) 7 SCC 80 , wherein it has been held that any forest produce and the tools, boats, vehicles, cattle, etc. Mr. Gogoi, therefore, contended to dismiss the petition. Mr. Gogoi has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Karnataka vs. K. Krishnan, (2000) 7 SCC 80 , wherein it has been held that any forest produce and the tools, boats, vehicles, cattle, etc. used in commission of the offence, which are liable to be forfeiture, should not be released, and the provision law are to be strictly complied with and followed for the purpose of achieving the object for which the Act was enacted and liberal approach is uncalled for. Mr. Gogoi also referred to an order of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the State of Assam vs. Chinglen Singh, Crl. Pet. No. 355/2022, dated 26.04.2022 and Rafikul Islam vs. State of Assam, Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 16/2022, dated 29.04.2022. 8. Having heard the submissions of the learned advocates of both the sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents paced on record and also perused the case laws referred by the learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 9. It appears that the Offence No. CIR/04 of 2022, dated 23.03.2022, was registered under Section 9, 49(B) and 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 and (Assam Amendment) Act, 2009. It also appears that the Tractor was seized on 13.04.2022, from the possession of the petitioner. Further it appears from the Letter No. CIR/07/2022/406-07, dated 19.05.2022, issued by the Forest Range Officer to the Special Public Prosecutor, Gauhati High Court stating that confiscation proceeding, under section 39(1) and 50(8) of Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, has already been started in respect of seized Tractor bearing Registration No. AS-12-BC-2124, and that the Tractor was used for hunting of wild buffalo at Balidubi area under Biswanath Chariali and that ownership of the vehicle is not being identified, and therefore, it is prayed for dismissing the petition. Now, what left to be seen is whether a seized vehicle, in respect of which a confiscation proceeding has already been started can be released in the custody of the petitioner, pending such proceeding. 10. Now, what left to be seen is whether a seized vehicle, in respect of which a confiscation proceeding has already been started can be released in the custody of the petitioner, pending such proceeding. 10. In the case of State of Karnataka vs. K.A. Kunchindammed, (2002) 9 SCC 90 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with somewhat similar provisions under the Karnataka Forest Act held as follows: “23.......The position is made clear by the non-obstante clause in the relevant provisions giving overriding effect to the provisions in the Act over other statutes and laws. The necessary corollary of such provisions is that in a case where the Authorized Officer is empowered to confiscate the seized forest produce on being satisfied that an offence under the Act has been committed thereof the general power vested in the Magistrate for dealing with interim custody/release of the seized materials under Cr.P.C. has to give way. The Magistrate while dealing with a case of any seizure of forest produce under the Act should examine whether the power to confiscate the seized forest produce is vested in the Authorized Officer under the Act and if he finds that such power is vested in the Authorized Officer then he has no power to pass an order dealing with interim custody/release of the seized material. This, in our view, will help in proper implementation of provisions of the special Act and will help in advancing the purpose and object of the statute. If in such cases power to grant interim custody/release of the seized forest produce is vested in the Magistrate then it will be defeating the very scheme of the Act. Such a consequence is to be avoided. 24. From the statutory provisions and the analysis made in the foregoing paragraphs the position that emerges is that the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge were right in holding that on facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is the Authorized Officer who is vested with the power to pass order of interim custody of the vehicle and not the Magistrate. The High Court was in error in taking a view to the contrary and in setting aside the orders passed by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge on that basis.” 11. The High Court was in error in taking a view to the contrary and in setting aside the orders passed by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge on that basis.” 11. It is to be mentioned here that while dealing with similar issues, in the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Sujit Kumar Rana, AIR 2004 SC 1851 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that vehicle seized for committing forest offence was not normally to be released to the party till culmination of all proceedings in respect of the forest offence as the particular approach in the matter would perpetuate commission of more offence with respect to the forest and its produce which, if not prevented is bound to affect the mother earth and the atmosphere surrounding it. 12. Again, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Kallo Bai, (2017) 14 SCC 502 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is apparent that Section 15 gives independent power to the authority concerned, but confiscation of the article as mentioned there under, even before the guilt is completely established. This power can be exercised by the officer concerned if he is satisfied that the said object was utilized during the commission of a forest offence, and protection is provided for the owners of the vehicle/articles if they are able to prove that they took reasonable care and precaution as envisaged under Section 5 of Section 15 of the ‘Adhiniyam’ and said offence was committed without their knowledge and connivance. It is also held that criminal prosecution is distinct from confiscation proceeding. The two proceedings are different and parallel, each having a distinct purpose. The object of confiscation proceeding is to enable speedy and effective adjudication with regard to confiscation of the produce and the means used for committing the offence while the object of the prosecution is to punish the offender. The scheme of ‘Adhiniyam’ prescribed an independent procedure for confiscation. The intention of separate proceeding is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop further misuse of the vehicle. 13. Thereafter, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Uday Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 733 , Hon’ble Supreme Court again held that: “29. The scheme of ‘Adhiniyam’ prescribed an independent procedure for confiscation. The intention of separate proceeding is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop further misuse of the vehicle. 13. Thereafter, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Uday Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 733 , Hon’ble Supreme Court again held that: “29. Our analysis of the amendments brought by MP Act 25 of 1983 to the Indian Forest Act 1927 leads to the conclusion that specific provisions have been made for the seizure and confiscation of forest produce and of tools, boats, vehicles and articles used in the commission of offences. 29.1. Upon a seizure under Section 52(1), the officer effecting the seizure has to either produce the property 27 Writ Petition No 18818 of 2017 decided on 15 February 2018 before the Authorized Officer or to make a report of the seizure under sub-section (2) of Section 52. Upon being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, the Authorized Officer is empowered, for reasons to be recorded, to confiscate the forest produce together with the tools, vehicles, boats and articles used in its commission. Before confiscating any property under sub-section (3), the Authorized Officer is required to send an intimation of the initiation of the proceedings for the confiscation of the property to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. Where it is intended to immediately launch a criminal proceeding, a report of the seizure is made to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. 29.2. The order of confiscation under Section 52(3) is subject to an appeal under Section 52-A and a revision under Section 52-B. Subsection (5) of Section 52-B imparts finality to the order of the Court of Sessions in revision notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the Cr.P.C. and provides that it shall not be called into question before any court. 29.3. Section 52-C stipulates that on the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate under sub-section (4) of Section 52, no court, tribunal or authority, other than an Authorized Officer, an Appellate Authority or Court of Sessions (under Sections 52, 52-A and 52-B) shall have jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property in regard to which confiscation proceedings have been initiated. Sub-Section (1) of Section 52-C has a non-obstante provision which operates notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Forest Act 1927 or in any other law for the time being in force. The only saving is in respect of an officer duly empowered by the State government for directing the immediate release of a property seized under Section 52, as provided in Section 61. Hence, upon the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate of the initiation of confiscation proceedings under sub-section (4)(a) of Section 52, the bar of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 52-C is clearly attracted. 29.4. The scheme contained in the amendments enacted to the Indian Forest Act 1927 in relation to the State of Madhya Pradesh, makes it abundantly clear that the direction which was issued by the High Court in the present case, in a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to the Magistrate to direct the interim release of the vehicle, which had been seized, was contrary to law. The jurisdiction under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. was not available to the Magistrate, once the Authorized Officer initiated confiscation proceedings.” 14. The legal proposition that can be crystallized from the ratios laid down in the cases discussed herein above is that pending confiscation proceeding, a vehicle seized under Forest Laws, cannot be released in the interim custody of the owner. And the jurisdiction under section 451 of the Code of Criminal procedure is not available to the courts when confiscation proceeding is initiated. 15. Thus, keeping the above principle in mind, whiles the facts and circumstances of the case in hand are analyzed in the light of the relevant provision of law, we find sufficient force in the submission of Mr. D. Gogoi, the learned Standing counsel for the Forest Department. The case law referred by him, i.e. K. Krishnan (Supra) and the order dated 29.04.2022, and 26.04.2022, passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court also strengthened his submission. 16. Since the authorized officer has already started the confiscation proceeding in respect of the seized vehicle, this Court is not empowered to release the seized vehicle in the custody of the petitioner during pendency of the said proceeding; otherwise it will frustrate the object of enacting the relevant provision. The submissions, so made by Mr. Uddin, learned counsel for the petitioner, received due consideration of this court. The submissions, so made by Mr. Uddin, learned counsel for the petitioner, received due consideration of this court. But, in view of the Tractor being seized under special statute and separate mechanism is provided for dealing with the same, the ratio laid down in the case Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai (supra) to the considered opinion of this court would not come into his aid. There is also nothing on the record to show that the vehicle was used for committing the offence without the knowledge and connivance of the petitioner. 17. In the result, I find no merit in the present Criminal Revision Petition and the same is dismissed. The parties have to bear their own costs.