JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 326 of 2021 The instant Interlocutory Application has been filed for condonation of delay of 55 days in filing the instant appeal. 2. No counter affidavit to the Interlocutory Application has been filed on behalf of the respondent. 3. Heard the parties. 4. Having regard to the averments made in this Interlocutory Application and considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 5. Accordingly, I.A. No. 326 of 2021 is allowed and delay of 55 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 573 of 2019 6. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard on merit today itself. 7. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, has been preferred against order/judgment dated 18.06.2019 passed in W.P. (L) No. 2089 of 2017 whereby and whereunder the Award dated 21.07.2016, passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 40 of 2013 by which the petitioner was held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground, was quashed and set aside by allowing the writ petition filed on behalf of Management-writ petitioner. 8. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings in the writ petition, which require to be enumerated, are as hereunder : One Dhanua Kamin (mother of the claimant) who was in regular employment of M/s BCCL died in harness on 06.04.1992. It is the case of the claimant that there was an agreement between the parties dated 10.04.1992 for providing employment to one dependent of the deceased after he/she attains majority. On the strength of said agreement, the claimant-son sometimes in the year 1998 applied for appointment on compassionate ground and was sent for Medical Board for determination of his age, but, in spite of repeated representations no employment was provided to the dependent-son. Being aggrieved, the dependent-son, namely, Dharambir Beldar preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5267 of 2007, which was dismissed vide order dated 01.07.2008. Being aggrieved, the dependent-son, namely, Dharambir Beldar preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5267 of 2007, which was dismissed vide order dated 01.07.2008. After dismissal of the writ petition, the claimant through Union, namely Koyala Ispat Mazdoor Panchayat raised an industrial dispute, which culminated into reference being Reference Case No. 40 of 2013, wherein reference was made to the effect : “Whether the action of the management of Madhuban Colliery under Barora Area of M/S BCCL in denying employment to Sri Dharambir Beldar, depenant son of Late Dhanwa Kamin in violation of Agreement dated 10.04.1992 is fair and justified? To what relief the dependant son of deceased workman is entitled?” The Tribunal answered the reference in favour of claimant and hold that he is entitled to get employment, as would appear from paragraph 15 of the Award dated 21.07.2016, which reads as under : “15. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I hold that action of the management of Madhuban Colliery under Barora Area of M/S BCCL in denying employment to Shri Dharambir Beldar son of Late Dhanwa Kamin in violation of agreement dt. 10.04.1992 is not fair and justified. Hence he is entitled to get employment within 30 days from the publication of the award.” The management, being aggrieved with the said award, preferred writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 2089 of 2017, which was allowed quashing the Award dated 21.07.2016 passed in Reference Case No. 40 of 2013, against which, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 9. Mr. Ajay Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant-claimant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that even though the writ petition, being W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007, was dismissed vide order dated 01.07.2008 but since there was a reference for adjudication of the dispute pertaining to justification of the decision of the management by which the writ petition was denied appointment on compassionate ground, the Tribunal has considered the factual aspect and considering the deposition put forth on behalf of the parties answered the reference holding the decision of the management of not providing employment to the claimant to be unjustified. But the learned Single Judge without appreciating the fact that the Tribunal has considered the order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5267 of 2007 holding therein that the writ Court has not considered the memorandum of settlement dated 10.04.1992 for providing employment to one dependent of the deceased, therefore even after dismissal of the writ petition the principal of res judicata will not be applicable and in that view of the matter the order passed by learned Single Judge suffers an error. Therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 10. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for respondent-BCCL has submitted that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in answering the reference by giving complete go by the order passed by Co-ordinate learned Single Bench of this Court whereby claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground was rejected on merit and the aforesaid order has never been challenged. According to learned counsel once the order passed by Co-ordinate learned Single Bench has attained its finality the Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter while answering the reference but having not done so the Tribunal has committed gross illegality and as such after considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, if the learned Single Judge interfered with the Award, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. It has further been submitted that even the writ petitioner cannot be held entitled for appointment taking into consideration the fact that the bread-earner has died in the year 1992 and after fifteen years in the year 2007 writ petition was filed and as of now thirty years has passed. Therefore, the immediate requirement for getting the appointment on compassionate ground has already been meted out. Therefore, the claimant cannot be said to be in need for appointment on compassionate ground. Therefore, submission has been made that the order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 12. The admitted fact, in this case, is that the deceased-employee died in harness on 06.04.1992. Therefore, submission has been made that the order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 12. The admitted fact, in this case, is that the deceased-employee died in harness on 06.04.1992. Thereafter, an application for compassionate appointment was made by the claimant but when no employment was provided, he preferred a writ petition invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being W.P.(S) No. 5267 of 2007, which was dismissed vide order dated 01.07.2008. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under : “If no decision was taken on petitioner’s application for his appointment on compassionate ground said to have been made in the year 1998, petitioner should have moved the competent court of law within reasonable time. This writ petition was filed after 9 years of making such application. Petitioner has survived all these years. It has been held in (1994) 4 SCC 138 -Umesh Kumar Nagpal that the consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercises at any time in future, and that such appointment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. Paragraph 11 of (2006) 5 SC 766 State of J & K and others V. Sajad Ahmad Mir reads as follows:- “We may also observe that when the Division Bench of the High Court was considering the case of the applicant holding that he had sought “compassion”, the Bench ought to have considered the larger issued as well and it is that such an appointment is an exception to the general rule. Normally, an employment in the Government or other public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates who can come forward to apply and compete with each other. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of the sole breadwinner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the setback. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of the sole breadwinner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the setback. Once it is proved that in spite of the death of the breadwinner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say “goodbye” to the normal rule of appointment and to show favor to one at the cost of interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.” In the circumstances, the respondents cannot be directed to consider the petitioner’s case of compassionate appointment. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.” Further admitted fact in this case is that the order passed in writ petition, being W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007, was never assailed rather the claimant raised an industrial dispute making reference being Reference Case No. 40 of 2013, for adjudication of dispute, as referred and quoted above. The Tribunal answered the reference in favour of claimant holing the claimant entitled to get appointment on compassionate ground. The management-company, being aggrieved with the said award, preferred writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 2089 of 2017, which was allowed quashing Award dated 21.07.2016 passed in Reference Case No. 40 of 2013, against which, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 13. This Court, from the materials available on record as also from the argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the parties, has gathered therefrom that following issues fell for consideration : I. Whether the Award passed by the Tribunal, after dismissal of the writ petition [W.P.(S) No. 5267 of 2007] by co-ordinate learned Single Judge Bench of this Court whereby claim for appointment on compassionate ground was denied on merit, can be said to be justified holing the writ petitioner entitled to get appointment on compassionate ground? II. Whether after lapse of 30 years, as on date, the claimant can be held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground? 14. Issue No. I : Admittedly, herein the claimant before raising the dispute under Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking direction upon the management-company to provide appointment on compassionate ground. 14. Issue No. I : Admittedly, herein the claimant before raising the dispute under Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking direction upon the management-company to provide appointment on compassionate ground. The co-ordinate learned Single Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 01.07.2008, relevant portion of which has been referred and quoted above, from perusal of which it is evident that the learned Single Judge has decided the case on merit, i.e., considering the principle of delay and laches in approaching the High Court seeking direction for appointment on compassionate ground. The aforesaid order was never challenged by the writ petitioner-claimant and as such the order attained finality. The writ petitioner, after dismissal of writ petition, raised a dispute under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 wherein a reference was made having been referred before the Tribunal for its adjudication. The Tribunal passed the Award dated 21.07.2016 answering the reference in favour of claimant and hold entitled the petitioner to get employment on compassionate ground. It appears from the award, as appended with the paper book that the fact about order dated 01.07.2008 passed by learned Single Bench in W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007 was placed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal taking into consideration the fact that there was Memorandum of Settlement between the parties on 10.04.1992, the same having been not considered by learned Co-ordinate Single Bench, therefore, the said order has not been relied upon by the Tribunal and considering the content of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.1992 passed the award answering the reference in favour of claimant and against the management. It is not in dispute, so far as the settled position of law that the order passed by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India binds the Courts and Tribunals falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court and in that view of the matter, once the High Court has passed the order in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, i.e., the order dated 01.07.2008 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007 has attained its finality, therefore, it is not available to the Tribunal to give the said order go by rather it has to follow the same. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the Tribunal has not considered the effect of order passed by Co-ordinate learned Single Bench dated 01.07.2008 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007 in right perspective, therefore, the award passed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be justified reason being that the Co-ordinate learned Single Bench had already rejected the claim of the petitioner on the principle of delay and laches as also on the ground that the claimant has approached the court of law fairly after a long period and by that time the very object and intent of the appointment on compassionate ground has vanished. Accordingly, the finding recorded by the Tribunal in the Award cannot be said to be justified one and as such Issue No. I is decided against the claimant and in favour of management. 15. Issue No. II The proposition of law is well settled, so far as appointment on compassionate ground is concerned to the effect that very object and intent to provide appointment on compassionate ground to meet the immediate succor so that the dependent of the deceased-employee may not die with starvation. In the instant case, admittedly death of the workman occurred in the year 1992 and the dependent-son approached the court of law for the first time in the year 2007 by filing wit petition being W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007 and as of now 30 years has lapsed. 16. It requires to refer herein that so far as the writ petition is concerned, it is true that there would be no application of Limitation Act or no limitation is provided but certainly there is issue of delay and laches which is to be considered by the High Court while issuing the writ as has been held in New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh & Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ] in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted as hereunder : 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India). In State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India). In State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, in paragraph 7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which reads as hereunder – “7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” 17. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has the duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. It is, thus, evident that the principle of delay and laches is to be taken into consideration by the writ court while issuing a writ but herein admittedly this Court has been approached after lapse of 15 years from the date of death and as such, the case of the writ petitioner is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. It is, thus, evident that the principle of delay and laches is to be taken into consideration by the writ court while issuing a writ but herein admittedly this Court has been approached after lapse of 15 years from the date of death and as such, the case of the writ petitioner is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. The explanation furnished by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the order rejecting his claim has been communicated in the year 2008 and, therefore, the writ petition has been filed after lapse of four years, that explanation is also not acceptable to us for two reasons, firstly, even accepting that the order rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner has been communicated in the year 2008 the question is what the writ petitioner was doing from the date of making application till the order said to have been communicated to him and secondly, even accepting the version of the writ petitioner that in the year 2008 the order rejecting his claim has been communicated to him even thereafter, after lapse of four years the writ petition has been filed and, therefore, according to our considered view, it is a case where the explanation furnished by the writ petitioner cannot be accepted. 18. Here, admittedly the workman died in the year 1992 and the dependent-son approached the court of law for the first time in the year 2007 by filing wit petition being W.P. (S) No. 5267 of 2007 and as of now 30 years as lapsed, therefore, the very object and intent of the appointment on compassionate ground has vanished. 19. This Court has also considered the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 897 of 2021, disposed of on 09.04.2021 [2021 SCC Online SC 299] wherein it has been held, after taking into consideration the nature of appointment on compassionate ground under the National Coal Wage Agreement and taking into consideration the fact that from the date of death substantial period has gone and as such, the very object of the compassionate appointment which is for providing immediate succour to the family of the deceased employee, the concerned respondent has been held not entitled for compassionate appointment. The relevant paragraph (Para 9) is being quoted as hereunder :- “9. The relevant paragraph (Para 9) is being quoted as hereunder :- “9. We are in agreement with the High Court that the reasons given by the employer for denying compassionate appointment to the Respondent’s son are not justified. There is no bar in the National Coal Wage Agreement for appointment of the son of an employee who has suffered civil death. In addition, merely because the respondent is working, her son cannot be denied compassionate appointment as per the relevant clauses of the National Coal Wage Agreement. However, the Respondent’s husband is missing since 2002. Two sons of the Respondent who are the dependents of her husband as per the records, are also shown as dependents of the Respondent. It cannot be said that there was any financial crisis created immediately after Respondent’s husband went missing in view of the employment of the Respondent. Though the reasons given by the employer to deny the relief sought by the Respondent are not sustainable, we are convinced that the Respondent’s son cannot be given compassionate appointment at this point of time. The application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.” 20. Accordingly, Issue No. II is decided in favour of management and against the claimant and as such the claimant cannot be held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground after lapse of 30 years. 21. This Court, therefore, following the principle laid down in the cases referred hereinabove, is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge since has been passed after taking into consideration the facts in entirety hereinabove, therefore, we are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference by this Court. 22. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove and considering the legal position, as has been propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court, referred hereinabove, is of the considered view that no case is made out showing interference with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 23. 22. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove and considering the legal position, as has been propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court, referred hereinabove, is of the considered view that no case is made out showing interference with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 23. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.