Sukul Yashoda v. State of A. P. , Rep. by Principal Secretary, Revenue Department
2022-08-01
D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Korrapati Subbarao, learned counsel for the 7th respondent, learned Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for respondents 1 to 6. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri P.S.P. Suresh Kumar argued the matter at length. He points out that the petitioner was given ryotwari Patta for Ac.1-19 cents situated at Tiruchanur Village, on 23.03.2013. However, the 7th respondent herein has filed an appeal which was entertained by the 3rd respondent and disposed of by orders dated 24.05.2017. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the appeal, if any, should be filed within 60 days from the date of order. Yet, without a delay condonation application or even a leave application the Appeal was filed and the same was entertained. He also points out that a specific objection was raised in the counter about this aspect of delay and the lack of delay condonation of application. Despite the same, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Sub-Collector passed the impugned order on the ground that the date of knowledge is the critical aspect for the computation of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that two judgments relied upon by the Sub-Collector for coming to the conclusion are not under the provisions of this Act. They are inter se parties. Apart from this, learned counsel for the petitioner raised a serious objection about the power, competency and jurisdiction of the Sub-Collector to go into the complicated questions of fraud and decide the right/title etc., of the respondents in an Appeal under the Act in question. It is his contention that the Sub-Collector has gone beyond his jurisdiction and decided the matters, which are beyond the scope of the power. He points out that specific grounds have been taken in the Writ Petition with regard to this. Therefore, he prays for an order to set aside the impugned order dated 24.05.2017. He also relied upon the judgment reported in Veerappa v Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor, 2002 (5) ALD 121 wherein it is held that the appellate authority is a creature of the statute, unless the power is specifically given to him he cannot condone the delay. He points out that this is also a decision rendered under Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1956. 3.
He points out that this is also a decision rendered under Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1956. 3. For the 7th respondent, learned counsel Sri K. Subba Rao argues the matter. He points out that the 7th respondent is not a party to the original proceedings in which patta was granted. According to him the 7th respondent is claiming independent title to a part of the property. He asserted that the 7th respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the property. Therefore, she has a right in Appeal. 4. Sri K. Subba Rao, in reply to the issue of contention of delay etc., relies upon the Division Bench judgment reported in Maharajah Alak Narayana Society of Arts and Science v Special Deputy Tahsildar (Inams), parvathipuram, 1977 (2) AndhWR 295 . He points out that the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the judgment related to the dispute inter se parties who were before the authority. Sri K. Subba Rao points out that the judgment he relies upon is a case where the person who has filed an appeal was not a party to the original proceedings. He draws the attention of this Court, particularly the paragraph 8 of the judgment and argues that the person who is not added as a party in the original proceedings or who complains that without any notice to him patta was granted etc., can file an appeal. Sri Subba Rao points out that in this Division Bench case also the appellate authority rejected the appeal filed by the 3rd party on the ground that there is no application for condonation etc. In paragraph-8 of the judgment the Division Bench held that the appellate authority was wrong in the thinking that there was a delay and made a further mistake in thinking that the appellate authority has no power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. Learned counsel Sri K. Subba Rao also submits in all fairness that the impugned order is not a final order and the matter was remanded to Inams Deputy Tahsildar for a fresh enquiry. 5. Learned counsel arguing for the official respondents support the orders passed and states that an order was passed on merits and the Courts should not interfere. 6. The essential point urged is about the delay and condonation of the delay.
5. Learned counsel arguing for the official respondents support the orders passed and states that an order was passed on merits and the Courts should not interfere. 6. The essential point urged is about the delay and condonation of the delay. An issue is raised about the power of the authority to entertain the appeal without any delay condonation. While the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner talks of the power of a Tribunal to entertain an application and also states that such Tribunal is a creature of the statute, in the opinion of this Court the Division Bench judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is applicable as the facts are closer to the facts on hand. The essential difference is that in the 2nd judgment the Division Bench notices that it is a case of a person, who was not party to the original proceedings. This, in the opinion of this Court makes an essential difference. This Court, therefore, decided to follow the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, wherein it is clearly held that the question of condonation of delay etc., will not arise if a person is not a party to the original proceedings. The issue of the condonation of delay etc., is not very material in the opinion of this Court. 7. However, Sri P.S.P. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is on a stronger wicket as far as the facts and issues, which are dealt with in the orders are concerned. This Court also agrees that the Sub-Collector has entered into areas which cannot exactly be decided by him. Nevertheless, as the issues are left open, the matter is remanded to Inam Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor and this Court is of the opinion that nothing further needs to be said on the correctness of the findings. The issue about the title to the property and the alleged differences in the survey numbers that are strongly urged by Sri P.S.P. Suresh Kumar are matters of fact which this Court while exercising the power under Article 226 cannot go into. Nevertheless, a prima facie reading of the title deed show that the 7th respondent is claiming some right in the property with Sy.No.295/2 in which also the petitioner claims rights. This issue is, however, left open.
Nevertheless, a prima facie reading of the title deed show that the 7th respondent is claiming some right in the property with Sy.No.295/2 in which also the petitioner claims rights. This issue is, however, left open. No decision is given by this Court on the right title and interest of the 7th respondent. 8. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the Writ Petition should be disposed of leaving it open to the Inam Deputy Tahsildar to decide the issue afresh by conducting a de novo enquiry. Both the parties are given liberty to raise all the legal and factual pleas that they have possession. 9. The de novo enquiry entire exercise should be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that the opinions expressed in this order are only for the purpose of disposal of this Writ Petition only. The authority concerned shall hear and decide the matter as per law and on its own merits. 10. At this stage, learned Government Pleader for Revenue states that as per his recollection recently a G.O., was issued transferring the powers of the Inam Deputy Tahsildar. Therefore, the competent authority to whom the powers have been conferred shall decide this matter. There shall be no order as to costs. 11. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Applications, if any, pending shall also stand closed.