JUDGMENT : 1. This is an Insurance Company's appeal arising out of the judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Faizabad dated 19.01.2015, partly allowing the claim petition. 2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are these: Dinesh Kumar Yadav along with his friends, Ajay Kumar and Shekhar went over to Allahabad (now Prayagraj) on the Mauni Amawasya (Kumbh Mela). He was returning home after taking a holy dip in the intervening night of 10/11.02.2013 on board his friend's Bolero SUV bearing Registration No. UP-32EP-6819. The vehicle was proceeding on the Allahabad-Lucknow National Highway. As the SUV reached Village Pahuranwa within the local limits of Police Station Bachhranwa, District Raebareli on the highway, a truck bearing Registration No. UP-33T-2516, that was moving ahead of the Bolero, without signalling to stop, was suddenly and negligently halted by its driver, causing the SUV, wherein Dinesh Kumar Yadav and his friends were travelling, to lose control and hit the truck on its rear side. In consequence of the accident, Dinesh Kumar Yadav sustained injuries and died on the spot. His friends, Ajay and Shekhar, besides other occupants on board the SUV, sustained grievous injuries. 3. The deceased, Dinesh Kumar Yadav, it is said, was a hard working and capable man. His untimely demise left his dependents deprived and their future gloomy. The deceased had a lone child, a son aged one month at the time of his demise. It is said that Dinesh Kumar Yadav had a sweetmeat shop and he was a professional cook. He was capable at his job and was engaged on contract to cook for wedding parties far and near. It was asserted that the deceased had a minimum monthly income of Rs.15,000/-. The deceased's wife asserted that for the mental shock sustained, she was entitled to a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-and for the loss of love and affection to a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. A sum of Rs.50,000/-was spent on the deceased's funeral and last rites. According to the claimants, the future loss of earnings was a sum of Rs.24,30,000/-and future prospects were liquidated at a figure of Rs.12,15,000/-. A total compensation in the sum of Rs.43,95,000/-was claimed with 12% interest. A sum of Rs.50,000/-was spent on the deceased's funeral and last rites. According to the claimants, the future loss of earnings was a sum of Rs.24,30,000/-and future prospects were liquidated at a figure of Rs.12,15,000/-. A total compensation in the sum of Rs.43,95,000/-was claimed with 12% interest. It must be pointed out here that the claim petition was instituted on behalf of the four claimants, to wit, Smt. Nirmala Devi alias Rajpati, the deceased’s widow, Devendra Veer Yadav, the deceased’s minor son, represented by his mother and next friend, Smt. Kunti Devi and Chandrika Yadav, the deceased's mother and father, respectively. 4. Smt. Preeti Agrawal was arrayed as opposite party no. 1 to the claim petition instituted before the Tribunal. She is the owner of the truck bearing registration No. UP-33T-2516. Mohd. Raeesh was arrayed as the second opposite party, who is the driver of the offending vehicle. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited through its Regional Manager, Civil Lines, Faizabad was arrayed as opposite party no. 3 to the claim petition. The aforesaid Insurance Company are the insurers of the offending vehicle. Bhagwati Prasad is the owner of the Bolero SUV bearing Registration No. UP-32EP-6819. He is arrayed as opposite party no. 4 to the claim petition. Virendra Kumar, who is arrayed as opposite party no. 6, is the driver of the SUV. The New India Assurance Company Limited through its Regional Manager, Reedganj, Faizabad was arrayed as opposite party no. 5 to the claim petition. They are the insurers of the SUV. 5. A joint written statement was filed by the owner and the driver of the offending truck and a separate one by the truck’s insurers. Opposite parties nos.4, 5 and 6 to the claim petition, that is to say, the owner, the insurer and the driver of the SUV, all put in their separate written statements. 6. The crux of the defence taken by the owner and the driver of the offending truck is that on the date of accident, the truck was on its way to Kanpur to fetch a consignment of goods and had parked at a wayside hotel on the left hand side of the road. The driver was resting in the stationary truck, when the SUV lost control and hit the truck. It was the driver of the offending vehicle who was to entirely blame for the accident. The driver was resting in the stationary truck, when the SUV lost control and hit the truck. It was the driver of the offending vehicle who was to entirely blame for the accident. A first information of the accident was never lodged by the claimants. It was emphasized that in case the offending truck were to blame, an FIR would most certainly be lodged against its driver. The offending truck’s insurer took all substantial and technical defences. The Insurance Company took a plea that they were not in a position to say if the offending truck was insured validly with them on the date and time of accident. The claimants had not brought on record any evidence to that effect. It was also pleaded that the owner of the offending truck had to establish that all due premium had been paid and further that at the time of accident, the offending vehicle had a valid Fitness Certificate and Insurance Cover, a Registration certification, a route permit, besides duly paid up road tax and was driven by the driver under a valid Driving Licence. But, amidst these technical defences, which are almost preposterous on the state of the parties’ case and evidence, what is substantial is the Insurance Company’s defence that the Bolero hit the truck from the rear side, showing that the SUV was driven negligently. The owner of the SUV took a defence that his vehicle was plying with valid papers on the date of accident. It was driven by the sixth respondent, who held a valid licence. The SUV was being driven with due care and caution. It was, particularly, pleaded that all on board the fourth respondent’s SUV were his friends and acquaintances, who had taken a non-gratuitous ride to the Kumbh Mela for the purpose of taking a holy dip and Darshan. It is also said in the written statement that the driver of the offending vehicle says that he had parked the vehicle on the side of the road, where he was taking rest, but there were no parking lights on the vehicle, which had to be put on to park it on the side of a highway. 7. It is also said in the written statement that the driver of the offending vehicle says that he had parked the vehicle on the side of the road, where he was taking rest, but there were no parking lights on the vehicle, which had to be put on to park it on the side of a highway. 7. The Bolero’s insurers also took various pleas in their defence, should the liability fall on their shoulders, but they do say that the offending truck was suddenly and negligently stopped in its tracks, without taking any precaution to avoid an accident. The driver of the SUV, in his separate written statement, has more or less pleaded on the same lines as the owner of that vehicle. 8. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi): “(1) Whether on 10/11.02.2013 at 00:45 hours within the area of Village Pahuranwa and local limits of Police Station Bachhranwa, District Raibareli, the deceased was proceeding on the Lucknow-Allahabad National Highway along with his friends, Ajay Kumar and Shekhar, in his friend’s Bolero No. UP-32EP-6819 from the Kumbh Mela on Mauni Amawasya after a holy dip when at the place, above stated, the driver of truck No. UP-33T-2516, without giving any signal suddenly brought his vehicle negligently to a halt on the highway, which led the driver of the Bolero to lose control and hit the truck on its rear side and Dinesh Kumar Yadav, who was on board the Bolero, sustained injuries that led to his death on the spot, whereas his friends, Ajay and Shekhar, besides others, were seriously injured. (2) Whether on the above specified date, time and place, truck bearing Registration No. UP-33T-2516 involved in the accident was driven by the driver under a driving licence that was not valid and effective? (3) Whether on the aforesaid date, time and place of accident, the driver of the Bolero Car involved, bearing Registration No. UP-32EP-6819 did not have a valid and effective driving licence? (4) Whether on the date, time and place of accident, truck bearing Registration No. UP-33T-2516 did not have a valid insurance cover? (5) Whether on the date, time and place of accident, the Bolero involved in the accident bearing Registration No. UP-32EP-6819 did not have a valid and effective Insurance Cover? (4) Whether on the date, time and place of accident, truck bearing Registration No. UP-33T-2516 did not have a valid insurance cover? (5) Whether on the date, time and place of accident, the Bolero involved in the accident bearing Registration No. UP-32EP-6819 did not have a valid and effective Insurance Cover? (6) Whether the aforesaid accident is the result of a contributory negligence by the driver of Bolero bearing Registration No. UP-32EP-6819? (7) Whether the claimants are entitled to any relief? If yes, how much and from which opposite party?” 9. It must be clarified here that the four claimants are respondent nos.1 to 4 to this appeal. The offending truck’s insurer, that is to say, the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, are the appellants. The owner and the driver of the offending truck are arrayed as respondent nos.5 and 6 to this appeal. The owner and the driver of the Bolero are arrayed as respondent nos.7 and 9 here, whereas the Bolero’s insurers, the New India Assurance Company Limited, are arrayed as respondent no. 8. 10. The claimant-respondent nos. 1 to 4 shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as “the claimants” unless the context requires individual reference. The appellant-Oriental Insurance Company Limited shall hereinafter be referred to as “the Insurance Company”. The other parties shall be referred to by appropriate description. 11. The claimants, in support of their case, examined Smt. Nirmala alias Rajpati, the deceased's wife as CPW-1, besides Ajay Kumar as CPW-2. In their documentary evidence, the claimants filed through list 9 x 2, a report obtained under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a photostat copy of an extract of the GD dated 13.02.2013 from the police station, where the accident was reported. There is also a copy of an inquiry report about the accident, besides the deceased’s death certificate, his mark-sheet and a photostat copy of the autopsy report. 12. On behalf of the opposite parties to the claim petition (not the appellants here, but the owner, driver and the insurer of the Bolero), Virendra Kumar was examined as OPW-1. He proved the fact that the Bolero was plying under a valid insurance policy on the date of accident and its premium had been paid on schedule. This witness has also proved the fact that on the date of accident, he held an effective and valid driving licence, the original whereof he produced in Court. He proved the fact that the Bolero was plying under a valid insurance policy on the date of accident and its premium had been paid on schedule. This witness has also proved the fact that on the date of accident, he held an effective and valid driving licence, the original whereof he produced in Court. 13. The claim petition was tried by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Faizabad, who, by his judgment and award dated 19.01.2015, partly allowed it, awarding compensation, aggregating to the sum of Rs. 5,08,500/- together with 7% per annum simple interest from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. There are directions in the award about investment of a substantial sum of the compensation in a term deposit with a Nationalized Bank with release of a part of it in favour of the claimants, who were adults. The aforesaid award shall hereinafter be called “the impugned award”. 14. Aggrieved by the impugned award, the Insurance Company have preferred the present appeal. 15. Heard Ms. Pooja Arora, learned Advocate holding brief of Mr. S.C. Gulati, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, Mr. Taranjeet Singh Makker, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 8, Mr. Mukesh Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of claimants and Mr. Purushottam Chaurasiya, Advocate holding brief of Mr. S.C. Yadav, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 7 and 9. 16. The principal ground, on which the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has pressed this appeal, is that the driver of the ill-fated Bolero is guilty of contributory negligence, because he dashed against a stationary truck from the rear. It is further submitted that contributory negligence, which has not at all been applied by the Tribunal to apportion the liability between the offending truck and the ill-fated Bolero, is clearly discernible, even if one were to accept the claimants' case that the offending truck was abruptly brought to a halt on the highway causing the Bolero to collide with it. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has advanced her submissions more on the foot of a case that it was an abrupt halting of the vehicle that brought about the accident. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has advanced her submissions more on the foot of a case that it was an abrupt halting of the vehicle that brought about the accident. On the foot of this case, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company that contributory negligence of the driver of the Bolero cannot be excluded, because he was driving rashly and negligently, close behind the offending truck and without maintaining sufficient distance, necessary to avoid collusion, in the event of a sudden slow down or halt. In this connection, learned Counsel for the appellant has invited the attention of the Court to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989 (for short “the Regulations of 1989”) framed by the Central Government in exercise of their powers under Section 118 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 17. The learned Counsel for the claimants, on the other hand, submits that the ill-fated Bolero was not at all driven rashly or negligently or without maintaining the requisite distance from the offending truck. He submits that there is absolutely no evidence led on behalf of the owner, the driver or the Insurance Company to establish that the Bolero was moving at a fast speed and without maintaining the distance necessary to prevent a collusion, in case the vehicle moving in front of it were brought to a sudden halt. The issue about the negligence of the offending truck, and more particularly, contributory negligence of the driver operating the ill-fated Bolero, has been dealt with by the Tribunal under Issues Nos. 1 and 6. It is with reference to the findings on these issues and the relative evidence that the Insurance Company has sought to make out a case in this appeal. 18. The Tribunal has extensively referred to the evidence of CPW-1, Smt. Nirmala Devi, CPW-2, Ajay Kumar and OPW-1, Virendra Kumar, to hold it to be a case of wholesome and unshared negligence by the offending truck. 19. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, however, during the course of arguments, has drawn the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of CPW-2, Ajay Kumar dated 12.12.2014. 19. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, however, during the course of arguments, has drawn the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of CPW-2, Ajay Kumar dated 12.12.2014. The relevant part of the cross-examination of CPW-2 reads: ^^eSa cqysjks esa Mªkboj ds ihNs okyh lhV ij chp esa cSBk FkkA ;g dguk lgh gS fd cqysjks pkyd vfu;af=r gksdj rsth ls pyrs gq, lM+d ds fdukjs ihNs ls Vªd esa tkdj HkhM+ x;kA** 20. It does appear that this particular part of the cross-examination of CPW-2 went unnoticed by the Tribunal, whose judgment has proceeded on the basis that the consistent stand of all witnesses is that the offending truck was moving on the road when it was brought to an abrupt halt by its driver, leading to the accident. This Court has carefully perused the evidence of all the three witnesses, including CPW-2, Ajay Kumar and OPW-1, Virendra Kumar. So far as CPW-1, Smt. Nirmala Devi is concerned, it is common ground between parties that she is not an eye-witness of the accident. Her evidence is not of much relevance, as far as the issues of negligence and contributory negligence are concerned. However, a careful perusal of the evidence of CPW-2, Ajay Kumar spares not the slightest doubt that he is an eye-witness of the accident and one of the injured occupants on board the ill-fated vehicle. In his examination-in-chief, this witness has testified: ^^tSls gh ge yksx xzke igqjkoksa Fkkuk cNjkoka ftyk jk;cjsyh igaqps fd vkxs&vkxs tk jgk Vªd la[;k ;wih&33Vh&2516 dk pkyd fcuk fdlh ladsr ds eq[; ekxZ ij vpkud vius okgu dks ykijokghiwoZd jksd fn;k ftlls fd cqysjks dk pkyd vfu;af=r gksdj Vªd esa ihNs ls Vdjk x;k vkSj cqysjks esa cSBs lHkh yksx xEHkhj :i ls ?kk;y gks x;sA rFkk cqysjks esa cSBs esjs fe= Jh fnus'k dqekj ;kno dk nq?kZVuk esa vkbZ pksVksa ds dkj.k nq?kZVuk LFky ij gh e`R;q gks x;h FkhA** 21. CPW-2, Ajay Kumar was cross-examined at the instance of the owner and the driver of the Bolero, who were opposite parties nos.4 and 6 to the claim petition. In the cross-examination as aforesaid, it has been stated by CPW-2, Ajay Kumar, thus: ^^?kVuk Vªd ds vpkud fcuk fdlh ladsr ds :d tkus ds dkj.k ?kVhA** 22. CPW-2, Ajay Kumar was also cross-examined at the instance of the insurers of the Bolero, who were opposite party no. In the cross-examination as aforesaid, it has been stated by CPW-2, Ajay Kumar, thus: ^^?kVuk Vªd ds vpkud fcuk fdlh ladsr ds :d tkus ds dkj.k ?kVhA** 22. CPW-2, Ajay Kumar was also cross-examined at the instance of the insurers of the Bolero, who were opposite party no. 5 to the claim petition. In this part of the cross-examination, it has been stated by CPW-2 as follows: ^^;g dguk lgh gS fd ;g nq?kZVuk Vªd la[;k ;wih&33Vh&2516 ds pkyd }kjk eq[; ekxZ ij vpkud fcuk dksbZ ladsr fn;s gq, ykijokghiwoZd jksdus ls gqbZ gSA cqysjks okgu dk pkyd lhfer xfr ls okgu py jgk FkkA bl dkj.k mDr nq?kZVuk esa cqyjks pkyd dh dksbZ xyrh ugha gSA** 23. There is another very important eye-witness, who is the driver of the ill-fated Bolero. As regards the precise manner in which the accident occurred, OPW-1, Virendra Kumar, the driver of the Bolero, has testified in his examination-in-chief on 09.01.2015 as follows: ^^okgu Lokeh ds dgus ij fcuk ÁfrQy ds eSa lHkh ds lkFk dqEHk esys esa okgu pykdj x;k Fkk vkSj ykSVrs oDr fnukad 10-2-2013 dh jkf= esa yxHkx 12&1 cts Vªd la[;k ;wih 33Vh&2516 dk pkyd fcuk fdlh ladsr ds tk jgk Fkk vkSj vpkud ykijokghiwoZd Vªd jksd nsus ls nq?kZVuk dkfjr gks xbZ vkSj ftlesa fnus'k dqekj dh ekSds ij gh e`R;q gks xbZA** 24. This witness was cross-examined on behalf of the claimants, where he has described the manner of accident, thus: ^^Vªd esa esjh xkM+h ihNs ls yM+h FkhA nq?kZVuk ds le; esjh xkM+h 40 ls 50 fdŒehŒ Áfr ?kUVk dh jrkj ls FkhA Vªd esjs vkxs&vkxs tk jgk Fkk fcuk fdlh ladsr ds :dk vkSj eSa vfu;af=r gksdj ihNs ls Vdjk x;kA ;g dguk xyr gS fd okgu Lokeh dks Áfrdj nsus ls cpkus ds fy, >wBh xokgh ns jgk gawA** 25. OPW-1, Virendra Kumar was also cross-examined by the Insurance Company, who were opposite party no. 3 to the claim petition. In the relevant part of his cross-examination by the Insurance Company, OPW-1 has said: ^^;g dguk xyr gS fd Vªd ढkcs ij [kM+k FkkA ;g dguk lgh gS fd eSa Vªd esa ihNs ls ?kqlk gawA ;g dguk xyr gS fd esjh ykijokgh ds dkj.k nq?kZVuk ?kVhA** 26. The witness aforesaid was also cross-examined at the instance of the Insurance Company of the ill-fated Bolero, opposite party no. The witness aforesaid was also cross-examined at the instance of the Insurance Company of the ill-fated Bolero, opposite party no. 5 to the claim petition, where OPW-1, Virendra Kumar has stated: ^^;g nq?kZVuk Vªd la[;k ;wih 33Vh&2516 ds pkyd }kjk eq[; ekxZ ij vpkud ykijokghiwoZd jksdus ls gqbZA nq?kZVuk okys fnu eSa fcYdqy lhfer xfr ls okgu pykrs gq, vk jgk FkkA blesa esjh dksbZ ykijokgh ;k vlko/kkuh ugha FkhA bl nq?kZVuk esa lkjh xyrh Vªd okys dh FkhA** 27. It seems to this Court that the solitary discordant and out of context utterance of CPW-2, Ajay Kumar in his cross-examination at the instance of the Insurance Company, was not brought to the Tribunal's notice and the Tribunal too, somehow, glossed over the words or read one extra ^^ugh** (not) into the logical context and texture of the testimony. Had the words been noticed by the Tribunal or pointed out, the Tribunal would have certainly appreciated the evidence for the true words of it. It also seems to this Court that the words went unnoticed by the claimants and other parties too, for if they had noticed the apparently discordant words, that do not seem to fit in the context, they would have recalled CPW-2 to clarify this part of the evidence. 28. The evidence of CPW-2 and OPW-1, Ajay Kumar and Virendra Kumar, respectively, both of whom were doubtlessly on board the ill-fated Bolero, with the latter being its driver, is unmistakable about the manner in which the accident happened. It is the consistent version of both these witnesses in their examination-in-chief and cross-examination, but for one abberation, that the Insurance Company now seeks to capitalize upon, that the offending truck was suddenly brought to a halt on the highway, leading the ill-fated Bolero to ram into it from the rear side. It is a well settled principle of appreciating evidence that it has to be read as a whole and understood for what the witnesses substantially intend to say. A slip during the artful cross-examination, which does not fit into the context and fabric of the otherwise consistent stand of the two witnesses, CPW-2 and OPW-1, cannot be understood to mean what the Insurance Company want this Court to accept. 29. A slip during the artful cross-examination, which does not fit into the context and fabric of the otherwise consistent stand of the two witnesses, CPW-2 and OPW-1, cannot be understood to mean what the Insurance Company want this Court to accept. 29. No doubt, the words, on which the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company lays emphasis, say that it is true that the driver of the Bolero lost control and rammed into the truck, standing by the side of the road, but this stand of CPW-2, Ajay Kumar does not at all fit into his otherwise consistent stand in his examination-in-chief and cross-examination at the instance of two other parties, where he says that the accident occurred because the truck, while moving ahead, suddenly halted without giving a signal. It is impossible to reconcile these two stands except by falling back upon the consistency of the witness's version that blames the driver of the offending truck for the sudden halt. Moreover, if the words in the cross-examination of CPW-2, on which the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company places much reliance, are to be carefully read, all the difference would come from the word ^^ugh** between the words ^^lgh vkSj gS** 30. On a wholesome reading of the evidence, the words to the contrary, spoken by CPW-2, appear to be the product of a slip of tongue, to which the otherwise consistent stand of the witness unmistakably points. The purpose of cross-examination is to elicit truth and not lay a trap for the unwary. This is precisely what the Insurance Company wants this Court to do by reading the words in the cross-examination of CPW-2 at the instance of the Insurance Company on its plain terms and without reference to the consistent stand of the witness elsewhere. 31. The evidence of OPW-1 is also of cardinal importance. He is the driver of the ill-fated Bolero and was at the wheel. He has spoken unwaveringly about the fact that it was on account of an unexpected and sudden halt without a signal by the offending truck on the highway that led to the accident. There is also nothing in the testimony of CPW-2 and OPW-1 to suggest that the ill-fated Bolero was driven rashly and negligently. The vehicle appears to have been driven at a controlled speed, about which both the witnesses have categorically testified. There is also nothing in the testimony of CPW-2 and OPW-1 to suggest that the ill-fated Bolero was driven rashly and negligently. The vehicle appears to have been driven at a controlled speed, about which both the witnesses have categorically testified. The accident did occur due to a sudden and unexpected halt by the offending truck. This takes this Court to the other question, that assuming that the truck did a sudden halt without signal, is the ill-fated Bolero still liable for some contributory negligence? The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has strongly mooted that it is. The basis of the argument is that the ill-fated Bolero did not maintain sufficient distance between itself and the vehicle moving in the front i.e. the offending truck. It is urged that non-maintenance of a safe distance between the two vehicles led to the accident. 32. This Court is not impressed with this submission of the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company either. The reliance placed by the Insurance Company on Rule 23 of the Regulations of 1989 (for short, 'the Regulations of 1989) would require a reference to it. It reads: “23. Distance from vehicles in front.- The driver of a motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop.” 33. It is interesting to note that Rule 24, that immediately follows Rule 23, says something about abrupt braking. Rule 24 of the Regulations of 1989 reads: “24. Abrupt brake.- No driver of a vehicle shall apply brake abruptly unless it is necessary to do so for safety reasons.” 34. The question whether the Bolero or the offending truck were moving at a safe distance, and likewise whether the truck unexpectedly applied brake without signalling, could only be answered for the Insurance Company, if they had led some evidence on the point. There is absolutely no evidence led on behalf of the Insurance Company to show that the ill-fated Bolero did not maintain a safe distance between itself and the offending truck when the accident occurred. Likewise, there is no evidence led by the Insurance Company to show that the offending truck did not suddenly halt without signalling, and if it did, it was necessary for safety reasons. Likewise, there is no evidence led by the Insurance Company to show that the offending truck did not suddenly halt without signalling, and if it did, it was necessary for safety reasons. The Insurance Company could have discharged this onus by examining the driver of the offending truck as a witness. The driver of the offending truck was never called as a witness by the Insurance Company, leading to a failure on its part to discharge its evidential burden or onus probandi. 35. It is true that a vehicle that hits from the rear has some explanation to give, but when it does give an explanation with evidence, the vehicle that is moving in the front has to lead evidence and explain that it was not its negligence by a sudden act of braking. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in The New India Assurance Company Ltd., Lucknow v. Smt. Abha Srivastava and 4 others, First Appeal From Order No. 375 of 2017, decided on 12.09.2018. In The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Abha Srivastava (supra), it has been held by their Lordships of the Division Bench: “No doubt whenever any vehicle is hitting from behind then certainly in normal case it will be presumed that vehicle hitting from behind is also having some role to play in accident but there cannot be hard and fast principle for that and negligence on the part of driver hitting from behind can only be assumed, if the circumstances say so or on the basis of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur negligence on the part of driver hitting from behind can be presumed. Moreover, on the basis of evidence produced by the parties, negligence of the driver hitting from behind can also be proved. In the present case oral evidence on the part of truck owner or Insurance Company of Truck has not been produced. Driver of the Truck has also not been produced before the Court so as to infer any negligence on the part of Car Driver/deceased. Learned Trial Court only on the basis that deceased ought to have taken utmost care and precaution while driving the vehicle, he should have maintained proper distance from the Truck, held him responsible for 25%. Driver of the Truck has also not been produced before the Court so as to infer any negligence on the part of Car Driver/deceased. Learned Trial Court only on the basis that deceased ought to have taken utmost care and precaution while driving the vehicle, he should have maintained proper distance from the Truck, held him responsible for 25%. In this context, the statement of PW-1, wife of the deceased is relevant wherein she has categorically stated that deceased did apply brakes but could not avoid the accident. In her cross-examination, it is also specifically mentioned by her that brakes were applied by force even then accident could not be avoided. So far oral evidence is concerned that is entirely in favour of deceased. On the basis of statement of PW-1 wife of deceased, it can be inferred that inspite of due diligence and care, accident could not be avoided by the deceased. Any other evidence for proving the negligence on the part of deceased has not been produced. Even otherwise on consideration of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the circumstances of the case then we find that accident took place at 3.30 AM in the night and at the place of accident, no crowd was there as has been asserted by PW-1. It has been narrated by her that though Kanpur-Lucknow Road is a busy road but at the time of accident being the night there was no traffic at the place. From the site plan, it can be inferred that Jeevandhara Hospital was nearby on the right side of the road and towards left side two shops are being shown. Accordingly, it can be presumed that place of accident was not a busy place rather it was secluded place and at 3.30 AM in the night there was no occasion for any person to cross the road. It has been argued by learned counsel for claimants that at the place of accident elevation of road is there and it was not possible for anybody to cross the road at that place but it has not come in the evidence that road was elevated. In the night at 3.30 AM crossing of road by anybody cannot be presumed and if it was such then evidence in this regard ought to have been given by the defendants. In the night at 3.30 AM crossing of road by anybody cannot be presumed and if it was such then evidence in this regard ought to have been given by the defendants. When in the night at 3.30 AM there is no one on the road and nobody was likely to cross the road then vehicles run faster than usual and vehicles running behind also keep less distance than the normally maintained. In the night certainly vehicles run faster seeing the barren road and it is not expected that the vehicle running infront will apply brake suddenly without any reason and if such happening took place and deceased did try to apply brakes but could not avoid the accident then his negligence cannot be attributed. It has also come in evidence that back-light as well brakelights of the truck were not working. As such contribution of vehicle running ahead can be attributed solely. Applying sudden brakes without any reason coupled with failed back lights & brake light and caution taken by deceased absolve him of any responsibility for accident. Accordingly, we are of the view that the observation of the trial court, the deceased was also responsible while driving the vehicle to the tune of 25% contributory negligence is not based upon evidence rather it is based on conjectures and surmises and same cannot be accepted. In the overall assessment of the evidence in the accident the Truck Driver was solely responsible for the accident and deceased was not at all liable for contributory negligence and finding of the trial court in this regard is liable to be reversed.” 36. Contributory negligence has to be established by the party pleading it and unless burden on the point is discharged, no inference can be raised about it. In this regard, reference may be made to another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Prabandhak, U.P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam v. Rabia Begum and others, 2015 ACJ 1492 , where it has been remarked: “8. In absence of any cogent and trust worthy evidence, the Tribunal has not relied upon the defence set up by the appellant that it is a case of contributory negligence. The burden was on the part of the appellant respondent to establish that the driver of the Jeep was equally responsible in causing the accident in question. In absence of any cogent and trust worthy evidence, the Tribunal has not relied upon the defence set up by the appellant that it is a case of contributory negligence. The burden was on the part of the appellant respondent to establish that the driver of the Jeep was equally responsible in causing the accident in question. Since the appellant respondent failed to discharge his burden to establish the case of contributory negligence, the Tribunal has decided the issue No. 1 in positive and issue No. 3 in negative.” 37. This Court must take note of the repeated emphasis that the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has laid on the provisions of Rule 23 of the Regulations of 1989 to say that the sufficiency of distance is a matter which must be inferred from the circumstances obtaining. He has relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Sujatha and others, 2021 ACJ 1079, where it has been observed: “15. As per regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, a driver of a motor vehicle moving behind another ongoing vehicle must maintain sufficient distance to avert any collision, in the event of the ongoing vehicle slowing down or applying sudden brake. This is a benevolent statutory provision and it will apply and will have a bearing on all the motorists to ensure their safety. The object with which this regulation has been enacted is that the driver of a motor vehicle, in order to ensure his own safety and the safety of others, must maintain sufficient distance or to keep away from the ongoing motor vehicle at a reasonable distance so as to avoid any collision in the event of an eventuality. This regulation will assume significance, especially when the country witnesses a burgeoning vehicle population. Even though the expression 'sufficient distance' is not expressly provided in the said regulation 23, by indicating the actual distance required to be maintained between two vehicles, it can be interpreted and inferred that it is the distance reasonably and adequately required to ensure absolute control to bring the vehicle to a halt, in the event of application of sudden brake or unwarranted brake by the ongoing vehicle. It is needless to mention that a driver of a motor vehicle must not only maintain sufficient distance between the vehicles, but must also follow the rules of prudence and study the driving pattern of the ongoing vehicle, the vehicles coming behind and/or the motorist who may suddenly dart across, to ensure that nothing untoward happens while driving. If this is adhered to, certainly, accidents of motor vehicles could largely be averted. 16. If the above parameters are applied to this case, it is contended that the driver of the offending lorry had suddenly applied brake. There is no evidence brought on record as to whether the driver of the vehicle was driving at an alarming speed and then suddenly applied brake. Be that as it may. The deceased, as a motorist riding behind a heavy vehicle, ought to have exercised caution. The same yardstick will equally apply to the offending driver of the lorry, who, in the event of applying brake, has to ensure the safety of the other ongoing riders, as also the vehicles preceding his vehicle or apply brake in such a way that it will not result in any collision. 17. In this case, admittedly, the deceased had hit the lorry soon after sudden brake was applied, as has been spoken to by PW 2, which would only indicate that the deceased was not prudent enough or maintaining sufficient distance to avert a collision. It is also an indicative factor that the deceased was not wearing helmet at the time of accident. Had he been wearing a helmet, we are certain that the injuries caused to the deceased would have been mitigated and he could have survived the accident. Admittedly, it was the deceased who had hit the lorry from behind and sustained injuries and it is not a case where there was a head-on collision between two vehicles. Therefore, there is negligence to a certain extent on the part of the deceased also, and the negligence cannot be attributed wholly on the driver of the offending lorry. In the light of the above discussion and in the light of the deposition of PW 2, eyewitness, we are of the view that the Tribunal ought to have fixed contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, which it failed. In the light of the above discussion and in the light of the deposition of PW 2, eyewitness, we are of the view that the Tribunal ought to have fixed contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, which it failed. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we fix 20 per cent negligence on the part of the deceased and 80 per cent on the driver of the offending lorry, insured with the appellant insurance company.” 38. This Court has already indicated that there is evidence led on behalf of the claimants to show that there was no negligence on the part of the ill-fated Bolero, whereas there is evidence also led on behalf of the claimants, which shows that it was a negligent act of sudden braking by the offending truck, that caused the accident. In the circumstances leading to the accident, where there is not much of documentation, which normally comes with a case involving a criminal prosecution, drawing an inference that the ill-fated Bolero did not maintain sufficient distance is not possible. If the Insurance Company had taken care to lead some evidence to show that there was any violation of Rule 23 of the Regulations of 1989, it is possible that the evidence on both sides of the scales could then have been evaluated. Here, there is no evidence at all led on behalf of the Insurance Company to support a case based on Rule 23. In the context of Rule 23, reference may be made to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Subhadraben and another v. Dinmohammed and others, Civil Appeal No. 19963 of 2017, decided on 28.11.2017. In the said decision, where Rule 23 of the Regulations of 1989 was, like the present case, strongly mooted to support a case of negligence by the driver of the Fiat car that hit the offending truck from its rear side, it was held: “5. The Tribunal also considered the defence taken by the respondents that the driver of the fiat car was following the truck without keeping sufficient distance from the truck to avoid collusion. The Tribunal also considered the defence taken by the respondents that the driver of the fiat car was following the truck without keeping sufficient distance from the truck to avoid collusion. The Tribunal, however, on analysing the evidence held that the truck was overloaded with iron plates hanging outside the body of the truck, the truck driver was negligent in loading the goods in such a dangerous manner without putting any red light, reflector or red flag on the goods hanging outside the truck and also applied sudden brakes in the middle of the road and due to darkness the fiat car, which was following the truck, collided with the truck. Further, the respondents did not produce any evidence to substantiate their plea that the fiat car was being driven in excessive speed causing the fateful accident. On this basis, the Tribunal justly found that the truck driver was solely responsible. The High Court, however, overturned this well considered finding in a very casual manner merely by referring to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989. The said Rule 23 reads thus: “23. Distance from vehicles in front.- The driver of a motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop.” The High Court even after reproducing paragraph 14 of the Tribunal’s Judgment in its entirety, however, did not advert to the attending circumstances considered by the Tribunal. The respondents having failed to produce any evidence that the fiat car was being driven in excessive speed, we fail to understand as to how Rule 23 can come to the aid of the respondents. Strikingly, the High Court has upheld the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the truck driver applied sudden brakes. Having concurred with that finding and absent any evidence produced by the respondents about the fiat car being driven in excessive speed, we cannot countenance the approach of the High Court in concluding that the fiat car was not being driven in a moderate speed or to invoke the theory of contributory negligence of the driver of the fiat car to the extent of 50%. The finding so recorded by the High Court is not only contradictory but error apparent on the face of the record.” 39. The finding so recorded by the High Court is not only contradictory but error apparent on the face of the record.” 39. The remarks of their Lordships of the Supreme Court do bear on the point that the Insurance Company urge in this case, inasmuch as the Insurance Company, as already said, have failed to produce any evidence that the Bolero was either driven negligently, or that it did not maintain sufficient distance, which it was supposed to, under the circumstances. 40. This Court is of considered opinion that but for the stray utterance in the cross-examination of CPW-2 at the instance of the Insurance Company, it is a case of consistent evidence in support of the claimants pitted against no evidence, whatsoever led by the Insurance Company. There is absolutely no material to infer a case of contributory negligence here that the Insurance Company wants this Court to do. 41. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs throughout. 42. The interim order 15.05.2015 is hereby vacated.