JUDGMENT : I.A. No.113 of 2017 This interlocutory application has been filed for condonation of delay of 984 days in filing this criminal revision petition. The learned APP has raised no objection. For the reasons stated in the application, I.A. No. 113 of 2017 is allowed and delay of 984 days in filing this criminal revision petition is condoned. Criminal Revision No. 1390 of 2016 Criminal Revision No.1390 of 2016, Criminal Revision No.469 of 2016 and Criminal Revision No. 603 of 2016 have been heard together on the last few days. 2. These criminal revision petitions arise out of Katras PS Case No. 73 of 2005 and counter-case vide Katras PS Case No. 64 of 2005. 3. A First Information Report vide Katras PS Case No.73 of 2005 was lodged on the written report of Smt. Shanti Manjhi alleging commission of offence under sections 341, 323, 147, 148, 149 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code by Mihir Majhi, Nirmal Kumar Manjhi, Smt. Putul Manjhi, Parimal Manjhi, Smt. Mithu Manjhi, Kamal Manjhi, Smt. Sangita Manjhi, Nimai Patra, Phani Bhushan Manjhi, Binod Chandra Manjhi, Smt. Mithu Manjhi, Shyamlal Manjhi, Smt.Shipra Manjhi and Madhav Chandra. This First Information Report was converted into G.R Case No. 758 of 2005 in which the trial commenced vide T.R No.333 of 2010. 4. After investigation, the abovenamed 14 persons were sent up for trial and a charge under sections 341, 323, 325, 147, 148, 149 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against them. During the trial three witnesses were examined – PW3 is the informant. In support of the informant who is the wife of Bhudev Chandra Manjhi her daughters came in the witness box as PW1 and PW2 and deposed about involvement of 14 persons who assaulted their father and mother. 5. The learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad by judgment dated 29th October 2010 convicted the accused under sections 341, 323, 147, 148 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code. On the question of sentence, the learned Judicial Magistrate formed an opinion that the accused the majority of whom were female folks and aged persons are the first offenders and therefore benefit under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 can be extended to them and, accordingly, directed them to execute a bond undertaking that they shall maintain peace and good behaviour for the next two years. 6. 6. The judgment in T.R Case No.333 of 2010 came to be challenged by the accused persons in Criminal Appeal No. 261 of 2010 and by judgment dated 27th November 2013 conviction of the accused persons for the aforesaid offence was set aside. 7. The informant has filed the present criminal revision petition against the judgment of acquittal recorded in Criminal Appeal No.261 of 2010. 8. Mr. Amit Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the judgment of conviction recorded by the trial Court could not have been interfered by the appellate Court on mere non-examination of the injured person and the investigating officer. The learned counsel for the petitioner would refer to the judgment in “Geeta Devi v. State of U.P” 2022 SCC OnLine SC 57 to submit that the judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 261 of 2010 requires reconsideration by an order of remand by this Court. 9. Per contra, Mr. Mukesh Kumar, the learned counsel for O.P Nos.2 to 15 would refer to the judgment in “Venkatesan v. Rani” (2013) 14 SCC 207 to submit that in exercise of the revisional powers the High Court is not supposed to convert an order of acquittal into conviction except in exceptional cases. 10. In “Venkatesan” the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “7. To answer the questions that have arisen in the present case, as noticed at the very outset, the extent and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly in the context of exercise thereof in respect of a judgment of acquittal, may be briefly noticed. The law in this regard is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. Illustratively, as also chronologically, the decisions rendered in Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu, Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh,K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. And Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas may be referred to. 8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. 587-88) “8. 8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. 587-88) “8. … This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible; (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. *** 10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.” 9. The observations in para 9 in Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below: (SCC pp. 226-27) “9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. 226-27) “9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial. 10. The above consideration would go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the trial court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence thereby causing miscarriage of justice. The reappreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Code. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a retrial after setting aside the acquittal. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a retrial after setting aside the acquittal. As the language of Section 401 of the Code makes it amply clear there is no power vested in the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.” 11. Having examined the materials on record, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the matter. In the first place, there cannot be conviction of an accused both under section 147 as well section 148 of the Indian Penal Code [refer, “Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel” (2018) 7 SCC 743 ]. 12. On the issue of non-examination of the injured who is the husband of the informant the least that can be observed is that the prosecution case revolves around assault upon Bhudev Chandra Majhi and when this person has chosen not to come to the witness box the very foundation of the prosecution case would definitely be shaken. As would appear from the judgments by the Courts below, there was serious doubt whether informant herself was an eyewitness as she admitted that she did not give any report before the police in the police station. 13. Furthermore, there is no universal law that in every case in which the investigating officer has not been examined ipso facto prejudice would be caused to the accused person, but in case like the present one where there is serious doubt on the claim of the witnesses that they are the eyewitness, the accused were deprived of the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witnesses. 14. In the above circumstances, this Court finds no ground to interfere in the matter and, accordingly, Criminal Revision No.1390 of 2016 is dismissed. 15. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Court concerned through “Fax”.