JUDGMENT : The petitioner is aggrieved of the order dated 26th June 2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 223 of 2010. 2. A First Information Report being Sakchi PS Case No. 59 of 2005 was lodged against five accused persons – the petitioner was the informant. After investigation, the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet under sections 341, 323 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal Code. This First Information Report was converted into G.R Case No. 1284 of 2005 corresponding to T.R No. 96 of 2010. 3. The judgment in T.R No. 96 of 2010 corresponding to G.R Case No.1284 of 2005 convicting the accused for the aforesaid offences came to be challenged by them in Criminal Appeal No. 223 of 2010. The appellate Court by judgment dated 26th June 2015 partly allowed the appeal releasing the opposite party nos. 2 to 6 extending benefit under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 4. In principle, this Court would agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the benefit of probation could not have been given without any report from the Probation Officer, but for, the provisions under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot reverse an order of acquittal into one of conviction and it is only in rarity of cases such power should be exercised and, that too, only by an order of remand. 5. In “Venkatesan v. Rani” (2013) 14 SCC 207 the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the powers of the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 397 read with section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction the High Court cannot do what the sessions Court would not have done. It was held so in the light of sub section (3) to section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which puts a bar on the powers of the revisional Court to convert an order of acquittal into conviction. It was held so in the light of sub section (3) to section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which puts a bar on the powers of the revisional Court to convert an order of acquittal into conviction. The aforesaid context keeping in mind, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional powers under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can remand a matter for retrial and, that too, only in exceptional cases in which it is brought on record that the order/judgment of the sessions Court is patently illegal or has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. Putting a word of caution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that “as the language of section 401 of the code makes it amply clear there is no power vested in the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction”. 6. In “Venkatesan” the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “7. To answer the questions that have arisen in the present case, as noticed at the very outset, the extent and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly in the context of exercise thereof in respect of a judgment of acquittal, may be briefly noticed. The law in this regard is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. Illustratively, as also chronologically, the decisions rendered in Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu, Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. And Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas may be referred to. 8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. 587-88) “8. 8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. 587-88) “8. … This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible; (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. *** 10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.” 9. The observations in para 9 in Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below: (SCC pp. 226-27) “9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. 226-27) “9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial. 10. The above consideration would go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the trial court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence thereby causing miscarriage of justice. The reappreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Code. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a retrial after setting aside the acquittal. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a retrial after setting aside the acquittal. As the language of Section 401 of the Code makes it amply clear there is no power vested in the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.” 7. Mr. Arun Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner who is the informant in G.R Case No. 1284 of 2005 which led to T.R No. 96 of 2010 would submit that the appellate Court committed a grave procedural error in not calling for a report of the Probation Officer and not only that there is no consideration about the essential conditions which are required to be considered by the Court while extending benefit under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 8. In the judgment under challenge, the appellate Court observed that both parties are neighbours and the injuries caused to three persons are said to be simple in nature. As would appear from examination of the materials on record, there was no report of the Probation Officer, but then, the learned trial Judge who heard the accused persons on question of sentence on 28th September 2010 has recorded that there was no prior conviction of the accused persons. The learned trial Judge considered nature of the offence and circumstances of the case, however, declined to extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act – but, without any reason. 9. Section 361 of the Code of Criminal procedure provides that the Court must record special reasons for not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and the Children Act, 1960. 10. In “Om Prakash v. State of Haryana” (2001) 10 SCC 477 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “4. When the case came up for admission before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellants raised the contention that the provisions of Section 360 CrPC have not at all been looked into and we, therefore, issued limited notice as to why the said provisions will not be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. When the case came up for admission before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellants raised the contention that the provisions of Section 360 CrPC have not at all been looked into and we, therefore, issued limited notice as to why the said provisions will not be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The provisions of Section 360 CrPC are beneficial to the accused only when the accused is a first offender in case the accused is more than 21 years of age. Section 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that if the Court decided not to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 360, then it must record its reasons as to why the benefit of Section 360 CrPC is being denied. In view of the peremptory nature of the language of provisions of Section 361, the Magistrate as well as the Court in appeal and revision not having indicated as to why the provisions of Section 360 CrPC have not been applied, there has been a gross miscarriage of justice and the legislative mandate engrafted in the aforesaid two sections of the Code have not been complied with.” 11. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in this case and, accordingly, Criminal Revision No. 1234 of 2015 is dismissed.