JUDGMENT : Writ petition on behalf of society has been filed laying challenge to the order of the Labour Court under Section 33(C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act dated 09.02.2021 Ex.P8. The controversy in this case has already been narrated in the judgment of this Court dated 23.10.2020 Ext.P4 wherein society had challenged the order of the Arbitration Court and Tribunal allowing the arbitration claim of the respondent, who at the initial service was appointed as clerk on 11.05.1967, was promoted from time to time and lastly to the post of Secretary, which was designated as Managing Director. A show cause notice dated 04.10.2000 was served upon seeking explanation and dissatisfied with the explanation, the society decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings, which resulted into suspension with effect from 21.10.2000 pending enquiry. Enquiry officer submitted a report on 25.01.2002 holding the respondent guilty of charges. Subcommittee vide decision dated 25.02.2002 decided to dismiss the party respondent from the service. It is in that background the proceedings reached the Arbitration Court. The management/Society raised the plea that the Arbitration Court could not order reinstatement and grant of service benefits in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ambika T.N. v. Kottappady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. No.E.155 and Others [ 2018 (4) KHC 493 ]. This Court was also brought to the notice that the respondent had also filed a petition under Section 33 (C)(2) for claiming certain benefits as recorded in paragraph 10 of the judgment Ext.P4. Noticing all these contentions, this Court accepted the plea of the society by directing the Arbitration Court to assess the damages and composition to be awarded to the respondent in view of the harassment and spate of litigation for number of years and as regards the other claims regarding backwages, was to be considered in the pending application. 2. When the matter was pending before the Arbitration Court for assessment of the damages a settlement was arrived at resulting into payment of Rs.2,00,000/- on 27.04.2021. 2. When the matter was pending before the Arbitration Court for assessment of the damages a settlement was arrived at resulting into payment of Rs.2,00,000/- on 27.04.2021. However, in the meantime a claim petition No.16/2016 had already been preferred by the party respondent before the Labour Court under 33(C)(2) wherein petitioner society did not put in appearance resulted into following directions: “(6) In the result the claim petition is allowed as follows: a. Opposite party is directed to pay the following amounts: i. Rs.6,93,311/- (Rupees six lakhs ninety three thousand three hundred and eleven only) towards balance monthly pay arrears. ii. Rs.11,60,751/- (Rupees eleven lakhs sixty thousand seven hundred and fifty one only) towards interest @ 10% of balance monthly pay arrears from 21.10.2000 to 31.05.2019. iii. Rs.80,860/- (Rupees eighty thousand eight hundred and sixty only) towards earned leave wages and Rs.1,10,509/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand five hundred and nine only) towards its interest. iv. Rs.88,000/- (Rupees eighty eight only) towards bonus arrears and Rs.1,27,467/- (Rupees one lakh twenty seven thousand four hundred and sixty seven only) towards its interest. v. Remit Rs.68,178/- (Rupees sixty eight thousand one hundred and seventy eight only) towards arrears of pension contribution payable to co-operative society pension board. vi. The above sum shall be paid within one month, failing which the amount will carry interest @ 10% per annum from the date of application (25.06.2019) till payment. Pronounced in Open Court this the 9th day of February 2021.” 3. Sri. Arjun Raghavan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act is a complete code. All the matters relating to the service of seniority has to be adjudicated in those proceedings and not by other proceedings. 4. On plain and simple reading of provisions of Section 33(C)(1) or 33(C)(2) respondent party would not fall within the definition of 'workman' under Section 2(S) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 as he was holding the post of Secretary, which was designated as Managing Director. Even otherwise, once there is a settlement respondent party is estopped to claim the amount as per the impugned award. Section 33(C)(2) only relates to execution of settlement or award or any amount due from the Management. Even otherwise, once there is a settlement respondent party is estopped to claim the amount as per the impugned award. Section 33(C)(2) only relates to execution of settlement or award or any amount due from the Management. Neither there is an award nor a settlement, amount of Rs.2,00,000/- as per the settlement has already been received and provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 33(C) regarding any amount due from the employer would not come to the rescue of the party respondent in the absence of his designation as above. 5. On the other hand, senior counsel Sri. Dharmadan submits that there has been a harassment of 23 years as noticed by this Court in the judgment Ext.P4. Arbitration Court was delegated to assess the damages in terms of harassment and spate of litigation but not with regard to other service matters. Therefore, respondent was compelled to invoke jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2). The petitioner did not contest the aforementioned proceedings nor lead any evidence viz. the evidence lead by the petitioner for claiming the benefits and urges this Court for dismissal of this writ petition. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book. 7. It would be expedient to extract the operative part of the judgment rendered by this Court : “10. In Ambika (supra) the question before the Division Bench of this Court was whether a Co-operative Arbitration Court constituted under Kerala Co-operative Societies Act can force the employer Society to retain the services of an employee whom it no longer wishes to employ. Noticing the cases along with the aforementioned points, it was held that the outcome depends upon the powers that are given to the Co-operative Court or the stipulated tribunal created under the Act. I am of the considered view that the Arbitration Court cannot order for re-instatement in service as the jurisdiction only vests with Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. At the best, the Arbitration Court could have assessed damages/ compensation. I am of the considered view that the Arbitration Court cannot order for re-instatement in service as the jurisdiction only vests with Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. At the best, the Arbitration Court could have assessed damages/ compensation. The respondent in this case has already availed the remedy by claiming the following reliefs before the Labour Court in a petition filed under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, which reads as under: “(I) Therefore the claim petitioner is entitled for balance monthly pay arrears from 12/98 to 24-09- 2005 from the counter petitioner society to the extent of a sum of Rs.6,93,311/- with its interest from 21-10- 2000 i.e. the date suspension at the rate of 10% interest per annum and the same may be commuted quantified in view of the Arbitration Court award dated 7-8-2018 and Co-operative Tribunal award dated 22-4-2019. (ii) It is further prayed that the Hon Court be pleased to compute the interest payable on balance pay arrears and the amount due in view of above mentioned awards and its interest passed by the Hon Arbitration Court on 7-8-2018 in ARC No.76/2003 and the award passed by the Hon State Cooperative Tribunal on 22-4-2019 in appeal as 170/18. The interest quantified from 21-10-2000 to 31-05-2019 is fixes as Rs.1160751.8 which is shown in the schedule No.2. (iii) It is further prayed that as the co-operative Arbitration Court and Hon'ble State Co-operative Tribunal held that the claim petitioner is entitled for all service benefits and back wages as though he was in the service and also to quantify the number of Earned Leave due to the petitioner from 2000-01, to 24-09-2005 the period in which he was kept out of service. The Hon Court be pleased to hold that in his credit there is 182.53 days to which he is entitled to get earned leave wages which totally comes to a sum of Rs.80860 and he is eligible to recover the same with its 10% interest as detailed in the schedule No.2 and in para No.11 of the petition it may be computed and quantified as Rs.110508.67 by way of interest till 31-05-2019. (iv) It is also further prayed that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to quantify the bonus arrears fell due from 2000-01 to 24-09-2005 after fixing the bonus payable in every year at the ceiling limit of 16000/- and as such he is entitled for Rs.16000x5=80000+8000=88000/- with its interest at the rate of 10% till payment is made as detailed in para No.12 of this petition. In the case of Bonus arrears interest in each year it fell due on 31st of March, hence interest is to be computed and quantified as Rs.127466.67 till 31-05-2019. (v) It is further prayed to commute and quantify the arrears of pension contribution payable in the cooperative society's pension board the share of the employee as well as the employer. The employees share comes to the tune of Rs.68178/- as shown in the schedule No.1 with its interest and the penal interest being accrued on it along with the employers share towards that scheme with its interest and penal interest which is to be quantified and ordered the same in the pension Board. (vi) To allow such other relief that the claim petitioner may seek and this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the nature and circumstances of this case.” 11. since the respondent has sought the execution of the award for retirement amount under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the dictum laid down in the judgment cited supra, the grievance of the petitioner has some force. Accordingly, I dispose of this writ petition by directing the Arbitration Court to assess the damages/compensation to be awarded to the respondent in view of the harassment and the wrath/spate of litigation for a number of years. As regards the other claim regarding back wages, it is pending application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The writ petition is allowed by modifying the award of the Arbitration Court to the aforementioned extent. The Arbitration Court is directed to assess the compensation/damages after issuing notice to the respective parties and necessary steps should have been taken within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 8. The writ petition is allowed by modifying the award of the Arbitration Court to the aforementioned extent. The Arbitration Court is directed to assess the compensation/damages after issuing notice to the respective parties and necessary steps should have been taken within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 8. This Court had not taken away the right of the society to raise the objection qua maintainability of the petition under Section 33(C)(2) and just gave a passing reference with regard to the claim without commenting on the merits, as it would have been only erroneous for this Court to opine on the maintainability in a proceedings pertaining to the examination or the veracity of the Arbitration award or order of the Tribunal. 9. The definition of 'workman' defined under Section 2(S) is extracted hereinbelow : [(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person— (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 10. On plain and simple reading of the above, a person has to be either performing certain duties in respect of categories defined therein and in none of the categories the petitioner falls in view of the fact that he was Secretary of the society. On plain and simple reading of the above, a person has to be either performing certain duties in respect of categories defined therein and in none of the categories the petitioner falls in view of the fact that he was Secretary of the society. Nothing prevented the party respondent to claim all the benefits even though not referred by this Court with regard to the damages of harassment as harassment would have been considered of a vide amplitude by considering arrears of the salary and other service benefits. The aforementioned view of mine is derived from the ratio decidendi culled out by this Court in General Manager, Thalassery Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd. v. Mukundan and Another [ 2021 (1) KHC 551 ] paragraph 12 and 13 reads as under : 12. This being the position and having regard to the terminology of S.69(2)(d) of the Act, we have to consider whether the matter sought to be adjudicated is merely monetary simpliciter or whether the issue of monetary benefits is only a consequential one that may crop up subject to the outcome of a service related dispute. For this we have to look into Ext.P1 plaint amended by Ext.P6 pending before the 2nd respondent. As noticed earlier, the definite case of the 1st respondent is that he was demoted as Senior Clerk while working as Accountant without following procedural formalities. Ultimately that position has been accepted. It is the definite case of the 1st respondent that he was eligible to be promoted to the cadre of Chief Accountant / Manager / Assistant Secretary, which are all posts of identical cadre, with effect from 01/11/1993, that his immediate junior one E. Damodaran was promoted as Chief Accountant on 01/11/1993, overlooking his seniority that he should have been promoted in the place of Sri. Damodaran and thus by virtue of the pronouncements from judicial fora he is entitled to get all service benefits. In para 7 of the claim he has stated thus: "7. So it has become necessary to determine the correct amount due to the plaintiff as per the decision shown above. Damodaran and thus by virtue of the pronouncements from judicial fora he is entitled to get all service benefits. In para 7 of the claim he has stated thus: "7. So it has become necessary to determine the correct amount due to the plaintiff as per the decision shown above. Even though the plaintiff is entitled to all the benefits enjoyed by his juniors promoted to higher posts ignoring the legitimate rights the plaintiff from holding that posts, for avoiding the delay he is claiming the benefits only on the basis of statutory Grade Promotions from post of Internal Auditor. The detailed calculation is shown in the schedule attached herewith. As per the Schedule the plaintiff entitled to receive an amount of Rs.28,96,395/- less Rs.74,454/- already received on 19/12/2016 with 12% future interest till payment of it." 13. Viewing the question in this backdrop, we are also of the view that the learned Single Judge has correctly upheld the Ext.P5 order. In other words, it is not a money claim simpliciter but service related issues also are required to be adjudicated by the 2nd respondent and then only he will be able to quantify the amount, if any, liable to be paid by the appellant. We may hasten to add that we shall not be understood to have held that the 1st respondent is entitled to such service benefits as claimed. In other words, we make it clear that we have not made any observation on merits in regard to such issues. We also make it clear that we have not made any opinion as to the legal entitlement of the 1st respondent to raise such issues in ARC No.22/2017 in view of the earlier litigations as also his entitlement to such service benefits. That can be done only by the Co-operative Arbitration Court. 11. Things did not stop here, petitioner accepted the settlement on 27.04.2021 whereas the award of the Industrial Tribunal 33(C)(2) is of February, 2021. Be that as it may. The provisions of sub-sections 1 and 2 of 33(C) which are extracted hereinbelow would not come to the rescue of respondent to claim the relief as sought for : 33C. 11. Things did not stop here, petitioner accepted the settlement on 27.04.2021 whereas the award of the Industrial Tribunal 33(C)(2) is of February, 2021. Be that as it may. The provisions of sub-sections 1 and 2 of 33(C) which are extracted hereinbelow would not come to the rescue of respondent to claim the relief as sought for : 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.- (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [Chapter VA or Chapter VB], the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; 1[within a period not exceeding three months:] [Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] None of the aforementioned conditions existed for such relief. Accordingly, award of the Labour Court Ext.P8 and consequential show cause notice Ext.P9 are quashed. This writ petition stands allowed.