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2022 DIGILAW 711 (ALL)

Tara Prasad Sonkar v. Binod Devi

2022-05-07

NEERAJ TIWARI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Chandan Sharma, advocate holding brief of Sri Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the revisionists and Sri Brijesh Chandra Naik, learned counsel for opposite parties. 2. Present revision has been filed for setting aside the judgment and order dated 17.02.2022 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 10, Varanasi in Small Causes Case No. 04 of 2019 (Smt. Bindo Devi and others Vs. Tara Prasad Sonkar and others). 3. Apart from many other grounds taken in revision, learned counsel for the revisionists has pressed the ground of jurisdiction of the Court only before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the revisionists submitted that opposite parties instituted Small Causes Case No. 04 of 2019 (Smt. Bindo Devi and others Vs. Tara Prasad Sonkar and others) seeking eviction of revisionists-defendants from disputed property and for recovery of rent arrears also. While filing the suit, opposite parties contended that shop in question was rented at the rate of Rs. 5,000/-per month calculating the valuation of suit Rs. 2,40,000/-. Revisionists-defendants disputed the rent and submitted that shop in question was rented at the rate of Rs. 500/-per month and accordingly, issue No. 2 was framed with regard to actual determination of rent as to whether it was Rs. 5,000/-or Rs. 500/-per month. He next submitted that this issue was decided in favour of revisionists-defendants accepting the rent at the rate of Rs. 500/-per month. He further submitted that once the rent was fixed at the rate of Rs. 500/-per moth by deciding issue No. 2, valuation of suit has been decreed to less than one lac and Court of District Judge would have no jurisdiction to try the case in light of Section 15 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC, 1908”). Section 15 of CPC mandate that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of lowest grade competent to try and in the present case, it has to be decided by concerned Small Causes Court. He next submitted that once the Court has no jurisdiction, order passed by the Court is nullity in the eye of law. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgments of Apex Court in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat Vs. Dir. Health Services, Haryana and others; (2013) 2 SCC (LS) 841 (paragraph 7) and Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgments of Apex Court in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat Vs. Dir. Health Services, Haryana and others; (2013) 2 SCC (LS) 841 (paragraph 7) and Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Vishan Dayal Rajpoot and Ors; 2018 (191) AIC9 ( paragraph 20, 21, 34, 47) as well as of this Court in the matter of Prabha Rani Agrawal Vs. Income Tax Officer and Ors; (2013) 259 CTR (All) 118. 5. Learned counsel for opposite parties opposed the submissions raised by learned counsel for the revisionists and submitted that there are two situations; first, Court is having inherent lack of jurisdiction, second, after filing written statement or any subsequent development, Court may not have the jurisdiction to decide the case. He next submitted that in present case, it is necessarily required on the part of revisionists-defendants to raise objection with regard to jurisdiction in written submission to enable the Court to frame issue and decide the same. In the present case, suit was filed alongwith valuation of Rs. 2,40,000/-and the Court is having pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the same on the date of filing, therefore, it is not the case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. Further, while filing written statement, revisionists-defendants has never raised objection about the jurisdiction of the Court and only it was stated in written statement that suit has been filed by showing excess rent to bring the case in appellate jurisdiction of Small Causes Court for early disposal of the matter. It is also stated in written statement that just to deprive one step of appellate court at District Judgeship, excess rent has been shown. He reiterated that at no point of time, revisionists-defendants has raised objection of jurisdiction, therefore, Court is having full jurisdiction to decide the case. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Vishan Dayal Rajpoot and Ors; 2018 (191) AIC9 (paragraph 49, 56, 57) as well as of this Court in the matter of Rajendra Kumar @ Vinay Kumar Vs. Pankaj Kumar Agarwal; 2019 (3) ARC 621. 6. I have considered the rival submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the judgments relied upon Facts of the case are undisputed. 7. Pankaj Kumar Agarwal; 2019 (3) ARC 621. 6. I have considered the rival submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the judgments relied upon Facts of the case are undisputed. 7. After going through the pleadings, the only question before this Court is to decide as to whether without raising the issue of jurisdiction in written submission, Court is bound to first decide its jurisdiction based on pecuniary limits i.e. valuation of case and then proceed to decide the case on merits or not. 8. Learned counsel for the revisionists has only submitted that he has raised objection with regard to amount of rent and once the objection is accepted, it is required on the part of Court to first consider its own jurisdiction to decide the case, but he could not dispute this fact that in written statement, no objection has been raised about the jurisdiction of the Court. Case was filed showing the rent at the rate of Rs. 5000/-, therefore, Court is having full jurisdiction to decide the same. After filing written statement showing the rent at the rate of Rs. 5,00/-, Issue No. 2 was framed with regard to determination of rent and that was ultimately decided in favour of revisionists-defendants accepting the rent at the rate of Rs. 500/-per month. Thereafter, proceeded to decide the case on merits. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionists has relied upon paragraph 7 of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat (supra), which is quoted below; “7. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior Court, and if the Court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a Court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/ inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a Court/Tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate, defeating the legislative animation. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. Similarly, if a Court/Tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate, defeating the legislative animation. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide: United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, MANU/SC/0067/1951: AIR 1951 SC 230 . Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lal Ramnarayan & Ors. MANU/0367/1977: AIR 1978 SC 22 ; Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Anr., MANU/SC/0477/1981: AIR 1981 SC 537 ' and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors., MANU/SC/0278/1999: AIR SC 2213).” 10. Learned counsel for the revisionists has relied upon paragraphs 20, 21, 34 & 47 of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thr. L.Rs. and Ors. (supra), which are quoted below; “20. By the above amendment in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 the limit of pecuniary jurisdiction of small causes court was increased from Rs.25,000/-to Rs.1 Lakh. The Judge, Small Causes Court in the State of U.P. is senior-most Civil Judge, working in the district. Although the Court of Small Causes was empowered to take cognizance of a suit upto the valuation of Rs.1 lakh w.e.f. 07.12.2015, the suit in question namely Small Causes Suit No.1 of 2010 which was pending in the Court of Additional District Judge, Firozabad continued to proceed in the court of Additional District Judge. None of the parties raised any objection with regard to hearing of suit by Additional District Judge, consequently, the Additional District Judge heard the parties and by judgment dated 22.10.2016 decreed the suit for eviction and due rent & compensation. The tenant aggrieved by the judgment of Additional District Judge filed a revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, before the High Court. 21. One of the grounds taken before the High Court was that in view of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, the Court of Additional District Judge ceased to have jurisdiction to try suit between lessor and lessee of value upto Rs.1 Lac w.e.f. 07.12.2015, assumption of jurisdiction subsequent thereto, is without jurisdiction. 34. Whether the Additional District Judge, in the facts of the present case, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of small causes suits having valuation upto Rs. 34. Whether the Additional District Judge, in the facts of the present case, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of small causes suits having valuation upto Rs. 1 lakh and could still have proceeded to decide the suit, whose valuation was less than Rs. 1 lakh? We may also notice provision of Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that suits shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows:-“Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.” 47. As noted above, the proviso to subsection (2) provides that figure Rs.5,000/-shall be construed to Rs.25,000/-. By U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, the figure of Rs.25,000/-stood substituted by Rs.1 lac. Reading sub-section(2) read with proviso and U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment Act), 2015 clearly means that Small Cause suits with aluation not exceeding Rs.1 lac shall be cognizable by Court of Small Causes. When a Small Cause suit not exceeding value of Rs.1 lac is cognizable by Court of Small Causes, obviously, no other court can take cognizance. Additional District Judge to whom small causes suit in question was transferred since its valuation was more than of Rs.25,000/-was not competent to take cognizance of the suit after U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment Act), 2015 w.e.f.07.12.2015, when the suit in question became cognizable by Small Causes Court i.e. Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. To the above extent, the judgment of learned Single Judge in Shobhit Nigam’s Case has to be approved and judgment of Single Judge in Pankaj Hotels (Supra) laying down that even after 07.12.2015, the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the suit in question cannot be approved.” 11. Learned counsel for the revisionists has also relied upon paragraph 25 of judgment of this Court in the matter of Prabha Rani Agrawal (supra), which is quoted below; “25. Learned counsel for the revisionists has also relied upon paragraph 25 of judgment of this Court in the matter of Prabha Rani Agrawal (supra), which is quoted below; “25. From the aforesaid decisions, it follows that (i) a question relating to jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter can always be raised at any stage, be in appeal or revision, (ii) initiation of proceedings under section 147 of the Act and/or service of notice are all questions relating to assumption of jurisdiction to assess escaped income, (iii) if an issue has not been decided in appeal and the matter has simply been remanded, the same can be raised again notwithstanding with the fact that no further appeal has been preferred, (iv) in the reassessment proceedings, relief in respect of item which was not originally claimed cannot be claimed again as the reassessment proceedings are for the benefit of the Revenue, and (v) relief can only be claimed in respect of the escaped income. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases to the facts of the present case, we find that in the first round of proceedings before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the appellant had specifically questioned the validity of the proceedings initiated under section 148. of the Act. That issue was not decided by the Commissioner (Appeals) who had remanded the matter for fresh assessment after providing opportunity of hearing. The question relating to the jurisdiction assumed under section 147/148 of the Act goes to the very root of the matter and it can be raised in appeal for the first time. The appellant had raised this question again in appeal and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the ‘Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to adjudicate upon the grounds' taken before him., In fact, he had casually observed that the proceedings under section 148 of the Act had been validly initiated but, wrongly applied the principles laid down by the apex court in the case of Sun Engineering Works P., Ltd., MANU/SC/0707/1992: [1992] 198 ITR 297 (SC).” 12. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has also relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thr. L.Rs. and Ors. (supra). In that case when issue of jurisdiction came before the Apex Court for adjudication, Apex Court framed three issues and issue No. 3 covers the controversy involved in this matter. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has also relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thr. L.Rs. and Ors. (supra). In that case when issue of jurisdiction came before the Apex Court for adjudication, Apex Court framed three issues and issue No. 3 covers the controversy involved in this matter. Issue No. 3 and findings of Apex Court are quoted herein below; “5. From the above submissions of learned counsel for the parties and the pleadings on record, following are the issues, which arise for consideration in this appeal: (i) …....................................................................................................... (ii) .......................................................................................................... (iii) Whether respondents (tenants) having not raised any objection regarding jurisdiction of the Court of Additional District Judge where the suit was pending after amendments made by Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, the respondent (tenant) is precluded to question the competence of the Court of Additional District Judge to decide the suit vide his judgment dated 22.10.2016 in view of Section 21 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in revision filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act? ISSUE NO. 3. “It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that even if the Additional District Judge was not competent to decide the small causes suit on 22.10.2016, the judgment of the Additional District Judge was not liable to be interfered with by the revisional court in view of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure relates to objection to jurisdiction. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows:-“21. Objections to jurisdiction.—[(1)] No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. [(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.]” 13. The policy underlying Section 21 of Code of Civil Procedure is that when the case has been tried by a court on merits and the judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it has resulted in failure of justice. The provisions akin to Section 21 are also contained in Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 and Section 99 of Code of Civil Procedure. This Court had occasion to consider the principle behind Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure and Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 in AIR 1954 SC 340 , Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan. In paragraph 7 of the judgment following was laid down: - 7. ….The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. One more submission which was raised in the said appeal was considered by this Court. One of the submission of the appellant who had instituted the suit in the subordinate court was that as per the revised valuation, the appeal against the decree of subordinate judge did not lay before the District Court but to the High Court, hence, the judgment of the District Judge in appeal should be ignored. The appeal in the High Court be treated as first appeal. It was contended that appellant has been prejudiced in the above manner. The appeal in the High Court be treated as first appeal. It was contended that appellant has been prejudiced in the above manner. Rejecting the above submissions, this court laid down following in paragraphs 11 and 12:- 11. …..This argument proceeds on a misconception. The right of appeal is no doubt a substantive right, and its deprivation is a serious prejudice; but the appellants have not been deprived of the right of appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Court. The law does provide an appeal against that judgment to the District Court, and the plaintiffs have exercised that right. Indeed, the undervaluation has enlarged the appellants right of appeal, because while they would have had only a right of one appeal and that to the High Court if the suit had been correctly valued, by reason of the undervaluation they obtained right to two appeals, one to the District Court and another to the High Court. The complaint of the appellants really is not that they had been deprived of a right of appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Court, which they have not been, but that an appeal on the facts against that judgment was heard by the District Court and not by the High Court. This objection therefore amounts to this that a change in the forum of appeal is by itself a matter of prejudice for the purpose of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. 12. The question, therefore, is, can a decree passed on appeal by a court which had jurisdiction to entertain it only by reason of undervaluation, be set aside on the ground that on a true valuation that court was not competent to entertain the appeal? Three High Courts have considered the matter in Full Benches, and have come to the conclusion that mere change of forum is not a prejudice within the meaning of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Vide Kelu Achan v. Cheriya Parvathi Nethiar Mool Chand v. Ram Kishan and Ramdeo Singh v. Raj Narain. In our judgment, the opinion expressed in these decisions is correct. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in AIR (1962) SC 199, Hiralal vs. Kalinath and AIR 1963 SC 634, Bahrain Petroleum Co. vs. P.J.Pappu and Another. Vide Kelu Achan v. Cheriya Parvathi Nethiar Mool Chand v. Ram Kishan and Ramdeo Singh v. Raj Narain. In our judgment, the opinion expressed in these decisions is correct. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in AIR (1962) SC 199, Hiralal vs. Kalinath and AIR 1963 SC 634, Bahrain Petroleum Co. vs. P.J.Pappu and Another. This court in (1993) 2 SCC 130 , R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited vs. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. had again considered Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In paragraphs 7 and 8, following has been laid down: - 7. ….It may be further noted that the learned Single Judge trying the suit had recorded a finding that the Bombay Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and unless there has been consequent failure of justice. The above provision clearly lays down that such objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by the appellate or revisional court subject to the following conditions: (i) That such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; (ii) in all cases where issues are settled then at or before such settlement of issues; (iii) there has been a consequent failure of justice. 8. In the present case though the first two conditions are satisfied but the third condition of failure of justice is not fulfilled. As already mentioned above there was no dispute regarding the merits of the claim. The defendant has admitted the deposit of Rs 10,00,000 by the plaintiff, as well as the issuing of the five cheques. We are thus clearly of the view that there is no failure of justice to the defendant by decreeing of the suit by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, on the contrary it would be totally unjust and failure of justice to the plaintiff in case such objection relating to jurisdiction is to be maintained as allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. In (2005) 7 SCC 791 , Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. DLF Universal Ltd., this court had again considered Section 21 and other provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. In paragraph 30, following has been laid down: - 30. ….The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject- matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity. Again in (2007) 13 SCC 650 , Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas, this court held that there is distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. This court noticed the amendments made in Section 21 in the year 1976. Following was stated in paragraph 34, 37 and 41:- 34. It may be noted that Section 21 provided that no objection as to place of the suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In 1976, the existing section was numbered as sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was added relating to pecuniary jurisdiction by providing that no objection as to competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection had been taken in the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there had been a consequent failure of justice ........ 37. 37. As can be seen, Amendment Act 104 of 1976 introduced sub-section (2) relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and put it on a par with the objection to territorial jurisdiction and the competence to raise an objection in that regard even in an appeal from the very decree. This was obviously done in the light of the interpretation placed on Section 21 of the Code as it existed and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan followed by Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath and Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu. Therefore, there is no justification in understanding the expression objection as to place of suing occurring in Section 21-A as being confined to an objection only in the territorial sense and not in the pecuniary sense. Both could be understood, especially in the context of the amendment to Section 21 brought about by the Amendment Act, as objection to place of suing. 41. In the light of the above, it is clear that no objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court which tried OS No. 61 of 1971 could be raised successfully even in an appeal against that very decree unless it had been raised at the earliest opportunity and a failure of justice or prejudice was shown. Obviously therefore, it could not be collaterally challenged. That too not by the plaintiffs therein, but by a defendant whose alienation was unsuccessfully challenged by the plaintiffs in that suit. 14. Now, reverting back to facts of this case it is apparent from the judgment dated 22.10.2016 of Additional District Judge, that no objection to the competence of Additional District Judge to decide the case was taken by any of the parties. No objection having been taken to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code comes into play. Subsection (2) of Section 21 provides that no objection as to the competence of the Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. No objection has been raised by respondent tenant regarding competence of the Court. Subsection (2) of Section 21 provides that no objection as to the competence of the Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. No objection has been raised by respondent tenant regarding competence of the Court. Subsection (2) precludes the revisionist to raise any objection regarding competence of the court and further revisional court ought not to have allowed such objection regarding competence of Court of Additional District Judge to decide the suit. The respondent tenant did not raise any objection regarding competence of the Court and took a chance to obtain judgments in his favour on merits, he cannot be allowed to turn-round and contend that the court of Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to try the Small Cause Suit and the judgment is without jurisdiction and nullity. Section 21 has been enacted to thwart any such objection by unsuccessful party who did not raise any objection regarding competence of court and allowed the matter to be heard on merits. Further, in deciding the small cause suit by Additional District Judge, the tenant has not proved that there has been a consequent failure of justice. 15. The High Court in the impugned judgment has not adverted to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In judgment of Shobhit Nigam (Supra) also, affect of Section 21 was neither considered nor raised. Section 21 contains a legislative policy which policy has an object and purpose. The object is also to avoid retrial of cases on merit on basis of technical objections. 16. There is another judgment of Single Judge of the High Court referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent i.e. SCC Revision No.305 of 2016, Tejumal vs. Mohd. Sarfraz, 2017 (121) ALR 392. In the above case, learned Single Judge had allowed the revision under Section 25 against the judgment dated 12.08.2016 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge on the ground that the judgment of Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction. Sarfraz, 2017 (121) ALR 392. In the above case, learned Single Judge had allowed the revision under Section 25 against the judgment dated 12.08.2016 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge on the ground that the judgment of Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, High Court had noticed judgment of this court in R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited vs. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. where it was held that in view of Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, objection as to the place of suing should be taken by the party concerned in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and the objection to this effect shall not be allowed by the Appellate or Revisional Court but relying on the judgment of this Court in Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman Paswan, learned Single Judge held that defect of jurisdiction whether pecuniary or territorial or to the subject matter cannot be cured and can be set up at any stage of the proceeding. 17. We are of the view that the above view of the learned Single Judge is neither in consonance with the judgment of this Court in Kiran Singhs case nor with R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited (supra) which has been noted and referred to by learned Single Judge. Section 21 is statutory recognition of the legislative policy which cannot be ignored or given a go-by by the litigants who challenges an unfavourable decision. 18. We thus of the view that the view of the learned Single Judge in Tejumal Vs. Mohd. Sarfraj does not lay down the correct law and cannot be approved. 19. In the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that High Court committed error in allowing the S.C.C. Revision filed by the respondent tenant without taking into consideration Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. We thus hold that even when the court of Additional District Judge was not competent to decide the Small Causes Suit in question on the ground that the pecuniary jurisdiction is vested in Court of Small Causes i.e. Civil Judge, Senior Division w.e.f. 07.12.2015, no interference was called in the judgment of Additional District Judge in the exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction by High Court in view of the provisions of Section 21 of Code of Civil Procedure.” 21. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has also relied upon paragraph 5 of judgment of this Court in the matter of Rajendra Kumar @ Vinay Kumar (supra), which are quoted below; “5. In view of the fact admitted by learned counsel for the tenant-revisionist that objection as to the pecuniary jurisdiction was not specifically raised by the tenant-revisionist before the court below after the amendment was made in Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, he can not be permitted to raise the objection as to the pecuniary jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the Civil Procedure code, 1908 and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Agarwal since Deceased Thr. Lrs. & Ors (supra) (paragraphs 56 to 59). Thus, there is no merit in this revision, therefore, the revision is dismissed.” 22. Learned counsel for the revisionists has admitted that revisionists-defendants have not raised the issue of jurisdiction due to pecuniary limits in their written submission, but his argument was focused only on the ground that it is a question relating to jurisdiction which goes to the root of matter and can be raised at any stage. 23. Judgment relied by him also support the very same contention. 24. There is no doubt in the submission of learned counsel for the revisionists that a question relating to jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter can be raised at any stage, but in present case, there is specific bar provided in Section 21 of CPC, 1908, which says that it can be raised in the Court of first instance and not thereafter. Therefore, argument so advanced and judgment relied upon cannot be accepted. 25. Certainly Section 15 of CPC, 1908 provides Court in which suits to be instituted whereas Sections 21 of CPC, 1908 provides objection to jurisdiction. Sections 15 & 21 are being quoted below; “15. Court in which suits to be instituted.-Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. 21. 25. Certainly Section 15 of CPC, 1908 provides Court in which suits to be instituted whereas Sections 21 of CPC, 1908 provides objection to jurisdiction. Sections 15 & 21 are being quoted below; “15. Court in which suits to be instituted.-Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. 21. Objections to jurisdiction.-[(1)] No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues or settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. [(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.]” 26. Section 21 of Sub-section (1) deals with the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of Court and it is very well stated that no objection with regard to competence of Court with reference of pecuniary limits shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court, unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity. Whereas in present case, this objection has never been taken in written submission, therefore, at this stage, contrary to provisions of Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, no objection can be entertained with regard to jurisdiction of Court based upon pecuniary limits. 27. It is also not disputed that it is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. There is no doubt on the point that at the time of filing of Small Causes Case, rent was claimed as Rs. 5,000/-per month and accordingly, valuation of suit was more than Rs. 1,00,000/-. 27. It is also not disputed that it is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. There is no doubt on the point that at the time of filing of Small Causes Case, rent was claimed as Rs. 5,000/-per month and accordingly, valuation of suit was more than Rs. 1,00,000/-. Therefore, Court was having jurisdiction to try the case and jurisdiction can only be ceased based on pecuniary limits subject to raising objection in written submission, which was never raised. Therefore, competence of Court based upon jurisdiction cannot be challenged without taking objection in written submission at the first instance. Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Agarwal (Supra) has taken very same view that no order can be passed contrary to provisions of Section 21 of CPC, 1908. Relying upon the very same judgment, this Court in the matter of Rajendra Kumar @ Vinay Kumar (supra) has also taken the same view. 28. Therefore, under such facts of the case as well as provisions of Section 21 of CPC, 1908 and the judgments discussed above, there is no illegality in the impugned order. 29. Accordingly, revision lacks merit and is dismissed. 30. No order as to costs.