JUDGMENT : The present review petition has been filed for reviewing the order/judgment dated 23.03.2021 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1634 of 2020, whereby the respondent authorities were directed to measure the additional work executed by the writ petitioner and to determine the amount to be paid to him for the said work with a further direction to complete all these exercise within a period of three months from the date of the said order. 2. Mr. Ashutosh Anand, learned AAG-III appearing on behalf of the review petitioners submits that since no administrative approval of the additional work said to have been executed by the writ petitioner was taken from the Secretary, Building Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, no payment can be made to him for executing the same. It is also submitted that the work at the residence of the then Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro was done by the petitioner without awarding any contract in his favour and without following due procedure for the same as provided under Jharkhand Public Works Department Code. The execution of the said work by the petitioner (if at all) was in complete violation of Rule 158 of the Jharkhand Public Works Department Code. 3. Learned AAG-III, while referring to paragraph-10 of the order/judgment dated 23.03.2021 passed by this Court, submits that it was observed inter alia that on the one hand, the payment of the petitioner, who had already executed the additional work was not released on the ground of non-granting of administrative approval and on the other hand, the same work was allotted to a new tenderer, who had nothing to do with the said work. In fact, the new tender issued for the residence of the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro was for some other work and only part of the alleged additional work claimed to have been done by the writ petitioner had overlapped. 4. Learned AAG-III further submits that this Court while passing the order dated 23.03.2021 has erred in observing that there was no specific denial of the fact by the respondents that the petitioner had done additional work at the residence of Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro. It is an error apparent on the face of record considering that the respondent no. 4. Learned AAG-III further submits that this Court while passing the order dated 23.03.2021 has erred in observing that there was no specific denial of the fact by the respondents that the petitioner had done additional work at the residence of Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro. It is an error apparent on the face of record considering that the respondent no. 1/writ petitioner had though stated in paragraph-16 of the writ petition that the said work was already completed by him, yet the said statement was categorically denied and disputed in paragraph-28 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 (the petitioner no. 2 herein). It is also submitted that even in paragraph-29 of the counter affidavit, it was specifically stated that there was no such admission of the work said to have been done by the writ petitioner at the residence of the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro. 5. Heard learned counsel for the review petitioners and perused the content of the review petition. 6. Before appreciating the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be relevant to go through the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court explaining the conditions/eventualities under which a review petition may be entertained. 7. In the case of “Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aibam Pishak Sharma & Ors.”, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “3. ……… It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. 8. In the case of “Parsion Devi & Ors. Vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors.”, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. 9. In the case of “Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Mawasi & Ors.”, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed: “19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216) ‘… nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. … The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.’ Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: ‘It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.” Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, “for any other sufficient reason” in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” 28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed: “32. … It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words “any other sufficient reason” must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of “mistake or error apparent on the face of the record” or some ground analogous thereto.” 29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed: “11. … A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.” 30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: “3. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: “3. … But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed: “9. … An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC … A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be „an appeal in disguise?.” 33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words: “56. … Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.” 34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: “13. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.” 34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: “13. … The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason”. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.” 35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed: “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier. 22. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. 22. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” 10. It has consistently been held in the aforesaid judgments that a review petition cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. The power of review may be exercised on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, even after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found. It may also be exercised on any such analogous ground. 11. Reverting back to the present case. So far as the issue with regard to non-grant of administrative approval by the Secretary, Building Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand is concerned, the same has duly been considered in paragraph-7 of the order/judgment dated 23.03.2021, which is reproduced as under: “On perusal of the Site Order Book, it appears that on 20.12.2017, the Junior Engineer had made noting on the same to the effect that the respondent no. 3 had directed for doing the additional work and on the same date, the respondent no. 4 had also made noting on the Site Order Book, directing the Junior Engineer to ensure the compliance of the order of the respondent no. 3 by the petitioner. The respondent no. 3 had also issued letter dated 08.03.2018 to the respondent no. 4 for execution of the said additional work treating it as most urgent. 4 had also made noting on the Site Order Book, directing the Junior Engineer to ensure the compliance of the order of the respondent no. 3 by the petitioner. The respondent no. 3 had also issued letter dated 08.03.2018 to the respondent no. 4 for execution of the said additional work treating it as most urgent. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4 prepared the estimate of the additional work and sent it for administrative approval of the same. It is evident that the respondent no. 3 vide letter dated 22.09.2018, informed the respondent no. 4 that the additional work had been completed by the petitioner with a direction to ensure the payment of the said work in accordance with law. Thus, the claim of the petitioner that the said work has been done by him is duly substantiated by the said letter. The respondents in the counter affidavit have also not specifically denied the execution of the additional work by the petitioner, however, they have refused to make payment of the same on the ground that it was done without any administrative approval. The respondents have tried to impress upon this Court that the Jharkhand Public Works Department Code specifically prescribes the procedure to be followed for awarding a contract and since the petitioner has done the said additional work without any specific written order of the competent authority, claim towards the same is not admissible. The contention of the respondents is that as per rule 158 of the Jharkhand Public Works Department Code, a tender must be obtained for all works which are proposed to be given on contract unless the amount of contract is Rs. 25,000/- or less or wherever the competent authority specifically directs this to be taken up departmentally or by nomination in case of exigencies. So far as the said legal aspect is concerned, this Court too has no confusion on the same. The question arises as to whether the said procedure comes in the way of the petitioner in claiming the amount for the additional work done by him at the residence of the respondent no. 3.” 12. So far as the said legal aspect is concerned, this Court too has no confusion on the same. The question arises as to whether the said procedure comes in the way of the petitioner in claiming the amount for the additional work done by him at the residence of the respondent no. 3.” 12. So far as the submission of learned AAG-III with respect to paragraph-10 of the said order/judgment is concerned, this Court finds that the review petitioners themselves have stated that the new tender had partly overlapped the additional work said to have been executed by the writ petitioner and thus, I am of the view that even if various other works at the residence of the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro were also included in the new tender, the same does not change the position. This Court having considered the factual as well as the legal issues involved in the matter has held that the writ petitioner is entitled for payment of additional work done by him at the residence of the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro. 13. So far as the claim of the review petitioners that they had specifically denied the execution of additional work by the writ petitioner in the counter affidavit, I have perused paragraph-28 of the counter affidavit which has been highlighted by the learned AAG-III and on perusal of the same, it appears that the respondents had made evasive denial of the writ petitioner’s claim. Though the respondents claimed in the said paragraph that the administrative approval was not given for the additional work, they had not stated that additional work was not at all done by the writ petitioner. Further in paragraph-29 of the counter affidavit, the respondents had denied the statements made in paragraph-17 of the writ petition which was only with regard to the content published in the daily newspaper “Dainik Jagran” on 24.08.2019 and 25.08.2019 and as such, the statement made in paragraph-29 cannot be treated as denial of execution of additional work by the writ petitioner. 14. It is a trite law that a review cannot be filed in the shape of an appeal. So far as the present review petition filed on behalf of the State of Jharkhand is concerned, the same does not involve any such issue which can be entertained in the review jurisdiction of this Court. 14. It is a trite law that a review cannot be filed in the shape of an appeal. So far as the present review petition filed on behalf of the State of Jharkhand is concerned, the same does not involve any such issue which can be entertained in the review jurisdiction of this Court. All the grounds for review has already been considered in the order dated 23.03.2021 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1634 of 2020, on perusal which it would be evident that each and every aspect of the matter has duly been appreciated by this Court. Hence, I see no reason to review the said order. 15. It is a sorry affair that on the one hand, the review petitioners (the State of Jharkhand and its authorities) have prayed for review of the order dated 23.03.2021 claiming that this Court had wrongly observed that there was no specific denial of the execution of additional work by the writ petitioner at the residence of Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro and on the other hand, in the review petition itself, they have accepted that following the order dated 23.03.2021, a three members committee was formed which had also accepted the execution of 10 additional works by the writ petitioner which amounted to Rs. 28,18,967/-. It would thus be appropriate to refer Ground No. (xvii) taken in the review petition for ready reference, which is quoted as under: (xvii) For that in the above facts, it is clear that the additional work has been definitely done by the petitioner amounting to Rs. 28,18,967/- but only work amounting to Rs. 3,72,421/- is the genuine claim payable by B.C.D. For rest of the amount of Rs. 24,46,546/- no order was given by any official of Building Construction Department and hence it is no payable by Building Construction Department. (xviii) For that the work was done by the contractor/petitioner as per instruction given by the then D.C Bokaro through his letter (No. 707 dated 08.03.2018) addressed to Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro. 16. 24,46,546/- no order was given by any official of Building Construction Department and hence it is no payable by Building Construction Department. (xviii) For that the work was done by the contractor/petitioner as per instruction given by the then D.C Bokaro through his letter (No. 707 dated 08.03.2018) addressed to Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro. 16. It would appear from the aforesaid facts that the present review petition has been filed after about a year of the passing of the order dated 23.03.2021 just to deprive the writ petitioner from getting the fruits of the order dated 23.03.2021 passed by this Court and also in order to take an excuse for not complying the direction within the time stipulated in the said order. 17. Before parting with this case, it would be relevant to refer the last order passed in the present review petition along with Cont. Case (Civil) No. 436 of 2021 i.e., order dated 17.06.2022 wherein this Court had noticed that the affidavit of the present review petition was sworn by one Mr. Raj Kumar Rana, Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro. The said officer is physically present before this Court, who has now retired from service. On putting question to him regarding his place of posting on the date of execution of the affidavit of the present review petition, he has clearly submitted that he was holding the post of Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro, however, has mentioned himself in the said affidavit as Executive Engineer, Building Construction Department, Jharkhand. If the said officer was in-charge of the aforesaid Division, and was not posted in the Secretariat during the relevant period, it is difficult to understand as to how he could have sworn the affidavit of review petition filed on behalf of the State of Jharkhand as well as the Secretary, Building Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand. 18. It has already been observed by this Court in the order dated 17.06.2022 that the affidavit of any petition which is filed in High Court on behalf of the Secretary of the State, must either be sworn by him or by a gazetted officer authorized by him who is concerned with the affairs of the department at Secretariat level and not by a field officer. Moreover, the claim of the review petitioners is that administrative approval was not accorded to the alleged additional work done by the writ petitioner. Moreover, the claim of the review petitioners is that administrative approval was not accorded to the alleged additional work done by the writ petitioner. Thus an officer of Secretariat level should have been authorized to swear the affidavit and not a field officer. That apart, some factual claims made in the review petition were also required to be verified by the Secretary, Building Construction Department, Jharkhand himself or by an officer posted in the Secretariat under him and duly authorized for the said purpose. 19. At this juncture, Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III, refers to letter no. 3513 dated 27.12.2021 issued by the Joint Secretary, Building Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand to the Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro i.e., Mr. Raj Kumar Rana and submits that he was duly authorised by the department to swear the affidavit of the present review petition. 20. That being the position, the situation becomes even more serious. It is completely beyond comprehension as to how the Secretariat of the Building Construction Department can direct a field officer, who is not at all concerned with the affairs of a department at Secretariat level, to swear an affidavit on behalf of the State as well as the Secretary of the department. The Court, however, understands that Mr. Raj Kumar Rana being a sub-ordinate field officer had to follow the direction of the Secretary and under said circumstance, he had sworn the affidavit of the present review petition. It is a case of sheer irresponsibility of the Secretary and other concerned officers of the Secretariat in directing Mr. Raj Kumar Rana, the then Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro to swear affidavit of the present review petition. 21. As it has already been observed hereinabove that the issue involved in the present matter has duly been considered by this Court while passing order dated 21.03.2021 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1634 of 2020, the present review petition being completely frivolous is deserved to be dismissed. 22. In the case of “State of Haryana Vs. Mukesh Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 47. 22. In the case of “State of Haryana Vs. Mukesh Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 47. This special leave petition is dismissed with costs of Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) to be paid by the State of Haryana for filing a totally frivolous petition and unnecessarily wasting the time of the Court and demonstrating its evil design of grabbing the properties of the lawful owners in a clandestine manner. The costs be deposited within four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. In this petition, we did not issue notice to the defendants, therefore, we direct that the costs be deposited with the National Legal Services Authority for utilising the same to enable the poor litigants to contest their cases. 23. The present review petition is accordingly dismissed. Since valuable time of the Court has been consumed in considering the review petition, it seems appropriate to impose an exemplary cost on the State of Jharkhand which is quantified as Rs. 10,000/- to be paid in favour of Advocates” Association Welfare and Development Fund, Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi within one month. I.A. No. 4549 of 2022 also stands dismissed accordingly.