ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. Central Coalfields Limited (in short, CCL) is in appeal against the order dated 27th October 2016 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4191 of 2010. 2. By the said order, the writ Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the writ petitioner who is the respondent in the present appeal and remanded the matter to CCL to consider the case of the respondent on the question of quantum of punishment. 3. In the order dated 27th October 2016 the writ Court has observed as under : “6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and on perusal of the documents available on record, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference for the following facts and reasons : (i) The main charge framed against the petitioner is that his father submitted a wrong affidavit stating that Sri Kishori Singh and Anil Kumar Singh are his sons-in-law and thus, the petitioner submitted a false information and misguided the respondents-CCL. Pursuant to framing of such charge, the matter was enquired into and the enquiry officer came to the conclusion that said Sri Kishori Singh and Anil Kumar Singh are not the sons-in-law of the father of the petitioner. Though, it has been objected to by the learned counsel for the petitioner stating that the enquiry officer did not at all appreciate the evidence of his father, wherein he has in unequivocal terms has deposed that he is the actual father-in-law of said Kishori Singh and since the Mathura Singh did the Kanyadaan of her daughter, so people call his father-in-law of Kishori Singh. Be that as it may be, this Court cannot go into the disputed question of fact and fact findings recorded by the enquiry officer. (ii) Indisputably, the petitioner joined the services of the respondents on 16.06.1988 under Land Loser Scheme and there is no dispute that the land of his father was acquired and petitioner, being the son (dependent) was given employment in lieu of acquisition of land under the said scheme. Furthermore, in the memo of charge, it has been recorded that the petitioner secured employment in CCL during 1988 against the land in Tarmi/Turiya village belonging to his father. Furthermore, in the memo of charge, it has been recorded that the petitioner secured employment in CCL during 1988 against the land in Tarmi/Turiya village belonging to his father. Hence, the foundational fact of his employment that his father's land was acquired and under the Land Loser Scheme floated by the respondents, he obtained job remains undisputed. (iii) However, from the discussions made above, even if it is taken to be true that the petitioner furnished false information regarding his genealogy table, as this Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the facts findings recorded by the enquiry officer, the punishment of dismissal from services that too after serving about two decades appears to be shockingly disproportionate and the punishment appears to be grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and hence, hit by doctrine of proportionality so far as quantum of punishment is concerned. In view of the aforesaid facts and reasons, as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the impugned order dated 04.02.2004 and appellate order dated 27.04.2010 are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted back to the respondents-authorities to consider the case of the petitioner afresh mainly on the question of quantum of punishment taking into account the observations made by this Court, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 7. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petitions stand disposed of.” 4. CCL has questioned legality of the aforesaid direction by the writ Court on the ground that “length of service” is not a relevant consideration for award of punishment in a disciplinary enquiry where serious allegations of misrepresentation and providing false information have been found proved against the delinquent employee. 5. Mr. Ayush Aditya, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that there is no allegation against the respondent that he secured his own employment by providing false information and while so the writ Court rightly considered the unblemished past service of the respondent to interfere with the order of punishment of dismissal from service. To fortify the aforesaid submission, Mr. Ayush Aditya, the learned counsel for the respondent would refer to paragraph no.15 of the judgment in “Delhi Police, through Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Sat Narayan Kaushik” (2016) 6 SCC 303 . 6. To fortify the aforesaid submission, Mr. Ayush Aditya, the learned counsel for the respondent would refer to paragraph no.15 of the judgment in “Delhi Police, through Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Sat Narayan Kaushik” (2016) 6 SCC 303 . 6. In “Sat Narayan Kaushik”, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in exercise of the powers under writ jurisdiction the High Court can interfere with quantum of punishment having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in particular, gravity and seriousness of the misconduct. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “15. Coming to the first two submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, has power to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the appointing authority in an appropriate case provided the High Court has taken into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case such as nature of charges levelled against the employee, its gravity, seriousness, whether proved and, if so, to what extent, entire service record, work done in the past, remaining tenure of the delinquent left, etc. In other words, it is necessary for the High Court to take these factors into consideration before interfering in the quantum of the punishment.” 8. As we gather from the aforesaid observations in “Sat Narayan Kaushik”, the question of punishment is within exclusive domain of the employer which of course shall take into consideration the various aspects as indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Generally the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not interfere with the punishment order unless it is shown to the Court that the order of punishment is such that shocks the conscience of the Court or that no reasonable employer could have passed such an order. 9. In “Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India” (1987) 4 SCC 611 the misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee was that he refused to take food for which he was inflicted punishment of rigorous imprisonment for one year and, later on, dismissed from service. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service Lord Diplock said: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;. . .” 11. In the present case, the allegation against the respondent is that he provided false information which facilitated employment to Kishori Singh and Anil Kumar Singh whom his father claimed as his sons-in-law. The charge-memo dated 23rd July 2001 served upon the respondent reads as under : “You secured employment in CCL during 1988 against land in Tarmi/Turiya village belonging to your father. In the family chart of Sri Ram Pravesh Singh, your father, you had indicated that Sri Kishori Singh, son of Mundrika Singh & Anil Kumar Singh, son of Muniji Singh are the son-in-law of your father i.e. your brother-in-law. In the family chart of Sri Ram Pravesh Singh, your father, you had indicated that Sri Kishori Singh, son of Mundrika Singh & Anil Kumar Singh, son of Muniji Singh are the son-in-law of your father i.e. your brother-in-law. Your father, Sri R.P. Singh also submitted affidavit that they are in his sons-in-law. It has been gathered that Sri Kishori Singh and Anil Kumar Singh are not the sons-in-law of your father (your brothers-in-law). Thus you have submitted a false information and misguided the CCL management as well abetted an act which amount to misconduct in terms of Clause 26.1, 26.9, 26.22 and 26.38 of the Standing Orders of CCL by which your services are governed in CCL.” 12. Clauses 26.1, 26.9 and 26.22 of the Standing Order of CCL read as under : 26.1: Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property. 26.9: Giving of false information regarding one's name, age, father's name, qualification etc. in connection with his employment. 26.22: Any willful and deliberate act which is subversive of discipline or which may be detrimental to the interest of the company.” 13. On admitted facts, the respondent cannot deny knowledge about the affidavit furnished by his father in which he had claimed that Kishori Singh and Anil Kumar Singh are his sons-in-law. It is alleged that the respondent also furnished a genealogical table in which the aforesaid two persons are shown as his brothers-in-law. In a properly constituted departmental enquiry, these facts have been found proved. We would also note that there is no allegation of denial of an opportunity to defend himself by the respondent. Therefore, the writ Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact recorded in the departmental proceeding against the respondent. 14. In the order dated 27th October 2016, the writ Court rightly observed that it would not go into the questions of disputed facts which, as would appear, the respondent sought to agitate before the writ Court. However, on the ground that the respondent served CCL for about two decades the writ Court held that the punishment of dismissal from service was shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. 15. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid finding recorded by the writ Court that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct cannot be countenanced in law. However, on the ground that the respondent served CCL for about two decades the writ Court held that the punishment of dismissal from service was shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. 15. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid finding recorded by the writ Court that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct cannot be countenanced in law. What punishment may amount to shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct can be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case [refer, “Hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen” AIR 1965 SC 917 ]. The reason why the writ Court would normally not interfere with the punishment order appears to be that the writ Court is not constituted as a Court of appeal [refer, “State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao” (1975) 2 SCC 557 ] and, therefore, the question of proportionality of punishment must be examined in the context of proved misconduct. 16. The plea that the respondent who was appointed in the year 1988 after having served CCL for 16 years was dismissed by an order dated 4th February 2004 and, therefore, the order of punishment of dismissal from service was rightly found shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct is liable to be rejected. In our opinion, the punishment of dismissal from service inflicted upon the respondent for the proved misconduct of furnishing false information and thereby misguiding the management is not disproportionate to the misconduct committed by him. 17. Having held so, we find serious error in the approach of the writ Court and, therefore, would interfere with the order dated 27th October 2016 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4191 of 2010. 18. In the result, L.P.A No. 399 of 2017 is allowed and, consequently, W.P.(S) No.4191 of 2010 is dismissed. 19. I.A No. 951 of 2019 stands disposed of.