JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The afore captioned Writ Appeals arise out of the impugned common judgment dated 27.07.2022, rendered by the learned Single Judge, disposing of WP(C) No.22515/2022 and a batch of connected writ petitions (Civil). 2. The afore writ petitions have been filed by the Managers of various aided Higher Secondary Schools, impugning the Government Order, G.O.(MS) No.121/2022/G.Edn. dated 07.07.2022, issued by the competent authority of the State Government in the General Education Department and the prospectus issued by the Directorate concerned, with the approval of the Government for regulating admission to plus one course (Higher Secondary), for the academic year, 2022-23, to the extent it concerns private aided Higher Secondary Schools. The hitherto norm of allotting 30% of the total seats in plus two courses in aided Higher Secondary Schools, run by Managements other than minorities and Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC)/Other Backward Classes (OBC Communities), upto last year has been altered by ordering that the said Management Quota will be only 20% of the total seats and 10% seats will be allotted to students of the community to which the management belongs, to be allotted strictly on the basis of inter se merit of such eligible students. Further, it was also ordered therein that if no community is declared by the Management for the above purpose, then the 10% community quota seats shall be converted as general merit seats and the same will be filled up through the Central Allotment Process (CAP). The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rendered the afore impugned common judgment in these Writ Petitions (Civil), finding that the main plea of the writ petitioner's management that the 10% community quota, set apart for managements other than minorities and backward classes, is not constitutionally valid. However, the second plea of the writ petitioners, that the 10% community quota seats should be converted as management quota seats, have been repelled by the learned Single Judge and it has been held that this Court does not have the competence in judicial review to order that the said 10% community quota seats should be converted as management quota seats, but that the said seats will have to be converted as general merit/open merit quota seats, going by the specific stand in that regard of the State Government. 3. 3. Various writ petitioner managements have filed the afore writ appeals, to the extent that they are aggrieved by the rejection of their second plea for conversion of 10% community quota seats as management quota seats and with the plea that those managements should be allowed to fill up the said 10% quota seats as management quota seats, apart from the regular 20% management quota seats already allotted to them and thus, they should be given the right to fill up 30% of the total seats as management quota seats, as was allowed from 2005 onwards. Whereas, the State and the Departmental authorities concerned have filed Writ Appeals, as above, challenging the finding of the learned Single Judge, regarding the invalidity of setting apart of the 10% community quota seats to managements other than minorities and backward classes, contending that the differentiation of classification for the said 10% quota seats is not merely on the basis of community, based on religion, caste etc, but also on the fact that the community concerned would have endeavored to establish those schools and that therefore, it is in recognition of that aspect that the said 10% quota seats have now been set up with a rider that community quota seats should be filled up by the respective managements, strictly on the basis of merit of the eligible applicants. 4. We have heard both sides in extenso and have gone through the pleadings and materials on record. 5. As the State/Departmental authorities have filed their statement dated 21.07.2022 in Writ Petition (Civil), WP(C) No.22515/2022, and has adopted the said statement as pleadings in the other WP(C)s, we would treat WP(C) No.22515/2022 as the lead writ petition, for the purpose of convenience, especially for reference of documents. Documents, as marked in the said WP(C) No.22515/2022, as well as in the statements filed by the respondents in that WP(C) will be referred to hereinafter for convenience, unless otherwise indicated. 6. After hearing the submissions of the parties, we would observe that there may be broadly 3 categories of managements of aided Higher Secondary Schools, whose admissions to plus two courses are regulated by the prospectus, produced as Ext.P5, for the Academic Year 2022-23. Such categories are:- (i) Managements run by minorities and SEBC/OBC communities. 6. After hearing the submissions of the parties, we would observe that there may be broadly 3 categories of managements of aided Higher Secondary Schools, whose admissions to plus two courses are regulated by the prospectus, produced as Ext.P5, for the Academic Year 2022-23. Such categories are:- (i) Managements run by minorities and SEBC/OBC communities. (ii) Managements run by organizations other than minorities/SEBCs, but who have a definite stand that they have a community to which the management belongs “as per the terminology employed in Government orders, i.e., such managements have strong linkage with the specific community, based on religion and caste, but other than religious minorities and SEBCs. (It appears that none of such managements have been made parties in the present writ proceedings). (iii) Managements, other than minorities and SEBC communities, but run by individual managers, registered Societies, companies, trusts etc, who, according to them, are not in a position to identify any specific community to which the management belongs, due to various reasons. (The writ petitioners are essentially managements of the 3rd category). 7. At the outset, it may be better to have a broad overview of the various norms and Government orders issued by the State Government, which have regulated admissions to plus two courses in aided Higher Secondary Schools. As per Annexure R1(a), GO.(MS) No.18/1991/G.Edn dated 01.02.1991 (produced as Annexure R1(a) along with the afore statement), it has been interalia ordered, in page no.2 thereof, that 20% was allotted to Management Quota, 12% and 8% respectively allotted to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST). This allocation appears to have been done without any distinction as to whether the management belongs to any minorities or OBC or not. Later, the Government issued Annexure R1(b), GO(MS) No.21/1991/G.Edn. dated 27.02.1991, ordering in page no.2, paragraph no.2 thereof, that for aided minority/OBC community managements, the allocation would be 40% (open merit), 20% management quota, 20% community quota (community to which the school belongs), 12% and 8% respectively for SC and ST. Whereas for aided school managements, other than minorities and OBC, the allocation was 50% for open merit, 20% for management quota, 10% for community quota (community to which the school belongs) and 12% and 8% respectively for SC and ST. 8. Whereas for aided school managements, other than minorities and OBC, the allocation was 50% for open merit, 20% for management quota, 10% for community quota (community to which the school belongs) and 12% and 8% respectively for SC and ST. 8. The legality and validity of allotting 10% community quota seats on the criteria of the community to which the school belongs to, other than those run by minorities and Backward classes communities, was the subject matter of consideration in the Writ Petition earlier filed before this Court as OP No.18658/2000 [Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha & Anr. v State of Kerala & Ors.] 9. The Division Bench of this Court has rendered judgment on 06.02.2003, in OP No.18658 of 2000, holding that the abovesaid 10% community quota seats, allotted on the criteria to which the school belongs to managements other than minorities and OBC communities, is not constitutionally valid and does not stand scrutiny, as per the Articles of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench has noted that, as far as minority communities and backward classes communities are concerned, there are provisions in the Constitution, as in Article 30, Article 15(4), etc. But that for other communities, especially for forward communities, such reservation, solely on the basis of the community to which the school belongs to, would not be constitutionally valid. The Division Bench therein has specifically placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the celebrated case in Unni Krishnan, J.P. And Ors. v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. [ 1993 (1) SCC 645 ], wherein it has been categorically held that there shall be no quota reserved for any family, caste or community, which may have established the educational institution. So also, in State of Gujarat & Ors. v. N.V.Shah Charitable Trust & Ors. [ 1994 (3) SCC 552 ], it has been held that the nomination of candidates by the donor, who contributed a large amount of capital, to start the college, was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Division Bench also specifically placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the celebrated case in Dr.Jagadish Saran and Others v. UOI [ (1980) 2 SCC 768 ], where it was held that the quantum of reservation shall not be excessive or socially injurious, measured by the overall competency of the end-product. The Division Bench also specifically placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the celebrated case in Dr.Jagadish Saran and Others v. UOI [ (1980) 2 SCC 768 ], where it was held that the quantum of reservation shall not be excessive or socially injurious, measured by the overall competency of the end-product. Accordingly, the Division Bench, as per the Judgment rendered on 06.02.2003 in OP No.18658/2000, has conclusively held that the impugned clause, reserving seats for the community to which the school belongs to, is arbitrary and the said clause was quashed. Later, it appears that the Division Bench of this Court as per order dated 07.04.2003 in OP No.23665/2000, has held that the judgment of the Division Bench rendered on 06.02.2003 in OP No.18658/2000, has only struck down a clause in the notification regarding allotment of quota to the community to which the school belongs to and that the said judgment does not, in any manner, take away the rights of minorities and it was clarified that the petitioners therein would be at liberty to approach the Government, for necessary orders, in the matter of minority managements. (These aspects are discernible from a reading of GO(MS) No.156/ 2003/G.Edn dated 09.06.2003). 10. It was thereafter that the Government had issued GO(MS) No.156/2003/G.Edn., wherein the abovesaid decisions of the Division Bench of this Court, in OP No.18658/2000, OP No.23665/2000 etc have been referred to. The Government has ordered thereby on 09.06.2003 that, in compliance with the directions issued by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 06.02.2003, in OP No.18658/2000 as well as the subsequent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in OP No.23665/2000, it has become necessary to issue fresh orders, regarding the allocation of various quotas for admission to plus two courses in aided Higher Secondary School, since the clause for community reservation, based on the community to which the school belongs to, was quashed by this Court and also for clarification regarding minority and backward communities' managements. Accordingly, it was ordered thereby that, for private aided minority and backward classes managements, the allocation for aided minority and backward classes managements would be 40% (open merit), 40% for management quota, 12% and 8% respectively for SC and ST. Accordingly, it was ordered thereby that, for private aided minority and backward classes managements, the allocation for aided minority and backward classes managements would be 40% (open merit), 40% for management quota, 12% and 8% respectively for SC and ST. For aided managements other than minority and backward classes, it was ordered that the allocation would be 50% for open merit, 30% for management quota, 12% and 8% respectively for SC and ST. In other words, it appears that the 10% community quota, based on the community to which the school/management belongs to, as ordered in GO(MS) No.21/1991/G.Edn dated 27.02.1991, was given a complete go bye and the earlier management quota and community quota were merged together, with the result that for aided minority and backward classes management, the allocation for management quota would be 40% and for managements other than minority and backward classes, would be 30% (viz, 20% +10%). Later, the Government has issued GO(MS) No.164/2003/G.Edn. dated 17.06.2003, wherein the allocations in the management quota as above, has not been altered, but slight changes have been made out for providing quota for physically disabled candidates, to be adjusted in the open merit quota. The said GO may not have much relevance for the present cases. 11. It is later that the Government has issued Ext.P6, GO(MS) No.206/2005/G.Edn. dated 01.07.2005, whereby the overall management quotas in both managements of minority and backward classes and managements other than minority and backward classes, have not been altered. But the Government has noted in that GO dated 01.07.2005 that complaints have been received that managements do not provide adequate protection to the legitimate interest of students, who belong to minorities and backward classes and that therefore, it is ordered, as per paragraph no.6 of the said GO dated 01.07.2005, that the earlier referred GO(MS) No.156/2003/ G.Edn dated 09.06.2003 would be slightly modified with the direction that the 40% seats in plus two courses, allotted as management quota in private aided minority and backward classes schools, 20% thereof will be for students of minority and backward classes respectively and the remaining 20% will be management quota for the respective aided minority/backward classes management concerned. 12. It appears that the abovesaid overall management quotas ordered, as per GO(MS) No.164/2003/G.Edn. 12. It appears that the abovesaid overall management quotas ordered, as per GO(MS) No.164/2003/G.Edn. dated 17.06.2003 and as slightly modified, as per Ext.P6 GO dated 01.07.2005, have been governing the field from then onwards, i.e. for managements other than minorities and backward classes, the management quota was 30% and for minority and backward classes, it was 40% (20% management quota + 20% minority/OBC students quota). 13. However, for the previous Academic year 2021-2022, the Government had issued GO(Rt) No.3667/2021/G.Edn. dated 12.08.2021, approving the prospectus issued by the Directorate for the said Academic year 2021-2022, ordering that for managements other than minorities and backward classes, the management quota would be only 20% and 10% could be for community quota, on the criteria that the community to which the management belongs to be filled up on the basis of inter se merit of such community candidates. It appears that, as per the above GO dated 12.08.2021, the Government had essentially granted approval to the Directorate for issuing the prospectus for 2021-22, as above. The abovesaid new prescriptions of reducing the management quota to 20% and introducing 10% community quota was challenged in management schools, other than minorities and backward classes communities, where the subject matter of challenge, at the instance of persons, like the present writ petitioners, who belong to the afore mentioned 3rd category of managements, i.e. managements who are not in a position to declare community to which the school/management belongs, for various reasons, especially managements run by individuals, registered companies, societies, trusts etc. A batch of writ petitions, as in WP(C) No.21932/2021 (filed by the very same petitioner in the present WP(C) No.22515/2022) and connected writ petitions, were considered by this Court. The learned Single Judge had initially granted Ext.P2 interim order dated 12.10.2021 in WP(C) No.21932/2021 holding that, after considering the rival submissions, it is found that there is considerable prima facie force in the submission of the petitioner that their right to admit students to the management quota is being curtailed by unworkable conditions, inasmuch as they are not in a position to identify the community to which the school/management belongs to and that therefore, the said criteria is unworkable and irrational etc. The learned Single Judge also observed that a private aided management school cannot be called upon to disclose a particular community to which the management belongs to. The learned Single Judge also observed that a private aided management school cannot be called upon to disclose a particular community to which the management belongs to. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge ordered, as per Ext.P1 interim order dated 12.10.2021, that as an interim measure, the impugned orders at Exts.P1 & P2 therein, carving out 10% management quota, out of the earlier 30% management quota, as community quota seats for plus one admission for the academic year 2021-22, will remain stayed etc, and that the respondents will direct the petitioner to admit students to the management quota without insisting that 10% of the seats be earmarked for being allotted to students of the same community etc. Later, the writ petitions were taken up for final disposal on 22.12.2021. The learned Single Judge found that admissions have already been carried out on the basis of the interim orders as in Ext.P1 herein and that therefore, effectively, nothing survives in those writ petitions. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge, in Ext.P3 common judgment dated 22.12.2021 in WP(C) No.21932/2021 and connected WP(C)s, had found that admissions have already been carried out and the observations and directions, issued by this Court in those orders, were confined to the relevant clauses in the prospectus issued for the academic year 2021-22 only and nothing effectively survives in those writ proceedings and that the interim orders earlier passed by this Court in those writ petitions were made absolute. It was further made clear that the observations made in Ext.P3 judgment and the interim orders therein shall not stand as an impediment to the respondent authorities to come out with a prospectus for the next academic year, i.e. 2022-23 (in tune with the policy of the Government). Accordingly, those writ petitions were disposed of, as per Ext.P3. 14. It was further made clear that the observations made in Ext.P3 judgment and the interim orders therein shall not stand as an impediment to the respondent authorities to come out with a prospectus for the next academic year, i.e. 2022-23 (in tune with the policy of the Government). Accordingly, those writ petitions were disposed of, as per Ext.P3. 14. It is thereafter that the competent authority of the Government in the General Education Department had considered the proposal, as per letter dated 24.06.2022, issued by the Director of General Education, Government of Kerala, pointing out that in managements run by minorities and backward classes, the management quota is only 20% and the rest 20% quota is for students belonging to minority / OBC community, as the case may be, whereas the management quota in aided school managements, other than minorities and backward classes, continues to be 30% and that there are serious complaints and irregularities in by-passing of merit, while considering admissions in such management quota and that the management quota in managements other than minorities and OBC should also be lowered down to 20%. Further that, the position envisaged at the time of issuance of the earlier G.O.s in the year 2003 and 2005 etc have undergone a sea change in the education scenario. It was thus suggested that the Government should order for reducing the management quota in such managements to 20% and that 10% should be allotted as community quota, on the criteria of community to which the management belongs, but to be filled up strictly on the basis of inter se merit among such eligible community students. It appears that, after consideration of the abovesaid proposal, contained in the letter dated 24.06.2022 issued by the Director of General Education, the competent authority of the State Government in the General Education Department has issued the impugned Ext.P4 G.O.(MS) No.121/2022/G.Edn dated 07.07.2022, which reads as follows: 15. A reading of the impugned Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022 would reveal that as per the Government norms, in managements run by minorities and backward classes communities, 20% is allotted as management quota and 20% for students belonging to the respective minorities/OBC communities, as the case may be, based on inter-se merit. A reading of the impugned Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022 would reveal that as per the Government norms, in managements run by minorities and backward classes communities, 20% is allotted as management quota and 20% for students belonging to the respective minorities/OBC communities, as the case may be, based on inter-se merit. But, in the case of managements other than minorities and backward class communities, the management quota has to be 20% and 10% would be set up as community quota, to be filled up by students belonging to the community to which the management belongs, but on the basis of inter-se merit. So, it appears that the Government has taken the view that the hitherto norm of allowing 30% management quota for managements other than minorities and OBCs, should be reduced to 20% and 10% can be set apart for community quota, as above. It is also ordered thereby that for managements other than minorities and OBC communities, if they declare the community to which the school management belongs to, then 10% of the total fees at Plus Two level could be filled by the students in that respective community but strictly on the basis of inter-se merit. But in case of any such management, other than minority and OBC communities, such management is not in a position to declare the community to which the management belongs to, then such 10% community quota seats, in those respective managements, will be converted as open merit quota seats. 16. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has allowed the main plea of the petitioner, regarding the invalidity of allocating 10% community quota in managements other than minorities and OBC communities but has refused their second plea of the petitioners that the said 10% community quota seats in their management schools should be converted as management quota seats, so as to enable them to enjoy the management quota totally as 30% (i.e., already allocated 20% + the converted 10%) and has held that, in view of Government insistence, the said 10% community quota seats in those schools will stand merged with the open merit quota seats. So, the writ petitioners have succeeded in their first plea but have failed in their second plea. So, the writ petitioners have succeeded in their first plea but have failed in their second plea. The writ petitioners have filed the present Writ Appeals contending that the learned Single Judge went wrong in overruling the second plea and that the 10% community quota seats, held to be invalid, should be converted as management quota seats. Whereas, the State and departmental authorities have filed Writ Appeals challenging the finding on the first plea and would contend that the 10% community quota seats should not have been struck down as constitutionally invalid, as it is allocated, not merely on the basis of religion/caste/community basis, but also on the rational criteria that the community concerned would have endeavoured and spent their money and energies for establishing the school concerned and therefore, it is in recognition of that endeavour of the community to which the management belongs that this quota has been made and therefore, such classification or differentiation cannot be said to be solely on the basis of religion/caste/community, etc. but on something more as above, which is a reasonable criterion for differentiation and classification, and has a rational nexus to the objective in the good administration and functioning of such management schools. The main directions, issued by the learned Single Judge, as contained in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment in these writ petitions, are as follows:- “13. The above Government Order was challenged before this Court by the Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha and by judgment dated 06.02.2003 in O.P.No. 18658/2000, their Lordships of the Division Bench quashed the clause as per which seats were reserved for the community to which the schools belong, holding that the same is arbitrary. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below for convenience. 3. Argument was raised attacking the quota reserved for Community to which the schools belong. The petitioners have raised many grounds and said that so far as the communal reservation is concerned, the reservation is possible only for socially and educationally backward classes. We don't know what is meant by Community to which the schools belong. Supposing the School is started by a private Company or a Trust, it is not possible to give this type of reservation. It may include even forward Communities. 4. Counter affidavits have been filed by the respondents, including the State. We don't know what is meant by Community to which the schools belong. Supposing the School is started by a private Company or a Trust, it is not possible to give this type of reservation. It may include even forward Communities. 4. Counter affidavits have been filed by the respondents, including the State. The State has not, in the affidavit, expressly stated the reason for bringing such a quota except stating that this kind of reservation is prevalent even when the Pre-degree courses were there. An argument was raised stating that it is because of this that the private Colleges and Schools in the State are under the control of the Government. As a result of the agreement between the Management, Government and the Staff, the salary for the Teachers are paid through the Government. Thus, certain rights of the private Institutions have been taken away and it is for this the community is given a quota. Some arguments were made on the basis of the minority and the backward classes. So far as the minority Communities are concerned, there is reservation. The attack is on the additional 20% quota given for the community to which the Schools belong. 5. During the course of hearing, we expressed our view that the reservation under the Community quota to which the Schools belong does not stand scrutiny under the Articles of the Constitution of India. But the argument raised was that a large number of vacancies occur every year, so that all the persons, who applied for the course, will get admissions. We are not impressed with this argument. The question is not whether everybody will get admission or not. The question is whether the reservation made on the basis of the Community to which Schools belong is constitutionally valid or not. 6. In Dr. Jagadish Saran and Ors. v. U.O.I [A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 820], it has been stated that the quantum of reservation should not be excessive or socially injurious, measure by the overall competency of the end product. In Unnikrishnan's Case (1993) 1 S.C.C. 645 , it is stated that there shall be no quota reserved for the management or for any family, castes or community which may have established such college. In Unnikrishnan's Case (1993) 1 S.C.C. 645 , it is stated that there shall be no quota reserved for the management or for any family, castes or community which may have established such college. State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust (1994) 3 S.C.C. 552 , it is stated that the donor quota who contributed a large amount as capital for starting college held arbitrary. In Mohan Bir Singh Chawk v. Punjab University -A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 788, it stated that the Collegewise preference is not permitted. 7. Thus, we find that the clause mentioned above reserving seats for Community to which the Schools belong is arbitrary. That clause is quashed. We make it clear that the admissions already made on the basis of the Prospectus will not in any way be affected by this judgment.” 17. Now, we would deal with the major issues to be resolved in these cases: (A) The validity of the 10% community reservation quota in managements other than minorities and SEBC/OBC communities:- As mentioned above, the present writ petitioners are essentially falling within the third category of managements mentioned above, i.e., managements other than minorities and OBC communities, but who are not in a position to declare the community to which the school/management belongs, for various reasons. The 10% community reservation quota was introduced to regulate Plus two admissions, as per para No.2 of Anx.R1(b) G.O.(MS) No.29/1991/G.Edn. dated 27.02.1991. The said norm, which has been introduced from February, 1991 onwards, had governed the field till the academic year 2001-02. The validity of this community reservation quota was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 06.02.2003 in O.P.No.18658/2000. 18. The Division Bench of this Court has inter alia observed, in para Nos.3 & 4 of the judgment in O.P.No. 18658/2000 that, the reservation is possible for socially and educationally backward classes and minority communities based on the provisions in the Constitution. In that regard, there may not be any dispute that there are specific constitutional provisions, justifying such preferential or reservation quota for SEBCs and minorities, in view of the specific provisions contained in Article 16(5) and Article 30 of the Constitution of India, respectively. In that regard, there may not be any dispute that there are specific constitutional provisions, justifying such preferential or reservation quota for SEBCs and minorities, in view of the specific provisions contained in Article 16(5) and Article 30 of the Constitution of India, respectively. However, the Division Bench has noted therein that, in other cases, it is very difficult to rationally comprehend the concept of “community to which the schools/management belongs” and it was held that, supposing the school was started by a private company or trust, then it may not be possible to say to give this type of reservation and it may even include claims of forward communities. The argument placed by the State was that the said reservation of community quota based on the community to which the management belongs to, has been in vogue ever since the introduction of Pre-Degree courses in aided affiliated colleges. A result of the direct payment agreement between the management, Government and the Staff, salary and pensionary benefits of teachers are paid from Government funds and since certain rights of private institutions have been taken away, reservation of that nature is being given to the community concerned. The argument, on the basis of minorities and backward classes, was also considered by the Division Bench, which held that such reservation is feasible but that the main challenge is on the quota given for the community to which the schools belong. It was conclusively held by the Division Bench of this Court, in para No.5 of the said judgment, that the reservation, on the criterion of community to which the school belongs to, will not stand scrutiny under the Articles of the Constitution of India, etc., for communities other than minorities and SEBCs. 19. It was conclusively held by the Division Bench of this Court, in para No.5 of the said judgment, that the reservation, on the criterion of community to which the school belongs to, will not stand scrutiny under the Articles of the Constitution of India, etc., for communities other than minorities and SEBCs. 19. Sri.T.B. Hood, learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the State and departmental authorities, would strongly urge that the reservation of 10% community quota in these cases, as envisaged in Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, is not merely on the basis of a religious community, caste community, etc., but on something more, inasmuch as the community concerned would have endeavoured to put in their energies and financial capital for the establishment of the school concerned and that, since the right of admission is being regulated by the State, apart from the 20% management quota, the above 10% community quota is also given to the management, on the criteria of the community to which the school belongs to, in recognition of the social and financial contribution made by the community for establishing the school concerned. That, the abovesaid additional aspect, which is over and above the criteria of religion, caste, or the community to which the management belongs to, is a rational and reasonable basis of classification, which has a rational nexus with the objective of good administration of such management schools. 20. We have anxiously considered the abovesaid pleas of the State authorities. After due deliberation, we are of the firm view that the matter in issue is covered by the well considered verdict, rendered by the Division Bench of this Court on 06.12.2003 in O.P. No.18658/2000. We are merely concerned with managements other than minorities and backward class communities. Minority and backward class communities will get constitutional protection, in terms of Article 30 & Article 16(5) thereof, respectively. Moreover, there is no challenge to the separate community quota, given to students of minority community and backward class community in managements, run by those respective communities, now challenged in these proceedings. 21. In the celebrated decision laid down by the Five Judges Bench in J.P. Unnikrishnan & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others [ 1993(1) SCC 645 ], the Apex Court has inter alia held that there shall be no quota reserved for any family, caste or community, which may have established the educational institution concerned. 21. In the celebrated decision laid down by the Five Judges Bench in J.P. Unnikrishnan & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others [ 1993(1) SCC 645 ], the Apex Court has inter alia held that there shall be no quota reserved for any family, caste or community, which may have established the educational institution concerned. In State of Gujarat v. M.P.Shah Charitable Trust [ (1994) 3 SCC 552 ] the Apex Court has considered the validity of a donor quota for those, who contributed large amount as capital for the functioning of the educational institution concerned, and it was held therein that such a donor quota, on the basis of the contribution made as capital for starting the college, is arbitrary and unreasonable. Further, the Three-Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Thapar Institute of Engineering & Technology v. State of Punjab & Anr. [ (1997) 2 SCC 65 ] in para Nos.5, 6, 9, etc. thereof, by applying the test of reasonable classification in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality of opportunity, has categorically held that while nominating candidates for admission, the authority concerned should follow the criterion of merit and has viewed with disfavour the conferment of discretion in that regard on the founder of the institution or the person/persons in the management of the institution and it has inter alia been held that there shall be no quota reserved for any family, class or community, which may have established such a college. 22. The dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in decisions as in J.P. Unnikrishnan’s case supra [ 1993(1) SCC 645 ], as well as in the Three-Judge Bench decision in Thapar Institute’s case supra [ (1997) 2 SCC 65 ], to the extent it relates to the management quota, have been substantially altered by the dictum laid down subsequently by the larger Bench (Eleven-Judge Bench) of the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ] and the subsequent decisions of the 5 Judges Bench as in Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (2003) 6 SCC 697 ], P.A. Inamdar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [ (2005) 6 SCC 537 (Seven-Judge Bench)], etc. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ] and the subsequent decisions of the 5 Judges Bench as in Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (2003) 6 SCC 697 ], P.A. Inamdar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [ (2005) 6 SCC 537 (Seven-Judge Bench)], etc. But, it appears that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in J.P. Unnikrishnan’s case supra [ 1993(1) SCC 645 ], Thapar Institute’s case supra [ (1997) 2 SCC 65 ], that there shall be no quota for any family, caste, community, etc, which may have established the educational institution, does not appear to have been, in any manner, altered. 23. Moreover, the Apex Court in the celebrated decision in Dr.Jagadish Saran & Others v. U.O.I [ (1980) 2 SCC 768 = AIR 1980 SC 820 ] has also held that the level or quantum of reservation should not be excessive or societally injurious measured by the over-all competency of the end-product, viz. degree-holders. 24. We are mainly concerned with managements other than minorities and backward class communities, in these cases. So, as mentioned above, the minority community and SEBC/OBC communities will get constitutional justification for preferential treatment or reservation, in view of the provisions contained in the Constitution, as in Article 30, Article 16(5), etc., respectively. 25. As observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in OP No.18658/2000, if the school is started by a company, trust or registered society, etc., then, it may be very difficult to even say as to which is the community to which the school/management belongs to and this may even include forward communities. If at all a community can be easily identified, as observed by the Division Bench in the above decision, it could be mainly inclusive of forward communities. As of now, the only constitutional provision, for preferential treatment or reservation for forward community, would be only within the narrow band width of the Economically Weaker Section quota (EWS quota), as enshrined in Article 15(6) of the Constitution of India, in the case of educational institutions and Article 16(6) of the Constitution of India in the case of appointments to services and posts. The State authorities have no case that the present reservation of 10% community quota, for managements other than minorities and backward class communities, could be traced, for justification, to any provision in the Constitution, including that for EWS quota. 26. That being so, the inevitable follow-up is that the present reservation or differentiation, by setting apart 10% community quota in managements other than religious and backward class communities, would be violative of the provisions of the Constitution as per Article 14, Article 15(1) & Article 29(2). Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination solely on the grounds of religion, caste, etc. Article 29(2) mandates that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receive any aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, caste, etc. Moreover, Rule 11 of Chapter VI of the Kerala Education Rules, framed under the Kerala Education Act, specifically stipulates that no pupil shall be refused admission to any school only on the ground of caste, community or religion, etc. 27. Therefore, as already conclusively held by the Division Bench, in the judgment dated 06.02.2003 in O.P. No.18658/2000 [Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Others], the abovesaid reservation of 10% community quota, for managements other than minorities and backward class communities, will not satisfy the test of reasonable conclusion, as per Article 14 and would also be violative of the other provisions of the Constitution, as per Article 15(1), Article 29(2) as well as Rule 11 of Chapter VI of the KER, etc. 28. Moreover, it is to be noted that, it has been contended, in para No.7 on page 4 of the statement dated 21.07.2022, filed by the respondents in W.P.(C) No.22515/2022, that the impugned 10% community reservation quota, made out in Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, is applicable only to institutions which are founded and run for fulfilling the educational needs of the students in the catchment area in general and that of the community or caste, in particular, in which the management belongs to etc. There is no specific averment that the benefit of the 10% reservation quota, made out as per Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, is for the communities concerned, who have established the college concerned. There is no specific averment that the benefit of the 10% reservation quota, made out as per Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, is for the communities concerned, who have established the college concerned. At the time of submissions in the court, such an argument was placed by the learned Special Government Pleader that the redeeming factor for justifying the said community reservation is not merely based on religion, caste, community, etc. But that, it is on the basis of the recognition of the fact that the community concerned would have endeavoured, by investing their time, money, energy, etc., in establishing the school concerned and it is for this endeavour, put in by the community, by way of their social and financial capital, that the 10% community quota is made out, to recognise and encourage the community concerned, which has a rational nexus in the objective of the good administration and management of the school. These oral submissions, made at the time of the hearing, do not find a place in the pleadings submitted by the State authorities. Even if we assume that such a pleading has been put up, such a factual pleading does not have any material basis, from the various Government norms governing the field. A perusal of the various Government Orders mentioned hereinabove would only show that what has been done is that the State has blandly stated that the reservation is on the criteria of the community to which the school/management belongs. There is no stipulation anywhere in those Government Orders, including the G.O. issued last year (on 12.08.2021) as well as the present G.O. issued for the present year (Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022) that the 10% community quota is only for the community concerned which has established the management school. On the other hand, it appears that, going by the stipulations, if, at the time of making the admission, the management can identify and declare the community to which the management/school belongs, then, it can utilise the 10% community reservation quota for admitting such community students, but strictly on the basis of inter-se merit. So, the Government norm, issued right from Anx.R1(b) G.O. dated 27.02.1991, is only that the reservation is on the criteria of the community to which the school belongs. So, the Government norm, issued right from Anx.R1(b) G.O. dated 27.02.1991, is only that the reservation is on the criteria of the community to which the school belongs. In other words, the present 10% community reservation, made out in Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, is only a resurrection of the 10% community quota, which was quashed by the Division Bench of this Court in Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha's case supra, as per the judgment dated 06.02.2003 in O.P. No.18658/2000. The dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the said case has become final and conclusive and in all fairness the State has fully complied with the spirit and substance of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in the abovesaid case, by issuing G.O.(MS) No.156/2003/G.Edn. dated 09.06.2003, taking away the 10% reservation quota, which was till then followed and merging the said 10% quota with the management quota. The said norm, as per G.O.(MS) No.156/ 2003/G.Edn. dated 09.06.2003, which was slightly modified, as per Ext.P6 G.O.(MS) dated 01.07.2005, has continuously regulated the field till now. Of course, a similar change was sought to be brought about last year by the issuance of the prospectus, as approved by G.O.(MS) dated 12.08.2021, which was stayed at the interlocutory stage in Ext.P1 writ proceedings, and later, the admissions, so made, in pursuance to the stay orders, were regularised and issues were left open to be decided for the present academic year, as can be seen from a reading of Ext.P3 judgment in the writ petitions filed last year by the very same management/similar managements. In other words, we are of the firm view that the present 10% reservation quota in managements other than minority and backward class communities is nothing but old wine in a new bottle, and it is a mere resurrection of the very same quota, which was interfered with by the Division Bench and accepted by the State, since the issuance of G.O. dated 09.06.2003. We are not in a position to appreciate why the State Government has again resurrected the 10% community quota in the present cases. 29. We are not in a position to appreciate why the State Government has again resurrected the 10% community quota in the present cases. 29. In view of the conclusive dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha's case supra (judgment dated 06.02.2003 in O.P. No.18658/2000), based on the various decisions of the Apex Court cited therein and taking into account the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Thapar Institute’s case supra [ (1997) 2 SCC 65 ], we are of the view that reservation quota for admission, on the basis of religion, caste, community, etc., other than that which may have justification in terms of Article 15(4) or Article 30, in the case of SEBCs and minorities, as the case may be, or in the case of the Economically Weaker Sections, cannot be said to satisfy the test of reasonable classification and the such reservation would be plainly in violation of the prohibitions against discrimination mandated in Article 15(1), Article 29(2) of the Constitution of India, etc. The State authorities have no case that the present 10% reservation quota is, in any manner justifiable, in terms of the Economically Weaker Section quota (EWS quota), envisaged in terms of the amended provisions as per Article 15(6). 30. As indicated above, neither the Government Orders as in Ext.P4, nor any other Government Orders have disclosed that the reservation is for communities, which have established the school and are still running those schools and that the Government has recognised the “community” to which the school belongs as ordered in Ext.P4 as such community that has originally established the school and still running it. Still further, the Government has no case that the files relating to the impugned Government Orders at Ext.P4, etc., would disclose that the Government has considered reservation only for such communities which have established the schools and running it and that the reservation is not solely on the basis of forward communities, etc. So the arguments advanced by the Special Government Pleader are not having any factual and material basis as disclosed by the impugned GOs and the files concerned. So, there is no necessity for us to consider such abstract contentions, which are not factually disclosed by the Government orders and files. So the arguments advanced by the Special Government Pleader are not having any factual and material basis as disclosed by the impugned GOs and the files concerned. So, there is no necessity for us to consider such abstract contentions, which are not factually disclosed by the Government orders and files. So, we have considered the validity of this 10% community reservation clause in the light of the dictum in the judgment in O.P. No.18658/2000, as the impugned clause in Ext.P4 is an exact replica of the quashed impugned condition dealt in that earlier judgment. So also, the State Government does not have a case that there are managements (other than minorities and OBC) who would fulfill the definitional contours of “religious denominations” as understood as per Art.26 of the Constitution. In the light of these aspects, there is no necessity for us to consider, in the available facts and circumstances of these cases, whether any of the rights of such managements, as projected on the basis of Art.19(1)(g) and/or Art.26 would justify such an impugned clause in Ext. P-4, etc. and issues are not decided by us. In other words, we are of the firm view that the present 10% community reservation quota for managements, other than minorities and backward class communities, as ordered in Ext.P4, would be plainly unconstitutional and ultra vires and it is declared so. In the light of these aspects, we are of the firm view that the learned Single Judge was fully right in concluding, as above, and in holding that the abovesaid 10% reservation quota is illegal and unconstitutional and we find no ground, whatsoever, to differ from the said considered conclusions of the learned Single Judge, as per the impugned judgments. 31. Hence, in view of the above aspects, we broadly affirm the said conclusion of the learned Single Judge, regarding the invalidity of the 10% reservation quota, as per Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, in case of managements other than minorities and backward class communities. Hence, the abovesaid plea of the state will stand repelled. (B) Validity of the reduction of the management quota seats from 30% to 20% in managements other than minorities and SEBC communities and other related issues:- 32. Hence, the abovesaid plea of the state will stand repelled. (B) Validity of the reduction of the management quota seats from 30% to 20% in managements other than minorities and SEBC communities and other related issues:- 32. As mentioned above, the second plea of the writ petitioners has been repelled by the learned Single Judge, by holding that the Court does not have the competence to order that the 10% community reservation quota in such managements should be ordered to be converted by this Court as management quota seats in their favour and that such 10% community quota seats should not be converted as open merit quota seats to be filled up by the Central Allotment Process (CAP). Various contentions have been urged by the writ appellant managements in that regard as follows: (a) Though the learned Single Judge as per Ext.P-3 judgment dated 22.12.2021 in W.P.(C).No. 21932/2021 and connected cases, had granted liberty to the State to come out with the prospectus for the next academic year mentioned therein (viz., which is the present academic year 2022-23), in tune with the policy of the Government, no such policy decision for reduction of the management quota from 30% to 20% has been taken by the State and at any rate, no such policy decision is discernible from Ext.P-4 GO dated 7.7.2022. (b) Ever since the issuance of Ext.R-1(b) GO dated 27.2.1991, in compliance with the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered on 6.2.2003 in O.P.No. 18658/2000 (Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha's case supra), the consistent practice since then was that the management quota, in managements other than minorities and OBC communities, will be 30% and that was in vogue till now. This past consistent practice has been given a total go-bye, as per Ext.P-4 GO dated 7.7.2022 and this could be in derogation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in deviating from the past consistent practice and such deviation is not justified, on the basis of any overriding public interest and hence, the impugned action of reduction of management quota is liable to be interdicted in judicial review proceedings. (c) In clause 13 on internal page 10 of Ext.P-5 prospectus, issued for the present academic year 2022-23, in pursuance of the approval granted by the Government, as per Ext.P-4 GO dated 7.7.2022, it has been clearly stated that the total management quota, set apart for aided managements other than minorities and OBC communities, would be 30%, comprising of the 10% community quota plus 20% management quota. That, therefore, even after the issuance of Ext.P-4 GO, overall management quota conceded to by the State authorities, in Ext.P-5 prospectus, is 30% and so, the 10% community quota, on account of its quashment, has to be converted as management quota seats, to keep the level of management quota seats as 30%, as ordered in the prospectus and the same is not to be merged with the open merit quota seats. (d) Without the support of cogent pleadings, it is also argued by some of the learned Advocates, appearing for the writ appellant managements, that what is involved in the reduction of the management quota from 30% to 20% is a drastic change of the consistent policy of the State and that therefore, such policy decisions, especially in relation to a major policy change, should have been decided only by the Council of Ministers of the State Government, going by the prescriptions in the Rules of Business of the State Government, framed under Art.166 of the Constitution of India. That, in the instant case, the impugned decision, reflected in Ext.P-4 GO dated 7.7.2022, has been taken only at the level of the Minister holding the portfolio of General Education and at best, with the approval of the Chief Minister and that since the decision was taken without the junction and participation of the Council of Ministers, either in a meeting or through circulation, the abovesaid decision at Ext.P-4 is ultra vires and illegal and is not legally enforceable. (e) Further that, no proper justification or reasons have been disclosed, either in Ext.P-4 G.O. dated 7.7.2022 or in the statement filed by the respondents in these cases, for the drastic reduction of the management quota from 30% to 20% and that the said decision is unreasonable and arbitrary. (f) That the 10% community quota should be ordered by this Court to be converted as management quota seats and not open merit quota seats. 33. (f) That the 10% community quota should be ordered by this Court to be converted as management quota seats and not open merit quota seats. 33. The abovesaid contentions are strongly opposed by the learned Special Govt. Pleader appearing for the State authorities. 34. Now we would deal with the rival contentions: Contention (a):- It is by now a trite and elementary legal position, as held by the Apex Court in decisions as in State of A.P. v. V.Sadanandam & Ors. [(1989) Suppl. (1) SCC 574 = AIR 1989 SC 2060 )] that the mode of recruitment and the category from which recruitment to a service should be made are all matters which are exclusively within the domain of the Executive and it is not for judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Executive in choosing the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment should be made, as they are matters of policy decision, falling exclusively within the purview of the Executive (see para 17 of the SCC report). So, in essence, the fixation of the sources of quotas in the methods of appointments to various posts and services under the control of the State authorities concerned, would be a matter which would exclusively and eminently fall within the domain and province of the policy prerogative of the State authority concerned. Further, it has also been held by the Apex Court, in the case in Dwarka Prasad & Ors. v. UOI & Ors. [ (2003) 6 SCC 535 ], that fixation of quotas or different avenues and ladders for promotion in favour of various categories of posts in feeder cadres, based upon the structure and pattern of the Department, is a prerogative of the employer, which mainly pertains to the policy-making field. 35. So also, it is trite that, if statutory provisions do not govern the field, then the Executive will have executive competence, co-extensive with its legislative competence and can provide for the fixation of the sources and quotas of appointments in various posts and services under the control of the State, by issuing executive orders. In that regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in M.P. Oil Extraction & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. In that regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in M.P. Oil Extraction & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [ AIR 1998 SC 145 – (1997) 7 SCC 592 ], wherein the Apex Court has held that the executive authority of the State must be held within its competence to frame a policy for the administration of the State. So also, in J & K Public Service Commission & Ors. v. Narinder Mohan & ors. [ (1994) 2 SCC 630 = AIR 1994 SC 1808 ] the Supreme Court has held that the existence of statutory rules is not a condition precedent for selection and appointment of eligible and fit persons to posts and services, as the executive power is co-extensive with the legislative competence of the State under Art. 162 and so, the State can issue executive orders, in the matter of creation and filling of posts. So also, it has been held, in decisions as in Ravi Paul & Ors. v. UOI & Ors. [ (1995) 3 SCC 300 ], that it is well settled that it is not obligatory to make rules for recruitment before a service can be constituted or a post created or filled and that the State, in exercise of its executive power, can make appointments in the absence of rules. Such view has been reiterated in a catena of cases as in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors [ (1995) 6 SCC 1 = AIR 1996 SC 352 ]. This decision has been relied on and referred to in para 76 by the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the sources and quotas of appointment of teaching staff in higher secondary schools in the State of Kerala in the case in K.Krishnankutty & Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. [ 1998 (2) KLJ 301 ] 36. So also, it is well settled, by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court, as in the Constitution Bench decision in R.Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. [ 1998 (2) KLJ 301 ] 36. So also, it is well settled, by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court, as in the Constitution Bench decision in R.Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors. [ AIR 1964 SC 1823 (para 10) = 1964 (6) SCR 368 ], that the State Government has the power to prescribe the criteria and machinery for admission of qualified students to medical and engineering colleges run by the Government and, with the consent of the management of Government aided colleges, to the said colleges also. So, in other words, sources of admissions/quotas for admission in educational institutions under the regulatory control of the State and sources of appointments/quotas of appointments in services and posts under the State, would all be matters which would fall eminently and exclusively within the province of the policy prerogative of the State authority concerned. In other words, the very prescription or stipulation of quotas for sources of admissions in educational institutions under the control of the State or sources for quotas of appointments in services and posts, would be exclusively within the province of policy. So, the substance and essence of a decision taken by the competent State authority, in prescribing or stipulating sources or quotas of admissions in Government educational institutions or educational institutions aided by the Government, would, in substance and essence, amount to a matter of policy or stipulation of policy by the State. It is also to be borne in mind that it is common ground that there are no statutory provisions either in the Kerala Education Act or in the Kerala Education Rules or in any other statutes which regulate the sources and quotas of admissions in aided higher secondary schools. In other words, in the absence of statutes, the State is fully competent to exercise its executive powers to stipulate or fix sources and quotas for admissions in educational institutions, including aided higher secondary schools and the very pith and substance of any such stipulation, regarding sources and quotas of admissions, would be exclusively within the province of policy. A reading of Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022 would indicate that, till then, the management quota set apart for managements other than minorities and backward classes communities was 30%, whereas the management quota set apart for religious minorities and backward classes managements was restricted to 20%. A reading of Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022 would indicate that, till then, the management quota set apart for managements other than minorities and backward classes communities was 30%, whereas the management quota set apart for religious minorities and backward classes managements was restricted to 20%. Of course, they have been given a quota of 20%, for admitting students belonging to the minority community/backward classes community, as the case may be. A reading of the letter dated 24.06.2022, issued by the Director of General Education addressed to the State Government (referred to as the 3rd paper in Ext.P4 G.O.) as well as the contents of Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022 would indicate that the Government has taken note that the management quota seats in managements of minorities and backward classes is 20% and that the management quota seats in managements other than minorities and backward class communities should be 20%, but an additional 10% out of the earlier 30%, can be set apart for the aforesaid community reservation quota, which has been held invalid supra. Further, the stipulations regarding utilisation of the 10% community quota in managements, like the writ petitioners, are also dealt with, about which we are not concerned, as the said issue has already been decided supra in favour of the State and in favour of the writ petitioners. So, the Government has ordered, by Ext.P4, that the management quota seats would be 20% in managements other than minorities and backward classes with an additional 10% community quota, as above. So, a reading of Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022 would thus make it clear that the Government, in its prerogative power, has taken the stand that henceforth the management quota seats in such managements would be limited to 20%, as in the case of minority and backward classes managements. The above said stipulation in Ext.P4, regarding 20% management quota and 10% community quota, is, in essence, fixation of the sources and quotas of admissions in aided higher secondary schools in managements other than minorities and backward classes. Hence, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position mentioned above, the essence and substance of the stand of the Government, reflected in Ext.P4, is a stipulation of the sources and quotas of admissions, as 20% management quota and 10% community quota, etc. Hence, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position mentioned above, the essence and substance of the stand of the Government, reflected in Ext.P4, is a stipulation of the sources and quotas of admissions, as 20% management quota and 10% community quota, etc. and therefore, the said stipulation in Ext.P4 would, in substance, be a matter within the exclusive province of the policy of the State. True, as pointed out by the writ petitioners, there is no specific recital or assertion in Ext.P-4 that the Government has thereby ordered a policy decision or change in policy. The mere fact that there is no recital in Ext.P-4 that what is reflected therein is a policy decision or a change of policy or a new policy, etc. will not, in any manner, retract from the nature and character of the decision reflected in Ext.P4, inasmuch as the said decision is in essence one relating to fixation of sources and quotas for admissions in the above managements and therefore, it is a matter within the policy domain. Now, we are not on the reasonableness of the said decision, but as to whether Ext.P-4 would reflect a policy decision. In the light of those aspects, we are constrained to overrule the above said contention of the writ petitioners that Ext.P-4 does not reflect a policy decision, regarding the stipulation of management quota. Even though it is common ground that, ever since the issuance of Anx.R-1(b) G.O. dated 27.02.1991, issued in compliance with the judgment dated 06.02.2003 of the Division Bench in O.P.No.18658/2007, the management quota in these cases was 30% and a change has been brought about in that regard in Ext.P-4 and that therefore what is involved in Ext.P-4 is also a new policy. In that regard, it is also relevant to note that it has been held by the Apex Court in various decisions, as in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors. [ (1998) 4 SCC 117 ], that the State has the prerogative right to change its policy from time to time under the changing circumstances and that the same cannot be questioned and therein the Apex Court has upheld the impugned change in policy. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors. [ (1998) 4 SCC 117 ], that the State has the prerogative right to change its policy from time to time under the changing circumstances and that the same cannot be questioned and therein the Apex Court has upheld the impugned change in policy. This aspect of the matter has also been relied on in para 76 of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Krishnankutty's case supra [ 1998 (2) KLJ 301 ] . 37. It may not also be out of place to mention in this context that the Apex Court, in the decision in Bharat Sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 494 = (1986) 4 SCC 51 ] has held that Sec. 34 (1) of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1973, which provided that 15% vacancies, for the teaching staff of registered private schools, shall be filled up by persons belonging to the SC/ST , shall suffer from no illegality and the said provision does not interfere with managerial functions, etc. (see para 8 of the SCC report). The above said decision of the Apex Court in Bharat Sevashram Sangh's case supra has been relied on in para 54 of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Krishnankutty's case supra [ 1998 (2) KLJ 301 ] . Contention (b):- 38. This contention is on the basis that ever since the issuance of G.O. dated 09.06.2003, as slightly modified by Ext.P6 G.O. dated 01.07.2005, the management quota in managements other than minorities and backward classes, was 30% till now and the said past consistent practice, followed for a very long time, has been substantially altered and the same would amount to derogation of legitimate expectation of the writ petitioner managements and that there is no countervailing of public interest to justify such alteration or deviance. 39. It is by now well established by a series of decisions that the Constitutional Courts (High Courts and the Apex Court) have only very limited grounds to interfere with policy matters and essentially, only the legality of the policy and not the wisdom or otherwise of the policy could be the subject matter of judicial review, as has been held in a host of decisions as in Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh (3) v. State of A.P & Ors. [ (2006) 4 SCC 162 ), BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. UOI & Ors. [ (2002) 2 SCC 333 ]. Therefore, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge, the grounds for interference in judicial review in respect of a policy decision, is on an extremely limited bandwidth. So also, it has to be borne in mind that persons, like the writ petitioner managements, can claim a vested right only if such right has arisen from a statute or by operation of law or from a contract (see MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh [ (2014) 13 SCC 583 ]. It is common ground that there are no statutory provisions which govern and regulate the filling of admissions to Plus Two courses in Aided Higher Secondary Schools. It is also common ground that the entire pay and allowances and remuneration and other financial benefits payable to teaching and non-teaching staff as well as their pensionary benefits, are paid from the State exchequer. The writ petitioner managements are running higher secondary schools aided by the State government. As held by the Apex Court in decisions as in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors, [ (1998) 4 SCC 117 ], the State has a prerogative right to change its policy from time to time under the changing circumstances and such change cannot be questioned. In other words, unless there is a vested right, no one can challenge the change of policy, of course, except on the ground of the policy being illegal or so unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. The writ petitioners have not been able to establish that they have a vested approved right, on the basis of either the statue or by operation of law or on the basis of any contract or agreement between the parties. The State has the prerogative right to fix the sources and quotas of admissions in Govt. schools as wells as in schools, like the writ petitioner managements, aided by the Government. Concomitantly, they also have the right to change its policy. 40. It has been held by the Apex Court, in the decision in Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corpn. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh, & Ors. schools as wells as in schools, like the writ petitioner managements, aided by the Government. Concomitantly, they also have the right to change its policy. 40. It has been held by the Apex Court, in the decision in Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corpn. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh, & Ors. [ (2019) 9 SCC 710 ], that the decision makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest, cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation and so long as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call for interference by judicial review, on the ground of the legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals being defeated (see para 20 of the SCC report). It may be profitable to refer to the contents of paras 19, 20 and 21 of P.P. Suresh's case supra [ (2019) 9 SCC 710 , p.720], which read as follows: “19. An expectation entertained by a person may not be found to be legitimate due to the existence of some countervailing consideration of policy or law. [ H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Eleventh Edn., Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of Government. [Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security, 1985 AC 776 , 788 : (1985) 2 WLR 866 (HL)] 20. The decision-makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation. [Findlay, In re, 1985 AC 318 : (1984) 3 WLR 1159 : (1984) 3 All ER 801 (HL)] So long as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or in an unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call for interference by judicial review on the ground of a legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals being defeated. 21. The assurance given to the respondents that they would be considered for appointment in the future vacancies of daily wage workers, according to the respondents, gives rise to a claim of legitimate expectation. The respondents contend that there is no valid reason for the Government to resile from the promise made to them. 21. The assurance given to the respondents that they would be considered for appointment in the future vacancies of daily wage workers, according to the respondents, gives rise to a claim of legitimate expectation. The respondents contend that there is no valid reason for the Government to resile from the promise made to them. We are in agreement with the explanation given by the State Government that the change in policy due was to the difficulty in implementation of the Government Order dated 20-2-2002. Due deference has to be given to the discretion exercised by the State Government. As the decision of the Government to change the policy was to balance the interests of the displaced abkari workers and a large number of unemployed youth in the State of Kerala, the decision taken on 7-8-2004 cannot be said to be contrary to public interest. We are convinced that the overriding public interest which was the reason for change in policy has to be given due weight while considering the claim of the respondents regarding legitimate expectation. We hold that the expectation of the respondents for consideration against the 25% of the future vacancies in daily wage workers in the Corporation is not legitimate.” 41. The above said dictum, laid down by the Apex Court in P.P. Suresh's case (supra), has been relied on in the decision in the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & Anr. v. EMTA Coal Limited [ (2022) 2 SCC 1 ]. It will be profitable to refer to para 20 of the decision in EMTA Coal Limited's case supra [ (2022) 2 SCC 1 ], which reads as follows: “20. It will not be out of place to mention that the said Act came to be enacted in pursuance of the decision of this Court in the case of Manohar Lal SharmaI, wherein this Court held that the allotment of Coal Blocks between 1993 and 2011 was arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. A plain reading of Section 11 of the said Act would reveal that it begins with a non-obstante clause. A plain reading of Section 11 of the said Act would reveal that it begins with a non-obstante clause. It provides that a successful bidder or allottee, as the case may be, in respect of Schedule I coal mines, may elect, to adopt and continue such contracts which may be existing with any of the prior allottees in relation to coal mining operations and the same shall constitute a novation for the residual term or residual performance of such contract.” 42. A reading of the letter dated 24.06.2022 of the Director of General Education, referred to as the 3rd paper in Ext.P-4, as well as the statements filed by the respondents would indicate that the management quota seats is filled up by the managements, not strictly on the basis of merit, but on the basis of their discretion, from amongst the eligible candidates who have applied in the management quota, who fulfill the minimum eligibility conditions for admission. It is stated, in the supra letter of the Director of General Education as well as in the abovesaid statement of the respondents that various complaints were received, regarding the deviance of merits, in filling up management quota seats and even allegations of donations/ bribe etc. being demanded by certain managements, in filling up management quota seats and various complaints have also come from many sources, including students' organizations, etc. Further that, such management quota seats are limited to 20%. It is in the light of these factors that the Government would state that they have taken the considered stand that management quota seats henceforth should be limited to 20%, etc. The stand of the State is that the abovesaid stand has been taken in public interest and in the interest of the student community, so as to ensure avoidance of dilution of merit, etc. We are not in a position to hold that the abovesaid aspects cannot be said to be in public interest. The stand of the State is that the abovesaid stand has been taken in public interest and in the interest of the student community, so as to ensure avoidance of dilution of merit, etc. We are not in a position to hold that the abovesaid aspects cannot be said to be in public interest. Of course, a strong critique is made by the various Advocates appearing for the writ appellant management that, under the guise of upholding merit for reducing management quota, the Government has ordered for converting 10% thereof as community quota and though it is on the basis of inter se merit, such community quota could be limited only to students of the community concerned and that therefore, the stand of the State that it is for upholding merit that the reduction of management quota is made, etc. cannot be said to be bona fide, etc. We have already upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge in quashing the community quota. The aspects as to whether the 10% management community quota should be converted as management quota seats or as open merit quota seats will be decided by us in the subsequent part of the judgment. For the present purpose, we are of the view that the reduction in the management quota is a policy prerogative of the State and cannot be said to be per se unreasonable or arbitrary in the Wednesbury sense. Hence, we are of the view that the change in policy, reflected in Ext.P-4, cannot be interfered with by us on judicial review, on the ground of substantive legitimate expectation, as urged by the writ appellant managements. The dictum laid down in that regard by the Apex Court in P.P. Suresh's case supra [ (2019) 9 SCC 710 ], and Punjab State Power Corporation's case supra [ (2022) 2 SCC 1 ] would squarely cover the issue and hence, the abovesaid pleas of the writ appellant managements cannot be countenanced by us. In other words, we are constrained to overrule the contention of the writ appellant managements that the impugned change in policy is liable to be interdicted on the ground that it is in derogation of substantive legitimate expectation. (c) Issues relating to clause 13 of Ext.P5 prospectus: 42A. In other words, we are constrained to overrule the contention of the writ appellant managements that the impugned change in policy is liable to be interdicted on the ground that it is in derogation of substantive legitimate expectation. (c) Issues relating to clause 13 of Ext.P5 prospectus: 42A. The contention in this regard is that Clause 13, given on internal page 10 of Ext.P5 prospectus, issued for the present academic year 2022-23 with the approval of the State Government, in pursuance of Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022, would make it clear that the overall management quota, even for this year, is 30%, comprising of 10% community quota and 20% management quota, etc. Hence, it is urged that since 10% community quota has been held to be invalid by this Court, the overall management quota still has to be maintained at 30% and therefore, the inexorable consequence is that the 10% community quota should be converted as management quota, so that the overall management quota would become 20%, comprising of the existing 10% + the 10% management quota. The abovesaid contention appears to be attractive in technical terms, but in substance, we are not persuaded to accept the abovesaid plea. Of course, in Clause 13, on page 10 of Ext.P5 prospectus, it is stated that the overall management quota is 30%, but it is clearly stated therein that 10% would be for community quota and 20% for management quota. Ext.P5 is only the prospectus issued by the Director of General Education and the same is subservient to the substantive decision issued by the Government at Ext.P4 G.O. dated 07.07.2022. The substantive decision taken by the State Government at Ext.P4 would reflect that, from the present academic year, the management quota seats in managements other than minorities and backward classes would be limited to 20%, so as to keep it at par with the hitherto 20% management quota, in the case of managements of minorities and backward classes. Of course, 10% has been carved out from the earlier 20%, so as to make it as 10% community quota, an issue which has already been settled above. So, in substance and essence, the management quota seats will stand reduced from 30% to 20% for the academic year 2022-23. Of course, 10% has been carved out from the earlier 20%, so as to make it as 10% community quota, an issue which has already been settled above. So, in substance and essence, the management quota seats will stand reduced from 30% to 20% for the academic year 2022-23. The mere projection of the technicalities of the aspects in Clause 13 of Ext.P5 will not alter the substantive nature of the decision of the Government in Ext.P4. This is for the simple reason that Ext.P5 prospectus, issued by the Director of General Education, who is subordinate to the State Government, will have to be read as subservient to the decision of the Government at Ext. P4. Hence, merely because of the aforesaid recitals in Clause 13 on internal page 10 of Ext.P5 prospectus, we are not in a position to hold that the management quota will have to be kept at 30%, as was held in the previous years. If we hold so, it would amount to a misreading or a wrong reading of the substantive decision of the State Government at Ext.P4 G.O. Further, it is also to be borne in mind that Clause 13 of Ext.P-5 prospectus should be understood and construed only in the light of the other clauses in the said prospectus, more particularly Clause 3.1, given on internal page 3 of Ext.P-5 prospectus. Clause 3 of Ext.P-5 deals with management and community quota seats as well as allotment in unaided schools. Clause 3.1 thereof inter alia deals with management and community quota seats. It is stipulated in the first para, appended under Clause 3.1 supra, that the management quota seats would be limited to 20% and the second para thereunder deals with community quota, which is in tune with the substantive decision taken by the Government, as per Ext.P-4 G.O. It is clearly stipulated therein that, in case the management does not avail the 10% community quota seats, then those 10% would stand merged with the open merit quota seats, as ordered in Ext.P-4 G.O. Therefore, the description given in item No.3, appended under Clause 13, given on internal page 10 of Ext.P-5 prospectus, should be read only in the light of the substantive decision taken by the Government in Ext.P-4 as well as Clause 3.1 of Ext.P-5, more particularly, the second para of Clause 3.1. Hence, the specific intention of the Government is that, in case, the community quota is not availed by the management, then the said 10% quota would stand merged with the open merit quota seats. For all these reasons, the abovesaid contention will stand rebutted. The aspect as to whether the Court could order for conversion of the 10% community quota as management quota or if it has to be merged with the open merit quota will be dealt with separately later in this judgment. (d) The contention based on Rules of Business of the State Government. 42B. At the outset, it has to be mentioned that there are no clear and cogent pleadings in these writ petitions that the impugned decision of the Government, at Ext.P4, would be in derogation of the rules of business of the State Government framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India and as to how the said decision, at Ext.P4, can be said to be ultra vires the Rules of business, etc. The pleadings in Ground (f) in WP(C) No.23186/2022 (which has led to WA No.1099/2022), are as follows: “f) It is submitted that following a policy decision 30% seats of plus one course have allotted non minority institution management seats all along. Managers were permitted to fill up those from among the qualified students without any restrictions or reservations. Now, vide Exhibit P-2 Government have taken a U in the matter. In Exhibit P-2 the reasons for taking such a decisions are not stated. It is not evident that such a decision is taken consciously after discussing the matter in the Cabinet. The only reason for taking such a decision is that the Director has recommended the same. No detailed study or field survey is held for taking such a decision. It is submitted that in the present year the weightage marks given to the students for studying in the same School wherein they have undergone the SSLC examination is taken away. In such circumstances, taking away 10 % seats from the Management quota would deny the Manager to choose students against the Plus one course from the very same School for want of competitive marks in the SSLC examination.” 43. It is faintly pleaded therein that it is not evident that such a decision is taken consciously after discussing the matter in the Cabinet. It is faintly pleaded therein that it is not evident that such a decision is taken consciously after discussing the matter in the Cabinet. In other words, the only vague pleading in that regard is that the decision ought to have been taken by the Council of Ministers. Sri.T.B.Hood, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the State authorities, would strongly object to allowing the Writ Appellant managements to raise these arguments without any backing of pleadings, inasmuch as, due to the lack of pleadings, the State was not in a position to meet the abovesaid pleadings and contentions, etc. Moreover, it appears from a reading of the impugned common judgment of the learned Single Judge in these cases, that the abovesaid contention was not argued or raised at the time of hearing of the WP(C). Since some of the Advocates have strongly relied on this argument, we would just examine the same. 44. The learned Special Government Pleader has made available the file in relation to the impugned Ext.P-4 G.O dated 07.07.2022. A perusal of the said file, leading to the issuance of Ext.P-4 G.O, would broadly indicate that the proposal that was considered by the competent authority of the State Government in the General Education Department was five matters, comprising of four sub-items in item 'A' and the sole item in item 'B' and item 'B' is the matter in relation to the impugned decision at Ext.P-4. Further, it appears from the submissions of the learned Special Government Pleader that the first four items had financial implications. The learned Special Govt. Pleader would submit on the basis of the contents of the file, that sub-items 1 to 3 of item 'A' were matters proposed without financial implication and the last sub-item of item 'A', namely, sub-item 4 of item A, involved financial implications, inasmuch as creation and sanction of additional batches of Plus Two courses were involved. It is also pointed out by the Special Government Pleader that item No.B thereof, which is the subject matter of Ext.P-4 decision, did not involve any financial implication, as it is only in relation to quotas and sources of admissions for Plus Two courses, as above. The abovesaid proposals, approved at the level of the Joint Secretary, were thereafter placed before the Principal Secretary to the Government in the General Education Department. The abovesaid proposals, approved at the level of the Joint Secretary, were thereafter placed before the Principal Secretary to the Government in the General Education Department. The Principal Secretary has ordered that sub-items 1 to 3 of item 'A' may be placed before the Council of Ministers. The learned Special Government Pleader would point out that the said order, made by the Principal Secretary as sub-items 1 to 3 of item 'A', though did not involve financial implication, were matters in relation to increase in the number of seats for students in the districts mentioned therein and therefore, though the matter was proposed without financial implication, as the matter involved creation of additional seats for the students, it was ordered to be placed before the Council of Ministers. Further that, sub-item No.4 of item 'A' was also ordered by the Principal Secretary to be sent for approval of the Finance Department, as it involved financial implications. As regards item No.B, which is the proposal in respect of the matter covered by Ext.P-4, it was ordered by the Principal Secretary on 29.06.2022 that, the proposal therein (i.e. reduction of management quota to 20% and creation of community quota, etc.), could be approved and was ordered to be placed before the Minister for General Education. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Minister for General Education on 30.06.2022, who has approved the same and has ordered that the file should be placed before the Chief Minister, for orders. Thereafter, the matter has been placed on 06.07.2022 before the Chief Minister, who ordered that all the abovesaid matters, involving both item 'A' (four sub-items) as well as item 'B' (i.e. the matter in Ext.P-4), should be placed before the Finance Minister for perusal and thereafter, the Government Order could be issued and released and thereafter, the matter may be placed before the Council of Ministers, for ratification. The file would also disclose that thereafter, the matter also required the approval of the Finance Minister, subject to the condition that the Minister for General Education may explain the financial implications to the Cabinet later, i.e. in respect of the matters in item 'A', which involved financial implications. It has also been ordered by the Finance Minister on 06.07.2022 that the file may be placed before the Minister for General Education. It has also been ordered by the Finance Minister on 06.07.2022 that the file may be placed before the Minister for General Education. Thereafter, the matter has again been placed before the Minister for General Education on 07.07.2022, who has ordered the issuance and release of the G.O, regarding the abovesaid decisions, subject to the condition regarding certain additional batches, with which we are not concerned at all in these cases. It is thereafter that the formal Government decision has been issued, in the form of Ext.P-4 G.O (Ms.) No.121/2022/G.Edn. dated 07.07.2022 and the G.O has been authenticated by the competent officer, in terms of the Rules of Business and the G.O has been issued by the order of the Governor of the State. The learned Special Government Pleader would point out that this is in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules of Business. 45. From the submissions of parties, it appears that Rule 14 of Part-I Sec.2 of the Rules of Business of the Government of Kerala, framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, mentions that all cases referred to in the Second Schedule shall be submitted to the Chief Minister, after consideration by the Minister in charge, with a view to obtaining his orders for circulation of the case under Rule 15 or bringing it up for consideration at a meeting of the Council. The Second Schedule is also referable to the supra Rule 14. The Second Schedule deals with matters of cases to be brought before the Council, namely the Council of Ministers. Item No.20, included in the Second Schedule, deals with proposals involving any important change of policy or practice. The learned Advocates appearing for the appellants have made available a copy of the Rules of Business, which appears to be not the updated one, inasmuch as the Note appended to Rule 20 is not seen mentioned in the Rules so provided to us. However, the learned Special Government Pleader has made available a copy of the Rules of Business, as amended upto 30.06.2007. A perusal of the said Rules would indicate that a Note has been appended under Item No.20 of the Second Schedule, which says that the question whether a proposal involves any important change of policy or practice, shall be decided by the Minister in charge of the department concerned. A perusal of the said Rules would indicate that a Note has been appended under Item No.20 of the Second Schedule, which says that the question whether a proposal involves any important change of policy or practice, shall be decided by the Minister in charge of the department concerned. It will be profitable to refer to the contents of item No.20 and the Note appended thereunder, as included in the Second Schedule of the Rules of Business and the same reads as follows : “20. Proposals involving any important change of policy or practice. Note:-The question whether a proposal involves any important change of policy or practice shall be decided by the Minister in charge of the department concerned.” 46. Going by the submissions of the appellants, they would contend that the matter in relation to the decision at Ext.P-4 involved change of the earlier policy of reduction of the management quota from 30% to 20%, inasmuch as the earlier norms, since June 2003, had earlier ordered that the management quota is 30% and therefore, such an important change of policy should have been decided by the Government only at the Cabinet level, etc. 47. The appellants would place reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui & Ors. [ (1973) 3 SCC 889 ] = ( AIR 1972 SC 1242 ) and Delhi International Airport Ltd. v. International Lease Finance Corpn. & Ors., [ (2015) 8 SCC 446 = ( AIR 2015 SC 1903 ), etc., which deal with matters where the impugned decision was taken without the concurrence of the Finance Department regarding the financial implication. 48. After hearing both sides and after going through the facts as disclosed in the files leading to the impugned Ext.P-4, we see that there cannot be any dispute that the decision at Ext.P-4, which has emanated from the aforesaid item No. B of the Government file, is in relation to reduction of the management quota from 30% to 20% and the consequential decision to create 10% community quota, etc. and these are matters, which do not require financial implications. Earlier after the recommendation of the Principal Secretary, the Minister for General Education has ordered to place the matter before the Chief Minister, for perusal. and these are matters, which do not require financial implications. Earlier after the recommendation of the Principal Secretary, the Minister for General Education has ordered to place the matter before the Chief Minister, for perusal. Thereafter, the Chief Minister is seen to have taken a conscious decision that for all the matters covered by supra item 'A' & supra item 'B', i.e., for both the matters involving financial implications and the matters which do not involve financial implications, the matter may be placed before the Finance Minister, for perusal and thereafter, the Government order can be issued and released and thereafter, the matter may be placed before the Council of Ministers, for ratification. Hence, at that stage, both the Minister for General Education and the Chief Minister have taken a conscious decision that there is no necessity to forthwith place the matter before the Council of Ministers and the same is to be done only subsequently by ratification. The Note appended to item No.20 of the Second Schedule would give discretion to the Minister holding the portfolio concerned to decide whether the proposal involves any important change of policy or practice, as envisaged in supra item No.20, i.e., as to whether the proposal involves any important change of policy or practice, so as to warrant the placement of the matter before the Council of Ministers. Thereafter, the proposal has been approved by the Finance Minister, with the condition that the financial implications should be explained in the Cabinet note, to be put up later. Thereafter, it has been ordered by the Finance Minister that the proposal, involving financial implications, should be explained in the Cabinet Meeting later and has also ordered that the matter may again be placed before the Minister for General Education. The Minister for General Education, thereafter, has approved the same and has ordered for the issuance of the G.O., subject to certain aspects regarding additional batches of courses, with which we are not concerned. Therefore, at that stage, it can be seen that both the Minister holding the portfolio as well as the highest constitutional executive functionary in the State, viz., the Chief Minister, has consciously taken a decision not to place the matter before the Council of Ministers then, but to issue the G.O and then place the matter for the ratification of the Council of Ministers later. If the above Constitutional functionaries, like the Minister and Chief Minister, have taken the view that the matter is one which does not involve any important change of law or practice, so as to forthwith warrant consideration and decision by the Council of Ministers, then the said opinion, taken by those Constitutional executive functionaries, cannot be the subject matter of judicial review and in other words, it may not be within the permissible parameters of judicial review to adjudge the issue as to whether the said decision of the Constitutional functionaries, not to then refer the matter to the Council of Ministers, but to place it for ratification later, is justiciable, within the judicial review. 49. The learned Special Government Pleader has apprised before us that it was so ordered, due to various reasons, especially, since the admission process has to be started and finalized, without any further delay and therefore, a decision was taken at the highest level that what may be required is ratification by the Council of Ministers later. 50. Having regard to the time frame of the admissions, we are of the view that the said decision cannot be said to be unreasonable or without authority. In the light of these aspects, we are of the view that the abovesaid new arguments, placed before us for the first time, regarding the alleged violation of the Rules of Business will not commend acceptance from our part. That apart, the pleadings are lacking in these writ proceedings, regarding the alleged violation of the Rules of Business. It has to be borne in mind that the Apex Court, in para 108 of the decision in Lalaram & Ors. v. Jaipur Development Authority [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ], has held that, in the absence of pleadings, regarding the alleged violation of the Rules of Business of the Government, there is no necessity for the High Court to get into those aspects. So also, it has to be borne in mind that the aforecited decision of the Apex Court, in Lalaram's case supra [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ], has been rendered after considering various other previous decisions of the Apex Court on the subject, of the impact of Rules of Business of the Government, in cases as in R.Chitralekha v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1964 SC 1823 ], Madras Rubber Factory (MRF) Ltd. v. Manohar Parikkar & Ors. [ (2010) 11 SCC 374 ], Rajastan Housing Board v. New Pink City, Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. & Anr. [ (2015) 7 SCC 601 ], etc. 51. Further, it is also seen that none of the writ petitioner-Managements/writ appellant-Managements have urged and argued this point regarding the alleged violation of the Rules of Business before the learned Single Judge, at the time of the disposal of the W.P(C). 52. It has been held, in para No.105 of Lalaram’s case supra [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ], that it is no longer res integra that the enjoinment of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166, is not mandatory, so much so that any non compliance therewith, ipso facto, would render the executive action/decision, if otherwise validly taken in terms of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3), invalid. It was also held therein that any decision however, to be construed as an executive decision, as contemplated under Article 166, would essentially have to be in accordance with the Rules of Business. However, it has been further held therein that the Rules, depending upon the scheme thereof, may or may not accord an inbuilt flexibility in its provisions, in the matter of compliance and it is possible that the provisions of the Rules, en bloc, may not be relentlessly rigid, obligatory or peremptory, proscribing even a minimal departure ensuing incurable vitiations, etc. 53. It will be profitable to refer to para No.105 of Lalaram’s case supra [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ] , which reads as follows:- “105. It is no longer res integra that the enjoinment of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166, is not mandatory so much so, that any non compliance therewith, ipso facto would render the executive action/decision, if otherwise validly taken in terms of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3), invalid. Any decision however, to be construed as an executive decision as contemplated under Article 166, would essentially has to be in accordance with the Rules of Business. The Rules depending upon the scheme thereof, may or may not, accord an inbuilt flexibility in its provisions in the matter of compliance. It is possible that the provisions of the Rules en bloc may not be relentlessly rigid, obligatory or peremptory proscribing even a minimal departure ensuing in incurable vitiations. The Rules depending upon the scheme thereof, may or may not, accord an inbuilt flexibility in its provisions in the matter of compliance. It is possible that the provisions of the Rules en bloc may not be relentlessly rigid, obligatory or peremptory proscribing even a minimal departure ensuing in incurable vitiations. Contingent on the varying imperatives, some provisions may warrant compulsory exaction of compliance therewith e.g. negative/prohibitive expression/clauses, matters involving revenue or finance, prior approval/concurrence of the Finance Department, consultation/approval/ concurrence of the Finance and Revenue departments in connection therewith and issues not admitting of any laxity so as to upset, dislodge or mutilate the prescribed essentiality of collective participation, involvement and contribution of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister in aid of the Governor in transacting the affairs of the State to effectuate the imperatives of federal democratic governance as contemplated by the Constitution.” 54. Still further, it has been held in para No.107 of Lalaram’s case supra [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ], that the mandatory nature of any provisions of any Rule of Business would be conditioned by the construction and the purpose thereof to be adjudged, in the context of the scheme as a whole. The interpretation of the Rules, necessarily, would be guided by the framework thereof and the contents and purport of its provisions, and the status and tenability of an order/instrument, represented as an executive decision, would have to be judged in the conspectus of the attendant facts and circumstances and no straight jacket formula can thus be ordained, divorced from the Rules applicable and the factual setting accompanying the order/decision under scrutiny. It will be pertinent to refer to para No.107 of Lalaram’s case supra [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ] , which reads as follows:- “107. Obviously, thus the mandatory nature of any provision of any Rule of Business would be conditioned by the construction and the purpose thereof to be adjudged in the context of the scheme as a whole. The interpretation of the Rules, necessarily, would be guided by the framework thereof and the contents and purport of its provisions, and the status and tenability of an order/instrument, represented as an executive decision would have to be judged in the conspectus of the attendant facts and circumstances. The interpretation of the Rules, necessarily, would be guided by the framework thereof and the contents and purport of its provisions, and the status and tenability of an order/instrument, represented as an executive decision would have to be judged in the conspectus of the attendant facts and circumstances. No straight jacket formula can, thus be ordained, divorced from the Rules applicable and the factual setting accompanying the order/decision under scrutiny.” 55. Further, we are also apprised by the learned Special Government Pleader that, after Ext.P4 G.O. was issued on 07.07.2022, writ petitions in these cases were filed before this Court on 11.07.2022 onwards and thereafter, the matter was being considered by the learned Single Judge and the final judgment was rendered on 27.07.2022 and still, further writ appeals were being filed by both sides. It is only in view of the pendency of the abovesaid writ proceedings that the Government was disabled from placing the matter before the Council of Ministers for ratification. 56. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, more particularly, taking into account the time schedule for the commencement and closure of the admissions, the decision taken, as to the Government files to issue the Government Order and place the matter before the Council of Ministers for ratification later, may not be said to be one which has been taken without authority or that it is unreasonable, etc. 57. Further, it is also to be borne in mind that the present decision, in relation to Ext.P4, which emanated from supra item (b) of the Government file, does not have any financial implication, for which there is no dispute. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court cited by the appellants are all in relation to matters taken without the concurrence of the Finance department, in cases which involved financial implication. 58. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court cited by the appellants are all in relation to matters taken without the concurrence of the Finance department, in cases which involved financial implication. 58. It is also relevant to note that the Apex Court, in para No.37 of the decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P., [ (2011) 12 SCC 333 ], has held that the cases in R. Chitralekha’s case supra [ (1964) 6 SCR 368 = AIR 1964 SC 1823 ] MRF’s case supra [ (2010) 11 SCC 374 ], are distinguishable, since those cases dealt with Rules pertaining to financial implications, for which there were no provisions in the appropriation Act and so the Rules required mandatory compliance and that in the case considered by the Apex Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan’s case supra [ (2011) 12 SCC 333 ], there was no issue of financial repercussions and the issue therein was whether the Council of Ministers is permitted to delegate the power to amend its decision to a Committee of Ministers consisting of Ministers in-charge of the departments concerned and the Chief Minister and whether such amendment needs to be consistent with the Rules of Business, framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it has been held therein that the case laws provide that the delegation is permissible and that the Rules of Business are directory in nature in that regard and the impugned action therein was not interfered with. It will be profitable to refer to the contents of para No.37 of the decision of the Apex Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan’s case supra [ (2011) 12 SCC 333 , pp.345-346], which reads as follows:- “37. We have considered the larger Bench judgment of this Court in R. Chitralekha [ AIR 1964 SC 1823 ] and taken note of the fact that MRF Ltd.[ (2010) 11 SCC 374 ] is distinguishable from the case at hand since that case dealt with rules pertaining to financial implications for which there were no provisions in the Appropriation Act, and so the rules required mandatory compliance. Here, there is no issue of financial repercussions. Here, there is no issue of financial repercussions. The issue here is whether the Council of Ministers is permitted to delegate the power to amend its decision to a Committee of Ministers consisting of the Ministers in charge of the Departments concerned and the Chief Minister, and whether such amendment needs to be consistent with the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. The case law provides that delegation is permissible and that Rules of Business are directory in nature. In view of the above, we find that delegation of power is permissible. Submissions so made on behalf of the appellant in this regard are preposterous.” 59. It is also relevant to note that it is has been clearly laid down by the Apex Court in decisions as in A.Sanjeeva Naidu v. State of Madras & Anr. [ (1970) 1 SCC 443 = AIR 1970 SC 1102 ] and by this Court in T.S.Sudheer v. State of Kerala [2010 (1) KLT 25], that the decision of the Government would have immunity, since it has been issued as a Government Order, in the name of the Governor, and therefore, it cannot be contended that no valid decision was taken by the competent authority of the State Government, etc. 60. Taking into account the aspect that there has been no pleadings in the writ proceedings and since these arguments were never raised before the learned Single Judge in the W.P.(C)s and also taking into account the abovesaid aspects mentioned hereinabove, we are of the view that it cannot be contended that the impugned decision, at Ext.P4 Government Order, has been rendered in violation of the Rules of Business. Hence, the abovesaid arguments in that regard stand repelled. (e) Contention regarding the reasons and justifications for the policy decision at Ext.P-4. 61. It has been urged by the appellant-Managements that a reading of Ext.P-4 G.O. or even the contents of the statement would not indicate any proper reasons or justifications for the drastic change of policy, so as to reduce the management quota from 30% to 20%. A reading of Ext.P-4 G.O. dated 7.7.2022 would indicate that the same has been issued, after taking into account the recommendations of the Director of General Education, as made out in the latter's letter dated 24.6.2022, read as the 3rd paper in Ext.P-4. A reading of Ext.P-4 G.O. dated 7.7.2022 would indicate that the same has been issued, after taking into account the recommendations of the Director of General Education, as made out in the latter's letter dated 24.6.2022, read as the 3rd paper in Ext.P-4. Both the said letter dated 24.6.2022 as well as Ext.P-4 would indicate that, even as per the consistent norms, the management quota, allotted to the Managements of minorities and backward classes, communities, was only 20%, whereas, as per the norms till then followed, the management quota for Managements, other than minorities and backward classes communities, was 30%. The Director of General Education has stated, in the letter dated 24.6.2022, that the scenario in the education sector in the higher secondary school system has undergone a sea change since the issuance of the G.O. dated 9.6.2003, fixing the management quota as 30%, in the case of Managements other than minorities and backward classes etc. Further that, various complaints have been received, regarding irregularities in the conduct of admissions in the management quota. It is common ground that the management quota is not filled up strictly on the basis of merit, but on the basis of the discretion of the Management, from amongst the eligible applicants, who have applied in the management quota and who have the minimum eligibility norms for admissions. These aspects of the matter are also dealt with in the statement dated 21.7.2022, filed by the respondents in the WP(C). It is true that these aspects, regarding the alleged irregularities in the conduct of admissions in the management quota, are not explicated or expatiated in Ext.P-4 G.O. As held hereinabove, the scope of interference in judicial review, in regard to policy matters, is on an extremely limited bandwidth. We are essentially concerned with the illegality of the decision and of course, reasonableness can be adjudged, subject to the Wednesbury Principles, in the sense that the decision should be so absurd and so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever imagine to take such a decision. 62. We have already held that no provisions of the statute or law or any of the legal rights of the writ petitioner-Managements have been violated in the instant case. 62. We have already held that no provisions of the statute or law or any of the legal rights of the writ petitioner-Managements have been violated in the instant case. So, the only issue is as to whether the decision at Ext.P-4 is so unreasonable and perverse, that no reasonable authority would ever have taken such a decision, if such authority was properly instructed on the facts and the law that govern the scenario. Sitting in judicial review, we are not empowered to adjudge the sufficiency of the reasons of the decision, to evaluate as to whether the policy decision is hit by the Wednesbury unreasonableness. The grounds stated in the letter dated 24.6.2022, issued by the Director of General Education, as well as the statement of the respondents and the approach in Ext.P-4 cannot be said to be totally lacking reasonableness, so as to vitiate and characterize the decision as unreasonable in the 'Wednesbury sense'. 63. In the decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. N.Subbarayudu & Ors. [ (2008) 14 SCC 702 ], the Apex Court dealt with judicial review of a policy decision regarding fixation of cut-off dates for retiral benefits arising out of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980, Rule 2 thereof. The Apex Court has held, in paras 5 to 9 thereof, that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority, keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and attenuating circumstances, and that fixation of the cutoff date is within the policy domain of the executive authority and the Court should not normally interfere with the fixation of the cut-off date by the executive authority, unless such order appears to be, on the face of it, blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. In para 8 thereof, it has been held that various decisions of the Apex Court have held that the choice of a cutoff date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government, unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical. In para 8 thereof, it has been held that various decisions of the Apex Court have held that the choice of a cutoff date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government, unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority, as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the Court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14, unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. It will be profitable to refer to the contents of paras 5 to 9 of the decision of the Apex Court in N.Subbarayudu's case supra [ (2008) 14 SCC 702 , pp.703-704], which read as follows: "5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal [ (2005) 6 SCC 754 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 910].) 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal [ (2005) 6 SCC 754 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 910]. 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad [ (1990) 3 SCC 368 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 51], Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal [ (1994) 4 SCC 212 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 925 : (1994) 27 ATC 561] (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. [ (2004) 2 SCC 76 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 337] (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary [ (1996) 10 SCC 536 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1431], etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass [ (2008) 1 SCC 683 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 289 : JT (2008) 3 SC 221] and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi [ (2008) 4 SCC 720 : (2008) 2 JT 639 : (2008) 3 Scale 45 ] the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. " 64. Further, in the recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Vinod Kumar M.K. v. State of Kerala & Ors. " 64. Further, in the recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Vinod Kumar M.K. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [ 2022 (2) KHC 664 (DB)], it has been held that matters relating to creation and sanction of posts in Government departments would squarely come within the realm of policy decision of the Government, and that the Courts cannot, in the exercise of its powers of judicial review, issue mandamus to direct the Government to sanction and create posts, etc. Further, a reading of para 13 thereof would indicate that a further contention raised by the petitioner was that there was total non-application of mind on the part of the Government, in issuing the impugned order, as the same is not a speaking order, and as regards that contention, the Division Bench of this Court has held, in para 13 of M.K.Vinod Kumar's case supra, that creation of posts are within the exclusive domain of the Government and comes under the category of policy decisions upon which, ordinarily, interference by Courts is not warranted, and it was held that the abovesaid contention, regarding total non-application of mind, as the impugned rejection order was not a speaking one, was repelled by this Court since the decision was in the realm of policy. In the light of these aspects, we are inclined to take the view that, it is not as if no reasons whatsoever has been disclosed either in the materials or in the pleadings, regarding the change in policy reflected in Ext.P-4. Further, the sufficiency of the reasons cannot be the subject matter of judicial review interference in matters which fall within the province of policy. Still further, in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the decision as in N.Subbarayudu's case supra as well as by the Division Bench of this Court in M.K.Vinod Kumar's case supra, etc., even non disclosure of the reasons to justify the policy decision may not be a ground for interference in judicial review, so long as the decision cannot be said to be blatantly capricious or discriminatory, etc. Further, the Apex Court has held, in para 37 of the decision in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. Further, the Apex Court has held, in para 37 of the decision in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. [2021 SCC Online SC 807], that policy decision is presumed to be in public interest and such decision once made, is amenable to challenge and that the Constitutional Court is expected to keep its hands off, unless and until there is manifest and extreme arbitrariness. 65. In the instant case, what is involved is the reduction of the management quota from 30% to 20%. Some reasons are stated in the materials as well as in the pleadings and also in the impugned order. Since fixation of quotas for admissions is fully within the province of policy and as the policy decision cannot be said to be so unreasonable and capricious in the ‘Wednesbury sense’, we have no option but to repel the abovesaid contention of the appellants. 66. Yet another related ground has also been urged by some of the learned advocates appearing for the appellants that, since the past consistent practice continued for a very long time, its alterations should have been done only after consultation and hearing the stakeholders, like the writ petitioner-Managements, etc. and that therefore, the impugned decision which has been rendered without consultation and hearing the stakeholders, like the writ petitioner-Managements, should be held to be in derogation and should be interfered with, as it is in derogation of the elementary principles of fairness and natural justice as well as the procedural legitimate expectation. The appellants have no case that whenever the State Government came to issue Government Orders from time to time in fixation of quotas for admission the managements were given a hearing by the Government. We are not in a position to hold that the impugned policy decision is liable to be interfered, on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not granted to the managements. (f) Contention regarding the issue as to whether this Court sitting in judicial review has the power and competence to order that the 10% community quota should be converted as management quota seats, as contended by the writ appellant Managements or whether it should be merged with the open merit quota, as urged by the State. 67. We have already rejected the contentions of the appellants based on Clause 13 on internal page 11 of Ext.P-5 prospectus. 67. We have already rejected the contentions of the appellants based on Clause 13 on internal page 11 of Ext.P-5 prospectus. The substantive decision of the State Government at Ext.P-4 is that, henceforth, the management quota allotted to the Managements, other than minorities and backward classes, would stand reduced from the previous 30% to 20%. 68. We have already held, as urged by the writ petitioners, that the 10% community quota is unconstitutional and invalid. The appellant Managements would urge that, since the 10% community quota has been quashed, as urged by them, the same should be converted as management quota seats and not as open merit quota seats, as urged by the State. Whereas the contra stand of the State is that, based on their policy prerogative, in case this Court holds that the 10% community quota is invalid, then the said 10% community quota could be converted, not as management quota seats, but has to be merged with the open merit quota seats. It is specifically provided, in Ext.P-4, that in case any management is not able to avail the 10% community quota seats, then such 10% seats will be converted as open merit quota seats. 69. There has been a conscious decision of the State Government to reduce the management quota seats in these case from 30% to 20%. The 10% community quota seats has been held by this Court as invalid. Will this Court, sitting in judicial review, have the jurisdictional competence to order that the said 10% community quota seats should be converted as management quota seats, as contended by the managements, and overrule the specific stand of the State, that the said 10% quota seats should merge with the open merit quota seats. 70. The simple answer to this question can be answered by examining another related question. The said related question is as to whether the matter, relating to fixation of quota and sources of admissions in educational institutions, is within the exclusive policy province of the State Executive or whether this Court has any leeway, while adjudging the reasonableness or otherwise of the same, to hold that the same should necessarily be converted as management quota seats. 71. The answer to this simple issue has already been settled by a long catena of decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts. 71. The answer to this simple issue has already been settled by a long catena of decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts. The answer is that matters relating to the fixation of quotas and sources of admissions, are fully and exclusively within the policy province and prerogative of the Executive. These educational institutions are aided by the Government and they have the competence to fix the sources and quotas of admissions. The function of the judicial review Court is essentially relating to the evaluation of the legality of a policy decision, and at best, whether the policy decision is hit by capriciousness and unreasonableness in the ‘Wednesbury sense’. 72. We have already held that the impugned policy decision, in reducing the management quota seats from 30% to 20%, is not vitiated by any illegality or unreasonableness in the ‘Wednesbury sense’. We have fully concurred with the considered verdict of the learned Single Judge, that the allotment of 10% community quota seats in Managements, other than minorities and backward classes communities, is unconstitutional and invalid and in derogation of the various provisions of the Constitution, like Article 14, Article 15(1), Article 29(2) and Rule 11 of Chapter VI of KER, etc. 73. Though we have invoked the judicial review power to hold the 10% community quota seats as unconstitutional and invalid, it would be in total derogation of the elementary canons and principles of judicial review if we were to hold that we have the competence to order that the 10% community quota seats should necessarily be converted as management quota seats, and that too overruling the contra stand of the State that, if the Courts hold the 10% community quota seats to be invalid, then the said seats should be merged with open merit quota seats. The Constitutional Courts, exercising the powers of judicial review, should be extremely cautious and circumspect about the exercise of its powers ,in that regard. Hence, we are of the considered view that it is not within our province to order that the 10% community quota seats should be converted as management quota seats and that too overruling the contra stand of the State. Hence, we are of the considered view that it is not within our province to order that the 10% community quota seats should be converted as management quota seats and that too overruling the contra stand of the State. In other words, the inevitable fall-out of this is that we do not have any legal option, but to accept the considered stand of the State that, in the event of the 10% community quota seats being declared as invalid by this Court, then the said quota should necessarily be merged with the open merit quota seats. Hence, we are constrained to overrule the abovesaid pleas and contentions of the appellant-Managements as well. 74. In view of the decision as per Ext.P-4 as well as Clause 3.1 of Ext.P-5 prospectus, more particularly the 2nd para of that clause, the mandate of the Government is that, in case community quota is not availed, then the same would stand merged with the open merit quota seats. So, this Court has held that community quota itself is invalid. The inexorable result is that the said 10% quota seats will have to be merged with the open merit quota seats. That apart, the Government has made a specific stand before us that, in case this Court holds community quota to be invalid, then the said quota of seats will have to be merged with the open merit quota seats. Since the fixation of sources and quotas of admission is solely within the policy purview of the State Government, the Court sitting in judicial review will be interfering with the policy powers of the State Government, if we accept the contention of the writ appellant-Managements, that the 10% community quota seats will have to be merged with the management quota seats and not with the open merit quota seats. For these reasons, the abovesaid contention will stand rebutted. 75. Further, the Apex Court has held in the decision in State of Punjab v. Anshika Goyal & Ors. [ (2022) 3 SCC 633 , paras 8 & 10] that, it will not be right and proper for the Constitutional Court sitting in judicial review, to interfere with the policy decision of the State Government, so as to alter the quota of reservation, etc. [ (2022) 3 SCC 633 , paras 8 & 10] that, it will not be right and proper for the Constitutional Court sitting in judicial review, to interfere with the policy decision of the State Government, so as to alter the quota of reservation, etc. In that case, the Government of the State of Punjab had directed and ordered that the sports quota, in admissions to medical educational institutions, will be limited to 1%, and therein the High Court had interfered with the same and ordered the State Government to enhance the reservation for sports personnel from 1% to 3%, and it was held by the Apex Court that, since the matter regarding the fixation of quota is essentially and substantially within the realm of policy, it was not trite for the High Court to have interfered with the said policy decision so as to alter the quota for admissions. 76. Lastly, we will have to consider W.A.No.966/2022, which has been filed by a third party to the writ proceedings. The said appellant in W.A.No.966/2022 was never made a party to the writ proceedings and the said party secured the third party leave and then was permitted to file the present writ appeal. The appellant therein is the Nair Service Society (NSS), which is running a corporate educational agency in respect of 38 aided higher secondary schools and 2 aided vocational higher secondary schools in various parts of the State. According to their pleadings, the objective of the said educational agency is for the welfare and upliftment of the members of the Nair community, who got downgraded socially and economically with the march of time, etc. The said educational agency would broadly fall within the second category of Managements mentioned by us in the earlier part of this judgment, i.e. Managements other than religious and backward classes communities but who have declared the community to which the Management belongs, and they have already invoked the provisions of Ext.P-4 G.O and Ext.P-5 prospectus for availing the 10% community quota seats. 77. 77. As recorded in the order dated 16.8.2022 in this W.A., which was heard along with the batch of cases, on being queried, all the writ petitioner-Managements have stated before us that they have no grievance as against Managements, like the said appellant, availing the community reservation benefits, and that the grievance of the writ petitioners was essentially that they are not in a position to declare the community to which their Management belongs for various reasons, and that therefore, the said Management’s community reservation quota is unworkable, to the extent it affects them and that therefore, the said quota is unlawful, etc. The appellant in W.A. No.966/2022, being a third party, was never heard in the writ proceedings, and they have already availed the benefits of the scheme and they have about 38 aided higher secondary schools and 2 aided vocational higher secondary schools in various parts of the State. Hence, we have taken the view that it will be highly inequitable and unfair to make the said appellant Management suffer the adverse consequences of the judgment for the present academic year, since the said adverse verdict came at the last moment during the process of the admission stage, and there had been various confusions, and the State also does not have any serious objection in the said appellant availing the community reservation benefits from this academic year. Accordingly, after hearing the parties, we have passed orders dated 16.8.2022 as well as 19.8.2022 in this W.A.No.966/2022, whereby the adverse conditions, as per the impugned directions contained in clauses ‘b’ and ‘c’ of para 30 of the impugned judgment dated 27.7.2022 of the learned Single Judge in the instant WP(C).No. 22515/2022, to the limited extent that it is directed as against the said appellant, was directed to be kept in abeyance and the said appellant was also permitted to make admissions in the said 10% community quota for this year. 78. The learned Single Judge has noted in the impugned judgment that, various affected Managements, especially those who may come within the above mentioned second category, were not made party to the writ proceedings. Hence, out of equitable considerations, we have permitted the appellant in W.A.No.966/2022 to make admissions, as above. No other interference is called for, as regards the impugned judgment. 79. Hence, out of equitable considerations, we have permitted the appellant in W.A.No.966/2022 to make admissions, as above. No other interference is called for, as regards the impugned judgment. 79. The abovesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha's case was complied with by the State by the issuance of G.O. dated 9.6.2003 and we fail to understand as to why the said community quota was again resurrected and restored for this year and that too, in identical terms, which has led to unnecessary confusions. Moreover, we also see that, as of now, there is no comprehensive G.O. relating to the various sources of admissions, which have to be culled out from various Government Orders, and the provisions made for community quota in Ext. P-4 G.O. has been held by the learned Single Judge as unconstitutional and ultra vires, which has been affirmed by us to the extent indicated herein above. Hence, it is for the competent authority of the State Government to ensure that a comprehensive Government Order be issued in the matter free from unnecessary controversies, so that there is clarity about the various sources and quotas of admissions well in advance and we hope that the Government will do the same well before the end of April, 2023 or so, instead of waiting till the last minute, as has been done this year. 80. Though we have held that the impugned decision of the Government is not vitiated by illegality or unreasonableness in the 'Wednesbury sense', we are of the firm view that after the verdict given by the learned Single Judge for the previous academic year, as per Ext.P-3, rendered as early as on 22.12.2021, the Government and the Directorate of General Education should have taken the decision without any further delay thereafter, atleast before the end of April, 2022, instead of having waited till the 1st week of July 2022. 81. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not call for any major interdiction at the hands of this appellate Court. No other orders and directions are required. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeals will stand disposed of.