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2022 DIGILAW 723 (RAJ)

Kamala Devi Gupta v. Union Of India

2022-03-03

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. In the wake of instant surge in COVID – 19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, abundant caution is being maintained, while hearing the matters in the Court, for the safety of all concerned. 2. These writ petitions have been preferred claiming, in sum and substance, the following reliefs: “It is, therefore, most humble prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed with cost and by an appropriate writ, order or direction:- A. The impugned order dated 13.06.2013 (Ann.2) and the judgment dated 02.01.2014 (Aqnn. 7) passed by the Competent Authority may kindly be quashed and set aside and it may be held that the pipeline should not be installed at the newly porposed path which passess through the fileds of the farmers. B. Any other appropriate order, which may be found just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case be passed in favour of petitioners.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Union of India had taken the decision for the installation of a pipeline for the transportation of petroleum natural gas from Mehsana to Bhatinda, and that a notification to that effect was published under Section 3 sub-section (1) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Rights of Users) Act, 1962. And that, the proposed pipeline passed from certain lands in Jodhpur, which belonged to the Jodhpur Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the ‘J.D.A.’) and therefore, the J.D.A. addressed a communication vide letter dated 25.06.2013 to the competent authority in the Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. requesting that the particular Khasra through which the pipeline was proposed to pass through be substituted with other khasras, as the proposed khasra was to be used for the construction of a transport nagar, and an undertaking to that effect was made before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court and a scheme to the same effect has been created. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that subsequently, order sheets were drawn, dated 05.06.2013 and 13.06.2013, whereby the request made by the J.D.A. to substitute the proposed khasra for an alternate khasra due to the aforementioned reasons, was discussed and accepted, and the pipeline was shifted. 5. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that subsequently, order sheets were drawn, dated 05.06.2013 and 13.06.2013, whereby the request made by the J.D.A. to substitute the proposed khasra for an alternate khasra due to the aforementioned reasons, was discussed and accepted, and the pipeline was shifted. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the said decision was taken arbitrarily and therefore, the petitioner, after receiving an intimation of the said change in the path of the pipeline, vide letter dated 17.12.2013, at Annexure-3, from the competent authority, also received a notice to that effect, And that, in light of the above, the petitioner submitted written objections to the competent authority, after which the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of hearing, at which time the petitioner also submitted detailed written objections to the new proposed path for the pipeline, some among them being that the proposed path of the pipeline would traverse through the fields of many farmers and adversely affect agriculture, and that the J.D.A. had over 900 bighas land in the originally proposed khasra, and the proposed pipeline could be relocated within the same Khasra itself without adversely impacting the construction of the transport nagar, and therefore shifting the khasra itself was unecessary and arbitrary in nature. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the competent authority passed a judgment, dated 02.01.2014, at Annexure – 7, by which the objections and contentions raised by the petitioner were rejected, and that the competent authority did not take into consideration the fact that another pipeline of HPCL was passing through therefore the proposed pipeline also could conveniently be installed along the same path. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the competent authority so appointed was a retired R.A.S. Officer and would therefore not be a ‘competent authority’, and that 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew this Court’s attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Lalijabhai Kadvabhai Savaliya & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the competent authority so appointed was a retired R.A.S. Officer and would therefore not be a ‘competent authority’, and that 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew this Court’s attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Lalijabhai Kadvabhai Savaliya & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 2016 (9) SCJ 309 wherein the following was observed: “It is thus clear that "Competent Authority" is given wide ranging powers Under Section 5 for considering the objections, Under Section 6 for making the report to the Central Government and Under Section 10 for determining compensation for damage/loss or injury under first part of Section and to determine the market value under the second part of the Section. By virtue of these powers, crucial rights of the persons interested in the land are bound to be affected. His orders and report would certainly deal with variety of civil rights of the interested persons and issues pertaining to compensation. At this stage, the observations of this Court in Trilok Sudhirbhai Pandya (Supra), in the context whether the person appointed as Competent Authority could be a person other than a public servant are quite eloquent: 17. The aforesaid reference to the various provisions of the Act shows that the competent authority has got vast powers, which affects the rights of persons interested in the land over which the pipeline is to be laid and on the reports of the competent authority, the Central Government and the State Government are to take decisions affecting the rights of persons interested in the land. Under the provisions of the Act, therefore, the competent authority does not merely determine the compensation at the first instance in accordance with the statutory Rules as has been contended by the learned Counsel for Respondent 4, but has to perform various other quasi-judicial functions which are normally performed by public servants whose pay allowances and other incidentals of service are met out of the public exchequer. If instead of public servants, a person is appointed whose pay, allowances and other incidentals are not paid out of the public exchequer but directly paid by a private employer such as Respondent 4, for whom the right of user is being acquired and by whom the compensation is payable, persons interested in the land will have reasonable grounds for assuming that such a competent authority, who is dependent on a private corporation for his salary, allowances, accommodation and transport allowances, will have a bias in favour of the private corporation.” 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further attempts to draw a comparison between ‘competent authority’ under the Section 2 (e) of the Metro Railway (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 and ‘competent authority’ under the Act of 1962. And that, the competent authority under Section 16 must also be someone who is holding or has held a Judicial Office not lower in rank than that of a Subordinate Judge or is a trained legal mind. And that, if such a requirement is not read into and not taken as an integral and essential qualification, then it would amount to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that under Section 6 sub section (3) of the Act of 1962 any notification issued under Section 6 sub-section (1) after the expiry of a period of 1 year from the date of that notification, it shall cease to have effect on expiration of that period. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the following judgment rendered in State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1269 , stating that the principles of natural justice must be followed even in the case and enquiry was made and a decision was passed by a Government Servant. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submits that the process of laying down the proposed pipeline has in fact not begun, and therefore, factual aspect of irretrievable laying down of pipeline is not made out, and neither has the proposed transport nagar plan been produced before this Court. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submits that the process of substitution of the path of the pipeline was done at the instance of the J.D.A. after informing the Respondent no. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submits that the process of substitution of the path of the pipeline was done at the instance of the J.D.A. after informing the Respondent no. 2 that the originally proposed khasra had been allocated towards the construction of a transport nagar, and that an undertaking for the same purpose was made before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court and a scheme for the same was also created by the competent authority. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further submits that the due process of issuing notice to the persons through whose lands the proposed pipeline was to be laid down was made, and that the concerned persons were provided with an opportunity of hearing. And that, the competent authority so appointed under the Act of 1962, after hearing such concerned persons and taking into consideration their objections, passed the impugned judgment dated 02.01.2014. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further submits that all the procedure as laid down by law was complied and the averments made by the petitioner, that the shifting of the pipeline was arbitrary and highly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India are baseless allegations. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further submits that the contention of the petitioner that a pipeline of the HPCL was already passing through Khasra No. 142, that a representation to the same effect was in fact made by the petitioner before the competent authority during the time of hearing, and was taken into consideration. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further submits, with regard to the contention of the petitioner that the competent authority was not a ‘competent authority’, that the competent authority under Section 2 (a) of the Act of 1962 is vested with certain powers, including but not limited to hearing of objections, declaration of Rights of Users, decision regarding compensation and so on. And that, the competent authority in the present case, was in fact a ‘competent authority’ as laid down under the Act of 1962, and therefore, claims of the petitioner that the competent authority was in fact not a proper authority, is wrong. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent no. And that, the competent authority in the present case, was in fact a ‘competent authority’ as laid down under the Act of 1962, and therefore, claims of the petitioner that the competent authority was in fact not a proper authority, is wrong. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, the J.D.A., submits that the land in originally proposed khasra was found to be reserved for the purpose of construction of a Transport Nagar and Automobile Market Scheme by the respondent no. 4 and that revision of the path of the proposed pipeline at this stage would be detrimental to the public interest at large. And that, doing so would occupy majority of the vacant lands allocated for the aforementioned purpose, due to other reasons of security and maintenance of the pipeline. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 further submits that the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) has also started functioning at the old transport nagar, and it has therefore become more essential to shift the transport nagar to the khasra in question. 20. Heard learned counsel for both the parties as well as perused the record of the case, alongwith the precedent law cited at the Bar. 21. This Court observes that the impugned order and judgment, dated 13.06.2013 and 02.01.2014 respectively, have been passed after issuing the concerned persons, upon whose land the proposed pipeline was initially passing through, and that an opportunity of hearing was afforded to the concerned persons and their objections and written submissions were taken on record. And that, the contentions raised by the petitioner, with regard to an existing pipeline of the HPCL, was brought to the notice of the concerned authority and that the same was given due consideration before passed the impugned judgment. 22. This Court further observes that the contention of the petitioner that the competent authority is not in fact a ‘competent authority’ is not accepted by this Court, by virtue of the fact that the competent authority was duly appointed under the Act of 1962, and the exercise of his powers in the present case have been exercised in accordance with those conferred upon him under the Act of 1962. 23. 23. This Court observes that the original khasra allocated towards the establishment of the pipeline was changed at the request of the J.D.A., as is reflected from the record, and with good reason, that the said khasra was already reserved for the Transport Nagar and Automobile Market Scheme and that a scheme to that effect was prepared. And that the land wherein the old transport nagar was situated is being utlisied by the AIIMS and therefore, any revision of the plan at this stage would could inordinate delay and inconvenience to the public at large. 24. This Court further observes, that the proposed pipeline has been shifted from the originally allocated khasra with good reason and that the respondent. no. 2 acted at the behest and request of respondent no. 4. And that the manner in which the same was done was in accordance with the law as laid down in the Act of 1962. 25. This Court perused the judgments cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but finds that they do not apply to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 26. In light of the aforesaid observations, this Court does not find it a fit case so as to warrant any interference under the writ jurisdiction by this Court. 27. Consequently, the present petitions are dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of.