ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (now, Tata Steel Limited) is in the appeal against the writ Court's order dated 30th July 2010. By this order, its challenge to the Award dated 18th June 2005 made in Reference Case No.4 of 1998 has been rejected. 2. The respondent who is the concerned workman was dismissed from service on 28th September 1996 after rendering service of 22 years under Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (in short, TISCO), on the allegation that he encroached upon the Company's land and constructed a pucca house over the land comprised under RS Plot No. 3613/3716 and 3622 under Mauza-Bara. He raised an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication vide order dated 11th April 1998 in the following terms : “Whether the dismissal from services of Shri D.K. Banerjee, Ticket No.103678, workman, TISCO Ltd., Jamshedpur is proper and justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 3. By an order dated 17th March 2005, the Labour Court, Jamshedpur held that the domestic enquiry conducted against the respondent was not fair and proper and, accordingly, the Management was offered opportunity to lead evidence. Three witnesses were produced by the Management to justify the dismissal order dated 28th September 1996. The respondent also examined himself as a witness to demonstrate that the very basis of the dismissal order was non-existent and he was never in illegal possession of the land claimed by the Company belonging to itself. 4. The respondent produced copies of the Rent Fixation Case Nos.342/1965-66 and 159/1988-89 and the rent receipts to lay support to his stand that Plot Nos.3622, 3666 and 3667 under Khata No.54 of Mauza-Bara belonged to Pritam Santhal and not to the Company. It was also brought on record that Title Suit No.57 of 1995 was instituted by the Company in which wife of the respondent was arrayed as defendant no. 23. 5. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur on appreciation of the evidence laid before it came to a conclusion that the land under dispute was not in possession of the Company prior to 1990. 6. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur came to such conclusion for the following reasons : “15. The document filed by the workman shows that plot no.3622 under Khata No.54 was not in possession of the company till 1990. 6. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur came to such conclusion for the following reasons : “15. The document filed by the workman shows that plot no.3622 under Khata No.54 was not in possession of the company till 1990. From the case of the company also it appears that the company is not in possession of the plot no.3613/3716 and 3622. In ext. M/4 it is stated by the Divisional Manager (Land) of the company that the company has been dispossessed from the lands and a title suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is being filed by the company. This document is dated 5.5.1995. M.W. No.3 has also stated that title suit relating to the aforesaid plots of land including other adjoining lands is pending before the subordinate Judge-II at Jamshedpur for declaration of right, title and recovery of possession against fifty three persons as defendants including Smt. Krishan Banerjee, wife of the workman. Title Suit No.57 of 1995 is till pending which is in respect of plot no. 3621, 3622, 3623 and 3626 and 3613/37216. This court can not weigh the evidence and decide title or possession of the parties. Judgment from a competent court is awaited. Under the circumstances it is not proper for the company to claim the plots as the property of the company. The title and possession was disputed at the time of giving charge sheet and therefore, it was not proper to charge the workman for encroaching upon the company's land. Under the circumstances it is held that chargesheet, issued to the workman, is vague and the termination of the services based on the chargesheet is illegal this decides issue no.1 and (ii) accordingly.” 7. In Reference Case No.4 of 1998, award was prepared on 18th June 2005 which came to be challenged by TISCO in W.P.(L) No.1142 of 2006. 8. The powers of the writ Court to interfere with the findings of sub-ordinate Tribunal are very limited and unless it is shown to the Court that the findings recorded by the sub-ordinate Tribunal are contrary to the records and perverse the writ Court would not interfere with the award prepared by the Tribunal (refer, “Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan” AIR 1964 SC 477 ). 9. 9. The writ Court observed that the Company was not in possession of Plot No.3622 Khata No. 54 till 1990 and it was a disputed claim between the Company and 53 workmen one of whom was the respondent's wife. The writ Court therefore ruled that the findings recorded by the Labour Court did not warrant interference and, accordingly, W.P.(L) No.1142 of 2006 was dismissed observing as under : “After hearing learned counsel for both the parties and going through the Award, I find that there is no apparent illegality in the finding of the Labour Court and the document filed by the management, has come to a finding that since the title suit is pending which was filed by the management for declaration of their title and possession over the land, which is said to be unauthorizedly occupied by the worker and since title and possession of the Company is still to be decided and also since earlier the labour court has held that the domestic inquiry is against the principle of natural justice and was improper. In that view of the matter, the direction for re-instatement and back wages as awarded, is within the jurisdiction and power of Labour Court and it requires no interference by this Court under its writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.” 10. Heard the learned counsels appearing for both parties. 11. The respondent joined TISCO, Jamshedpur in December 1994 and for about 22 years rendered satisfactory services as Mazdoor. On 13th May 1995, he received charge-memo on the allegation of unauthorisedly constructing a pucca house by encroaching upon the Company's land measuring an area of about 30ft x 40ft in RS Plot No. 3613 and 3622 of Mouza-Bara. Out of three witnesses produced by the Management, MW1 is a formal witness. Sanjay Kumar Shukla who was working as Tehsildar in the Land Office of TISCO was examined as MW2. He stated that a joint complaint was received against the workman and on enquiry the allegations in the compliant vide Exhibit M-6 that the workman had unauthorisedly encroached upon the Company's land was found correct. This witness identified the enquiry report, certified copy of Khatian etc. He, however, as would admit in the cross-examination, did not make any enquiry from neighbours of the workman. This witness identified the enquiry report, certified copy of Khatian etc. He, however, as would admit in the cross-examination, did not make any enquiry from neighbours of the workman. As MW3, the Circle Officer employed in the Land Department of TISCO stated that the land comprised under RS Plot No. 3613/3716 under Khata No. 83, Mouza-Bara was recorded in the name of TISCO in the year 1934-37. He further stated that the name of Pritam Santhal was recorded as tenant under TISCO with respect to land RS Plot No. 3622 under Khata No. 54, Mouza-Bara and this piece of land was surrendered by the tenant by Deed of Surrender dated 11th January 1943 to TISCO. He further deposed that after vesting of land the Government of Bihar leased out several plots of land including the aforesaid land to TISCO by a registered Deed of Lease dated 1st August 1985. He further deposed that Title Suit No. 57 of 1995 was instituted by TISCO for declaration of its right, title, interest and recovery of possession against 53 persons including Smt. Krishan Banerjee who is wife of the workman as defendant no. 23 and the said suit was still pending in the Court of Subordinate Judge-II, Jamshedpur. A copy of the application filed by Smt. Krishan Banerjee under section 83 of CNT Act was also laid in evidence by the Management. As noticed above, the respondent relied on the order dated 24th January 1989 passed by LRDC, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur in Rent Fixation Case Nos. 342/1965-66 and 159/1988-89 to show that rent for the lands under plot nos. 3622/3666 and 3667 in Khata No. 54 was paid by Pritam Santhal and not by TISCO. 12. The test in a departmental proceeding which is like a civil proceeding is preponderance of probability. The expression “preponderance of probability” refers to a high degree of possibility about existence of a fact. A mere possibility is not sufficient for the Authority to hold the delinquent employee guilty. The order of dismissal of the respondent on the allegation of encroaching upon the Company's property could not be sustained even with the help of evidence produced in Reference Case No. 4/1998. From the evidence laid by the parties before the Labour Court, we gather that there was serious controversy as regards right, title and interest of TISCO over the encroached land. From the evidence laid by the parties before the Labour Court, we gather that there was serious controversy as regards right, title and interest of TISCO over the encroached land. The writ Court adopted the well-settled principle of no-interference in the cases where the sub-ordinate Tribunal is shown to have not committed grave errors in law or where the findings recorded by the sub-ordinate Tribunal did not suffer from serious errors of record bringing perversity in the final order/award. 13. A detailed exposition of the law on the subject may be found in “Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor” AIR 1961 SC 1087 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “15.….. The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kaneath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and the following four propositions were laid down: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction; (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice; (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous; (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision….” 14. In view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur which have been approved by the writ Court, we do not find any ground to interfere with the order dated 30th July 2010 passed in W.P.(L) No.1142 of 2006. 15. Mr. Manish Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the contention that full back wages is not the rule referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “National Gandhi Museum v. Sudhir Sharma” 2021 LLR 1040 . 16. 15. Mr. Manish Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the contention that full back wages is not the rule referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “National Gandhi Museum v. Sudhir Sharma” 2021 LLR 1040 . 16. This Letters Patent Appeal was filed on 4th September 2010 and vide order dated 3rd May 2011 while admitting this Letters Patent Appeal this Court stayed the operation of the Award dated 18th June 2005. We are informed that vide order dated 6th December 2006 the writ Court had also stayed operation of the Award dated 18th June 2005. Simultaneously, an order was passed under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 directing the Company to pay the respondent last salary drawn by him. 17. By virtue of this order, Mr. Manoj Tandon, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the plea that the respondent failed to show that during the period of termination he was not gainfully employed is not open to debate. 18. On the question of grant of back wages, we may indicate that back wages in cases of illegal termination is a normal rule but there is no rule of law which provides that full back wages must be paid to the workman – the answer would depend on a host of factors. In one of the earliest cases in “Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.” (1979) 2 SCC 80 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a strait-jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the Rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (See Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield).” 19. However, in that case also back wages only to the extent of 75% was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 20. In “Union of India v. Ram Bahadur Yadav” (2022) 1 SCC 389 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “18. With regard to plea of the appellants for grant of back wages, in Tarsem Singh, this Court has held that payment of back wages would depend on result of the inquiry. In the present case on hand, by the time, the order came to be passed by the learned Single Judge, the respondent had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. In normal course, we would have permitted to hold inquiry, but keeping in mind that the respondent had retired from service even before the judgment was rendered by the learned Single Judge, we are not inclined to do so at this stage.... 19. Opposing the award of back wages, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase. Grant of back wages depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In the aforesaid case, while dealing with grant of back wages, this Court has held that in the case of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is normal rule and the adjudicating authority to take into consideration the length of service of the employee, nature of misconduct, financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. Coming to the case on hand, the respondent was not given any opportunity to defend his case at all. It is clearly well settled that any amount of suspicion cannot be equated to proof. Coming to the case on hand, the respondent was not given any opportunity to defend his case at all. It is clearly well settled that any amount of suspicion cannot be equated to proof. Keeping in mind ratio in the judgment of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase, we are of the considered opinion that grant of 50% of back wages is just and fair in the facts and circumstances of the case…….” 21. The respondent when he was dismissed from service on 20th September 1996 had service of about 11 years left. There is no discussion in the Award dated 18th June 2005 or in the order dated 30th July 2010 passed by the writ Court why full back wages must be paid to the respondent. In view of the rules which have evolved through the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that it would serve the interest of justice if full back wages part of the award is modified and the respondent is granted 50% back wages. This shall be done by TISCO within a period of three months. 22. Ordered accordingly. 23. L.P.A No. 371 of 2010 is partly allowed. 24. The interim order dated 3rd May 2011 stands vacated.