JUDGMENT Rajnesh Oswal, J. - The demand Notice No. SWU/24-27 dated 15.02.1997 was issued by the respondent No.1 espousing the cause of respondent No.4, w/o Sher Singh, who was ex-employee of the petitioners, for converting her to work charge cadre as per policy with effect from 01.10.1988 in the pay scale of 260-400 (pre-revised) with full back wages and other monetary benefits. The Assistant Labour Commissioner, Jammu after recording the failure of conciliation between the petitioners and the respondent No.1, reported the matter to respondent No.3 vide its report dated 29.01.1998. The respondent No.3 vide its order dated 10.09.1998 made a reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1974 to the respondent No. 2. The respondent No.2 after considering the evidence led by the contesting parties answered the reference by virtue of an award dated 06.05.2002, thereby holding respondent No. 4 entitled to the scale wages w.e.f. 01.10.1988. 2. The petitioners have pleaded that the respondent No. 4 was engaged by the Society known as the Salal Project Employees Co-operative Society Limited and was never engaged on compassionate basis by the petitioners. The petitioners through the medium of this writ petition have not only impugned the award dated 06.05.2002 but also the notification No. L-42011/13/98/IR(DU) dated 10.09.1998, whereby reference was made by the respondent No.3 to the respondent No.2 as well as the notification dated 21.05.2002 published pursuant to the award of respondent No.2 on the following grounds: (i) That the reference made by respondent No. 3 is invalid as no reference under the Industrial Disputes Act can be made in respect of a dispute, which is not inter se between the workman and the management. (ii) That the finding of respondent No. 2 is based upon "no evidence? as respondent No. 4 was in fact appointed and paid by a Co-operative Society formed by the employees of a Corporation/Project. (iii) That the respondent No. 2 has erred in omitting to consider the documentary evidence of the Co-operative Society which proved that respondent No. 4 had been paid consolidated wages of Rs. 750 by the society, which fact had been admitted by respondent No. 4 in her testimony. (iii) That the respondent No. 2 has erred in omitting to consider the documentary evidence of the Co-operative Society which proved that respondent No. 4 had been paid consolidated wages of Rs. 750 by the society, which fact had been admitted by respondent No. 4 in her testimony. (iv) That the respondent No. 2 has erred in holding that as the appointment order of respondent No. 4 as an employee of the Co-operative Society has been signed by an officer of the corporation, so that would make her as an employee of the corporation. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 4, in which it has been stated that the writ petition is not maintainable as the evidence cannot be re-appreciated in the writ petition. It is also stated that a notification issued by the Central Government referring the dispute to the respondent No.2 has been challenged after more than four years, as such, this writ petition suffers from delay and laches. It is further stated that respondent No. 4 was appointed by virtue of the appointment order dated 01.04.1987 issued by the office of Senior Manager (P&A) Salal Hydroelectric Project Jyotipuram. The said order has not been issued by the Co-operative Society. Merely, placing the services of respondent No. 4 in the office of Salal Project Co-operative Store does not mean that she has been appointed by the authority other than the petitioners. In nutshell, the stand of respondent No. 4 is that she was the employee of the petitioners and not of Co-operative Society as she never applied for appointment in the Co-operative Society and in fact, she sought/applied appointment on compassionate grounds with the petitioners only. The payment of wages of respondent No. 4 from the funds of co-operative store is immaterial and the nature and character of the employment can be equated with an employee placed on deputation. It is also the stand of respondent No. 4 that the petitioners? employees are working in this Salal Project Employees Consumer Store and it clearly shows that the petitioners have placed its employees in the said store. 4. Mr. Ashwani Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that there is no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioners and respondent No. 4. He placed much reliance upon the fact that respondent No. 4 was drawing her wages from the Salal Project Employees Co-operative Society. 4. Mr. Ashwani Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that there is no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioners and respondent No. 4. He placed much reliance upon the fact that respondent No. 4 was drawing her wages from the Salal Project Employees Co-operative Society. 5. Per contra, Mr. Varinder Bhat, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 vehemently argued that this writ petition is in fact an appeal whereby, the petitioners are seeking re-appreciation of the evidence by the Court. He has further argued that the appointment order dated 01.04.1987 clearly reveals that respondent No. 4 was appointed on compassionate grounds, though, she was posted in the Salal Project Co-operative Store. 6. Heard and perused the record. 7. Before this Court considers the issues raised by the petitioners, it is apt to observe that while exercising the jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India against an award passed by respondent No. 2 under the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court cannot act as an appellate authority and re-appreciate the evidence but at the same time, if there is perversity, the same cannot be ignored. This Court cannot interfere with the award passed by the respondent No.2 merely because on the basis of same set of evidence, other view is also possible. In Krushna Narayan Wanjari v. Jai Bharti Shikshan Sanstha, (2018) 12 SCC 620 , Apex Court has held as under: 13. Considering the entire facts of the case and the findings recorded by the Labour Court, prima facie we are of the view that the High Court has exceeded in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with the finding of facts recorded by the Labour Court. It is well settled that the High Court in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction normally should not interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution and convert itself into a court of appeal. 14. While discussing the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [ (1986) 4 SCC 447 ] , held as under: '17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [ AIR 1975 SC 1297 ] where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at AIR p. 1301 of the Report as follows: "7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] that the 'power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [ AIR 1951 Cal 193 ] , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors'. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division [ AIR 1958 SC 398 ] and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: (AIR p. 413, para 30) '30. ... It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.' 15. In Birla Corpn. Ltd. v. Rajeshwar Mahato [ (2001) 10 SCC 611 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1011] , the question of validity of termination of services of the respondent by the appellant Corporation was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. On evidence, the Industrial Tribunal found that the duties of the respondent were mainly managerial or administrative. The Tribunal held that the respondent was not a workman and the reference was therefore not maintainable against the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court relying on Section 2(s)(iv) (as amended in West Bengal) held that as the respondent was drawing salary less than Rs 1600 per month, he had to be regarded as a workman. The Corporation moved this Court against the order of the High Court. This Court while setting aside the decision of the High Court held as under: '4. It was not in dispute that at the time of the termination of services of Respondent 1, he was receiving Rs 1185 per month by way of salary. The Tribunal recorded the evidence as well as took into consideration documentary evidence which was produced by the parties. On the basis of the evidence which was adduced before it, the Tribunal observed that: "The main duties of Shri Rajeshwar Mahato were both supervisory and administrative in nature. In the instant case, Shri Mahato's functions were mainly of a managerial nature. He had control as well as supervision over the work of the jute mill workers working under him.? 11. As we have also noticed hereinabove, the Tribunal had given a categorical finding to the effect that Respondent 1's function was mainly of managerial nature. His duties were both supervisory and administrative and therefore he was regarded as not being a workman. Though the Tribunal did not specifically state so, it is evident that it is because of Section 2(s)(iii) that Respondent 1 was regarded as not being a workman. 12. Neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court, as we have already noticed, referred to this aspect of the matter. Though the Tribunal did not specifically state so, it is evident that it is because of Section 2(s)(iii) that Respondent 1 was regarded as not being a workman. 12. Neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court, as we have already noticed, referred to this aspect of the matter. Even assuming that the West Bengal amendment was applicable, that would still not help to hold Respondent 1 as a workman if the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the nature of the duties performed by him, as arrived at by the Tribunal, is not set aside as being frivolous or without any evidence. As long as the finding of the Tribunal stands, namely, that the respondent was an employee mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, the award of the Tribunal could not have been set aside. As we have already observed the Single Judge or even the Division Bench could have come to the conclusion that the finding so arrived at by the Tribunal was either frivolous or not based on any evidence. But this aspect of the case was completely overlooked by the High Court. The emphasis of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench was only with regard to applicability of the amendment of the State of West Bengal to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court erred in allowing on this ground the writ petition filed by Respondent 1. The decision of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed therein by the respondent stands dismissed.' 16. In Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers' Union [(2000) 4 SCC] , this Court considered a similar question with regard to the power of the High Court under Article 226 against the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. Reversing the decision of the Single Judge and restoring the fact-finding decision of the Tribunal, this Court held: (SCC pp. 259-60, para 17) '17. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned Single Judge and in ordering restoration of the award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned Single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether giving a complete go-by even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.' 8. Taking above principles in mind, this Court would consider the contentions raised by the petitioners in the present writ petition. 9. Taking above principles in mind, this Court would consider the contentions raised by the petitioners in the present writ petition. 9. From the record, it is evident that the respondent No. 3 vide its order dated 10.09.1998 referred the following dispute to respondent No. 2: 'Whether the action of the management of S.H.E.P. Jyotipuram represented by Chief Engineer in not converting the services of Smt. Vijay Laxmi, from daily wages to work charge cadre is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?' 10. The stand of the petitioners before respondent No.2 was that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioners herein and respondent No. 4 and she had never been appointed on compassionate grounds. The order dated 01.04.1987 is not an order of Salal Hydroelectric Project. 11. The evidence was also led by the petitioners and the respondent No.4. Respondent No. 4 submitted her affidavit dated 19.01.2000 and also produced the documentary evidence in the form of demand notice dated 15.02.1997 and order of appointment dated 01.04.1987. The petitioners also examined their witnesses, namely, Suresh Kumar, Parshotam Singh and Sanjay Kumar Singh. After hearing the parties, respondent No. 2 passed the impugned award. 12. The contention of the petitioners that the respondent No.3 could not have made reference to the respondent No.2 as the respondent No.4 was not employee of the petitioners is misconceived as the reference made by the respondent No.3 was comprehensive enough to include the contention raised by the petitioners with regard to their demur to the existence of relationship of employer and employee between the petitioners and respondent No. 4. Even the respondent No.2 considered the above objection of the petitioners and after examining the witnesses produced by the contesting parties and also the documentary evidence came to the conclusion that respondent No. 4 is the employee of the Project and while reaching to the said conclusion, respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon the appointment letter dated 01.04.1987 issued by the Deputy Manager (P&A) by virtue of which, respondent No. 4 was appointed on compassionate grounds. Learned Tribunal has also considered the application moved by respondent No. 4 for seeking appointment on compassionate grounds on account of death of her husband. Learned Tribunal has also considered the application moved by respondent No. 4 for seeking appointment on compassionate grounds on account of death of her husband. A perusal of the said application addressed to the General Manager, Salal Hydro Electric Project Jyotipuram reveals that she had sought appointment on compassionate grounds after the demise of her husband. Further, it has come in the statement of witness of the petitioners, namely, Parshotam Singh that six employees of the Management have been working in the consumer store. The witness of the petitioners, namely, Sanjay Kumar Singh has also stated that when there is requirement, the Management deputes its employees for looking after the works of the consumer store. Petitioners have even not examined J. G. Lal, the Deputy Manager (P&A), who had issued the appointment order dated 01.04.1987 and even no reason is forthcoming from the petitioners for non-examination of the said person. In absence of examination of the said officer, the petitioners cannot claim that the order of appointment was not an order of Salal Hydro-electric Project, more particularly when the said order has been issued with the approval of competent authority. In absence of such proof and the admission made by the witnesses of the petitioners that their employees also work in Co-operative Store, the contention of the petitioners that the respondent No.4 was getting salary from Co-operative Store pales into insignificance. 13. In view of the above, the finding returned by respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 4 was an employee of the petitioners cannot be termed as perverse. As the sole issue raised by the petitioners was the lack of employer and employee relationship and once that is established, then certainly, respondent No. 4 was entitled to scale wages w.e.f. 01.10.1988. 14. In view of this, this Court does not find any reason whatsoever to interfere with the well reasoned order dated 06.05.2022 passed by the respondent No.2, based upon the evidence led by the parties. This writ petition is found to be misconceived, as such, the same is dismissed.