JUDGMENT Sanjib Banerjee, CJ. - The three appellants have been convicted under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and have been each sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment together with a fine of Rs. 30,000/-. In default of payment of the fine, they have to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. 2. The incident is of the new year's day of 2009. The victim was then 15 years old. That was at a time when the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 had not been promulgated and the punishment for a rapist was lighter than it is now. 3. Before adverting to the facts, it may do well to notice the principal grounds urged on behalf of the appellants in this common appeal. At the outset, it may also be noticed that the appellants ran a common defence at the trial. 4. The primary anomalies pointed out on behalf of the appellants pertain to certain facts and their presentation by the three principal dramatis personae: the victim herself, her father who lodged the first information report on January 3, 2009 and a brother of the father who heard the victim's cries and was the first to reach the spot in a jungle off the Langja village in which the victim resided then. According to the appellants, there are two distinct versions of the victim as to where the victim was coming from and where she was going to when she was apparently grabbed by the appellants and dragged to the nearby forest. The appellants also point out that the exact time of the incident and the duration thereof do not match if the statements of the three principal prosecution witnesses are taken into account. The appellants next focus on the victim's uncle having initially asserted that he had single-handedly lifted the victim from the place of occurrence and ferried her to her residence, but that was contradicted consistently by the victim's father who claimed that his brother informed him of the incident, whereupon the father accompanied his brother to the place of occurrence and the two brothers carried the victim back to her house. The appellants also question the circumstances in which the victim's uncle was in the area at a time that ought to have been very deep into the night and how such person came to hear the muffled cries of the victim. Finally, the appellants submit that if it is the consistent case of both the victim and the victim's father that the victim became unconscious at the place of occurrence and remained unconscious for the next four days, it was not possible for the FIR to have disclosed the names of the assailants since no one other than the victim claimed to have seen the assailants. 5. In addition, the appellants refer to a supplementary FIR being lodged several days after the initial one. The full names and better particulars of the appellants herein were only disclosed in such supplementary FIR lodged on January 22, 2009. Here again, the appellants point out that the supplementary FIR, though lodged more than 20 days after the incident, also claimed that the victim was still unconscious as on such date. 6. The statements of the victim, her father and the uncle were recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The victim claimed that while she was returning after attending a new year's function at her aunt's, she was waylaid by the three appellants, gagged and dragged into a nearby forest and repeatedly raped and assaulted by the trio. The victim's version appears to be that for a period of more than four hours, she was ravaged after being forced into the forest by the three appellants. Though the victim claimed that she lost her consciousness and she remained unconscious for the next several days, yet the victim indicated, quite clearly, that it was her uncle who came to rescue her. The victim informed the Magistrate that she had come from her hospital bed to make her statement. 7. The father's statement before the Magistrate revealed that the father was informed of the incident by his brother, whereupon the father accompanied relevant brother to the place of occurrence and the two brothers carried the victim to her residence. According to the father, the brother observed that the victim required immediate hospitalisation. 7. The father's statement before the Magistrate revealed that the father was informed of the incident by his brother, whereupon the father accompanied relevant brother to the place of occurrence and the two brothers carried the victim to her residence. According to the father, the brother observed that the victim required immediate hospitalisation. However, she was kept for the rest of the night at home before being taken to Nongstoin CHC the next morning, from where she was referred to other places, which included, finally, a hospital in Shillong. 8. The uncle stated before the Magistrate that he heard the cries of a girl in distress and rushed into the forest to find out what was happening. He claimed to have been surprised to find his niece and he asserted that he found the victim bleeding and unconscious and he carried the victim on his shoulders and brought her to her residence. There is no reference in such statement to the uncle having first gone to report the matter to the victim's father and, only thereafter, having returned with the father to the place of occurrence to carry the victim home. 9. In course of her testimony at the trial, the victim referred to having returned from her aunt's place after the new year's function and having gone to a local shop before she was nabbed by the three appellants and dragged into the jungle and raped. She indicated that the time may have been around 8 pm or 8:30 pm and she claimed to have been detained in the forest while she was beaten up and raped by the three appellants till about 1 pm in the night'. She also claimed that she was unconscious for the most part, particularly when she was carried home. 10. The testimonies of the father and the uncle, at the time of the trial, were somewhat more similar than the rather divergent statements before the Magistrate. This time around, the uncle recounted that he had initially rushed to inform the victim's father of the incident before returning to the place of occurrence with the victim's father and carrying the victim home. This time around, the uncle recounted that he had initially rushed to inform the victim's father of the incident before returning to the place of occurrence with the victim's father and carrying the victim home. It must be indicated at this stage that it has been fairly submitted on behalf of the appellants that notwithstanding the victim and her father asserting that the victim was unconscious and remained in such state for the next four days, it was the categorical observation of the medical examiner who checked on the victim at the hospital, that the victim was somewhat conscious on January 3, 2009. It may be remembered that it was the clear and consistent stand of the father that the victim remained completely unconscious for four days; and, it was only thereafter that the victim informed the father of her assailants upon regaining consciousness. Meanwhile, the initial FIR had already been lodged on January 3, 2009 with the three appellants herein named therein. 11. Thus, upon considering the evidence of the medical examiner and by giving a degree of latitude to the unlettered victim and her father and uncle, it appears that all three of them made little distinction between a person being completely unconscious or in a semi-conscious state as a result of her trauma and pain or even being in a trance. Since the medical examiner testified that the victim was sufficiently conscious on January 3, 2009 and it was the father's assertion that the victim had named the assailants to the father, it was quite possible for the father to lodge the FIR with the appellants named therein on January 3, 2009. 12. As to the victim's initial assertion that she was attacked by the appellants at a point of time when she was returning from her aunt's place and a subsequent recollection that she had gone to a shop and on her way back therefrom she was grabbed by the appellants and dragged into the forest, what appears is that the victim's return from her aunt's place and her going to the shop immediately thereafter may have been within close proximately of each other for the victim, all of 19 years that she was at the time of trial, to have been confused and been somewhat less than accurate in narrating the incident. However, it does not matter much as to where the victim was coming from or where she was going if the main part of her statement is to be taken that she was grabbed by the three appellants, dragged into the forest and repeatedly sexually assaulted thereafter. 13. The same latitude must be given when the time factor is taken into account. The perceived anomaly or the apparent contradiction that the appellants speak of are not such that one of the witnesses claimed that the incident was during daylight hours and another claimed that it was in the dark. The incident took place after 8 o'clock in the dark hours and the victim's trauma may have lasted for what seemed to her to be an eternity and, it is in such sense that she may have indicated the duration of her captivity and assault to be more than four hours as a manner of speaking without intending to attach any degree of arithmetical precision thereto. It was not as if the victim was found to be wearing a watch or the victim observed the movement of the stars in the sky to accurately gauge how long she had been subjected to the brutal assault. 14. There is no doubt that the father of the victim and her uncle spoke in different tunes in their relevant statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code, but even if the perceived anomaly had not been resolved in course of their corroborating testimonies at the trial, it would have mattered little. There is nothing that the appellants have been able to detract from the fact that the victim was heartlessly assaulted and raped at the relevant time. The appellants have not been able to demonstrate - whether or not it was incumbent on them so to do - that the place of occurrence was not where the victim or her father or uncle claimed it to be. The perceived anomalies are only in the incidental details and not even in the essential features. However, since, other than by the victim herself, the appellants may not have been seen by anyone else at the relevant time, some of the incidental details are taken into account if only to assess whether the victim's lucid but unilateral version in such regard rings true. 15. However, since, other than by the victim herself, the appellants may not have been seen by anyone else at the relevant time, some of the incidental details are taken into account if only to assess whether the victim's lucid but unilateral version in such regard rings true. 15. A further submission in such context has been made by the appellants to the effect that the victim claimed that she did not know the appellants, yet she was able to name them. What comes through from the victim's narration is that she may not have been intimately acquainted with the appellants, but she was aware of them. It is quite possible for a girl in a neighbouring village to have been familiar with the members of another village in the sense of knowing who was who, but not having interacted or even spoken to them. Indeed, it appears that the victim blurted out the nicknames of her three assailants to her father when she was writhing in pain and in a semi-conscious state, whereupon the father referred to the appellants herein by their nicknames in the FIR filed on January 3, 2009 before incorporating the details in the supplementary FIR on January 22, 2009. 16. The final seed of doubt that is sought to be sown by the appellants is regarding the somewhat fortuitous presence of the victim's uncle at or about the edge of the same forest at an unlikely hour to be able to hear the agonizing cries of the victim. Such footy little point not only calls for no deep inquiry or even a plausible explanation but must also be recognised as another of the diversionary antics to deflect the focus from the essential to the irrelevant or as drowning persons clutching at straws in a desperate attempt to remain afloat. Whether the uncle was in a brothel on the outskirts of the village or may even have been engaged in an amorous interlude in another corner of the same forest, is not germane in the present milieu. The fact is that the uncle reached the place of occurrence and found the distressed victim: that is undeniable. The uncle even testified that in the darkness of the night in the desolate forest he could not catch a proper glimpse of the persons who fled from the spot to be able to identify them. The fact is that the uncle reached the place of occurrence and found the distressed victim: that is undeniable. The uncle even testified that in the darkness of the night in the desolate forest he could not catch a proper glimpse of the persons who fled from the spot to be able to identify them. It is only natural that a person rushing to a place from where he perceived the distraught wailing of a woman emanated would first try to locate the source of the sound and ascertain the cause therefor before stopping to focus on the faces of others passing by, particularly when he was not aware of what may have occurred in the first place. 17. Apropos the supplementary FIR that came to be made nearly three weeks after the initial complaint was lodged, there does not appear to be anything remiss that may aid the appellants in any manner. 18. There are myriad reasons why a supplementary FIR is sometimes necessary and there are other situations when a supplementary FIR is made without any specific purpose therefor. As noticed hereinabove, the supplementary FIR of January 22, 2009 in this case was made only to better describe the appellants herein and for no other purpose. Indeed, from the tenor of the supplementary FIR it appears that the supplementary FIR was intended to be a corrected version of the original FIR since the second and third paragraphs in the original FIR were substantially repeated in the supplementary FIR. It is, thus, that the second paragraph in the supplementary FIR was a verbatim reproduction of the second paragraph in the original FIR and it did not imply that even at the time that the supplementary FIR was filed, the victim remained unconscious. The intention of the supplementary FIR was that it would replace the original FIR and it was filed with the intention of it being deemed to have been lodged on January 3, 2009 in place and stead of the somewhat sketchy original FIR that lacked in particulars pertaining to the persons complained against therein. 19. There is a further feature to the matter. Unlike the usual practice adopted by the accused in course of criminal trials in this country, these appellants were adventurous enough to lead evidence at the trial to set up an alibi. 19. There is a further feature to the matter. Unlike the usual practice adopted by the accused in course of criminal trials in this country, these appellants were adventurous enough to lead evidence at the trial to set up an alibi. However, the pitfall of such an endeavour is that when it backfires, it sometimes recoils with a fatal sting. The trial court has meticulously referred to the evidence of the five witnesses called by the defence, including two of them who were the mothers of two of the appellants. The apparently self-serving and disparate versions of the five witnesses were so glaring that no reasonable person could have accepted the story of the alibi sought to be set up by the appellants. While the first witness called by the defence claimed that he saw the appellants returning that evening after working in the fields, three of the other witnesses claimed that all the appellants were in their respective houses and the relevant witness was also in his or her house. It is impossible that a person is in his own house he would be able to testify that the three others were, at the same time, in their respective houses. The defence evidence rang hollow. 20. The trial court has, quite adroitly, summarized the individual testimonies of the defence witnesses and disbelieved the excuse sought to be made out on behalf of the appellants. As a consequence, when the yarn that was spun by the appellants fell flat, the facts brought out by the prosecution fastened to the appellants even more to point to their culpability and collective guilt. 21. A further aspect has to be noticed in such regard, pertaining to the line of questioning in the cross-examination of the victim. In course of her cross-examination, the victim is reported to have responded to a question or suggestion in the following manner: '... I again say that I did not willingly accompany the above three accused but I was rather forcibly dragged by them. It is not a fact that I made a false acquisition (sic, accusation) against the said named accused persons...' 22. It must be conceded at the outset that there is a disadvantage in reading only the answers when the questions put in oral evidence to a witness, at least at the District judiciary level, as a matter of practice, are not recorded. It must be conceded at the outset that there is a disadvantage in reading only the answers when the questions put in oral evidence to a witness, at least at the District judiciary level, as a matter of practice, are not recorded. What appears from the relevant answer quoted above is that a suggestion may have been put to the victim that the victim had willingly accompanied the three appellants into the forest. While it is alright for any and every suggestion to be made in course of a cross-examination, a suggestion amounts to a positive case being built in defence. If it is suggested to a rape victim that she had consented to accompany the alleged assailant, then implicit in such suggestion is the admission of the assailant of being present at the same place as the victim at the relevant point of time. 23. The only other matter of significance that remains is the response of the first appellant to the ninth question put to him by the trial court in course of such appellant's examination under Section 313 of the Code. It appears that the investigating officer claimed that all the three appellants had confessed to having committed the crime in course of rendering statements to the investigating officer. A question was put to each of the appellants by the trial court as to whether such appellant had confessed to the commission of the offence in any statement given to the investigating officer. Though the second and third appellants completely denied having made any confession, the first appellant admitted and accepted that he had made such statement. 24. There is no doubt that in view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement made before the investigating agency or any representative thereof would have no evidentiary value by itself and may only be taken into account for the purpose of corroboration or any contradiction in certain situations. But the unequivocal acknowledgment in court of having made a confessional statement - whether to the police or otherwise - is an altogether different kettle of fish. 25. De hors the first appellant's response to the relevant question put by the trial court, even if the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code had been made, the same could not have been used, by itself, by the trial court in arriving at any decision. 25. De hors the first appellant's response to the relevant question put by the trial court, even if the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code had been made, the same could not have been used, by itself, by the trial court in arriving at any decision. However, when the first appellant admitted to the factum of having made the confession, it is such admission of the factum - and not the original statement itself - that can be taken as admission or confession. 26. Again, one of the disadvantages of a joint defence or joint appeal is that joint defendants and joint appellants cannot sever or deflect the charge to another. In a sense, the admission made by the first appellant prejudices the second and third appellants, if not in anything else but in, at least, completely discrediting their attempt at establishing an alibi. 27. It is true that much emphasis was placed by the trial court on the victim's version. However, merely because the evidence rests on the unilateral version of the victim without any corroboration as to the identity of the assailants or the extent of their merciless treatment of the victim may not detract from the veracity thereof. In this case, no attempt was made by the appellants to discredit the version of the victim or to impute any motive on her part to falsely implicate the appellants. Further, the medical examination conducted on the victim adequately revealed the nature of the assault that she was subjected to. 28. Considering the circumstances, the trial court appears to have dealt with the matter in the appropriate prospective by relying on the essential features of the victim's evidence and the corroboration thereof by the father and the uncle of the victim. Upon the appellants' attempt to set up an alibi failing hopelessly, there was no escape from the fact that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time and, in view of the reliable narration of the incident by the victim, the appellants' conviction does not call for any interference. The punishment meted out to the appellants appears to be appropriate in the context. 29. Accordingly, Crl. A. No. 28 of 2019 is dismissed. 30. Let copies of this order be immediately made available to the appellants free of cost.