JUDGMENT : By the Court.-Present writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed challenging judgment and order dated 13.2.2017 passed by respondent-1, State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as ''Tribunal'') in Claim Petition No. 1716 of 2014 (Kailash Chand v. State of U.P. and others), whereby Tribunal has dismissed above mentioned Claim Petition filed by Petitioner, Kailash Chand (hereinafter referred to as ''Petitioner''). 2. Perusal of record shows that petitioner applied for the post of Constable in Civil Police U.P. in the year 1999. After passing physical, written and medical examinations, he was declared successful and placed at Sl. No. 270 in the Select List. Accordingly, Petitioner was sent for departmental training at Police Lines, Sitapur as Recruitee Constable. 3. While undergoing training as Recruitee Constable at Police Lines, Sitapur, petitioner absented from the training session on 4.4.2011, 27.9.2011 and 28.9.2011, respectively. Absence of petitioner in training session on above noted three dates, respondent-6, Superintendent of Police, Sitapur issued show-cause notice dated 30.9.2011 to Petitioner asking him to show-cause as to why he may not be dismissed from service in terms of Rule 20(3) of U.P. Police Constables/Head Constable Service Rules 2008 as Amended in 2009 (hereinafter referred to as ''Rules of 2008''). Petitioner submitted reply dated 1.10.2011 to show-cause notice dated 30.9.2011 and thereafter, Disciplinary Authority i.e. respondent-6, Superintendent of Police, Sitapur thereafter passed order dated 29.10.2011 in terms of Rule 20 (3) of U.P. Police Constables/Head Constables Service Rules 2008 (Amended 2009) dismissing petitioner from service. 4. A perusal of order dated 29.10.2011 shows that since reply submitted by petitioner to show-cause dated 30.9.2011 was not found satisfactory, Petitioner, a probationer, was dismissed from service as per mandate of Rule 20 (3) of Rules, 2008 as amended in 2009. 5. Aggrieved by dismissal order dated 29.10.2011, petitioner preferred an appeal under Rule 20 of U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as ''Rules 1991'') before Appellate Authority. 6. Respondent No. 5, i.e. Additional Director General/Inspector General, Lucknow Zone, Lucknow vide order dated 3.12.2012 has dismissed appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner preferred Revision in terms of Rule 23 of Rules 1991 challenging termination order dated 29.10.2011 as well as appellate order dated 3.12.2012, which is also dismissed by Revisonal Authority i.e. respondent-4, the Inspector General/DIG, Lucknow Region Lucknow, vide order dated [11.3.2004]1. 7. Thereafter, Petitioner preferred Revision in terms of Rule 23 of Rules 1991 challenging termination order dated 29.10.2011 as well as appellate order dated 3.12.2012, which is also dismissed by Revisonal Authority i.e. respondent-4, the Inspector General/DIG, Lucknow Region Lucknow, vide order dated [11.3.2004]1. 7. Aggrieved by order dated [11.3.2004]1 passed by Revisional Authority i.e. respondent-4, order dated [29.10.2011]1 passed by Appellate Authority, i.e. respondent-5 and order dated [29.10.2011]1 passed by Disciplinary Authority i.e. respondent-6, Petitioner filed Claim Petition No. 1716 of 2014 (Kailash Chand v. State of U.P. and others) before Tribunal Lucknow. Claim Petition came to be dismissed by Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 13.2.2017. 8. Thus feeling aggrieved by judgment and order dated 13.2.2017 passed by Tribunal as well as orders dated [11.3.2014]1 passed by Revisional Authority i.e. respondent-4, order dated 3.12.2012 passed by Appellate Authority, i.e. respondent-5 and order dated [29.10.2011]1 passed by Disciplinary Authority i.e. respondent-6, Petitioner has now approached this Court by means of present writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 9. Tribunal while dismissing claim petition filed by Petitioner concluded that services of Petitioner was terminated by placing reliance upon Rule 20(3) of Rules, 2008 as amended in 2009 which is perfectly just and legal. Tribunal further concluded that contention raised on behalf of Petitioner that he was unwell and therefore could not participate in training sessions on three days cannot be accepted as no evidence in support of same was filed. Petitioner had an opportunity to lead evidence in this regard before Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority but did not avail the same. Tribunal further concluded that Police Force is a discipline force and act of Petitioner is an act of indiscipline to which no exception can be taken. 10. Mr. Devesh Mishra Advocate holding brief of Mr. Vijay Gautam, learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that Petitioner has been dismissed from service on the ground of misconduct, which is foundation of termination order and not motive. Consequently, termination order passed against Petitioner is stigmatic. Respondents in above noted circumstances were duty bound to hold an enquiry regarding alleged misconduct of Petitioner. In the present case, no departmental enquiry was conducted to prove alleged misconduct on the part of Petitioner. Consequently, impugned order of termination passed by Disciplinary Authority as affirmed by Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority are liable to be quashed by this Court. In the present case, no departmental enquiry was conducted to prove alleged misconduct on the part of Petitioner. Consequently, impugned order of termination passed by Disciplinary Authority as affirmed by Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority are liable to be quashed by this Court. He further submits that Tribunal while passing impugned order dated 13.2.2017 has not considered the aforesaid aspect and therefore, impugned order passed by Tribunal stands vitiated in law and fact and cannot be sustained. 11. It is then submitted that apart from other pleas, aforesaid plea was categorically raised before Tribunal but relying on Rule 20 (3) of Rules 2008 as Amended in 2009, Tribunal has concluded that since Petitioner was a probationer, no fulfledged enquiry was required to be undertaken. As respondent had issued a show-cause notice to Petitioner and he replied to said show-cause notice, which was taken into consideration before passing impugned order of dismissal from service dated 29.10.2011, no illegality can be said to have been committed by respondents in dismissing Petitioner from service. 12. On the aforesaid factual premise, sole issue which arisen for consideration is ''whether services of petitioner could be dispensed with in compliance of Rule 20 (3) of Rules 2008 as Amended in 2009 or as per the procedure contemplated in U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1991).'' 13. Before proceeding to answer the issue involved in present writ petition, it may be noted that initially it was Police Regulations which occupied the field. Regulation 541 of Police Regulations which is relevant for the controversy in hand is reproduced herein-under: ''Regulation 541.-(1) A recruit will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. The period of probation will be two years except in the following cases: (a) those recruited directly in the Criminal Investigation Department or District Intelligence Staff will be on probation for three years, and (b) those transferred to the Mounted Police will be governed by the directions in paragraph 84 of the Police Regulations. If at the end of the period of probation conduct and work have been satisfactory and the recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment. If at the end of the period of probation conduct and work have been satisfactory and the recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment. (2) In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police officer he may dispense with his service. Before, however this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show-cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit must furnish his representation in writing and it will be duly considered by the Superintendent of Police before passing the order of discharge. (3) Every order passed by a Superintendent under sub-paragraph (2) above shall subject to the control of the Deputy Inspector General be final.'' 14. Subsequently, State Government in exercise of powers under Clause (C) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 46 readwith Sub-Section 3 of Section 46 and Section 2 of Police Act, 1861 (hereinafter referred to as ''Act, 1861'') and in supersession of all existing Rules and Orders issued in this behalf, framed ''Uttar Pradesh (Civil Police) Constable and Head Constable Service Rules, 2008'' (hereinafter referred to as ''Rules 2008''). Rule 20 of aforesaid Rules which is relevant for the controversy in hand is quoted herein-below: ''20. Probation.-(1) A person on substantive appointment to a post in the service shall be placed on probation for a period of two years. (2) The appointing authority may, for reasons to be recorded, extend the period of probation in individual cases specifying the date up to which extension is granted: Provided that save in exceptional circumstances, the period of probation shall not be extended beyond one year and in no circumstances, beyond two years. (2) The appointing authority may, for reasons to be recorded, extend the period of probation in individual cases specifying the date up to which extension is granted: Provided that save in exceptional circumstances, the period of probation shall not be extended beyond one year and in no circumstances, beyond two years. (3) If it appears to the appointing authority at any time during or at the end of the period of extended period of probation that a probationer has not made sufficient improvement during the extended period of probation to the satisfaction of the appointing authority he may be reverted to his substantive post, if any, and if he does not hold a lien on any post, his services may be dispensed with. (4) A probationer who is reverted or whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (3) shall not be entitled to any compensation. (5) The appointing authority may allow continuous service, rendered in officiating of temporary capacity in a post included in the cadre or any other equivalent or higher post to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the period of probation.'' 15. Subsequently, State Government framed ''U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991'' (hereinafter referred to as ''Rules, 1991''). 16. Under the scheme of Rules of 1991, Rule 4 defines major penalty as well as minor penalty. Rule 5 provides that while awarding major punishment procedure as provided in Rule 14 (1) is to be followed but in case of imposition of minor punishment procedure provided in Sub-Rule-2 of Rule 14 is to be followed. As petitioner has been dismissed from service, same falls within the category of ''major penalty'' and therefore procedure provided in Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 14 shall be applicable. 17. Rule 14 of Rules, 1991 reads as under: ''14. Procedure for conducting departmental proceedings.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in these rules. the departmental proceedings in the cases referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 against the Police Officers may be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix 1. 17. Rule 14 of Rules, 1991 reads as under: ''14. Procedure for conducting departmental proceedings.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in these rules. the departmental proceedings in the cases referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 against the Police Officers may be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix 1. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) punishments in cases referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 may be imposed after informing the Police Officer in writing of the action proposed to be taken against him and of the imputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be taken in giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal. (3) The charged Police Officer shall not be represented by Counsel in any proceedings instituted under these rules. 18. Appendix-1 of Rules 1991 reads as follows: 472 ''Procedure Relating to the Conduct of Departmental Proceedings Against Police Officer Upon institution of a formal enquiry such Police Officer against whom the inquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which was proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take actution shall be used in the form of a definite charge of charges as in Form 1 appended to these Rules which shall be communicated to the charged Police Officer and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Police Officer, of the facts and circumstances against hi. He shall be required, with a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state, whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the Inquiry Officer so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charge Police Officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish: Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charge Police Officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish: Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the finding and the ground thereof. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Police Officer.'' 19. From perusal of impugned order of dismissal dated 29.10.02011, it transpires that an enquiry report dated 29.9.2011 was submitted by one Vidya Sagar Misra, Circle Officer, RTC, and, another report dated 21.10.2011 was submitted by Additional Superintendent of Police (North). Aforesaid reports were relied upon by Disciplinary Authority while passing impugned order of dismissal dated 29.10.2011. However, there is nothing on record to show that aforesaid reports were prepared after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to petitioner or the copies of aforesaid reports were ever supplied to Petitioner before passing impugned order of dismissal. 20. In paragraph 58 of writ petition, Petitioner has categorically averred that impugned order of termination passed by respondent-6 is contrary to provisions laid down in Appendix-1 of Rule 1991 which provides for conducting enquiry proceedings against police officer. For ready reference paragraph 58 of writ petition is quoted herein-below : ''58. That, dismissal order has passed by the Respondent No. 6, without following the procedure laid down in Appendix 1 (Procedure relating to the conduct of departmental proceedings against Police Officer), as such the impugned order is in violation of Rule 14 (1) of the Rules, 1991.'' 21. Again in paragraph 67 of the writ petition, Petitioner has alleged that he was not afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself as such entire proceedings is against provision of law. For ready reference paragraphs 67 of writ petition is quoted herein-under: ''That, the case of the petitioner is that the Respondent Authorities had denied reasonable opportunity to defence himself, as such the entire proceeding is against the provision of law. For ready reference paragraphs 67 of writ petition is quoted herein-under: ''That, the case of the petitioner is that the Respondent Authorities had denied reasonable opportunity to defence himself, as such the entire proceeding is against the provision of law. In support of the said averment the petitioner relied upon the judgment Triloki Nath v. Union of India, 1967 SLR 759 (SC), wherein it was held that non supply of documents amounted to denial of reasonable opportunity.'' 22. Paragraphs 58 and 67 of writ petition have been replied in paragraphs 48 and 53 of counter-affidavit wherein averments made in paragraphs 58 to 67 of writ petition have not been specifically denied. For ready reference paragraphs 48 and 53 of counter-affidavit are quoted herein-below : Þ48- ;g fd ;kfpdk ds izLrj la[;k&58 esa of.kZr rF; Lohdkj ugh gS ;kph vHkh izf'k{k.k gh izkIr dj jgk Fkk rFkk izf'k{k.k ds e/; mlds dk;Z ,oa vkpj.k Bhd ugha Fks ftlds dkj.k mls m0iz0 iqfyl vkj{kh lsok fu;ekoyh 2008 ;Fkkla'kksf/kr&2009 ds fu;e 20¼3½ fnukad 29&10&2011 ds )kjk ;kph dh lsok lekIr fd, tkus dks vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;kA 53- ;g fd ;kfpdk ds izLrj la[;k&65 ls 70 esa ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ;ksa dk mYys[k djrs gq, rdZ izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] ek0 U;k;ky; )kjk ikfjr fu.kZ;ksa ij fdlh fVIi.kh dh vko';drk ugha gSAß ''48 that the facts averred in the para 58 of the petition are not admitted. The petitioner was still under training; and during the training, his work and conduct was not proper, which was the reason why an order terminating the service of the petitioner was passed on 29.10.2011 under the Rule 20 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Constable and Head Constable Service Rules, 2008 as amended in 2009. 53. That, in the paras 65 to 70, while citing the judgments of the Hon'ble Court, an argument has been advanced that there is no need to make any comment on the orders passed by the Hon'ble Court.'' 23. It is an undisputed fact that prior to passing of termination order dated 29.10.2011, fact finding enquiries in the nature of preliminary enquiry were conducted against Petitioner but there is nothing on record to show that Petitioner was involved in such inquiry proceedings. Departmental enquiry initiated against a delinquent employee must be conducted in compliance of principles of natural justice. It is an undisputed fact that prior to passing of termination order dated 29.10.2011, fact finding enquiries in the nature of preliminary enquiry were conducted against Petitioner but there is nothing on record to show that Petitioner was involved in such inquiry proceedings. Departmental enquiry initiated against a delinquent employee must be conducted in compliance of principles of natural justice. Therefore a charge-sheet has to be issued and Enquiry Officer must inform delinquent officer of date, time and place of oral enquiry. Rule of natural justice further contemplates that even if the delinquent officer absents himself from participating in enquiry, in that eventuality ex parte enquiry is to be conducted to prove the charge levelled against delinquent employee. Only when aforesaid procedure is complied with, can delinquent employee be dismissed or terminated from service. 24. A Division Bench of this Court, in CMWP No. 215 of 2008 State of U.P. and others v. Raj Nath Gautam and another decided on 29.3.2017 has observed as follows in paragraphs 8 and 9 : ''8. It is trite law that the departmental proceedings are quasi judicial proceedings. The Inquiry Officer functions as quasi judicial officer. He is not merely a representative of the department. He has to act as an independent and impartial officer to find out the truth. The major punishment awarded to an employee visit serious civil consequences and as such the departmental proceedings ought to be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Even if, an employee prefers not to participate in the enquiry the department has to establish the charges against the employee by adducing oral as well as documentary evidence. In case the charges warrant major punishment then the oral evidence by producing the witnesses is necessary. 9. We may hasten to add that the above mentioned law is subject to certain exception. When the facts are admitted or no real prejudice has been caused to employee or no other conclusion is possible, in such situation the order shall not be vitiated. Reference may be made to the some of the decision of Supreme Court in K.L.Tripathi v. State Bank of India, AIR 1984 SC 273 ; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 and Biecco Lawrie Ltd. v. West Bengal, (2009) 10 SCC 32 .'' 25. Reference may be made to the some of the decision of Supreme Court in K.L.Tripathi v. State Bank of India, AIR 1984 SC 273 ; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 and Biecco Lawrie Ltd. v. West Bengal, (2009) 10 SCC 32 .'' 25. Time and again Courts have emphasized the necessity of having oral enquiry before an order of major punishment is passed against delinquent employee. 26. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 , Supreme Court held : ''An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the Government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a Government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.'' 27. Similar view was taken in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 : ''Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.'' 28. This Court has also taken same view in Subhas Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, 2000(1) UPLBEC 541 , holding: ''In our opinion after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner's service should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioner's reply to the charge-sheet he was given a show-cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice.'' In Meenglas Tea Estate v. The workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 , the Supreme Court observed ''It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way to cross-examination as he desires. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way to cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted''. In S.C. Girotra v. United Commercial Bank, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 212, the Supreme Court set aside a dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross-examination. In State of U.P. v. C.S. Sharma, AIR 1968 SC 158 , the Supreme Court held that omission to give opportunity to the officer to produce his witnesses and lead evidence in his defence vitiates the proceedings. The Court also held that in the enquiry witnesses have to be examined in support of the allegations, and opportunity has to be given to the delinquent to cross-examine these witnesses and to lead evidence in his defence. In Punjab National Bank v. A.I.P.N.B.E. Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 , (vide para 66) the Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in the presence of the charge-sheeted employee and he must be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. The same view was taken in A.C.C. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1963) II LLJ. 396 and in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1963) II LLJ. 78 (SC). Even if the employee refuses to participate in the enquiry the employer cannot straightaway dismiss him, but he must hold and ex parte enquiry where evidence must be led vide Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1962 SC 1348 , Uma Shankar v. Registrar, 1992 (65) FLR 674 (All).'' 29. The above judgment was followed by another Division Bench in Subhas Chandra Sharma v. U.P.Co-operative Spinning Mills and others, 2001 (2) UPLBEC 1475 , Court held thus: ''In cases where a major punishment proposed to be imposed an oral enquiry is a must, whether the employee request, for it or not. The above judgment was followed by another Division Bench in Subhas Chandra Sharma v. U.P.Co-operative Spinning Mills and others, 2001 (2) UPLBEC 1475 , Court held thus: ''In cases where a major punishment proposed to be imposed an oral enquiry is a must, whether the employee request, for it or not. For this it is necessary to issue a notice to the employee concerned intimating him date, time and place of the enquiry as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 541 , against which SLP has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 16-8-2000.'' 30. In Rajesh Prasad Mishra v. Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi and others, 2011(1) ADJ 135 , Court observed as under, after detail analysis: ''Now coming to the question, what is the effect of non-holding of oral inquiry, I find that, in a case where the inquiry officer is appointed, oral inquiry is mandatory. The charges are not deemed to be proved suo motu merely on account of levelling them by means of the charge-sheet unless the same are proved by the department before the inquiry officer and only thereafter it is the turn of delinquent employee to place his defence. Holding oral enquiry is mandatory before imposing a major penalty, as held by Apex Court in State of U.P. and another v. T.P.Lal Srivastava, 1997 (1) LLJ 831 , as well as by a Division Bench of this Court in Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 541 . The question as to whether non holding of oral inquiry can vitiate the entire proceeding or not has also been considered in detail by a Division Bench of this Court (in which I was also a member) in the case of Salahuddin Ansari v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(3) ESC 1667 and the Court has clearly held that non holding of oral inquiry is a serious flaw which vitiates the entire disciplinary proceeding including the order of punishment.'' 31. Another Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(5) ADJ 177 (DB), had also occasion to deal with the same issue. Another Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(5) ADJ 177 (DB), had also occasion to deal with the same issue. It has held: ''At this stage, we are to observe that in the disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent, the department is just like a plaintiff and initial burden lies on the department to prove the charges which can certainly be proved only by collecting some oral evidence or documentary evidence, in presence and notice charged employee. Even if the department is to rely its own record/document which are already available, then also the enquiry officer by looking into them and by assigning his own reason after analysis, will have to record a finding that those documents are sufficient enough to prove the charges. In no case, approach of the Enquiry Officer that as no reply has been submitted, the charge will have to be automatically proved can be approved. This will be erroneous. It has been repeatedly said that disciplinary authority has a right to proceed against delinquent employee in ex parte manner but some evidence will have to be collected and justification to sustain the charges will have to be stated in detail. The approach of the enquiry officer of automatic prove of charges on account of non filing of reply is clearly misconceived and erroneous. This is against the principle of natural justice, fair play, fair hearing and, thus, enquiry officer has to be cautioned in this respect.'' 32. In another case in Subhash Chandra Gupta v. State of U.P., 2011(10) ADJ 879 (DB), Division Bench of this Court, after survey of law on this issue, has observed as under: ''It is well-settled that when the statute provides to do a thing in a particular manner that thing has to be done in that very manner. We are of the considered opinion that any punishment awarded on the basis of an enquiry not conducted in accordance with the enquiry rules meant for that very purposes is unsustainable in the eye of law. We are further of the view that the procedure prescribed under the inquiry rules for imposing major penalty is mandatory in nature and unless those procedures are followed, any out come inferred thereon will be of no avail unless the charges are so glaring and unrefutable which does not require any proof. We are further of the view that the procedure prescribed under the inquiry rules for imposing major penalty is mandatory in nature and unless those procedures are followed, any out come inferred thereon will be of no avail unless the charges are so glaring and unrefutable which does not require any proof. The view taken by us find support from the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. and another v. T.P.Lal Srivastava, 1997 (1) LLJ 831 , as well as by a Division Bench of this Court in Subash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 541 . A Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Salahuddin Ansari v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) ESC 1667, held that non holding of oral inquiry is a serious flaw which can vitiate the order of disciplinary proceeding including the order of punishment has observed as under : “10....... Non holding of oral inquiry in such a case, is a serious matter and goes to the root of the case. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in Subash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 541 , considering the question as to whether holding of an oral inquiry is necessary or not, held that if no oral inquiry is held, it amounts to denial of principles of natural justice to the delinquent employee. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Subash Chandra Sharma v. U.P.Cooperative Spinning Mills and others, 2001 (2) UPLBEC 1475 and Laturi Singh v. U.P.Public Service Tribunal and others, Writ Petition No. 12939 of 2001, decided on 6.5.2005.'' 33. Principal of law which emanates from above judgments is that initial burden is on the department to prove the charges. In case of procedure adopted for inflicting major penalty, department must prove the charges by oral evidence also. 34. When confronted, learned Standing Counsel could not dispute that a major penalty of dismissal, without holding oral enquiry, has been held to be illegal in a catena of judgments of this Court and Supreme Court and in that view of the matter he finds difficult to assail the judgment of Tribunal. 35. 34. When confronted, learned Standing Counsel could not dispute that a major penalty of dismissal, without holding oral enquiry, has been held to be illegal in a catena of judgments of this Court and Supreme Court and in that view of the matter he finds difficult to assail the judgment of Tribunal. 35. Further he also could not dispute that entire proceedings in the case in hand are vitiated in law inasmuch before passing impugned order of punishment, copy of inquiry report was never supplied to petitioner nor he was given any opportunity to make a representation against same, therefore, impugned order of punishment is in violation of principles of natural justice and also the law laid down in Managing Director, E.C.I.L., Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 . 36. Since in the present case above noted statutory mandatory procedure has been given a go-bye, before dismissing petitioner from service, impugned judgment and order dated 13.2.2017 passed by Tribunal as well as order dated [11.3.2004]1 passed by Revisional Authority i.e. respondent-4, order dated [29.10.2011]1 passed by Appellate Authority, i.e. respondent-5 and order dated 3.12.1992 passed by Disciplinary Authority i.e. respondent-6 cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed. They are accordingly quashed. Writ petition is allowed. 37. However, respondents shall be at liberty to initiate fresh departmental proceedings against petitioner as per law noted herein above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.