JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 of Cr.PC read with Section 401 Cr.PC, lays challenge to judgment dated 11.12.2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, Camp at Rohru, HP, in Criminal Appeal No. 26-R/10 of 2018, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06/16.8.2018, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., in Case No. 16-3 of 2016, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- to the complainant. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that complainant being known to the accused, on his request advanced sum of Rs.7.00 lac to him, who with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque bearing No. 059092 dated 28.10.2015 amounting to Rs.7,00,000/- drawn at SBI Branch Mori, but fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured. Since petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings before the competent Court of law under Section 138 of the Act. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment dated 6/16.8.2018, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, Camp at Rohru, H.P, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 11.12.2018, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner-accused has approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the court below. 5. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner-accused has approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the court below. 5. Vide order dated 2.5.2019, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount, however fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be complied with and matter was repeatedly adjourned on the request of learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, enabling him to make the payment. Though at one point of time, undertaking was also given by the petitioner to this court that he will pay the entire amount, but fact remains that neither amount was deposited nor petitioner despite repeated orders came present before this Court and as such, this court has no option, but decide the case on its own merits. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment passed by the courts below, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the same, rather same appear to be based upon proper appreciation of the evidence led on record by the respective parties. Neither issuance of cheque nor signature thereupon has been denied by the accused, rather in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC, he has simply stated that he had issued blank cheque in favour of the complainant as security. Since accused never disputed the factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon, there is presumption in favour of the complainant in terms of provisions contained in Section 118 and 139 of the Act that cheque was issued in his favour for discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to lead the evidence in defence and raise the probable defence. 7. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to lead the evidence in defence and raise the probable defence. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 8. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 8. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC., the accused admitted that he had to pay only sum of Rs.3,47,000/- in lieu of the business transaction. He stated that he had issued a blank cheque as security, however he has not been able to probablize the aforesaid defence by leading cogent and convincing evidence. In case, accused had already paid the aforesaid amount allegedly taken by him from the complainant, he was required to explain that why he did not take steps, if any, to get the cheque issued by him as security back from the complainant. 9. In the case at hand, complainant tendered the evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CW1/A in examination in chief and also tendered documents Ext.CW1/B and Ext.CW1/C in evidence. In his cross-examination, he stated that he is contractor by profession and earns rupees 60 to 70 lacs per year and he also used to file ITR. He also admitted that he has not annexed any income tax return with his complaint. He deposed that apart from this contractor ship, he also deals in apple business. He deposed that in routine manner, he used to keep Rs.2-3 lac in his house as he has to make payment to the labourers. He specifically denied the suggestion put to him that he himself filled cheque Ext.CW2/A. He also denied that accused had only received Rs. 1.00 lac from him and cheque given to him was security and was misused by him. CW2 Amit Pal Singh, Assistant Manager, SBI Rohru, categorically deposed that cheque Ext.CW2/A came to his bank for recovery and same was dishonoured vide memo Ext.CW2/B for want of sufficient funds. 10. Accused while examining himself as DW1 deposed that complainant is known to him and he had paid loan to him through someone for the purpose of work. He also stated that complainant had paid Rs.15,50,000/- through someone and he had returned the entire amount except Rs.3,47,000/-. He further stated that he had handed over the blank cheque to Sh. Kushal Singh, but as a security. He also stated that complainant had paid Rs.15,50,000/- through someone and he had returned the entire amount except Rs.3,47,000/-. He further stated that he had handed over the blank cheque to Sh. Kushal Singh, but as a security. In his cross-examination, he admitted that Cheque was issued by him and it bears his signatures. He also admitted that his bank account is in SBI, Mori. He also admitted that cheque is multicity cheque. He deposed that amount was paid to him in 2014. He deposed that Sh. Kushal Singh Rawat is resident of his village and he has not cited him as witness. He specifically denied that he had borrowed Rs.7.00 lac from the complainant. He also admitted the receipt of demand notice. 11. Having scanned the entire evidence, be it ocular or documentary, led on record by the complainant, there appears to be no illegality and infirmity committed by the court below while passing the judgment impugned in the instant proceedings. Complainant successfully proved on record that he had lent sum of Rs.7.00 lac to the accused, who with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque amounting to Rs.7,00,000/-, but same was dishonored on account of insufficient funds. In the case at hand, complainant successfully proved on record all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the courts below while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and as such, same have been rightly upheld by the courts below. 12. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452 , wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 13. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, and as such, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 14. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Vs. Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 15. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned finding recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. 16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.