JUDGMENT : AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J. 1. The present Bench has been constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to answer the following question : QUESTION : “Do the provisions of Section 11(3) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 provide an independent remedy to a successful employee to approach the School Tribunal for seeking enforcement of the order passed by the School Tribunal in his favour or are the said provisions merely recommendatory in nature and in aid of directions issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) while deciding an appeal under Section 9 ? ” For the sake of brevity the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 is hereinafter referred to as the ‘MEPS Act’. The above question, for the sake of better answering, can be split up into two parts as under : Q.1. Do the provisions of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act provide an independent remedy to a successful employee to approach the School Tribunal for seeking enforcement of the order passed by the School Tribunal in his favour ? Q.2. Are the provisions contained in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act merely recommendatory in nature and in aid of directions issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) while deciding an appeal under Section 9 ? 2. The facts leading to the reference are as under : Sr. No. Dates Events 1. 1/8/1986 The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Secondary School run by the respondent nos.1 and 2 2. 7/5/1988 The appellant was terminated. 3. The appellant challenged his termination order by filing appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. 4. 29/11/1988 The School Tribunal, Nagpur allowed the appeal filed by the appellant thereby directing the reinstatement of the appellant from 7/5/1988 and the Management was directed to get resumed the appellant on duties forthwith. 5. The Management filed Writ Petition No.2873/1988 challenging the judgment of the School Tribunal. 6. 22/12/1988 This Court (Single Bench) granted stay to the judgment and order passed by the School Tribunal. 7. 19/2/1997 This Court (Single Bench) dismissed the writ petition for want of prosecution. 8. 7/5/2002 The appellant attained the age of superannuation. 9. 5. The Management filed Writ Petition No.2873/1988 challenging the judgment of the School Tribunal. 6. 22/12/1988 This Court (Single Bench) granted stay to the judgment and order passed by the School Tribunal. 7. 19/2/1997 This Court (Single Bench) dismissed the writ petition for want of prosecution. 8. 7/5/2002 The appellant attained the age of superannuation. 9. 1/3/2005 The appellant issued registered notice to the Management as the order of the School Tribunal was not implemented despite dismissal of the writ petition. 10. Since no steps were taken by the Management, the appellant filed application under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act before the School Tribunal. 11. 25/4/2005 The Management opposed the application by filing its reply 12. 24/4/2006 The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal directed the Management to pay back wages to the appellant from 7/5/1988 till her superannuation. The Education Officer was also directed to deduct the arrears of emoluments for the said period as per pay scale applicable and pay the same to the appellant within 90 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. 13. Order passed by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act was challenged by the Management in Writ Petition No.3470/2006. 14. 16/6/2011 This Court (Single Bench) allowed the writ petition holding that the directions so issued under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act were beyond the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal. 15. The appellant challenged the order passed by this Court (Single Bench) in Writ Petition No.3470/2006 by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.20/2012. 16. 7/2/2012 The Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment held that as the appellant was to be reinstated forthwith from 29/11/1988, the claim for wages after that period could not be viewed as back wages, which aspect was not considered by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of this Court observing so, set aside the judgment passed by the Single Bench of this Court and directed the proceeding in the writ petition to be heard afresh. 17. 11/6/2012 Upon restoration of writ petition, the same was decided by holding that from 7/5/1988 till notional reinstatement on 29/11/1988, there was no direction to pay back wages. 17. 11/6/2012 Upon restoration of writ petition, the same was decided by holding that from 7/5/1988 till notional reinstatement on 29/11/1988, there was no direction to pay back wages. Further regarding entitlement of arrears of salary from 29/11/1988 till superannuation of appellant on 7/5/2002, the Single Bench of this Court held that the School Tribunal had no jurisdiction under any of the provisions of the MEPS Act to grant relief of payment of arrears of salary once having decided the appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act 18. The aforesaid judgment of the Single Bench was challenged in the present letters patent appeal. 3. When the matter came up before the learned Division Bench, noticing the view of the learned Division Bench, in Mohammedi Fida Hussain Vs. State of Maharashtra 1986 (88) Bom. LR 557, which held that the power to recommend under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act constitutes an independent remedy to an employee of a private school, which decision has been referred/followed in Sudhakar Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2000 (4) BOM CR 113; Badarunnisa Begum Sheikh Abbas Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 407 ; Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque Vs. S.A. Azmi and others, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 249 ; Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh and others Vs. S.A. Ghode and others, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 261 , and a similar view taken by the learned Single Judge in Education Society, Yavatmal Vs. Narayan Govindrao Deshpande, 2004 (5) Mh.L.J. 417, and being unable to agree with the same for the reasons recorded therein, being of the view that the power to recommend under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, did not constitute an independent remedy, but was an action/relief which could be granted by the School Tribunal while deciding the appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, itself, had framed the above question and had requested the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench to decide the same, which is how, the question has come before us for an opinion/answer. 4. The arguments advanced : 4.1. Shri Ram Heda, learned Counsel has appeared and addressed the Court on behalf of Shri Anand Parchure, learned Counsel for the appellant and submits that : 4.1.1. 4. The arguments advanced : 4.1. Shri Ram Heda, learned Counsel has appeared and addressed the Court on behalf of Shri Anand Parchure, learned Counsel for the appellant and submits that : 4.1.1. The law which was settled almost 35 years ago by the judgment in Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra) which has since been consistently followed, is being sought to be unsettled, which is not permissible. Para 16 of the judgment in Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra) has been relied upon to submit that Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act provides an independent remedy. 4.1.2. Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, provides an independent remedy, to enforce the directions given in Section 11(2) of the MEPS Act. The language of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, according to learned Counsel, makes it clear that the course of action as stated therein could only be invoked after failure of the management to comply with the directions as contained in Section 11(2) of the MEPS Act, and therefore unless the failure was on record, the question of any recommendation would not arise, which indicated that it was an independent remedy. 4.1.3. Stress is laid upon the expression ‘it shall be lawful’, as occurring in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act to contend that an interpretation which would be beneficial for the employee has to be preferred, and it cannot be left to the discretion of the State whether to follow or not to follow the recommendation. 4.1.4. The word ‘recommendation’, cannot be given a restricted meaning. The setting and context of the word, the purpose for which it is used has also to be considered while determining whether Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act is an independent remedy, which it is. 4.1.5. Violation of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, remedy is provided in Section 13 of the MEPS Act. 4.1.6. That holding Section 11(3) merely re-commendatory in nature would cause serious prejudice to the lakhs of teachers across the State as the said action would not only narrow down and curtail the powers of the Tribunal but would also defeat the purpose for which the law was originally enacted. Shri Ram Heda, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon Mohammedi Fida Hussain Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1986 (88) BOMLR 557 ; Sudhakar s/o Vinayak Karegaonkar Vs. Shri Ram Heda, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon Mohammedi Fida Hussain Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1986 (88) BOMLR 557 ; Sudhakar s/o Vinayak Karegaonkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others, (2000) 4 BOM CR 113 ; Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque Vs. S.A. Azmi and others, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 249 ; Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh and others Vs. S.A. Ghode and others, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 261 ; Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Sheikh Abbas Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 407 ; Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 ; Manorma Verma (Smt) Vs. State of Bihar and others, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 671 and Union of India Vs. Madhusudan Prasad, (2004) 1 SCC 43 . 4.2. Shri Prashant Thakare, learned Counsel, has also addressed this Court, in support of the proposition that Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, provides for an independent remedy. According to him, the answer can be found in the provisions of Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act itself. He contends that : 4.2.1. An appeal would end on the directions given in Section 11(2) (a) to (f) of the MEPS Act. This being so, subsequently the School Tribunal cannot suo moto issue recommendations, which can be done only on an application by the employee complaining of the non-compliance of the directions and therefore Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act has to be construed as an independent remedy. 4.2.2. The Tribunal becomes functus officio, once appeal is decided and therefore unless the jurisdiction is again invoked by way of an application, it cannot become aware of the non-compliance of the directions as issued under Section 11(2) and assume jurisdiction, due to which also Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act has to be held as an independent remedy. 4.2.3. Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act can be only invoked on non-compliance and not otherwise, meaning that it is executory in nature and therefore separate proceedings would lie. 4.2.4. The recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) is an aid to the directions as issued under Section 11(2) and Section 13 of the MEPS Act is a penalty for non-compliance thereto. 4.2.5. The question is divided into two parts. First question is about whether it is independent remedy. Second question is whether the recommendation is in aid to the direction issued in appeal. 4.2.5. The question is divided into two parts. First question is about whether it is independent remedy. Second question is whether the recommendation is in aid to the direction issued in appeal. On the second question though the provision is sketchy however, the Tribunal can recommend to the State Government, and the amount can be deducted and it can be paid to the employee directly. 4.3.1. Shri Mohgaonkar, learned Counsel submits that Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act is not an independent remedy. He contends as under : 4.3.2. The basic question before this Court is whether Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act has to be read as an integral part of Section 11 or Section 11 (3) and has to be read independently in the given situation. 4.3.3. The MEPS Act and Rules are applicable to both the schools which are grant-in-aid and which are on non-grant basis, which is indicated by Section 3 of the MEPS Act. 4.3.4. Where an appeal is decided by the Tribunal of an employee working in school which is not admissible to grants at all, Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act would not come into picture at all. Therefore, it cannot be read in isolation. The language of Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, states that it shall be lawful for the Tribunal to recommend to the State Government that any dues directed by it to be paid to the employee which only arises out of the final decision given by the Tribunal under Section 9 read with Section 11 of the MEPS Act. The emoluments payable under Section 11 (2) (c) of the MEPS Act are being directed and if that is not complied and in case where the school is grant-in-aid school, then only the question of giving such recommendation would arise and the word “reinstate” used in Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act itself refers to the earlier part of the Section. Therefore, Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act cannot be read in isolation. 4.3.5. The order of reference, has already given consideration to this aspect by referring the matter itself. 4.3.6. In case a direction under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act is concerned, learned Counsel drew attention of the Court to Sub Section 4 of Section 11 of the MEPS Act and argued that 30 days period has been given. 4.3.5. The order of reference, has already given consideration to this aspect by referring the matter itself. 4.3.6. In case a direction under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act is concerned, learned Counsel drew attention of the Court to Sub Section 4 of Section 11 of the MEPS Act and argued that 30 days period has been given. The recommendation under sub section 3 of Section 11 of the MEPS Act will be part of final order. Therefore, Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act cannot be read in isolation. The recommendation runs along with order of reinstatement. If within prescribed period the Management fails to comply then that recommendation will start operating. It is absolutely unambiguous. 4.3.7. After delivering the judgment under Section 11 of the MEPS Act, the Tribunal gets discharged of its duty. There is no procedure prescribed. 4.3.8. Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra) considers the issue that Section 11(3) is not an independent remedy, wherein para 8 considers that the recommendation has to be integral part of the order. Sub section (3) of Section 11 of the MEPS Act is an integral part of Section 11 of the MEPS Act. 4.3.9. Had there been an intention of the legislature to create such a remedy of Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act then as the procedure is prescribed under Rule 39 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Rules, 1981 (for short, “the MEPS Rules”, hereinafter) regarding filing of an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act then the legislature would have made such arrangement in the Rules for making an application under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act for an employee in case favourable order is passed and there is no such power given to the Tribunal nor such procedure has been prescribed under the MEPS Act and Rules. Learned Counsel Shri A.D. Mohgaonkar, apart from relying upon Mohammadi Fida Hussain; Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque ; Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh and Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Shaikh Abbas (supra) has also placed reliance upon Maharashtra Shikshan Sanstha, Nagpur and another Vs. Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur and others, 1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 875 ; Chandrakant Ganpat Shelar and others Vs. Sophy Keely, Hill Garange High School, Bombay and others, 1987 Mh.L.J. 1012 ; St. Ulai High School and another Vs. Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur and others, 1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 875 ; Chandrakant Ganpat Shelar and others Vs. Sophy Keely, Hill Garange High School, Bombay and others, 1987 Mh.L.J. 1012 ; St. Ulai High School and another Vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh and another, 2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 597 ; Sangam Education Society, Nagpur and another Vs. Bharti Hansraj Borkar and another, 1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 847 ; Kashiram Rajaram Kathane Vs. Bhartiya R.B. Damle Gram Sudhar Tatha Shikshan Prasar Society and others, 1997 (3) Mh.L.J. 235 ; Dwaraka Bahu Uddeshiya Gramin Vikas Foundation, Buldhana and another Vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati and others, 2011 (1) Mh.L.J. 216 ; Saramma Varghese Vs. Secretary/President, S.I.C.E.S. Society and others, 1989 Mh.L.J. 951 ; Education Society, Yavatmal Vs. Narayan Govindrao Deshpande and others, 2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 417 ; Educational Society, Tumsar and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2016 (2) ALL MR 947 (S.C.) = (2016) 3 SCC 512 ; Public Welfare Society, Achalpur, through its Sanjay Ratankumar Chaudhary Office at Chawalmandi, Achalpur, Tq. Achalpur Distt. Amravati and another Vs. Ashish s/o Subhashchandra Joshi and another (Writ Petition No.5615/2017, decided on 9/10/2019) ; Kohali Rural Education Society through its Secretary Kohali, Tahsil Kalmeshwar, District Nagpur and another Vs. The State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Department of School Education, Mantralaya, Mumbai - 32 and others (Writ Petition No.6274/2015, decided on 24/8/2016). On the point of interpretation reliance is placed upon Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi and others, (2001) 8 SCC 540 ; State of Andhra Pradesh through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency Vs. Mohd. Hussain Alias Saleem, (2014) 1 SCC 258 ; Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya Vs. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., and others, AIR 1962 SC 1543 ; Newspapers Ltd. Vs. State Industrial Tribunal U.P. and others, AIR 1957 SC 532 ; Philips India Ltd. Vs. Labour Court, Madras and others, (1985) 3 SCC 103 ; Lalappa Lingappa and others Vs. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd., (1981) 2 SCC 238 ; Jeewanlal Ltd. and others Vs. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and others, (1984) 4 SCC 356 . 4.4.1. Shri S.S. Ghate, learned Counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 3, in addition to reliance on the judgments, stated below, adopts the arguments of learned Counsel Shri Mohgaonkar. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd., (1981) 2 SCC 238 ; Jeewanlal Ltd. and others Vs. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and others, (1984) 4 SCC 356 . 4.4.1. Shri S.S. Ghate, learned Counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 3, in addition to reliance on the judgments, stated below, adopts the arguments of learned Counsel Shri Mohgaonkar. Learned Counsel Shri S.S. Ghate apart from Mohammad Salama Anamul Haque and Mohammad Salama Anamul Haque has relied upon Bahujan Vikas Education Society and another Vs. Mrs. Vidya Devi w/o Abhimanyu Raut and others, 2006 (5) Mh.L.J. 124 ; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. and others Vs. Shyam Bihari Lal Gupta, (2005) 7 SCC 406 ; General Manager, Haryana Roadways Vs. Rudhan Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 591 ; R.N. Dey and others Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others, (2000) 4 SCC 400 ; Dwaraka Bahu Uddeshiya Gramin Vikas Foundation, Buldhana and another Vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati and others, 2011 (1) Mh.L.J. 216 ; M.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Jarina Bee (Smt), (2003) 6 SCC 141 ; Manohar Manikrao Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 2013 SC 681 and Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Shri Shriyans Prasad Jain and others, AIR 1958 SC 538 . 4.5.1. Mrs. Ketki Joshi, learned Acting Government Pleader, opposing the plea, submits that Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act cannot be held to be an independent remedy and contends as under : 4.5.2. The words in Section 11 of the MEPS Act are plain and unambiguous. Even while sometimes pain was due to certain interpretation then the Court would give an interpretation which sub-serves of the Act/the provisions itself. 4.5.3. In this case the recommendations which are to be made, if they are made time bound when the appeal is being decided itself under Section 9 of the MEPS Act and the orders or directions have been given under Section 11, since it is a beneficial legislation for the employees it would benefit them then and there itself, rather than driving them to another round of litigation, when there is a default and let them come under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, that cannot be purport of the Section. 4.5.4. If heading of Section 11 of the MEPS Act, is seen it indicates that it is a concise indicator of what it contains. 4.5.5. 4.5.4. If heading of Section 11 of the MEPS Act, is seen it indicates that it is a concise indicator of what it contains. 4.5.5. Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act cannot be separated from Section 11, so as to bifurcate it into two, by construing it to be an independent remedy and recommendation is one of the reliefs which can be granted while deciding an appeal, itself. 4.5.6. An interpretation which sub-serves the purpose of the Act, has to be adopted, and since the MEPS Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, an employee, ought not to be forced into another round of litigation, for the recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) which can form an integral part of the directions while deciding the appeal, itself. 4.5.7. Learned Acting Government Pleader Mrs. Ketki Joshi apart from reliance on Mohammedi Fida Hussain; Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh; Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque and Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Shaikh Abbas (supra) has also placed reliance on Shreenath and another Vs. Rajesh and others, (1998) 4 SCC 543 ; Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha and others Vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar and another, (2013) 15 SCC 358 ; State of Andhra Pradesh Through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency Vs. Mohammad Hussain Alias Saleem, (2014) 1 SCC 258 ; D. Saibaba Vs. Bar Council of India and another, (2003) 6 SCC 186 and Ramji Missar and another Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088 . 4.6. Learned Counsel Shri S.P. Bhandarkar submits that : 4.6.1. The intention of the legislature is clear and the expression ‘it shall be lawful’, indicates a permissible recourse, which can be taken by a Tribunal, while deciding the appeal itself. Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act according to him, is a surplus power which can be made use of to make the directions enforceable, after the expiry of the period as contained in Section 11(4) of the MEPS Act, while deciding the appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act itself. 4.6.2. Learned Counsel Shri S.P. Bhandarkar apart from relying on Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Shaikh Abbas ; Dwaraka Bahu Uddeshiya Gramin Vikas Foundation; Jarina Bee (Smt) ; R.N. Dey; Bahujan Vikas Education Society ; General Manager, Haryana Roadways ; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. ; Madhusudan Prasad and Manohar Manikrao Anchule, has also relied on Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya Vs. 4.6.2. Learned Counsel Shri S.P. Bhandarkar apart from relying on Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Shaikh Abbas ; Dwaraka Bahu Uddeshiya Gramin Vikas Foundation; Jarina Bee (Smt) ; R.N. Dey; Bahujan Vikas Education Society ; General Manager, Haryana Roadways ; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. ; Madhusudan Prasad and Manohar Manikrao Anchule, has also relied on Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya Vs. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. and others, AIR 1962 SC 1543 ; Tara Prasad Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others, (1980) 4 SCC 179 ; Rani Drigraj Kuer Vs. Raj Shri Amar Krishna Narain Singh, AIR 1960 SC 444 ; Sudhakar s/o Vinayak Karegaon Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 779 and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 . 4.7. Smt. Gauri Venkatraman, learned Counsel submits that Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act is not an independent remedy, as holding so would create two classes of employees, one employed by grant-in-aid institutions and the other by non-grant institutions, to which the recommendation under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act would not reach at all, which was not permissible. 4.7.1. The provision will be available only to such class of persons who are employees of the schools which are aided schools. As the MEPS Act applies to all class of teachers irrespective of whether they belong to aided schools or unaided schools and if it is to be held that it is an independent remedy and teachers can take recourse to this as an independent remedy then there would be a denial of remedy to the other class of employees who belong to such schools and who are working in unaided schools and this would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4.7.2. In Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra) it has already been held that this is a concurrent jurisdiction of the School Tribunal as well as the Civil Court and the remedy for execution of the order under Order XXI of CPC is already available. Remedy under Section 13 is also available. 4.7.2. In Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra) it has already been held that this is a concurrent jurisdiction of the School Tribunal as well as the Civil Court and the remedy for execution of the order under Order XXI of CPC is already available. Remedy under Section 13 is also available. This form of sub section cannot be called to be an independent remedy because other statutes such as the Industrial Disputes Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act provide express remedies for execution and this sub section cannot be construed to be an independent remedy. 4.7.3. Learned Counsel Mrs. Venkatraman, apart from placing reliance on Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque ; Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Shaikh Abbas ; Manohar Manikrao Anchule ; Mohammad Fida Hussain ; Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh ; Sudhakar Vinayak Karegaonkar and Narayan Govindrao Deshpande (supra) has also placed reliance on President, Shri Ganesh Shikshan Sanstha Bhandara Tah. And District Bhandara and others Vs. Smt. Savitri w/o Pushpashil Patel and others (Writ Petition No.3470/2006, decided on 11/6/2012). 5. Certain provisions of the MEPS Act, relevant for the decision of the question, are quoted below : “Section 3. Application of Act. (1) The Provisions of this Act shall apply to all Private schools in the State of Maharashtra, whether receiving a grant-in-aid from the State Government or not. Section 9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee in a private school – (a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order passed by the Management; or (b) who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion; and who is aggrieved, shall have a right to appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8. Provided that, ----------” Section 11 : Powers of Tribunal to give appropriate relief and direction. Provided that, ----------” Section 11 : Powers of Tribunal to give appropriate relief and direction. (1) On receipt of an appeal, where the Tribunal, after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties of being heard, is satisfied that the appeal does not pertain to any of the matters specified in section 9 or is not maintainable by it, or there is no sufficient ground for interfering with the order of the Management it may dismiss the appeal. (2) Where the Tribunal, after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties of being heard, decides in any appeal that the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was in contravention of any law (including any rules made under this Act), contract or conditions of service for the time being in force or was otherwise illegal or improper, the Tribunal may set aside the order of the Management, partially or wholly, and direct the Management ,- (a) to reinstate the employee on the same post or on a lower post as it may specify; (b) to restore the employee to the rank which he held before reduction or to any lower rank as it may specify; (c) to give arrears of emoluments to the employee for such period as it may specify; (d) to award such lesser punishment as it may specify in lieu of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank, as the case may be; (e) where it is decided not to reinstate the employee or in any other appropriate case, [to give to the employee twelve months' salary (pay and allowances, if any) if he has been in the services of the school for ten years or more and six months salary (pay and allowances, if any) if he has been in service of the school for less than ten years], by way or compensation, regard being had to loss of employment and possibility of getting or not getting suitable employment thereunder, as it may specify; or (f) to give such other relief to the employee and to observe such other conditions as it may specify, having regard to the circumstances of the case. (3) It shall be lawful for the Tribunal to recommend to State Government that any dues directed by it to be paid to the employee, or in case of an order to reinstate the employee any employments to be paid to the employee till he is reinstated, may be deducted from the grant due and payable, or that may become due and payable in future, to the Management and be paid to the employee direct. (4) Any direction issued by the Tribunal under subsection (2) shall be communicated to both parties in writing and shall be complied by the Management within the period specified in the direction, which shall not be less than thirty days from the date of its receipt by the Management. Section 13 : Penalty to Management for failure to comply with Tribunal’s directions. (1) If the Management fails, without any reasonable excuse to comply with any direction issued by the Tribunal under section 11 or any order issued by the Director under clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) of section 4A within the period specified in such direction, or as the case may be, under sub-section (5) of section 4A or within such further period as may be allowed by the Tribunal or Director, as the case may be, the Management shall, on conviction, be punished. (a) For the first offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fifteen days or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both. Provided that, ------- and (b) for the second and subsequent offences -------: Provided that, --------. (2) (a) Where the Management committing an offence under this section is a society, every person, who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, ------------. Provided that, --------. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), --------. Explanation :- ------” Propositions of Interpretation 6. The position regarding interpretation of statutes, as is spelt out by the Hon’ble Apex Court, from the judgments cited, amoungst others, is as follows : A. In Newspapers Ltd. (supra) the following proposition has been laid down, in the matter of interpretation of an enactment : “14. But in order to get its true import it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the objects it was to sub-serve. But in order to get its true import it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the objects it was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the constituent parts of the Act together and not by taking detached sections; or to take one word here and another there. Exposition “ex visceribus actus” is applicable. Lincoln College’s case, (1595) 3 Co Rep 58b : 76 ER 764 (A).” B. In Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya (supra) the following rules of construction of a provision have been laid down : “17. In construing section 76(1) and (2), it would be necessary to bear in mind the relevant rules of construction. The first rule of construction which is elementary, is that the words used in the section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. Since we are dealing with two sub-sections of Section 76, it is necessary that the said two sub-sections must be construed as a whole “each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest”. The two sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter-dependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. If repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be avoided.” C. In Ramji Missar and another (supra) it has been held that a beneficial provision ought not to be read in a restricted sense in the following words : “12. It is however possible that the words in Section 11(1) “pass an order under the Act” are not to be construed so strictly and literally, but to be understood to mean “to exercise the powers or jurisdiction conferred by the Act”. This wider interpretation might perhaps be justified by the scope and object of this section. Section 11 is to apply “notwithstanding anything in the Code or any other law” to all courts empowered to sentence offenders to imprisonment. This wider interpretation might perhaps be justified by the scope and object of this section. Section 11 is to apply “notwithstanding anything in the Code or any other law” to all courts empowered to sentence offenders to imprisonment. To read a beneficial provision of this universal type in a restricted sense, so as to confine the power of these courts to the exercise of the powers under Sections 3 and 4 alone would not, in our opinion, be in accord with sound principles of statutory interpretation. -------.” D. Tara Prasad Singh and others (supra) holds as under : “34. -------- Besides, marginal notes to the sections of a statute and the titles of its chapters cannot take away the effect of the provisions contained in the Act so as to render those provisions legislatively incompetent, if they are otherwise within the competence of the legislature to enact. One must principally have regard to the object of an Act in order to find out whether the exercise of the legislative power is purposive, unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the avowed or intended object is a mere pretence for covering a veiled transgression committed by the legislature upon its own powers. Whether a particular object can be successfully achieved by an Act, is largely a matter of legislative policy.” As to the expression ‘it shall be lawful’, it holds that it is an enabling and permissive expression. E. In Lalappa Lingappa and others (supra) it has been held that in construing a social welfare legislation, a beneficent rule of construction should be adopted, in the following words : “13. In construing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, as here, we must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the legislature and not for the courts to consider. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, as here, we must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the legislature and not for the courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none.” This position has been reiterated in Jeewanlal Ltd. and others (supra). F. In Philips India Ltd. (supra) it has been held that while interpreting a statute, the elementary rule is that it should be read as a whole, in the following words : “15. No canon of statutory construction is more firmly established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as “elementary rule” (see Attorney-General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All ER 497]) and as a “settled rule” (see Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [ AIR 1953 SC 274 : 1953 SCR 667]). The only recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: “it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers” (Quoted with approval in Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [ (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370 ]).” G. In Shreenath and another (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court, has held as under : “3. In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid of justice. In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid of justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed.” H. Anwar Hasan Khan (supra) holds as under : “8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [ (1990) 1 SCC 277 ] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16) “16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. ‘Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged’ as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)]) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said: ‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.’ (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553])” I. D. Saibaba (supra) considering the expression ‘date of that order’, for the purposes of commencement of the period of limitation, holds as under : “9. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553])” I. D. Saibaba (supra) considering the expression ‘date of that order’, for the purposes of commencement of the period of limitation, holds as under : “9. ----- Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart.” J. Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha and others (supra) reiterates the Golden Rule of interpretation as under : “31. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning when the language or phraseology employed by the legislature is precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims the intention of the legislature in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to and it is unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history, Statement of Objects and Reasons, framework of the statute, etc. Such an exercise need be carried out only when the words are unintelligible, ambiguous or vague. 32. It is trite law that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. ------- .” K. State of Andhra Pradesh through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency (supra) holds that a harmonious construction by reading the various parts of a section in relation to each other and in the context of the statute, purposively and meaningfully is what is required in the following words : “19. We cannot ignore that it is a well-settled canon of interpretation that when it comes to construction of a section, it is to be read in its entirety, and its sub-sections are to be read in relation to each other, and not disjunctively. Besides, the text of a section has to be read in the context of the statute. A few sub-sections of a section cannot be separated from other sub-sections, and read to convey something altogether different from the theme underlying the entire section. Besides, the text of a section has to be read in the context of the statute. A few sub-sections of a section cannot be separated from other sub-sections, and read to convey something altogether different from the theme underlying the entire section. That is how a section is required to be read purposively and meaningfully.” The provision as contained in Section 11(3) thus will have to be interpreted in light of the above principles and has to be construed in the context of Section 11 of the MEPS Act, as a whole. 6.1. What is also necessary to be kept in mind is the object and purpose of the MEPS Act. The same has been enunciated by the Full Bench of this Court in St. Ulai High School and another (supra) wherein it was held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in respect of matters covered by Section 9 of the MEPS Act, and though other questions as referred to were also answered they are not germane to the present questions. What is material is that while considering the scheme of the MEPS Act, amoungst the propositions were laid down as being demonstrative of the object and purposes of the Act it was held that the avowed object of the legislature in enacting the law was to provide security and stability of service to employees of recognised private schools and to regulate conditions of service by conferring a statutory basis upon the Rules that would be framed under the Act. Though Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act was not considered, however the scheme of the Act was held to be of a beneficial nature formulated to protect the interest of the employees, by providing for their security and stability, with the School Tribunal having full appellate powers for that purpose. CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTIONS : Q.1. Do the provisions of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act provide an independent remedy to a successful employee to approach the School Tribunal for seeking enforcement of the order passed by the School Tribunal in his favour ? 7. The very word ‘remedy’, indicates that it is a mechanism, or an action which has the capability of rectifying a wrong. In Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edn. ‘remedy’, is defined as ‘the means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or equitable relief. Remedial action. 7. The very word ‘remedy’, indicates that it is a mechanism, or an action which has the capability of rectifying a wrong. In Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edn. ‘remedy’, is defined as ‘the means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or equitable relief. Remedial action. It can also be a means of legal reparation. Thus a remedy, is one which always has the element of enforceability to it, for sans the same it would be rendered meaningless. When a remedy is a creature of a statute, then it is for that statute to provide for its enforceability and if the statute does not do so, then it cannot be said that a remedy would exist, as there is no enforceability. 7.1. Thus, for a provision to constitute an independent remedy, the Statute containing it, has to provide for a separate mechanism, for the enforcement of such remedy. The provisions of the MEPS Act, do not contain any such mechanism, whereby the recommendation as contemplated by the provisions of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, can be enforced, considering which, it cannot be said that the recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, can be a ‘remedy’, available to an employee. Section 11(3) only contemplates of a recommendation, which necessarily has to follow any direction as contained in Section 11(2) (a) to (f) of the MEPS, Act, if granted by the School Tribunal, and can be said to be a discretion to be exercised by the Tribunal for the speedy compliance of such directions. By itself Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act cannot be said to be a remedy which can be granted by the Tribunal de hors, any directions as contained in Section 11(2) (a) to (f) of the MEPS Act. Looking at it with another angle, can it be said that without resorting to the provisions of Section 11(2)(a) to (f) of the MEPS Act the Tribunal would be entitled to merely make a recommendation, in the case of an appeal filed under Section 9 or in other words can an employee, without securing an order for any of the reliefs as contemplated by Section 11(2)(a) to (f), approach the Tribunal under Section 9, for seeking a mere recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) ?. In our considered opinion, this cannot be so, as Section 11(3) is wholly dependent upon the Tribunal granting any of the directions as contemplated by Section 11(2) and therefore does not function independently or can be termed as a remedy, available to an employee, who approaches the Tribunal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. 7.2. This is further substantiated by the language of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act itself, which makes it lawful for the Tribunal to make the recommendation to the State Government, in cases where : (a) any dues directed by it to be paid to the employee, or (b) in case of an order to reinstate the employee any emoluments to be paid to the employee till he is reinstated, to be deducted from the grant due and payable or that may become due and payable in future, to the Management and be paid to the employee directly. Thus, the recommendation, as contemplated by Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act is not something which is independent of the directions as contained in Section 11(2), but necessarily follows such directions, and is not an independent remedy, which can be claimed by any employee, on its own. 7.3. It is also necessary to consider the placement and setting of a provision for the purpose of determining its nature. Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act is not an independent provision, but is made a part and parcel of Section 11 which confers power upon the Tribunal to give appropriate relief and directions, in an appeal filed under Section 9, by an employee, complaining of violations as provided in Section 9(1)(a) and (b). Thus a recommendation, as contemplated by Section 11(3), can only be given by the Tribunal in an appeal under Section 9 and not de hors an appeal, in any proceedings which may be filed by an employee. 7.4. This is further substantiated from the heading of Section 11 of the MEPS Act, which is ‘Powers of Tribunal to give appropriate relief and directions’. What these reliefs and directions would be are specified in the provision itself. Section 11(2) contains specific directions in clauses (a) to (f), which can be given by the Tribunal to the management. Whereas Section 11(3) contains the recommendation, which can be made to the State Government. What these reliefs and directions would be are specified in the provision itself. Section 11(2) contains specific directions in clauses (a) to (f), which can be given by the Tribunal to the management. Whereas Section 11(3) contains the recommendation, which can be made to the State Government. Thus, the use of the word ‘direct’, as contained in Section 11(2), considering that Section 11 confers powers upon the Tribunal, can only be construed as a command, which can be issued by the Tribunal to the management directing the management to comply with any of the directions as contained in Section 11(2) (a) to (f) and once such directions are issued, the management is statutorily duty bound to obey such directions, unless, the order of the Tribunal, is stayed or is set aside by the High Court. Thus, what flows from Section 11(2) is a command, to be obeyed by the management. 7.5. As against this Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act merely contemplates a ‘recommendation’, by the Tribunal to the State Government, which recommendation, has to be construed as an aid, in the enforcement of the direction/command as issued by the Tribunal under Section 11(2) of the MEPS Act. A recommendation, would normally be merely a suggestion, which may or may not be taken up and complied, as there is no statutory obligation to do so, unless the language and its placement so dictates otherwise. 7.6. The contention, that the recommendation, as contained in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, creates two classes, which may have some credence, in as much as the recommendation, makes it lawful for the Tribunal to recommend to the State Government that the recommendation would be permissible only in case of a management receiving grant and not otherwise. Though Section 3 of the MEPS Act, makes the Act applicable to all private schools, whether aided or non-aided, the making of any recommendation, would only be available to an aided school and not to a non-aided one. The question, therefore also has to be considered in this context. Though Section 3 of the MEPS Act, makes the Act applicable to all private schools, whether aided or non-aided, the making of any recommendation, would only be available to an aided school and not to a non-aided one. The question, therefore also has to be considered in this context. It cannot be said that the legislature in its wisdom, has provided for a separate remedy to an employee of an aided school, in the form of the recommendation as contained in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act and no remedy to an employee of a non-aided school, considering which also it will have to be held that Section 11(3) would not constitute a separate and independent remedy, which can be said to be available to an employee, that too of an aided school only. 7.7. At the most, it can be said that Section 11(3) in the matter of recommendation, as contemplated therein, would enable the Tribunal, where, the employee is/was working in an aided school, while deciding the appeal under Section 9, in addition to the reliefs, as provided in Section 11(2)(a) to (f), to also recommend to the State Government, the deduction of the dues, as have been directed to be paid by the management from the grants admissible to the management and paid directly to the employee. Of course, such a direction, can only be made effective, after the period as provided in Section 11(4) of the MEPS Act, is over. 7.8. Since the MEPS Act, is a beneficial piece of legislation, enacted to protect the rights of the employees, such a course of action, would also obviate a fresh round of litigation, which an employee, would have to initiate for the purpose of seeking the relief, of recommendation, as provided in Section 11(3), in case the argument that Section11(3) constitutes an independent remedy, is accepted. This would not only save time for the employee, but also another round of litigation, too. 7.9. There is yet another factor, which militates against the argument that Section 11(3), constitutes an independent remedy. Section 9 permits an appeal to be filed by an employee in respect of matters as provided in Section 9 (1) (a) & (b), regarding, dismissal/removal/otherwise termination/reduction in rank/superseding in promotion. 7.9. There is yet another factor, which militates against the argument that Section 11(3), constitutes an independent remedy. Section 9 permits an appeal to be filed by an employee in respect of matters as provided in Section 9 (1) (a) & (b), regarding, dismissal/removal/otherwise termination/reduction in rank/superseding in promotion. Section 11, enumerates what relief and directions can be given by the Tribunal, while deciding an appeal under Section 9, which is indicated by the expression ‘on receipt of an appeal’ as occurring in Section 11(1) and ‘where the Tribunal, after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties of being heard, decides in any appeal that the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was in contravention of any law (including any rules made under this Act), contract or conditions of service for the time being in force or was otherwise illegal or improper, the Tribunal may set aside the order of the Management, partially or wholly, and direct the Management -’ as occurring in Section 11(2) of the MEPS Act. The provisions of Section 11(2)(a) to (f) of the MEPS Act, contemplate, what relief and directions can be granted by the Tribunal to an employee and against the management, while deciding an appeal under Section 9. Clause (c) and (e) of Section 11(2) relate to monetary reliefs, which may be granted by the Tribunal. The placement of Section 11(3) below Section 11(2), itself would indicate that the recommendation as contained in Section 11(3), is an additional relief, which the Tribunal, in appropriate cases, can direct, while deciding the appeal itself, in case the employee is employed in a school, receiving grant. This is so, also for the reason that all the powers which are contained in Section 11 of the MEPS Act, have to be exercised by the Tribunal, while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the Act, and not otherwise. Holding otherwise, would lead to driving the employee to another round of litigation, for receiving a relief, which ought to have been granted to him, in the appeal itself, by the Tribunal, if circumstances, so warranted. 7.10. Holding otherwise, would lead to driving the employee to another round of litigation, for receiving a relief, which ought to have been granted to him, in the appeal itself, by the Tribunal, if circumstances, so warranted. 7.10. The contention that an appeal would end on the directions given in Section 11(2) (a) to (f), and therefore the powers under Section 11(3) would not be available to a Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under Section 9, clearly is misconceived and does not take into consideration that Section 11, confers power upon the Tribunal to grant such reliefs and directions, as deemed fit and proper by the Tribunal in an appeal filed by an employee under Section 9 itself. If the powers under Section 11 are to be exercised, in an appeal under Section 9, then, the power under Section 11(3) cannot be separated therefrom, and it cannot be contended that such power will have to be exercised independently in an appeal. Had this been the intention of the legislature, then as rightly contended by Shri Mohgaonkar, learned Counsel, the legislature would have provided for an independent mechanism for the institution of proceedings and their decision for the purposes of the Tribunal exercising the power under Section 11(3), which by its very absence, indicates that it was never the intention of the legislature to construe Section 11(3) as an independent remedy, but was merely a relief which it was lawful for the Tribunal to give, while deciding the appeal under Section 9, itself. 7.11. The argument that the expression ‘it shall be lawful’, as occurring in Section 11(3) has to receive an interpretation which would be beneficial for the employee, is correct. However, that by itself does not make the recommendation under Section 11(3) an independent remedy. In fact, as stated above, inclusion of such a recommendation, in the order of the Tribunal, while deciding the appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, would itself, sub-serve such beneficial interpretation, as it will, avoid any litigation being initiated, for the purpose of seeking such recommendation and would not only benefit the employee, but the system itself by obviating proceedings to be instituted separately for seeking such recommendation. 7.12. The expression ‘it shall be lawful’, as occurring in Section 11(3), in our considered opinion, is merely an enabling provision and cannot be held to render the provision mandatory. 7.12. The expression ‘it shall be lawful’, as occurring in Section 11(3), in our considered opinion, is merely an enabling provision and cannot be held to render the provision mandatory. The above expression had come up for consideration in Rani Drigraj Kuer (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, held it to be directory and not mandatory. 7.13. It is further to be noted that Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, cannot be considered to be executory in nature, for executing the orders of the Tribunal, for the reason, that the powers under Section 11 (3) necessarily have to be exercised, in an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. That being so, on this ground also, Section 11 (3) cannot be considered to be an independent remedy available to an employee, for the purpose of executing the orders passed by the Tribunal, by exercise of the powers under Section 11 of the MEPS Act. 7.14. It is not a case as if the MEPS Act does not prescribe any procedure or penalty, for failure to comply with the orders passed by the Tribunal. Section 13 of the MEPS Act specifically mandates that non-compliance of the orders of the Tribunal under Section 11 of the MEPS Act would be an offence and further provides prosecution of the management, for such an offence. Thus, non-compliance of any directions, by the management, passed by the learned School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) (e) to (f) of the MEPS Act, would entail in the prosecution of the management in the manner as provided in Section 13 of the MEPS Act, which may on conviction, lead to imprisonment or fine as enumerated in Section 13 of the MEPS Act. It is thus apparent, that Section 13, does not take into its compass and ambit any recommendation made by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act and rightly so, for the reason that the recommendation under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act is merely a recommendation and not a legally enforceable direction. It is thus apparent, that Section 13, does not take into its compass and ambit any recommendation made by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act and rightly so, for the reason that the recommendation under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act is merely a recommendation and not a legally enforceable direction. Had it been so, the legislature, in its wisdom, would have said so and would have also used the word “recommendation”, in Section 13 of the MEPS Act, contrary to which, Section 13 (1) specifically refers to ‘directions’ issued by the Tribunal under Section 11 of the MEPS Act, which could only relate to the directions as contemplated by Section 11 (2) (a) to (f) of the MEPS Act. Thus, the language of Section 13 also leads credence to Section 11 (3) not being an independent remedy, as had it been so, the legislature would have provided for a mechanism, in the MEPS Act, for its enforcement, which has not been so done, considering that what is provided in Section 11 (3) is merely a recommendation and not a direction. 7.15. Though in a given case, a recommendation may become mandatory and binding upon the authority, to whom it is made, however, such a position has to be reflected from the language of the statute, in which it is used. It is material to note, that in the instant case, we are dealing with the use of the word “recommendation” as used in a particular provision of the statute and the placement and setting of the said provision, would also assume significance in considering whether the recommendation is mandatory and binding upon the State Government or not. Generally speaking, in statutes, when a provision is made mandatory and binding, the statute also provides, the penalty or remedy, in case such provision is not complied with, as without a remedy for enforcement, the provision would not carry any meaning whatsoever. Since there is no provision in the MEPS Act, which provides for enforcement of the recommendation contemplated by Section 11 (3), that is one more reason, to hold, that Section 11 (3), does not constitute an independent remedy. 7.16. In Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra), the services of the employee, were transferred, and a show-cause-notice was served upon the employee, as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for insubordination etc. 7.16. In Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra), the services of the employee, were transferred, and a show-cause-notice was served upon the employee, as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for insubordination etc. which was replied and a suit came to be filed by the employee before the City Civil Court challenging the order of transfer, during the pendency of which, the employee’s services were terminated. In an appeal filed before the School Tribunal, an order was passed on 3/3/1984 allowing the same and the matter was remanded back to the respondents for holding a fair enquiry after complying with the necessary formalities and rules. Several communications were issued by the employee to the management asking that he be allowed to resume service and for payment of arrears of salary. Since there was no response, an application came to be filed under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act seeking a recommendation, to the State Government that the dues payable to the employee be deducted from the grant due and payable to the management and be paid to the employee, upon which, the School Tribunal had passed an order on 19/1/1985, holding that the power to recommend under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, could be exercised only at the time of passing an order in appeal and since in the earlier order of the Tribunal there were no directions under Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, the question of issuing them at a later stage did not arise. The High Court in Writ Petition held that Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act is in the nature of conferring powers upon the Tribunal of execution of its own orders and that Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act was an independent remedy available to the employee in the nature of an unorthodox execution and was not to be exercised only at the time when an order is made under Section 11 (2) of the MEPS Act. It further held that the power to recommend under Section 11 (3) would ordinarily be exercised upon the employee’s application pointing out the failure of the school management to comply with an order of the School Tribunal directing payment to him. It further held that the power to recommend under Section 11 (3) would ordinarily be exercised upon the employee’s application pointing out the failure of the school management to comply with an order of the School Tribunal directing payment to him. In our considered opinion, the judgment in Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra) does not consider the position, that the powers under Section 11 of the MEPS Act could only be exercised by the learned School Tribunal, while in sessin of an application under Section 9 of the MEPS Act and not otherwise, as is indicated by a combined reading of the language of Section 9 and Section 11 of the MEPS Act, as Section 11 clearly mandates, that the powers to grant appropriate relief and direction could be exercised by the Tribunal while considering an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. Nor does Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra), consider the import of the word “recommendation” as used in Section 11 (3) though it considers, that the State Government would ordinarily be expected to heed and comply with such recommendation. Expectation of the State Government, of ordinarily complying with the recommendation, in our considered opinion, cannot be equated with a direction to the State Government, to comply with the same. In a given case, if the State Government finds, that the grants admissible to the management, were not payable for some reason, it would be within its rights, not to consider the recommendation at all. There may be other contingencies, where the State Government, may not consider the recommendation for reasons to be recorded, in which situation also, Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, would merely be a recommendation/suggestion bereft of any teeth. Thus, in our considered opinion Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra) does not lay down the correct position of law, as emanating from Sections 9 and 11 of the MEPS Act. 7.17. In Sudhakar s/o Vinayak Karegaonkar, a question was framed as to whether the petition was required to be dismissed on the ground of alternate and efficacious remedy available under Section 11 (3) and Section 13 of the MEPS Act. Though Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra), was taken note of, the question however does not appear to have been answered, as there is no discussion whatsoever on the question under reference as is indicated, by para 11 thereof. 7.18. Though Mohammedi Fida Hussain (supra), was taken note of, the question however does not appear to have been answered, as there is no discussion whatsoever on the question under reference as is indicated, by para 11 thereof. 7.18. In Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra), the question which was considered was whether the order made by the School Tribunal under Section 11 of the MEPS Act can be termed as an executable order made by a Court capable of being executed under the provisions of CPC and it was held that the Tribunal was a ‘Court’, and the order made by the Tribunal was an executable order which could be executed in accordance with the provisions of CPC. In so far as Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act, it was held, that it merely empowers the Tribunal to make recommendation to the State Government, which may be of no avail in case the management is not receiving any grant-in-aid from the State Government. Though in para 12, it has been held by the learned Single Judge, that while passing the Act the legislature was obviously aware that the remedy of approaching the civil court for redressal of the same grievance was available to the employees, therefore, the legislature while keeping open the remedy of approach to the civil court, in fact, provided by enacting the Act a more effective remedy to the employees, which intention of the legislature was clear from the provisions of Section 11 (3) and 13 of the MEPS Act. Though it is held that Section 11 (3) of the MEPS Act is a remedy available to the employee in Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra), however, it has to be kept in mind that the learned Judge, while speaking of the remedy of recommendation was doing so, in light of the remedy of approaching the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act and not otherwise. This is further apparent from the later part of the very same paragraph, where the learned Judge, speaks that to hold otherwise would mean that the remedy of appeal to the School Tribunal would be less effective, which was not the intention of the legislature. This is further apparent from the later part of the very same paragraph, where the learned Judge, speaks that to hold otherwise would mean that the remedy of appeal to the School Tribunal would be less effective, which was not the intention of the legislature. Thus, properly read, Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra) does not hold that Section 11(3) creates an independent remedy to an employee, rather it holds that the remedy of appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, is made more effective by inclusion of Section 11(3). 7.19. Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh and others (supra) was a contempt petition, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, for non-compliance of the directions issued by the School Tribunal. It records that the School Tribunal is a Court and non-compliance with its directions would amount to committing contempt of Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act; directions issued by the School Tribunal were executable and effective remedy had been provided under the MEPS Act, in favour of the employee to get the directions executed through the Tribunal itself. While Mohammedi Fida Hussain and Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra), have been noted, its holding that as per Section 11 (3) the recommendation made by the School Tribunal, while disposing of the appeal or even thereafter would be binding on the State, which is expected to comply with the said direction, was based upon the stand taken by the State as was quoted in para 10 thereof, which was to the effect that in case of a grant-in-aid institution, if the recommendation under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act regarding back wages and its non-compliance was informed to the authorities of the Education Department then they shall deduct the amount available in non-salary grant of the management with the department and shall pay the same directly to the concerned employee within the period of six months. If amount of non-salary grant was not found due to the management then the concerned authorities shall communicate about the same to the employee within one month so as to enable him to take appropriate steps. It was held that taking recourse to the above procedure, as reflected in the stand taken by the State Government, the provisions of Section 11(3) would become meaningful and effective in the literal sense. It was held that taking recourse to the above procedure, as reflected in the stand taken by the State Government, the provisions of Section 11(3) would become meaningful and effective in the literal sense. The question whether Section 11(3) provided for an independent remedy to the employee, or the recommendation, if made, sans the concession, would be binding and what would be the effect of the recommendations in case it was made in respect of a school not getting grant, were not considered, as it was presumed that it so did (para 10). Thus, Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh and others (supra) was decided on an apparent statement made by the State regarding its stand vis-a-vis a recommendation made under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act and did not lay down any proposition of law, in respect of the question under present consideration. 7.20. In Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Sheikh Abbas (supra) the question which fell for consideration was whether a complaint under Section 13(1) of the MEPS Act, was maintainable before the JMFC. In para 7, while considering Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra) it was noted that it observed that in case the management does not obey the order of the Tribunal under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, the Tribunal can make recommendation to the State Government as regards payment to be made to an employee who has been directed to be reinstated by the Tribunal out of the dues that are payable by the Government to the management, however, in our considered opinion, Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque (supra) does not hold that the recommendation under Section 11(3) can be made in case the management does not obey the order of the Tribunal. Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Sheikh Abbas (supra) neither considers the question as to whether Section 11(3) is an independent remedy, nor the nature of such recommendation. 7.21. Shaikh Badarunnisa Begum Sheikh Abbas (supra) neither considers the question as to whether Section 11(3) is an independent remedy, nor the nature of such recommendation. 7.21. Narayan Govindrao Deshpande and others (supra) which holds that Section 11(3) is an independent provision and does not require that the School Tribunal must exercise power to make recommendation about deduction from the grants at the time of final disposal of the appeal only and not thereafter and can make the recommendation at any time, does not consider the position that Section 11(3) is a part and parcel of Section 11 of the MEPS Act, which provides what reliefs and directions can be given by the Tribunal, while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act and considering the beneficent nature of the legislation, the said intent could only be fructified, if the recommendation was to be made while deciding the appeal itself, instead of driving the employee to another round of litigation. Narayan Govindrao Deshpande and others (supra) thus does not lay down the correct position of law. 7.22. Maharashtra Shikshan Sanstha, Nagpur and another (supra) holds that the School Tribunal constituted under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, which is an Appellate Authority, is clothed with all the necessary powers substantive as well as procedural, to grant appropriate relief and do justice in the appeal preferred before it by any employee of a private school against the order of its management regarding his dismissal, removal, termination of service or reduction of rank as the case may be, and also has inherent powers to pass appropriate orders in the lis before it ex debito justitiae including the powers to issue temporary injunctions in matters not specifically covered by Order XXXIX of CPC or by any provisions of the Act and the expression “such other relief”, as occurring in Section 11(2) (f) of the MEPS Act, in appropriate cases would include the power to grant interim relief as may be deemed appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case before it and there was no reason to limit such powers to grant interim relief, though on the facts before it the impugned interim order was set aside. What is material to note is that all these powers, held to be possessed by the School Tribunal, are held so, for the purpose of exercise in an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act and not otherwise. 7.23. Dwaraka Bahu Uddeshiya Gramin Vikas Foundation, Buldhana and another (supra) holds that power of review is to be specifically conferred by statute and Section 10 of the MEPS Act, does not invest the School Tribunal with the power of review, and would indicate that it is the scheme of the Act which would prevail, for if the Act, does not provide for the enforcement of a particular provision independently, the same cannot be read into the Act, as an independent remedy. 7.24. Bahujan Vikas Education Society and another (supra) holds that omission on the part of any Court or Tribunal to incorporate a direction to pay the back wages cannot be later on filled in any execution proceedings, or by any other executing authority who has not been vested by law any power to supplant any order or direction by denoting such deficiencies or omissions assuming that some such order ought to exist and supports the view that a relief and direction as contained in Section 11(2) and (3) of the MEPS Act, has to be in the judgment of the School Tribunal, while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act and cannot be later on sought, de hors the appeal. 7.25. A somewhat similar view is also taken in President, Shri Ganesh Shikshan Sanstha Bhandara Tah. and District Bhandara and others (supra), which was a case, in which an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, was allowed by the School Tribunal, by a judgment dated 29/11/1988 directing reinstatement, writ petition against which came to be dismissed on 19/2/1997 for want of prosecution and thus the judgment of the School Tribunal became final. An independent application came to be filed by the employee thereafter under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, claiming a direction for payment of emoluments and same be ordered to be deducted from the grants as admissible to the institution. An independent application came to be filed by the employee thereafter under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, claiming a direction for payment of emoluments and same be ordered to be deducted from the grants as admissible to the institution. This application was registered as a contempt petition and was allowed by the School Tribunal by an order dated 24/4/2006, holding that the employee was entitled to back wages followed by a direction to the Education Officer to deduct the arrears from the grants payable to the institution and pay directly to the employee, which order came to be challenging in the High Court. While considering the import and scope of Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the directions and reliefs as contained in Section 11 of the MEPS Act could only be granted by the School Tribunal while deciding an appeal filed under Section 9 and once the appeal is decided, the School Tribunal ceases to have any jurisdiction to pass any further orders as the appeal no longer remains pending. It was also held that since the School Tribunal while deciding the appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, had not granted any relief in respect of back wages, the same were deemed to have been denied, which could only be challenged in writ petition before the High Court and an application under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act was not maintainable. 7.26. Coming to the other judgments, as relied upon by the respective Counsels, who have addressed us, Manorma Verma (Smt) (supra) merely holds that once the termination of an employee was held to be illegal, ordinarily, the consequential order of grant of back wages must follow, unless there are reasons on record which would justify a departure from the normal order, and has no applicability for deciding the question referred ; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. and others (supra) which holds that where the decree is only a declaratory one and does not contain any direction regarding back wages, such a direction cannot be read into the decree, is of no assistance in deciding the question under reference; General Manager, Haryana Roadways (supra) which deals with the entitlement for back wages; R.N. Dey and others (supra) which holds that the weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to the Court is to be exercised for maintenance of the Court's dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the Court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemner and the Court ; Madhusudan Prasad (supra) which holds that when a reinstatement is ordered in appeal or review, the authorities can pass specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty preceding the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be it being an enabling provision and the authorities can consider the relevant facts as to whether the employee should be denied the salary for the period he was kept under suspension preceding the removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement are also besides the point involved in the present reference and have no bearing. Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) is on the ground of awarding of full back wages, when the Tribunal/Court comes to the conclusion that the termination was illegal and is not germane. M.P. State Electricity Board (supra) which holds that payment of full back wages is not the natural consequences of an order of dismissal being set aside; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) which lays down principles for the determination of the validity of an act or notification when a challenge thereto is laid on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution, are all not relevant for the purposes of answering the question under reference. 7.27. Chandrakant Ganpat Shelar and others (supra) only holds that for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act, the School Tribunal constituted under Section 9 is a Court and defiance of its orders could be punished under the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court as the remedy under Section 13 of the MEPS Act, was only penal in nature and in spite of availing it would not have the effect of enforcing the order and is not of any relevance. Sangam Education Society, Nagpur and another (supra) is on a different footing all together, as it holds that an employee of a private school cannot claim the unpaid salary or unpaid emoluments from the management prior to his termination and the School Tribunal under Section 11(2) does not have any power to so direct. Kashiram Rajaram Kathane (supra) deals with the issue of an enquiry being vitiated and the consequences thereof and is of no assistance in deciding the question referred and is besides the point under consideration. Saramma Varghese (supra) has no applicability as it does not consider Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act at all. Educational Society, Tumsar and others (supra) which holds that as a normal principle, unless there is a specific provision in a Statute, back wages upon setting aside of termination as illegal, should follow, is also of no assistance. Public Welfare Society, Achalpur, (supra) is on a different footing altogether as it considers the violation in the matter of conduct of an enquiry, and is not relevant for the purposes of answering the question under reference; Kohali Rural Education Society (supra) was a case in which the management sought a direction against the Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur to release the difference of salary as well as the entire salary payable to the employee for a particular period within a time frame, based upon a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in some other matter, and is not relevant for the purposes of answering the question under reference. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others (supra) was a case which dealt with delay and latches and the applicability of the doctrine of proportionality in a matter of absenteeism and is not relevant for the purposes of answering the question under reference. Q.2. Are the provisions contained in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act merely recommendatory in nature and in aid of directions issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) while deciding an appeal under Section 9 ? 8. The word ‘recommend’ is defined in The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language, to mean as under : “Recommend : to write or speak in favour of (someone, something) to another person, as deserving employment, patronage etc.; to advise; to commend.” 8.1. The word “Recommendation” is defined as under in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition as under : “Recommendation. The word “Recommendation” is defined as under in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition as under : “Recommendation. The act of one person in giving to another a favorable account of the character, responsibility, or skill of a third. Recommendation refers to an action which is advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect.” 8.2. In A. Panduranga Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, (1975) 4 SCC 709 (supra), while considering the meaning of the word ‘recommend’, the Hon’ble Apex Court, held as under : “8. A candidate for direct recruitment from the Bar does not become eligible for appointment without the recommendation of the High Court. He becomes eligible only on such recommendation under clause (2) of Article 233. The High Court in the judgment under appeal felt some difficulty in appreciating the meaning of the word “recommended”. But the literal meaning given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is quite simple and apposite. It means “suggest as fit for employment”. In case of appointment from the Bar it is not open to the Government to choose a candidate for appointment until and unless his name is recommended by the High Court.” 8.3. In Thomson Vs. Canada (Deputy Minister of Agriculture) [1992] 1 SCR 385, where the issue was whether the Deputy Minister was required to follow ‘recommendation’ of the Committee to grant security clearance, it was held that the simple term ‘recommendation’, should be given its ordinary meaning. Recommendations ordinarily mean the offering of advice and should not be taken to mean a binding decision. 8.4. In V.M. Kurian Vs. State of Kerala and others, AIR 2001 SC 1409 , while considering the meaning of the word, held as under : “7. ------ The dictionary meaning of the word “recommend” is “to advise”, “to praise or commend”. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word “recommendation” is “a statement expressing commendation or a message of this nature” or suggests fit. It is true that the word “recommendation” is not defined in the Rules. ------ The dictionary meaning of the word “recommend” is “to advise”, “to praise or commend”. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word “recommendation” is “a statement expressing commendation or a message of this nature” or suggests fit. It is true that the word “recommendation” is not defined in the Rules. If we do not go by the meaning of the word “recommendation”, as suggested by learned counsel for the 5th respondent, and found that there is no conclusive meaning of the word “recommendation” we are of the view that in such a situation the meaning of the word has to be understood in the context of the provisions of the Rules and the object behind such Rules. ----- ” 8.5. In Guruji Seva Nyas, Indore Vs. State of M.P. and others, 2009 (4) M.P.L.J. 363 , a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, has considered the meaning of the word ‘recommend’, to mean a suggestion and has also relied upon the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Jai Singh Vs. Punjab State Human Rights Commission and another CWP 20075 of 2003 decided on April 2, 2005, which holds that the word “recommendation” necessarily means ‘to suggest’ which suggestion cannot be treated to be a decision capable of execution or enforcement. 8.6. In Manohar Manikrao Anchule (supra), while considering the word ‘recommendation’, in the context of the power under Section 20 (2) of the Right to Information Act, of the Central or State Information Commission to recommend for a disciplinary action, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : “22. ------ Section 20(2) empowers the Central or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal for the reasons stated in that section, to recommend for disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the relevant service rules. Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may impose penal consequences. When such a recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a “recommendation” and not a “mandate” to conduct an enquiry. Recommendation” must be seen in contradistinction to “direction” or mandate”. When such a recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a “recommendation” and not a “mandate” to conduct an enquiry. Recommendation” must be seen in contradistinction to “direction” or mandate”. But recommendation itself vests the delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major penalty.” A recommendation, in the normal sense, would therefore mean a suggestion, sans a jurisdiction to pass any direction, unless the language of the statute, its object and purpose and the effect which such recommendation is to achieve, indicate otherwise. 8.7. In juxtaposition, the word ‘direct’, ‘direction’, is stated in the New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of The English Language, to mean as under : “Direct : to explain or point out the way to (someone) ; to address, aim; to control the making of ; and ‘Direction’, as the act of directing, aiming or managing; a command; instruction; the course which something is taking or pointed towards. Blacks Law Dictionary states ‘Direct’ (verb) as to aim (something or someone); to cause (something or someone) to move on a particular course ; to guide (something or someone) ; to govern; to instruct with authority ; to address (something or someone), and ‘direction’, as the course taken in relation to the point toward or away from which something or someone is moving ; a point to or from which a person or thing moves ; the course on which something is aimed; an order ; an instruction on how to proceed.” 8.8. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (2002) 4 SCC 219 the word ‘direction’, in the context of users of the road or motorists on the road, was held to mean as under : “9. ------ Similarly, the word “direction” in the context of users of the road or motorists on the road should invariably only mean, to show the way or path towards an object or point or indicate the route for a destination. A direction in a particular context may even be an instruction simpliciter to guide and need not always mean a command to obey or carry out implicitly only the instruction. A direction in a particular context may even be an instruction simpliciter to guide and need not always mean a command to obey or carry out implicitly only the instruction. In construing the provisions of a statute or the words or language used, it has been always considered essential for the court normally to give effect to the natural or ordinary meaning of the words, keeping in view the subject-matter with reference to which the words are used, without ascribing to the words used any absolute meaning as if in vacuo or without reference to the context, particularly when such normal or ordinary understanding or construction conforms to and is consistent with the purpose or object of the legislation. -------.” 8.9. Since we are considering a direction to be issued by the Court by virtue of the power conferred in a Statute, in Arun Kumar Aggarwal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2014) 13 SCC 707 the Hon’ble Apex Court, has after taking a conspectus of the held decisions rendered till then, has held that the direction issued by the Court is in the nature of a command or authoritative instruction which contemplates the performance of certain duty or act by a person upon whom it has been issued. The above would demonstrate the marked distinction between a power to direct and a power to recommend. 8.10. It would thus be apparent that the meaning of the word ‘direct’, or ‘direction’, would normally mean a command, which is required to be obeyed. As against a ‘recommendation’ would merely be a suggestion, which may or may not be binding, considering the context in which it is used. 8.11. The School Tribunal is constituted under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, and thus is the creation of a statute, created for the purposes of deciding the disputes between the employees and the management, in relation to actions as enumerated therein of the management. Section 11 of the MEPS Act, is an empowering provision, by which the School Tribunal, has been empowered to grant the directions as indicated in therein. The School Tribunal, while deciding an appeal, is thus empowered to issue any of the directions as contemplated by Section 11(2) (a) to (f) of the MEPS Act. Section 11 of the MEPS Act, is an empowering provision, by which the School Tribunal, has been empowered to grant the directions as indicated in therein. The School Tribunal, while deciding an appeal, is thus empowered to issue any of the directions as contemplated by Section 11(2) (a) to (f) of the MEPS Act. The disobedience of the directions as contained in Section 11(2(a) to (f), has been penalised by virtue of Section 13 of the MEPS Act, which would indicate that a remedy has been provided by the statute itself, for violation of the directions as issued by the Tribunal under Section 11(2)(a) to (f) of the MEPS Act. 8.12. Apart from the directions which can be issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11(2)(a) to (f) of the MEPS Act, in appropriate cases, it is lawful for the School Tribunal to make a recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act. No remedy for its violation has been provided. The expression ‘it shall be lawful’, as occurring in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, merely indicates that in a given case, it would be permissible for the School Tribunal to direct what is contemplated by Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act. Thus, the expression is merely an enabling or permissive one and cannot be held to be mandatory, especially so, considering that there are two different sets of schools being governed by the MEPS Act, one admissible to grant-in-aid and the other non-grant, for to hold the expression as a mandatory one, would lead to consequences which would require the State Government to do something which is impossible, considering that a non-grant school, does not receive any grant from the State Government. This view acquires support from Rani Drigraj Kuer (supra) where, the Hon’ble Apex Court, has held that the expression ‘it shall be lawful’, has been held to be directory and not mandatory. 8.13. Thus, it has to be held that the recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, is merely recommendatory in nature and in aid of directions issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. 9. 8.13. Thus, it has to be held that the recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, is merely recommendatory in nature and in aid of directions issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. 9. This however, in the present context would not be the last word, for the recommendation as contemplated in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, when directed by the School Tribunal, while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, would be binding upon the State Government. This is so for the reason that the State Government itself has chosen to do so, by virtue of its stand as placed by way of affidavit in Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh (supra) which is as under : “That the appellant before the learned School Tribunal shall inform the concerned Authorities of Education Department i.e. Education Officer, Deputy Director, etc. about recommendations of the learned School Tribunal under section 11(3) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 by supplying the copy thereof. After expiry of the time given by the learned School Tribunal to the management of private school for complying the judgment, the appellant before the learned School Tribunal will inform about the compliance/non-Compliance of the said Judgment to the authorities of the Education Department. If the judgment of the learned School Tribunal, so far as payment of back wages is concerned, is not complied with by the management of the private school within stipulated time granted by the learned School Tribunal, then the authorities of the Education Department shall deduct the amount available in non-salary grant of the management with the department and shall pay the same directly to the concerned appellant within the period of six months. If the amount of non-salary grant is found not due to the management, then the concerned authorities of the education department shall communicate about the same to the appellant within a period of one month so as to enable him to take appropriate steps. If the amount of non-salary grant is found not due to the management, then the concerned authorities of the education department shall communicate about the same to the appellant within a period of one month so as to enable him to take appropriate steps. The amount of non-salary grant which will become due and available for the payment to the concerned management subsequently shall be paid to the concerned appellant directly by the authorities of Education Department as and when due and available till the arrears of back wages as directed by the learned School Tribunal are completely paid. 2. If compliance of more than one judgment passed in favour of the employees of a private school or of the same management by the learned School Tribunal so far as payment of back wages is required to be done, then the authorities of Education Department will deduct the amount of non-salary grant and shall pay the same to the concerned employees on pro-rata basis. Same procedure shall be adopted in respect of the non-salary grants which will become due and available for payment to the concerned management subsequently, till the arrears of back wages as directed by the learned School Tribunal are completely paid to the employees. 3. Insofar as the promotion/reinstatement of employee of the private school as per the judgment of learned School Tribunal is concerned, the Deputy Director of Education on receipt of intimation along with judgment of the learned School Tribunal shall direct the management of private school to comply the said direction immediately. If in spite of such direction, the management fails to comply the same, then the Deputy Director shall take the action of reduction or withdrawal grant-in-aid admissible to the management as per provisions of Rule 97.1 and 97-2 of the Secondary School Code. 4. If in spite of such direction, the management fails to comply the same, then the Deputy Director shall take the action of reduction or withdrawal grant-in-aid admissible to the management as per provisions of Rule 97.1 and 97-2 of the Secondary School Code. 4. If the post on which the reinstatement is granted, is vacant and if the said post is sanctioned and approved by the authorities of the Education Department for being eligible for grant-in-aid, then in case of failure to reinstate the concerned employee by the management of private school, the authorities of the Education Department shall release salary of such employee who is awarded reinstatement by the School Tribunal, on his intimation that the management has not permitted him to join duty, along with either a copy of joining report duly acknowledged by the management or postal acknowledgment of the communication addressed by the employee to the management, intimating his intention to join the duties.” which stand has been accepted by the Court and made a part of the judgment in Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh (supra) in the following words : “13. The abovesaid stand taken by the State Government is accepted and has been made part of this order and would be deemed to be the direction issued by this Court, in toto. Needless to observe that the Officers of the State Government shall give effect of the above procedure in each case which is brought before them in its letter and spirit.” and it has been held that : “14. On the basis of the said stand it is possible to hold that when recommendation is made by the School Tribunal and if the same is brought to the notice of the State Government or its agency, it is the duty of the authority to forthwith respond to the said recommendation. In case, the school in question is not entitled for grants from the State Government, it would be imperative for the authority to immediately inform the employee concerned that the school is not amenable to any grants. Such intimation should be sent within one month from the receipt of the recommendation or from the date on which the recommendation is brought to the notice of the authority. Such intimation should be sent within one month from the receipt of the recommendation or from the date on which the recommendation is brought to the notice of the authority. On the other hand, if the school is amenable to grants from the State Government and in the event no grants are due and payable, even then the authority should immediately bring this fact to the notice of the employee concerned, preferably within a period of one month from the receipt of the recommendation or from the date on which the authority was apprised of the said recommendation. However, if any non-salary grants are available and which are due and payable to the school in question, it would be the duty of the authority to forthwith deduct the amount payable to the employee as per the order of the School Tribunal and make it over to the employee directly. It is stated that normally non-salary grants are disbursed to the schools twice a year in the months of March and October; and as such the payment that has to be made to the employee should be commensurate with the said period. In any case, the authority should immediately inform the employee concerned the steps which it proposes to take in the matter and the reasonable time required for the same. In the event the non-salary grants due and payable to the school in question are insufficient, in that case the authority shall pay the amount which is immediately due and payable and the balance amount be paid in the following period when the grants become due and payable. This process may continue till the direction issued by the School Tribunal is fully complied with.” 9.1. In our considered opinion, though the recommendation in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act has been held to be not mandatory, the State Government shall be bound by its stand as taken in Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh (supra) and whenever the School Tribunal, in an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, makes a recommendation as contemplated by Section 11(3), the State shall be bound to act in consonance with its stand as recorded in Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh (supra). 10. Thus, in our considered opinion, the answer to the question referred to us is as under : 10.1. 10. Thus, in our considered opinion, the answer to the question referred to us is as under : 10.1. The answer to question no.1, has to be in the negative and it is held that Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, does not constitute an independent remedy for an employee, so as to be enforced by instituting separate proceedings before the learned School Tribunal. 10.2. However, the Learned School Tribunal will be fully justified in granting a relief of recommendation as contemplated under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, while deciding the appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, itself, to be effective after the statutory period as provided by Section 11(4) of the MEPS Act, has expired, depending whether the school in question is receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government or not. 10.3. In answer to question no.2, it is held that the provisions contained in Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act are merely recommendatory in nature and in aid of directions issued by the School Tribunal under Section 11 (2) while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, however, in so far as schools receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government are concerned, any such recommendation made by the learned School Tribunal under Section 11(3) of the MEPS Act, shall be binding upon the State Government, in view of its stand, as placed by way of affidavit in Vilas Shankarrao Deshmukh (supra). 11. The matter be now placed before the learned Division Bench, to decide the letters patent appeal, in view of the opinion, as rendered above. 12. Before we part with the order, we express our appreciation for all the learned Counsels, who have addressed us and have rendered their valuable assistance, enabling us, in deciding the reference.