JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The appellant herein has filed the instant Writ Petition (Civil) WP(C).No.19205/2012 before this Court with the following prayers: “i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Exhibit P8 Order dated 10.1.2019 of the 6th respondent and P9 Order of the 5th respondent Administrative Board dated 24.4.2019. (ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Exhibit P16 Order of the 2nd respondent. (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or the other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents 1 to 3 to refer the matter to the competent Court under the Industrial Dispute Act to settle the issue with respect to the dismissal of an employee from the Society. (iv) Issue a writ of mandamus or the other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 4th and 5th respondents to reinstate the petitioner back in Service in the event of quashing Exhibit P8 and P9 and to award compensation in view of reinstatement on the basis of back wages and all allowances eligible to petitioner. (v) Issue such other writ, order or direction which this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case.” 2. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned judgment on 16.9.2021 dismissing the above WP(C) with the finding that the writ petitioner has already approached the Arbitration Reference Court by filing Arbitration Reference Case A.R.C.No.27/2018 to challenge Ext.P-8 dismissal order as stated in Ext.P-16 order dated 9.6.2021 issued by the respondent State Government in the Labour Department, and therefore it is for the writ petitioner to take resort to further proceedings in that arbitration reference case before the Arbitration Reference Court in accordance with the provisions contained in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge on 16.9.2021 in the above WP(C), the writ petitioner has filed the instant intra court appeal under Sec.5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 3. Heard Sri.R.Sudhish, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant/writ petitioner and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 1 to 3 in W.A./WP(C). Though, notices are duly served on contesting respondents 4 to 6 in the W.A. (R-4 to R-6 in the WP(C)), there is no appearance of those parties. 4. 3. Heard Sri.R.Sudhish, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant/writ petitioner and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 1 to 3 in W.A./WP(C). Though, notices are duly served on contesting respondents 4 to 6 in the W.A. (R-4 to R-6 in the WP(C)), there is no appearance of those parties. 4. A brief reference to the factual details of this case would be pertinent. The writ appellant/writ petitioner had entered service of the 4th respondent Co-operative Society as Junior Clerk on 9.12.2011 and thereafter she was duly promoted as Senior Clerk, and later she was ordered to be kept out of duty/suspended from service for a period of 3 months from 14.5.2018 in respect of certain allegations raised against her. The appellant then preferred Ext.P-18 Arbitration Reference Case A.R.C.No.27/2018 on 23.6.2018 before the State Arbitration Court, Kozhikode, in accordance with the provisions contained in Sec.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies, Act, 1969, to challenge said order of the 4th respondent keeping her out of duty. Later, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against her by issuance of memo of charges on 16.8.2018, which ultimately led to the issuance of Ext.P-8 order dated 10.1.2019 issued by the Disciplinary Sub Committee of the 4th respondent, whereby the appellant has been ordered to be dismissed from service of the 4th respondent. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant had preferred a statutory appeal in terms of Rule 198(4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules before the competent authority and the appellate authority has dismissed said appeal as per Ext.P-9 appellate order dated 24.9.2019, thus confirming Ext.P-8 dismissal order. Being aggrieved by Ext.P-8 dismissal order as confirmed by Ext.P-9 appellate order, the appellant had approached the 3rd respondent District Labour Officer (DLO), who is the conciliation officer in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by filing Ext.P-10 application dated 6.9.2019 [referred to in Anx.R-3(a)] for ventilating her grievances in the matter. Being aggrieved by Ext.P-8 dismissal order as confirmed by Ext.P-9 appellate order, the appellant had approached the 3rd respondent District Labour Officer (DLO), who is the conciliation officer in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by filing Ext.P-10 application dated 6.9.2019 [referred to in Anx.R-3(a)] for ventilating her grievances in the matter. It is only now revealed that the 3rd respondent DLO has submitted Anx.R-3(a) proceedings dated 29.12.2020 addressed to the Additional Chief Secretary to Government in the Labour Department, reporting that the conciliation process has failed and that the issue relating to the justifiability or otherwise of dismissal of the appellant herein from the service of the 4th respondent employer and as to what relief she is entitled to etc, may be referred to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as “The ID Act”]. Further, it appears that the 3rd respondent DLO has issued the impugned Ext.P-17 order dated 20.6.2021 intimating the appellant that in view of the communication dated 9.6.2021 issued by the Labour Commissioner, it is seen that the appellant has already initiated Ext.P-18 Arbitration Reference Case ARC No. 27/2018 before the State Arbitration Court, and therefore there is no question of referring the industrial dispute raised by him to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act. It is this order at Ext.P-17 rendered on 20.6.2021 by the 3rd respondent DLO refusing to refer the industrial dispute under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act before the competent forum, that is under challenge in the present WP(C). 5. The learned Single Judge has held that since, it is disclosed from Ext.P-17 rejection order dated 20.6.2021 issued by the 3rd respondent DLO that the appellant has already initiated Ext.P-18 Arbitration Reference Case, then there is no question of the appellant again seeking the remedy for the same grievance before another forum in terms of the ID Act, and it is for the appellant to continue the Arbitration Reference Case proceedings before the said Arbitration Court etc. 6. 6. It is specific case of the appellant that the very factual averments stated in Ext.P-17 are completely wrong inasmuch as Ext.P-18 Arbitration Reference Case has never challenged Ext.P-8 dismissal order dated 10.1.2019 and Ext.P-18 Arbitration Reference Case has been set in motion only to challenge the earlier order issued by the 4th respondent before the dismissal order, whereby the appellant was ordered to be kept out of service for a period of 3 months. 7. After hearing both sides and going through the pleadings and materials on record, it is seen that the basic ground cited in the impugned Ext.P-17 rejection order is factually wrong. The sole ground of rejection in Ext.P-17 is that the appellant has already initiated Arbitration Reference Case to challenge the dismissal order. It is now common ground that the only Arbitration Reference Case initiated by the appellant in the matter is the one as per Ext.P-18 A.R.C.No.27/2018 filed before the Arbitration Court on 23.6.2018 to challenge the suspension order at ExtP-1. Further, Ext.P-18 is filed on 23.6.2018, which is well before the issuance of Ext.P-8 dismissal order dated 10.1.2019. So, on this sole ground the impugned Ext.P-17 rejection order is liable to be quashed. Further, it is seen that the 3rd respondent DLO himself has conceded before this Court that he has submitted Anx.R-3(a) proceedings dated 29.12.2020 before the competent authority of the State Government in the Labour Department recommending that the conciliation proceedings in respect of the Industrial Dispute raised by the appellant in Ext.P-10 has failed and therefore the said Industrial Dispute is to be referred to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act. 8. The counsel for the appellant says that now the appellant has been advised that the process of getting the matter referred by the State Government to the Labour Court in terms of Anx.R-3(a) will be time consuming and to obviate the delay, the appellant can seek the remedy in terms of Sec.2A of the ID Act inasmuch as, the dismissal of a workman like the appellant from the service of an employer can be agitated in terms of Sec.2A of the ID Act. Further that, the period of limitation of 3 years from the date of dismissal as stipulated in Sec.2A(3) of the ID Act is to be computed with reference to Ext.P-9 appellate order dated 24.4.2019 which has confirmed Ext.P-8 dismissal order dated 10.1.2019, and that the period of pendency of present WP(C) up to the date of issuance of certified copy of the judgment of this writ appeal may also be ordered to be excluded in terms of Sec.14 of the Limitation Act. Further, it is also urged that the Apex Court has already passed a series of orders in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3/2020 since 15.3.2020, ordering the exclusion/extension of time during the pendency of COVID-19 pandemic issues and further that, the latest order issued by the Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in the said Suo Motu WP(C) on 10.1.2022 has ordered that where the limitation would have expired during the period from 15.3.2020 till 28.2.2022, notwithstanding the actual parameters of limitation, shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 1.3.2022 etc. 9. Earlier, majority of the Larger Bench of this Court in the decision in Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. K.Santhosh [ 2015 (4) KLT 163 (LB)] has held that an employee of the Co-operative Society even if he is otherwise satisfied with the definition of “workman” as per the ID Act will have to seek remedies in relation to his dismissal from service only before the Arbitration Court constituted in terms of Sec.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the grievances of such an employee cannot be adjudicated by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, later, the Apex Court in the decision in K.A.Annamma v. Secretary, Cochin Co-operative Hospital Society Limited [ (2018) 2 SCC 729 ] has held that the majority view of the Larger Bench of this Court in Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-op. Bank's case supra [ 2015 (4) KLT 163 (LB)] does not lay down the correct legal position and that such grievances can be agitated by the workman concerned, who is an employee of the Co-operative Society, either before the forum made in terms of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act or by taking recourse to the remedies as per the Industrial Disputes Act. 10. 10. We have already held that the impugned rejection order at Ext.P-17 is illegal and ultra vires inasmuch as, the very ground of rejection raised therein is completely factually wrong for the reasons stated hereinabove. Now, the issue is as to what other reliefs are to be granted to the appellant herein. Either this Court can direct the competent authority of the State Government in the Labour Department to refer the industrial dispute pointed out in Anx.R-3(a) dated 29.12.2020 to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as the case may be, in terms of Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act or since, the grievance of the appellant is in relation to dismissal order, the workman can avail the remedy under Sec.2A of the ID Act. Sec.2A of the ID Act provides as follows: “2A. Dismissal, etc. of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial (1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).” 11. (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).” 11. The factual ingredients in Subsection (1) of Sec.2A is indisputably available in the facts of the case inasmuch as, the grievance of the appellant is in relation to Ext.P-8 dismissal order as confirmed by Ext.P-9 appellate order. The appellant has already approached the conciliation officer by filing Ext.P-10 conciliation application dated 6.9.2019 and 45 days period therefrom has already expired. Hence, the conditions in Subsection (2) of Sec.2A is also seen fulfilled. The only remaining issue is as to whether such application under Sec.2A(2) is hit by the period of limitation stipulated in Sec.2A(3) thereof. 12. Sec.2A(3) mandates that the application referred to in Sec.2A(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal as the case may be, before the expiry of 3 years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as prescribed in Sub section (1) thereof. In the instant case, the matters relating to punishment on misconduct, dismissal, etc the appellate provision is contained in Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. Admittedly, the appellant was an employee of the 4th respondent Co-operative Society registered under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. Rule 198(4) Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules provides for a statutory appellate remedy. The appellant has availed said statutory remedy which has culminated in Ext.P-9 appellate order dated 24.4.2019 confirming Ext.P-8 dismissal order dated 10.1.2019. In a case where revisional remedy/statutory appellate remedy is provided, then the workman is entitled to avail that, and the period of limitation in such cases will have to be counted from the date of communication of the appellate order/revisional order as the case may be. In the instant case, since, the appeal has been dismissed as per Ext.P-9, Ext.P-8 dismissal order will get merged with Ext.P-9 appellate order. So, ordinarily, the period of limitation of 3 years under Sec.2A(3) will have to be reckoned from the date of communication of Ext.P-9 order. We are told that Ext.P-9 order dated 24.4.2019 was served on the appellant by the 1st week of May, 2019 or so. So, ordinarily, the period of limitation of 3 years under Sec.2A(3) will have to be reckoned from the date of communication of Ext.P-9 order. We are told that Ext.P-9 order dated 24.4.2019 was served on the appellant by the 1st week of May, 2019 or so. If that be so, the 3 year period will expire only by the 1 st week of May, 2022. Assuming that the period of limitation is to be counted from the date of communication of Ext.P-8 dismissal order dated 10.1.2019, then the following aspects would be relevant. 13. In such a case, Ext.P-8 order would have been served on the appellant by 15.1.2019 or so. And if that be so, 3 years computed therefrom would be up to 15.1.2022. The present WP(C) was filed before this Court on 31.8.2021, in which judgment was rendered on 16.9.2021. The instant writ appeal has been filed before this Court on 27.10.2021. Hence, the period of pendency of writ proceedings in relation to these issues, i.e. from 31.8.2021 up to the date of issuance of certified copy of this judgment will have to be excluded. That apart, by virtue of various orders issued by the Apex Court in the Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3/2020, since 15.3.2020, the period of limitation has been extended and sufficient provisions have also been made for exclusion of time. The latest such order has been rendered by a Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court on 10.1.2022 and the orders in para 5(III) thereof reads as follows: “In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.3.2020 till 28.2.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.” 14. So, even if it is assumed that the period of limitation in the instant case would have expired on 15.1.2022, the appellant will get the benefit of extension of limitation and exclusion of time as ordered by the Apex Court in the said Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) in view of the COVID-19 pandemic issues. In any view of the matter, the appellant has sufficient time to file Sec.2A application. 15. In any view of the matter, the appellant has sufficient time to file Sec.2A application. 15. Sri.R.Sudhish, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the matter in relation to dismissal and discharge of workman, etc are covered by Item 3 in the Second Schedule appended to the ID Act. Further that, as per Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act an industrial dispute on a matter specified in the Second Schedule appended to the ID Act is to be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. Further that, as per Sec.10(1)(d) of the ID Act, any such dispute which fall either within the Second Schedule or the Third schedule could be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Item 6 of the Second Schedule clearly states that all matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule could be referred to the Labour Court. Still further, it can be seen from a mere reading of Sec.2A(1) of the ID Act that the individual workman concerned who is faced with dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination of service etc can approach either the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. Sri.R.Sudhish, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would also submit that this Court, in its discretion, may direct that the appellant may file Sec.2A(2) application directly before the jurisdictional Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal concerned for adjudication and decision. 16. The counsel for the appellant submits that his party would be advised to file said Sec.2A application before the Labour Court/Tribunal as the case may be, within 6 weeks from the date notified for receiving a certified copy of this judgment. The Labour Court/Tribunal as the case may be, may be directed to entertain the said application under Sec.2A of the ID Act preferred by the appellant, taking note of abovesaid aspects regarding the period of limitation. 17. Since, the appellant has options as above, and as the process of the 1st respondent State Government formally referring the dispute to the Labour Court in terms of Sec.10(1)(c) may be time consuming, and in view of the lapse of time, and taking note of the request of the appellant it is ordered that the appellant can ventilate her grievances to challenge the dismissal order by filing appropriate application under Sec.2A of the ID Act before the jurisdictional Labour Court concerned. Consequently, it is ordered that the impugned Ext.P-17 rejection order will stand quashed and set aside. The appellant may produce a copy of this judgment before the Labour Court/Tribunal as the case may be. Hence, the following directions and orders are passed: 1. The impugned Ext.P-17 order dated 20.6.2021 will stand quashed. 2. The appellant is given liberty to file application under Sec.2A before the Labour Court/Tribunal as the case may be, for ventilating her grievances regarding dismissal from service. 3. If such Sec.2A application is filed before the Labour Court/Tribunal as the case may be, then the said forum will take note of the aspects regarding the period of limitation as stated hereinabove. 4. The Labour Court/Tribunal as the case may be, may take all reasonable endeavours possible in the circumstances to ensure the early disposal of said application under Sec.2A without much delay, preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of said application. 18. The abovesaid crucial aspects have not been duly taken into consideration while the rendering of impugned judgment. Consequently, it is ordered that the impugned judgment dated 16.9.2021 rendered by the learned Single Judge dismissing WP(C) No.19205/2021 will stand set aside. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeal will stand finally disposed of.