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2022 DIGILAW 74 (TS)

Chief Operations Manager (Revising Authority) South Central Railway v. S. Raju S/o Ch. Peter

2022-02-17

G.RADHA RANI, P.NAVEEN RAO

body2022
ORDER : 1. These two writ petitions are filed challenging the decisions of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad (for short ‘Tribunal’) passed separately, in O.A. No. 249 of 2011 and O.A. No. 751 of 2011, but concern the 1st respondent and deal with two separate punishments imposed against the 1st respondent. In W.P. No. 15959 of 2014 petitioners challenge the order of Tribunal in O.A. No. 249 of 2011 setting aside the modified punishment of reduction to lowest post i.e. Pointsman with effect from 04.06.2001 for a period of five years having recurring effect. In W.P. No. 15931 of 2015, petitioners challenge the decision of Tribunal in O.A. No. 751 of 2011 setting aside removal from service. 2. Heard Sri. P. Bhaskar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-Railways and Sri. J. Sudheer, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent. 3. As the parties are same in both the writ petitions, the same is disposed of by this common order. 4. The 1st respondent was appointed as porter in the year 1971 and earned promotion as Pointsman and further promotions. At the relevant point of time, he was working as Deputy Station Superintendent. 5. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the 1st respondent leveling several charges, ultimately resulted in imposing the punishment of removal from service by order date 04.07.2000. On appeal preferred by the 1st respondent, the punishment was modified to that of reduction to the lowest post of Pointsman to come into effect from 04.06.2001 for a period of five years having recurring effect. Aggrieved thereby, the 1st respondent preferred revision. Pending revision, the 1st respondent joined service as Pointsman on 19.08.2001. With effect from 24.08.2001, he absented from duties. On 02.01.2002 fresh disciplinary proceedings were initiated alleging unauthorized absence continuously from 24.08.2001. These disciplinary proceedings resulted in imposing punishment of removal from service on 25.10.2002. These two punishments are challenged before the Tribunal in O.A. Nos. 249 of 2011 and 751 of 2011. 6. In O.A. No. 249 of 2011, the Tribunal noticed that the first and second charges are the main charges wherein, it was alleged that due to the negligence of the 1st respondent, there was eminent possibility of two trains colliding as they both were allowed to come to the station on the same track. On the first and second charges, the Enquiry Officer held the charges as not proved. On the first and second charges, the Enquiry Officer held the charges as not proved. The disciplinary authority has not agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, but without communicating the disagreement note and calling for explanation from the 1st respondent, he straight away imposed the punishment of removal from service. Though a vague contention was urged before the appellate authority, it can be safely stated that the plea was not raised on not giving opportunity of communicating the disagreement note. The appellate authority considering other aspects having found that the delinquency alleged is not grave, warranting removal from service, modified the punishment. However, even the modified punishment is on the higher side. The Tribunal having found that the disagreement note was not communicated to the 1st respondent offending his right to rely on the findings recorded by Enquiry Officer and to challenge the disagreement, following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the order of punishment is not sustainable as it denied the opportunity of hearing and violating the principles of natural justice and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the issue after following the due procedure required by law. 7. In O.A. No. 751 of 2011 the Tribunal found that as per the circular instructions issued by the Board on 26.04.1957, a particular mode is indicated to serve notice, if notice sent to the residential address of the employee could not be served. This circular requires pasting of notice on the notice board at the place of last working by the employee and also on the doors of the last knowing residential address in the presence of two witnesses. The Tribunal found that this circular was not complied. Therefore, it was not the case of effectively serving notice and thus held that illegal procedure was followed in conducting ex-parte enquiry and allowed the O.A. setting aside the punishment of removal dated 25.10.2002 and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. 8. As can be seen from the record, the first punishment was dated 04.06.2001 and the second punishment was on 25.10.2002. These two punishments are challenged in the two O.A. filed in the year 2011 i.e. after 10 years and 9 years respectively. 9. 8. As can be seen from the record, the first punishment was dated 04.06.2001 and the second punishment was on 25.10.2002. These two punishments are challenged in the two O.A. filed in the year 2011 i.e. after 10 years and 9 years respectively. 9. As per Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 an application challenging any decision has to be filed within one year from the date of service of the order offending the employees’ conditions of service. This section also enables the Tribunal to condone the delay, if application is filed to condone the delay to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. In the instant case, there was inordinate delay in instituting both O.As. The Railways raised objection on maintainability of the O.As. as the preliminary issue at the stage of admission. Having accepted the plea raised by the 1st respondent that the order of punishment dated 25.10.2002 was not served on him, till he made an application under the Right to Information Act in the year 2010 and thereafter, the Tribunal held that it cannot be said that there was delay in instituting the O.A. No. 751 of 2011. On the maintainability of O.A. No. 249 of 2011 against the punishment dated 04.06.2001, the Tribunal found that immediately after the order of Appellate Authority, the 1st respondent filed Revision, and no notice was served on the 1st respondent to hold hearing in the revision nor a decision was made till the punishment of removal was imposed on 25.10.2002. The Tribunal held that the notices stated to have been issued by the revisional authority in the revision preferred against the order of Appellate Authority dated 04.06.2001 was also furnished in an application made under the Right to Information Act, after 2010. Thus, the preliminary objections were over ruled and the O.As. were admitted. 10. During the course of hearing of O.As. also the issue of limitation was considered by the Tribunal and having regard to the decision taken by the Tribunal at the admission stage, the Tribunal over ruled the objection. The Court is informed that no challenge was made to the decision of the Tribunal overruling the objection of delay and latches and admitting the O.A. 11. also the issue of limitation was considered by the Tribunal and having regard to the decision taken by the Tribunal at the admission stage, the Tribunal over ruled the objection. The Court is informed that no challenge was made to the decision of the Tribunal overruling the objection of delay and latches and admitting the O.A. 11. Thus, the issue that the 1st respondent was not prosecuting the remedy before the Tribunal within the time specified by Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is no more available to the petitioners. This takes us to the consideration of the issue on merits. 12. Rule 10(2)(a) [Action of the inquiry report: The disciplinary authority - shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by the disciplinary authority or where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority a copy of the report of the inquiring authority, its findings on further examination of witnesses, if any, held under sub-rule (1)(a) together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge to the Railway Servant, who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission to the disciplinary authority within fifteen days, irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not to the Railway Servant] of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (for short ‘the Rules’) requires that whenever the disciplinary authority is not in agreement with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, records his dissent note, he must communicate dissent note, call for explanation and on due consideration of the explanation should pass final orders. As noticed by the Tribunal, which fact is not denied by the petitioners, after the disagreement recorded by the disciplinary authority no further notice was issued and straight away punishment was imposed. Therefore, the procedure followed by the disciplinary authority is in violation of the disciplinary Rules governing the service. 13. Having regard to the mandate of Rules, it can not be said that the view expressed by the Tribunal in holding that the disciplinary action leading to removal from service on 04.07.2000 modified by the Appellate Authority to that of reduction as vitiated is erroneous. 13. Having regard to the mandate of Rules, it can not be said that the view expressed by the Tribunal in holding that the disciplinary action leading to removal from service on 04.07.2000 modified by the Appellate Authority to that of reduction as vitiated is erroneous. Further, no plea is raised in the writ petition on the reason assigned by the Tribunal to set aside the punishment, when that is the only reason to allow the O.A. and remanding the matter. In both the writ petitions, the grounds urged are almost common and the grounds relate to the proceedings resulting in imposing the punishment of removal from service on 25.10.2002. 14. With reference to the punishment of removal from service dated 25.10.2002, the Tribunal held that due procedure was not followed in effecting service of notice to an employee remained unauthorizedly absent and therefore, the procedure is vitiated. 15. Rule 26 [Service of orders, notices etc. - Every order, notice and other process made or issued under these rules, shall be served in person on the Railway servant concerned or communicated to him by registered post] of the Rules require sending of notices and other processes to be served on the railway servant in person or communicated to him by registered post. 16. The Rule is silent on what course to be adopted by the disciplinary authority in case the notice returned un-served. The Board letter dated 26.04.1957 though issued earlier to the Rules, takes care of the contingency when notices were not served in the manner indicated by Rule 26. Ordinarily, the administrative instructions cannot supercede the Rules, more particularly, if those instructions were earlier to framing of Rules and yield place to the Rules. However, when Rules are silent on a particular aspect of disciplinary proceedings and the earlier instructions are not superceded by further instructions or clarifications, the said instructions continue to operate. It appears from the assessment of record by the Tribunal, and no contra pleading is raised before this Court, the mechanism indicated in the said letter continues to operate and all the Disciplinary Authorities are required to adopt such course. Clause (6) of the letter reads as under: “The charge memorandum should be served in person on the charged official or sent to his address through registered post. Clause (6) of the letter reads as under: “The charge memorandum should be served in person on the charged official or sent to his address through registered post. If the charged official is not traceable or refuses to accept the charge memorandum, a copy of the charge memorandum should be displayed on the notice board of the charged official’s last working place and also pasted on the door of his last known residential address in the presence of two witnesses.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. From this clause it is apparent that in case the charged official is not traceable or refuses to accept the charge memorandum, it should be displayed on the notice board of the last working place of the charged employee and also be pasted on the door of his last known residential address in the presence of two witnesses. 18. On going through the record, the Tribunal found that this procedure was not followed in affecting service of notice, on disciplinary action initiated against the employee and therefore, held that the proceedings are vitiated on that ground. 19. In addition to the provision in the Rules governing the service, the circular instructions of the Board requires a particular procedure to be adopted to effect service of notice by alternative mode when notice sent to the address of the employee through registered post available with the railways returns un-served. Admittedly, the said procedure was not followed. Though various other pleas are raised on the alleged unauthorized absence, there is no plea urged before this Court by the railways on why the findings and the view taken by the Tribunal on this aspect is erroneous. 20. It is thus noticed that the findings recorded by the Tribunal in both O.As. on the main issues remain unchallenged. 21. However, the matter does not rest here. The punishment challenged in O.A. No. 249 of 2011 was imposed on 04.06.2001 and punishment challenged in O.A. No. 751 of 2011 was imposed on 25.10.2002. The O.As. were allowed in the year 2014. In these writ petitions, the Court granted interim stay of the order of the Tribunal and the writ petitions are pending for eight long years. The punishment challenged in O.A. No. 249 of 2011 was imposed on 04.06.2001 and punishment challenged in O.A. No. 751 of 2011 was imposed on 25.10.2002. The O.As. were allowed in the year 2014. In these writ petitions, the Court granted interim stay of the order of the Tribunal and the writ petitions are pending for eight long years. Upholding the decision of Tribunal at this stage without considering the other aspects would mean remitting the matters to the disciplinary authority on issue relating to 11.01.2001, leading to disciplinary action assailed in O.A. No. 249 of 2011 and the issue of unauthorized absence between 24.08.2001 to 02.01.2002 leading to further disciplinary action assailed in O.A. No. 751 of 2011. It is not possible to reconstruct the events at this distance of time and it is not equitable on the part of railways to re-do the entire exercise at this stage. It is also tough for the employee to defend himself at this distance of time. Re-doing the exercise will throw up challenges to both parties. It also require reinstatement of the employee into service as Deputy Station Superintendent dating back to 04.07.2002 and thereafter taking further course of action. It results in settlement of large amount towards wages/allowances for that period. 22. The litigation completed two decades. The course suggested by the Tribunal may result in further litigation. Adopting normal course is not just and equitable. There has to be a full stop to any action/reaction, for that matter, to litigation. The writ Court need to step in, exercise its equity jurisdiction and give quietus to this long drawn litigation. 23. The decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases give guidance to exercising equity jurisdiction. 23.1 In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while cautioning the High Courts against substituting the punishment and holding that it should be left to the discretion of the competent authority to impose appropriate punishment, also held that in the given circumstances of a case and to put quietus to the litigation, the writ Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and prescribe appropriate punishment commensurate with the delinquency alleged and proved. This principle is consistently followed in all subsequent decisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 23.2. In Union of India and Others vs. Ex. This principle is consistently followed in all subsequent decisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 23.2. In Union of India and Others vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, 2021 SCC Online SC 1041 the Hon’ble Supreme Court extracted the principles summarized in the decision in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 . Paragraph-25 reads as under: “25. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 , as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charges of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in Para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 23.3. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 23.3. After taking due note of the view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held: “22. The well ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. 23. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. From these precedent decisions, two principles can be culled out. Firstly, in the ordinary circumstances whenever the Court is of the opinion that the punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings is disproportionate to the delinquency alleged and proved, the Court should ordinarily remit the matter for imposing appropriate punishment and the Court should not take on itself the task of prescribing any particular punishment. Firstly, in the ordinary circumstances whenever the Court is of the opinion that the punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings is disproportionate to the delinquency alleged and proved, the Court should ordinarily remit the matter for imposing appropriate punishment and the Court should not take on itself the task of prescribing any particular punishment. This is in recognition of well settled principle that it is the prerogative of the employer to take disciplinary action against his employee and to impose appropriate punishment as deemed fit by the employer, having regard to the delinquency alleged against his employee. Secondly, the Constitutional Courts have carved out an exception to this solitary principle. In given facts of a case, and to shorten the litigation, this Court can take up the task of prescribing appropriate punishment. 25. The cases on hand present a different perspective. Here the issue is not on scaling down the punishment administered by the Railway Administration. In view of the decision of the Tribunal everything goes back to the drawing board of Disciplinary Authority and he is required to undertake the rigmarole of whole gamut of disciplinary action. Having regard to time lag adopting that course at this distance of time is not just and equitable to both parties. Thus, we are of the opinion that in the peculiar facts of the case, to shorten the litigation and to draw curtains on the whole episode, it is expedient for the Court to step in and take up the task to itself. 26. This takes us to the question of how to modulate the reliefs to both sides. 27. The 1st respondent filed common affidavit in the two writ petitions. In Paragraph No. 4, he has stated that based on the issue discussed during the course of arguments advanced in the Court on 14.02.2022 he accepts the punishment of compulsory retirement to be given effect from 25.10.2002 to give quietus to the litigation. The said affidavit is taken on record. According to learned counsel for the 1st respondent, if the employee continued in service, he would have attained the age of superannuation on 31.08.2013, whereas on account of illegal order of removal from service, he was denied almost 13 years of service and prays the Court to treat the said period of service as on duty. 28. According to learned counsel for the 1st respondent, if the employee continued in service, he would have attained the age of superannuation on 31.08.2013, whereas on account of illegal order of removal from service, he was denied almost 13 years of service and prays the Court to treat the said period of service as on duty. 28. As expected, it is not unusual for the Standing Counsel to report to the Court that he has no instructions from his client on closing the litigation and leaves it to the Court to decide. 29. The employee joined service in the year 1971 and even by the time of his removal from service he rendered more than 30 years of service. In the peculiar facts of this case, the history of litigation, nature of findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the first round of disciplinary proceedings, amount of service put in by the employee even by 2002, we are of the opinion that following orders and directions would meet ends of justice: (i) The 1st respondent shall be treated as compulsorily retired from service with effect from 25.10.2002. (ii) Since the order of reduction was set aside by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 249 of 2011, we direct petitioners to treat the 1st respondent as serving in the capacity of Deputy Station Superintendent on the date of compulsory retirement and his retirement benefits be settled in that capacity. (iii) The 1st respondent is not entitled to arrears of amount due till 31.08.2013 on which date, the Tribunal allowed O.A. No. 751 of 2011 and entitled to arrears of pension payable only from 01.09.2013. (iv) The petitioners shall determine and settle retirement benefits and monthly pension within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. (iv) The petitioners shall continue to pay monthly pension, as admissible. 30. Writ Petitions are accordingly, disposed of. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.