JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. The case of the petitioner is that, the Tribunal while deciding the Claim Petition No. 151 of 2011 quashing the earlier order of punishment dated 08.01.2011 and directing the opposite parties before it to conclude the inquiry or the disciplinary proceedings within three months of service of the copy of said judgment, the said judgment was challenged by the State before this Court by means of Writ Petition No. 4147 (SB) of 2017 which was dismissed summarily on 22.02.2017. Therefore, the State was already aware of the judgment dated 31.03.2015 passed in the above mentioned claim petition as it had challenged the same before this Court and its petition was dismissed on 22.02.2017. However, the disciplinary proceedings were not completed within three months as ordered, not even from the date of passing of the judgment in Writ Petition by the High Court. Instead, the inquiry was completed on 17.09.2020, that is, almost five years from the date of judgment of the Tribunal and three years from the date of judgment of the High Court. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 12.10.2020 and the final order for punishment has been passed by the State Government in the name of his Excellency the Governor on 21.04.2022, that is, seven years from the judgment of the Tribunal and five years from the date of judgment of the High Court referred hereinabove. 3. The contention is that, this order is in the teeth of the full Bench decision of this Court in the case of 'Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi Vs. The New India Insurance Company Ltd. and others', Writ Petition No. 7179 (SS) of 2009. 4. The counsel for the State on the other hand says that the Full Bench does not bar the authorities from passing an order of punishment if the time period prescribed by a judgment of the Court or the tribunal has expired. 5. The contention of the State at this stage appears to be apparently erroneous in law. 6. Question no. The counsel for the State on the other hand says that the Full Bench does not bar the authorities from passing an order of punishment if the time period prescribed by a judgment of the Court or the tribunal has expired. 5. The contention of the State at this stage appears to be apparently erroneous in law. 6. Question no. (a) considered by the full Bench in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) reads as under:- "Whether if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame fixed by a court and concluded thereafter, without seeking extension from the Court then on the said ground the entire inquiry proceeding as well as punishment order passed, is vitiated in view of the judgment in the case of P.N. Srivastava." The answer to the said question reads as under:- "We hold that if an enquiry is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought." 7. On the face of it, the answer to question no. (a) is that if inquiry has not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the Court, setting out the reasons for delay in conclusion of the enquiry. These observations of the Full Bench clearly mean that two course of actions are open, one to drop the proceedings if the same are not concluded within the time prescribed by the Court/Tribunal, the other is to seek extension of time. The Full Bench has further stated that in such an event, that is, where extension of time is sought by the employer, it is for the Court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Full Bench has further stated that in such an event, that is, where extension of time is sought by the employer, it is for the Court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought. This answer to question no. (a) is mandatory as is evident from the very language used therein. When the Full Bench says that where there is stipulation of time by the Court it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought, it means that it cannot proceed further to pass the final order without seeking permission and the same being granted by the Court. 8. Reliance placed by the counsel for the State on the answer to question no. (b) is misconceived as, if based on the said answer, the contention is accepted that a final order could be passed without seeking permission of the Court and without applying for such permission and the same being granted, then, it will negate the answer to question no. (a). In fact, it will negate the very judgment of the Full Bench. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of the State's counsel the Court may refer to question no. (b). "Whether the law as laid down by a Division 2 Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Srivastava that if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame as fixed by a Court, it stands vitiated is still a good law in view of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as well as a judgment dated 27.07.2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1056 (SB) of 2009 (Union of India and others Vs. Satendra Kumar Sahai and another)." The answer to the said question is as under:- "The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the court has come to an end." 9. Nowhere does this answer to question no. (b) says that even if the time stipulated for the Court for completing an inquiry/disciplinary proceeding has expired and no permission for extension of time has been sought nor has it been granted, it is open for the authority to pass the final order without the said eventuality. The argument in fact runs contrary to the answer to question no. (a) as is apparent on the face of the record. Both answers to questions (a) and (b) have to be read, understood and applied harmoniously. What answer to question no. The argument in fact runs contrary to the answer to question no. (a) as is apparent on the face of the record. Both answers to questions (a) and (b) have to be read, understood and applied harmoniously. What answer to question no. (b) says is that in the event the time has expired and an extension of time is sought by the employer or for that matter the employee approaches the Court challenging the proceedings on the ground that the same have not been completed during the stipulated period as ordered by the Court, this by itself, that is, mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary inquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceeding in every case, meaning thereby, the Court which has fixed a stipulation of time has the jurisdiction to extend the time also. This can be done on an application by the employer or on a challenge being raised by an employee suo moto. It is for the Court to consider in these circumstances whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained, the Court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the inquiry. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, such an extension of time has to be considered in the interest of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the inquiry in the interest of fairness and an honest administration. The purpose behind is that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to serious detriment to the public interest. Nowhere does the answer to question no. (b) permit conclusion of the inquiry and thereafter passing of a final order of punishment by the disciplinary authority even where the time for completing of such enquiry or proceedings has already expired and no extension of time has been sought by the employer nor granted by the Court whether at its behest or in proceedings initiated by the employee. As already stated earlier, answer to question no. (b) deals with the situation where the time has expired which makes it mandatory for the employer to seek extension of time for completing such enquiry in view of the answer to question no. (a) and in that context the Court has the power to extend the time. The contention of the State's counsel if accepted will nullify, as already stated, the answer to question no. (a). (a) and in that context the Court has the power to extend the time. The contention of the State's counsel if accepted will nullify, as already stated, the answer to question no. (a). 10. On a harmonious and conjoint reading of both the answers i.e. to question (a) and (b) by the Full Bench what comes out is that where there is stipulation of time by the court, it will not be open for the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought. There is no escape from this. If it is sought then the court has power to extend the time and in this context, the observation of the Full Bench that mere delay on the part of employer in concluding a disciplinary inquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings has to be understood, meaning thereby, it is not as if once stipulated time has not been adhered, such proceedings have necessarily to be nullified. The Court has jurisdiction in suitable cases to extend the time. But this does not mean that the employer can pass final order in such a proceedings without seeking such extention of time or without the same being granted otherwise in some proceeding by the employee challenging its continuance after expiry of the stipulated time. Where would be the occasion for extension of time for completing the inquiry/ proceedings when a final order has already been passed concluding the proceedings? None. As already stated earlier, if answer to question no.(b) is understood as suggested by the State Counsel then it will render the answer to question no.(a) otiose. 11. In a given case even where such a final order has been passed, even if it is to be quashed, the Court may in its discretion in exercise of his jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India may grant further time for completing the inquiry proceedings afresh, if the charges are serious enough and as observed by the Full Bench a situation exists where a serious charge of misconduct would go unpunished leading to serious detriment to the public interest merely because of the delay on the part of the employer and/ or where delay is not much, but, that does not appear to be the case here. In this case the punishment which has been imposed is a minor punishment. In this case the punishment which has been imposed is a minor punishment. There are no charges of financial irregularity involved. As already stated, the judgment of the Tribunal is dated 31.03.2015, that is, it was passed more than seven years ago. The writ petition of the State itself was highly belated having been filed in the year 2017 and the same came to be dismissed on 22.02.2017, that is, more than five years ago. We're now in the year 2022. There is no mention of the factors which led to this delay in the impugned order. The Court also notices the inquiry report, according to which no loss was caused to the Government on account of any action of the petitioner. The only error pointed out on his part was as under:- ^^ijUrq fxV~Vh dh dqVkbZ ds mijkUr 03 ekg ds vUnj ysij dk dk;Z lqfuf'pr u djk;s tkus ds dkj.k fu;a=.k esa f'kfFkyrk gsrq vkaf'kd nks"k Áekf.kr gksrk gSA 12. On admitted facts as mentioned in the impugned order where only a minor punishment of withholding one increment of one year and recovery of the amount of one increment which would otherwise be payable for a year from the petitioner has been ordered. Nevertheless, in the larger interest, the State is granted one opportunity to demonstrate before the Court as to how it seeks to sustain the impugned order in the light of the above. This, of course, is without prejudice to the legal position discussed hereinabove so that this Court may do substantial justice under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. List this case on 23.05.2022 amongst the first ten cases of the day. No further time shall be granted to the opposite parties for filing a counter affidavit. 14. Until further orders, the impugned order is hereby stayed. 15. The name of Sri R.K. Upadhyay shall be printed in the cause list as learned counsel for opposite party no. 2.