JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Yashvardhan, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 19.08.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Fast Track Court, Bokaro in Sessions Trial No. 290 of 2014 by which the petition filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. has been allowed, which is now pending in the court of the learned Sessions Judge-II, Fast Track Court, Bokaro. 3. On the written report of opposite party no. 2, B.S. City P.S. Case No. 214 of 2014 dated 06.07.2014 was registered under Sections 498A, 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and subsequently on 16.07.2014 Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was added. 4. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the investigation has been carried out and the charge-sheet has been submitted whereby the petitioner was not sent up for trial. He further submits that further investigation is pending. He also submits that in course of trial, certain witnesses were examined and by the impugned order the learned court has called upon the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 Cr.P.C. He further submits that supplementary counter affidavit has been filed by the State, wherein, it has been disclosed in paragraph 5 that the charge-sheet has not been submitted against the petitioner as there was insufficient evidence. He also submits that prematurely the trial court has passed the impugned order. He relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Brindaban Das and Others vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) 3 SCC 329 . 5. Paragraphs 25, 26 and 29 of the said judgment are quoted herein-below: “25. The common thread in most matters where the use of discretion is in issue is that in the exercise of such discretion each case has to be considered on its own set of facts and circumstances. 5. Paragraphs 25, 26 and 29 of the said judgment are quoted herein-below: “25. The common thread in most matters where the use of discretion is in issue is that in the exercise of such discretion each case has to be considered on its own set of facts and circumstances. In matters relating to invocation of powers under Section 319, the court is not merely required to take note of the fact that the name of a person who has not been named as an accused in the FIR has surfaced during the trial, but the court is also required to consider whether such evidence would be sufficient to convict the person being summoned. Since issuance of summons under Section 319 Cr.P.C. entails a de novo trial and a large number of witnesses may have been examined and their re-examination could prejudice the prosecution and delay the trial, the trial court has to exercise such discretion with great care and perspicacity. 26. Although a somewhat discordant note was struck in Rajendra Singh case the views expressed in the majority of decisions of this Court on the point subscribe to the view that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is to be invoked, not as a matter of course, but in circumstances where the invocation of such power is imperative to meet the ends of justice. xxx xxx xxx 29. Section 319 Cr.P.C. contemplates a situation where the evidence adduced by the prosecution not only implicates a person other than the named accused but is sufficient for the purpose of convicting the person to whom summons is issued. The law in this regard was explained in Ram Kishan Rohtagi case and as pointed out by Mr. Ghosh, consistently followed thereafter, except for the note of discord struck in Rajendra Singh case. It is only logical that there must be substantive evidence against a person in order to summon him for trial, although, he is not named in the charge-sheet or he has been discharged from the case, which would warrant his prosecution thereafter with a good chance of his conviction.” 6. Mr. It is only logical that there must be substantive evidence against a person in order to summon him for trial, although, he is not named in the charge-sheet or he has been discharged from the case, which would warrant his prosecution thereafter with a good chance of his conviction.” 6. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the evidence which has been contained in Annexure-2 Series and submits that the witnesses have not specifically named the petitioner and in spite of that the learned court has allowed the petition under Section 319 Cr.P.C. He further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 . 7. Paragraphs 105 and 106 of the said judgment are quoted herein-below: “105. Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes un-rebutted, would lead to conviction. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes un-rebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if “it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence” is clear from the words “for which such person could be tried together with the accused.” The words used are not “for which such person could be convicted.” There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.” 8. By way of relying these judgments, Mr. A.K. Sahani learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although Section 319 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and an extra-ordinary power which can be exercised sparingly, however stronger evidence than mere probability of the complicity is required to be looked into while passing the order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. He further submits that the petition filed by the prosecution under Section 319 Cr.P.C. contained in Annexure-3 of the petition, is vague. 9. Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the State submits that although the charge-sheet was not submitted against the petitioner, however in the course of trial the name of the petitioner has been disclosed in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and that is why the petition under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been allowed by the learned court. He relied upon paragraphs 108 and 109 of the judgment rendered in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra). 10. Paragraphs 108 and 109 of the said judgment are quoted herein-below: “108. In Anju Chaudhary vs. State of U.P. a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that even in the cases where the report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is filed in the court and investigation records the name of a person in Column 2, or even does not name the person as an accused at all, the court in exercise of its powers vested under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can summon the person as an accused and even at that stage of summoning, no hearing is contemplated under the law. 109. 109. In Suman vs. State of Rajasthan, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that: (SCC p. 257, Para 17) “17........There is nothing in the language of this subsection from which it can be inferred that a person who is named in the FIR or complaint but against whom charge-sheet is not filed by the police, cannot be proceeded against even though in the course of any inquiry into or trial of any offence the court finds that such person has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the other accused.” 11. Mr. Yashvardhan, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 submits that in course of trial, prosecution witnesses have disclosed the name of the petitioner and that is why the learned court has rightly allowed the petition filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. He relied upon paragraph 117 of the judgment rendered in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) and submits that in paragraph 117 of the said judgment, entire aspect of the matter under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been considered which has been questioned and answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 12. Paragraph 117 of the said judgment is quoted herein-below: “117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows: Questions (i) and (iii) What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised? AND Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. In Dharam Pal case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr.P.C. and the Sessions Judge need not wait till “evidence” under Section 319 Cr.P.C. becomes available for summoning an additional accused. 117.2. Section 319 Cr.P.C. significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. 117.2. Section 319 Cr.P.C. significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C. and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. 117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial. Question (ii) - Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? Answer 117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination. Question (iv) - What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? Answer 117.5. Question (iv) - What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? Answer 117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for framing a charge...........The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different. Question (v) - Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged? Answer 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.” 13. In view of the above facts and considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has gone through the materials on the record. Seeing the impugned order, it transpires that altogether 11 witnesses including I.O. and Doctor have been examined. PW-1 to PW-9 have categorically stated about the complicity of the accused i.e. mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law (Nanad) and husband of the deceased for committing murder of deceased and the Doctor and I.O. also corroborates the testimony of these witnesses as well as prosecution version. PW-1 to PW-9 have categorically stated about the complicity of the accused i.e. mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law (Nanad) and husband of the deceased for committing murder of deceased and the Doctor and I.O. also corroborates the testimony of these witnesses as well as prosecution version. Considering these facts, the learned court has called upon the petitioner to face the trial. Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extra-ordinary power to the court and it is required to be exercised sparingly, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) on which the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as State and opposite party no. 2 have relied. In the case of Hardeep Singh (supra), which has also been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The court is required to examine the version of the prosecution witnesses in light of this observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner has annexed the evidences of the prosecution witnesses in this petition. Looking to those evidences of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, it transpires that all have taken the name of the petitioner and considering these aspects of the matter, the learned court has called upon the petitioner to face the trial. The observation and direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) has been taken care of by the learned court while passing the impugned order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 14. It is settled proposition of law that the trial Judge is not expected to allow mere evidence which has been placed on record and what has been stated by the witnesses. The Cr.P.C. and the Evidence Act confers vast and wide powers to the trial court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. In the criminal case, the court is required to find out the truth. Considering the evidences of the prosecution witnesses, the learned court has called upon the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 15. The argument of Mr. In the criminal case, the court is required to find out the truth. Considering the evidences of the prosecution witnesses, the learned court has called upon the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 15. The argument of Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned court has prematurely passed the impugned order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. that has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) particularly in paragraph 117. 16. It is also well settled proposition of law that even a person is not named in the charge-sheet and has been made an accused, the trial court has adequate power to summon such named person as well. A reference may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 . Paragraph 50 of the said judgment is quoted herein-below: “50. Person who has not joined as accused in the charge-sheet can be summoned at the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. There is no question of applicability of Section 319 of the Code at this stage (See SWIL Ltd. vs. State of Delhi). It is also trite that even if a person is not named as an accused by the police in the final report submitted, the court would be justified in taking cognizance of the offence and to summon the accused if it feels that the evidence and material collected during investigation justifies prosecution of the accused (See Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja). Thus, the Magistrate is empowered to issue process against some other person, who has not been charge-sheeted, but there has to be sufficient material in the police report showing his involvement. In that case, the Magistrate is empowered to ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and apply his mind independently on the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case. At the same time, it is not permissible at this stage to consider any material other than that collected by the investigating officer.” 17. As a cumulative effect of the above facts, there is no illegality in the impugned order. Accordingly, this petition stands dismissed. 18. Interim order dated 21.06.2017 stands vacated.