JUDGMENT : Shree Prakash Singh, J. 1. Heard Sri Q. M. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J.P. Maurya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and perused the record. 2. Instant writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 21.2.2003 passed by the appellate authority as well as the order dated 17.2.1975 passed by the Prescribed Authority. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in fact a proceeding under Section 10(2) of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 was commenced and the case was instituted as Ceiling Case No. 83 wherein misinterpreting the records, the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), vide order dated 17.2.1975 determined 54.4 acres of land as surplus land from the holdings of the petitioner. He admits that against the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed Appeal No. 244 of 1975 before the District Judge, Gonda wherein operation of the order impugned was stayed during the pendency of the appeal. 4. He further submitted that, due to the change of jurisdiction as per the amendment in the Ceiling Act, the matter was transferred from the court of District Judge to the Divisional Commissioner, Faizabad. The aforesaid appeal was dismissed in default on 28.12.1988. He further added that a fresh proceeding, after the amendment of Ceiling Act, was initiated and fresh notices were issued showing 49.08 acres of land as surplus land from the holdings of the petitioner. The petitioner filed objection to the aforesaid notice. After hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority declared 5.12 acres of land as surplus from the holdings of the petitioner. He submits that the order dated 29.7.1976 had become final as the State did not file any appeal against the same. 5. He argued that later on, the State filed an appeal on 20.9.2002 after delay of 26 years and assailed the order dated 29.7.1976. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention towards Annexure No. 7, which is the order of appellate authority dated 21.2.2003 by which the appellate authority admitted the appeal; condoned the delay; and issued notices to the petitioner. He submits that it is evident from the order itself that no notice was issued on the application for condonation of delay and, on the first date of hearing, i.e., at the admission stage, delay was condoned by the appellate authority without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 6. He submits that it is evident from the order itself that no notice was issued on the application for condonation of delay and, on the first date of hearing, i.e., at the admission stage, delay was condoned by the appellate authority without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 6. He also submits that in fact delay of 26 years has been condoned without calling any objection and without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which is impermissible under settled proposition of law. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the order of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Ragho Singh Vs. Mohan Singh and others, (2001) 9 SCC 717 wherein the Apex Court has held that appeal filed before the Additional Collector was beyond ten days and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed and, in that view of the matter, the Apex Court has held that such appeal is liable to be dismissed. Para 6 of that Judgment reads as under:- "6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Since it is not disputed that the appeal filed before the Additional Collector was beyond time by 10 days and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed for condonation of delay, there was no jurisdiction in the Additional Collector to allow that appeal. The appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Board of Revenue before which the question of limitation was agitated was of the view that though an application for condonation of delay was not filed, the delay shall be deemed to have been condoned. This is patently erroneous. In this situation, the High Court was right in setting aside the judgment of the Additional Collector as also of the Board of Revenue. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Noharlal Verma Vs. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Noharlal Verma Vs. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. Jagdalpur, 2008 (14) SCC 445 wherein it has been held in paras 32 and 33 that issue of limitation goes to the root of the matter and if any appeal or application is delayed or barred by limitation, the Court has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application for deciding the same on merits and, in such cases, the suit, appeal or application is liable to be dismissed. Paras 32 and 33 of that Judgment read as under:- "32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. 33. Sub Section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "3. Bar of Limitation.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not be set up as a defence." Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in the absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation." 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on the Judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case of V.M. Salgaocar and bros. Vs. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on the Judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case of V.M. Salgaocar and bros. Vs. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another, 2005 (4) SCC 613 wherein in para 20, following has been held:- "The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex-facie barred by the law of limitation, a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation." 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on para 5 of the Judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre and others, (1995) 1 SCC 42 . Para 5 of the said Judgment reads as under:- "5. In our view, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that the delay, if any, for launching the prosecution, could not have been condoned without notice to the respondents and behind their back and without recording any reasons for condonation of the delay. However, having come to that conclusion, it would have been appropriate for the High Court, without going into the merits of the case to have remitted the case to the trial court, with a direction to decide the application for condonation of delay afresh after hearing both sides. The High Court however, did not adopt that course and proceeded further to hold that the trial court could not have taken cognizance of the offence in view of the application filed by the prosecution seeking permission of the Court to file a "supplementary charge-sheet" on the basis of an "incomplete charge-sheet" and quashed the order of the CJM dated 21.11.1986 on this ground also. This view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case is patently erroneous." Placing reliance on the aforesaid Judgment, he submits that the Apex Court has emphasized that on delay condonation application, notice to the respondent is must and condonation of delay without issuing of notice and recording reasons is impermissible. 10. This view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case is patently erroneous." Placing reliance on the aforesaid Judgment, he submits that the Apex Court has emphasized that on delay condonation application, notice to the respondent is must and condonation of delay without issuing of notice and recording reasons is impermissible. 10. Referring the aforesaid Judgments, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is well settled proposition of law that if the revision or appeal is being filed beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under law then that must have to be accompanied with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He submits that in the instant matter, the delay was of about more than 26 years but the appellate authority, without providing opportunity of hearing, had admitted the appeal on the first date of hearing and no opportunity was provided for submitting objection to the aforesaid application. Placing the abovesaid Judgments, he has also added that from the order of the appellate authority, it is evident that same has been passed against the purport and ratio of the Judgments of the Apex Court. He further added that the appellate authority has overlooked the issue of limitation and did not take care of mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. From the admission of the appeal, it is evident that the delay condonation application was admitted without calling any objection from the petitioner/respondents. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that 5.12 acres of land was declared surplus by the Prescribed Authority. He submits that appellate authority without recording any finding has passed the impugned order which does not speak a single word about the same. The orders passed by the appellate authority and Prescribed Authority assail illegality and perversity and, as such, the same are liable to be set aside. 12. He also added to his contention that the appellate authority has also recorded a finding that the order of the Prescribed Authority by virtue of which 5.12 acres of land was declared surplus without jurisdiction. The appellate authority could not substantiate the finding that how the Prescribed Authority has exercised his jurisdiction which was not entrusted upon him. 13. 12. He also added to his contention that the appellate authority has also recorded a finding that the order of the Prescribed Authority by virtue of which 5.12 acres of land was declared surplus without jurisdiction. The appellate authority could not substantiate the finding that how the Prescribed Authority has exercised his jurisdiction which was not entrusted upon him. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State vehemently opposed the aforesaid contention and submitted that in fact order dated 21.2.2003 itself is indicative of the fact that the appellant counsel was directed to provide a copy of the memo of appeal and the application for condonation of delay to the counsel for the respondents. He submits that in fact adopting the aforesaid method, opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. He further added that so far as the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned that has been misread as the same is only the pleading on behalf of the Divisional Government Advocate and the same is not a finding of the appellate authority and, as such, there is no illegality or infirmity in the order passed by the court below. 14. He also added that the Judgments, which were placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are of the case where the appeal, suit or application is not supported by application for condonation of delay. In the instant matter, the application for condonation of delay was submitted and the appellate authority directed to provide a copy to the respondents counsel and, as such, the respondents counsel had an opportunity to oppose the application for condonation of delay. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of record, I find that the order dated 21.2.2003 reveals that on the first date of hearing, the appeal was admitted and, thereafter, notices were issued though it is settled proposition of law that on delay condonation application, notice is to be issued to the respondent/ party concerned and after deciding the same, the matter shall be heard on merits. Further so far as the issue with regard to the jurisdiction, which was raised by the Divisional Government Advocate, is concerned, there may not be any finding by the appellate authority but since the fact was there and it seems that same was in the mind of the appellate authority while deciding the appeal and, as such, it cannot be said that while passing the order aforesaid, the same has been taken into consideration. 16. Prior to going into exhaustive discussion over the issue, it is appropriate to mention Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1963'), which is being quoted hereunder:- "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases – Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 17. Barely going through the aforesaid Section, the word which has been emphasized by the Legislature is 'sufficient cause and the satisfaction of the court'. So far as the 'sufficient cause' is concerned, it depends on factual matrix of the case in a given situation. The bona fide nature of the explanation and the diligent act of such applicant are the base of test of sufficient cause. If it is found that explanation is concocted or the applicant is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause then certainly that goes against such applicant, who has moved application for condonation of delay. The sufficient cause is to be considered in a proper object, philosophy and spirit. While dealing with such situation, the court has always found out paramount consideration of substantial justice. Liberal approach, while dealing with such applications, are required but it is also the duty of the court to see that the same may not be unbriddled and unguided. 18. It has also to be looked into that there is material difference between inordinate delay and short delay. While condoning the inordinate delay, the Court has to be rather strict as the same can change the settled things as unsettled. 18. It has also to be looked into that there is material difference between inordinate delay and short delay. While condoning the inordinate delay, the Court has to be rather strict as the same can change the settled things as unsettled. It has been settled that an inordinate delay could not be condoned without notice to the respondents and without recording any reasons for condonation of delay. So far as the issue of reaching to the substantial justice is concerned, the same is undoubtedly a goal/intent of legislature but, condoning the inordinate delay, without issuance of notice or calling objection from other side, shall frustrate the very object of the aforesaid doctrine. 19. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is concerned that the appellate court had directed to provide a copy of the appeal as well as the application for condonation of delay to the counsel for the respondents, the same will not subserve the purpose as the appellate authority had admitted the appeal on the first date of hearing and, virtually, no opportunity of hearing was provided. Further if such procedure is supposed to be sufficient in case of calling objection on application for condonation of delay then the very purpose and intent of the legislature for enactment of the Limitation Act will frustrate as the same is not sufficing the very purpose of the word 'sufficient cause' mentioned in the Act 1963. 20. In the instant matter, the appeal has been filed after an inordinate delay of 26 years. Admittedly, no notice was issued and the appeal was admitted on the first day of hearing without issuance of notice to the petitioner. In such view of the matter, the appellate authority has not only ignored the provisions envisaged under the Act 1963 but has also overlooked the settled proposition of law. 21. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order dated 21.2.2003 passed by the appellate authority is hereby set aside. 22. The matter is remanded back to the appellate authority to decide the matter afresh after calling objections on the delay condonation application submitted by the petitioner and after providing due opportunity of hearing to all the concerned parties. The matter shall be concluded within six months from the date of this order. The petitioner shall appear before the appellate authority within a period of 15 days. 23. The matter shall be concluded within six months from the date of this order. The petitioner shall appear before the appellate authority within a period of 15 days. 23. The parties undertake that they shall not seek unnecessary adjournments. 24. Interim protection granted by this Court, vide order dated 8.8.2003 shall remain continued till disposal of the appeal. 25. The writ petition is allowed accordingly.