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2022 DIGILAW 75 (MAN)

State of Manipur v. Louriyam Sanahanbi Devi

2022-05-13

SANJAY KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT Sanjay Kumar, CJ. - Motor Accident Claims Case No. 159 of 2014 was filed by the parents (father, since deceased), widow and son of late Louriyam Sanjit Singh, a Police Constable of Ukhrul District Police, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Lamphelpat. The case was thereafter transferred to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bishnupur, and renumbered as Motor Accident Claims Case No. 1 of 2016. This claims case was filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1988'), seeking compensation of Rs.22,33,480/- for the death of Louriyam Sanjit Singh in an ambush by underground activists while travelling in a motor vehicle owned by the State. The Tribunal settled five issues for consideration in the case. The second issue framed was as to whether the claims case was maintainable or not. Judl. Misc. Case No. 6 of 2017 was filed by the State requesting the Tribunal to take up the second issue pertaining to the maintainability of the claims case as a preliminary issue. By order dated 26.10.2017, the Tribunal accepted the plea of the State. Having considered the preliminary issue, the Tribunal held that the claims case was maintainable and that there was a need to go deeper into the matter to clarify the legal position, vide order dated 26.02.2018. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Manipur and its Under Secretary (Home) filed this revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. Heard Mr. Athouba Khaidem, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the petitioners; and Mr. A. Deni Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Section 166 of the Act of 1988 applies to claims for compensation arising out of accidents involving motor vehicles and in cases of death, where the death is essentially accidental as opposed to intentional. As the police constable admittedly died in an ambush by underground activists, the State would contend that it was not an accidental death and that no claim would lie for compensation under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. 4. As the police constable admittedly died in an ambush by underground activists, the State would contend that it was not an accidental death and that no claim would lie for compensation under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. 4. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1988 reflects that the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty and others [ (1987) 4 SCC 284 ] was taken into account, wherein suggestions had been made to raise the limit of compensation payable as a result of a motor accident, in respect of death and permanent disablement, in the event of there being no proof of fault on the part of the person involved in the accident and also in hit-and-run motor accidents. The proposed legislation was stated to have been prepared in the light of this background and some of the important provisions therein were with regard to enhanced compensation in cases of 'no fault liability' and 'hit-and-run' motor accidents, apart from payment of compensation by the insurer, to the extent of actual liability, to the victims of motor accidents irrespective of the class of vehicles. 5. Section 166 of the Act of 1988, titled 'Application for compensation', states that an application for compensation arising out an accident of the nature specified in Section 165(1) may be made by a person who sustained injury; or the owner of the property; or where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or by any agent duly authorized by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case maybe. 6. Section 165 (1) of the Act of 1988 provides for the adjudicating of claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Thus, it is clear that the accident involving the death of a person must arise out of the use of the motor vehicle. There must therefore be a direct link between the death and the use of the motor vehicle. 7. However, in Rita Devi (Smt.) and others v. New India Assurance Co. Thus, it is clear that the accident involving the death of a person must arise out of the use of the motor vehicle. There must therefore be a direct link between the death and the use of the motor vehicle. 7. However, in Rita Devi (Smt.) and others v. New India Assurance Co. Limited and another [ (2000) 5 SCC 113 , the Supreme Court enlarged the scope of such link. In that case, some persons hired an auto-rickshaw and then stole it. The dead body of the auto-rickshaw driver was recovered by the police the next day. The legal representatives of the deceased driver claimed compensation under the provisions of the Act of 1988 on the ground that the death was caused in an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The Tribunal held in their favour but the High Court reversed it, holding that there was no accident as contemplated under the Act of 1988 and, as such, a claim for damages did not lie under the Act of 1988. In appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the issue for consideration was the legal import of the words 'death due to an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.' The question, per the Supreme Court, was whether a 'murder' could be termed to be an accident in a given case. Noting that 'murder', as it is understood in common parlance, is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing, the Supreme Court went on to state that there could be instances where a 'murder' can be by accident in a given set of facts. According to the Court, the difference between a 'murder' which is not an accident and a 'murder' which is an accident would depend on the proximity of the cause of such murder and if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder and it is a murder simplicitor but if the cause of the murder or the act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court noted that the passengers of the auto-rickshaw decided to commit the felonious act of stealing it and in the course of achieving the said objective, they eliminated the driver and, therefore, it could be said that the death of the driver was an accidental murder. On this basis, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Tribunal. 8. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shiv Dutt Sharma 2004 A.C.J. 2049, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court held, on the strength of judicial pronouncements, that if a passenger traveling in a bus suffers an injury on account of a bomb explosion or other terrorist activities, it would be within his right to claim compensation under the Act of 1988 and even a person standing outside who suffers such an injury would be equally entitled. 9. In Bipal Bashi Das v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and another [2005 (3) GLT 407], a Division Bench of the Agartala Bench of the Gauhati High Court was dealing with a claim for compensation by a widow in relation to the death of her husband in an extremist attack while travelling in a motor vehicle. In that case, the driver was requested by the passengers of the hired Jeep to take an alternative route and avoid the route infested by extremists. However, the driver refused to do so and extremists attacked the Jeep en route, resulting in the death of the claimant's husband. The Bench noted that the dominant intention of the extremists was not to kill any of the passengers in particular but to attack the vehicle and, therefore, when the dominant intention was not to cause the death of any particular individual but was an attack on the use of the vehicle, the death arising out of such an occurrence could be treated as an accidental death. 10. Though the above decisions are pressed into service by Mr. A. Deni Sharma, learned counsel, in support of his contention that the death of the police constable was an accidental death, this Court is not persuaded to agree with him that the case on hand would fall within the ambit of the principles laid down in the aforestated case law. It is clear therefrom that the Courts drew a distinction between 'accidental murder' as opposed to 'murder by intention'. It is clear therefrom that the Courts drew a distinction between 'accidental murder' as opposed to 'murder by intention'. Only if the death of the person using the vehicle was caused incidentally and not with the intention that a 'particular person' should be killed, it would amount to an 'accidental murder', which would be capable of being brought within the scope of the Act of 1988. 11. In the case on hand, it is an admitted fact that, on 08.12.2002, late Louriyam Sanjit Singh, Police Constable, was travelling from Ukhrul to Imphal in the State's Gypsy vehicle along with other members of Ukhrul District Police as an escort party of the Superintendent of Police, Ukhrul. About 7 Km short of New-Heaven, at about 4.00 pm, underground activists ambushed the vehicle and opened fire on the police. Apart from Louriyam Sanjit Singh, two others were killed on the spot due to bullet injuries. Three others, who received bullet injuries, had to be hospitalized. The death of Louriyam Sanjit Singh was due to laceration of the brain resulting from the bullet injury and was classified as homicidal in nature. 12. The intention of the underground activists was to target the inmates of the vehicle in particular as they were members of the police force. It was therefore not a random killing, as was the case in Rita Devi (supra) and Bipal Bashi Das (supra). Though Mr. A Deni Sharma, learned counsel, would attempt to narrow down the concept of 'particular person' by stating that the intention should have been to kill Louriyam Sanjit Singh, in particular, this Court is not inclined to accept such argument. The intention of the activists was to attack the targeted members of the police force. Therefore, this was not a case of 'murder by accident', as in Rita Devi (supra), and was an intentional killing of targeted members of the police force. The death of Louriyam Sanjit Singh therefore does not qualify as an 'accidental death' by the use of a motor vehicle, whereby his legal representatives can claim compensation under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. 13. Mr. Athouba Khaidem, learned Government Advocate, would inform this Court that ex-gratia and other benefits have already been released to the legal heirs of late Louriyam Sanjit Singh. 13. Mr. Athouba Khaidem, learned Government Advocate, would inform this Court that ex-gratia and other benefits have already been released to the legal heirs of late Louriyam Sanjit Singh. Even if so, it is for them to decide whether they can maintain a lawful claim for more compensation and if so, take steps before the appropriate forum in accordance with law to claim the same. Reserving liberty to them to do so, the present revision petition is allowed, setting aside the order dated 26.02.2018 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bishnupur, in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 1 of 2016. In consequence, this Court holds that the said claims case is not maintainable under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.1