JUDGMENT : This revision petition, under Sections 401/397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the order dated 24.12.2020, passed by the learned Special Judge, Assam, in Special Case No. 02/2017, under section 7/13 (1)(b)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with section 109/120(B)/420/465/468/471/201 IPC. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, dated 24.12.2020, the learned Special Judge, Assam, has rejected the petition No. 392/2020, filed by the petitioner -Dr. Mrigen Saikia, under section 5(2) of P.C. Act, read with section 306 Cr.P.C. for allowing him to become an approver in the said case. 2. The factual background, leading to filing of the present petition, is briefly stated as under: “On 27/10/2016, Dr. Anshumita Gogoi had filed one FIR with the Officer-in-Charge of Dibrugarh Police Station to the effect that one Nabakanta Patir asked her to pay a sum of Rs. 10 lacs for the post of Dental Surgeon, selection of which was to be made by Assam Public Service Commission (APSC). Upon the said FIR the O/C, Dibrugarh Police Station had registered a case, being Dibrugarh P.S. Case No.936/2016, under section 7/13 (1)(b)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with section 109/120(B)/420/465/468/471/201 IPC and carried out investigation. The investigation culminated in submission of part Charge Sheet on 04.01.2018, against as many as 24 accused, and thereafter, supplementary Charge Sheet was submitted against some more accused on 02.01.2019. The name of the present petitioner finds mentioned in Sl.No.73 of the Supplementary charge Sheet, laid under section 7/13(1)(a)(b)(d)(2) of P.C. Act read with section 463/468/471/477(A)/201 IPC. Upon the said charge sheets Special Case No. 02/2017, had been registered. Thereafter, to assist the investigating agency he has decided to become an approver and filed one petition, being petition No. 392/2020, under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before the learned Special Judge Assam. Thereafter, the learned Special Judge had referred the petition to prosecution asking it to submit its statements on the request of the accused. Then the prosecution side had filed an application for recording the statement of the accused under section 164 Cr.P.C., and accordingly the learned Special Judge has got the statement of the accused by the learned Addl. Thereafter, the learned Special Judge had referred the petition to prosecution asking it to submit its statements on the request of the accused. Then the prosecution side had filed an application for recording the statement of the accused under section 164 Cr.P.C., and accordingly the learned Special Judge has got the statement of the accused by the learned Addl. C.J.M., Kamrup (M) and furnished a copy of the same to the prosecution so as to enable it to furnish its statement/opinion upon the application of the accused/petitioner. After filing of opinion by the prosecution side and thereafter considering the same and also considering the statement of the petitioner under section 164 Cr.P.C., the learned Special Judge, Assam vide impugned order dated 24.12.2020, had rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had failed to make true disclosure of the facts and also failed to make an inculpatory statement, and that the prosecution side will be able to establish its case easily with the help of other witnesses.” 3. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this court by filing the present petition on the ground that the learned court below had passed the impugned orders without application of judicial mind and without considering the fact that the petitioner would be instrumental in conviction of the prime accused, and that the learned court below has failed to consider the fact that if the prosecution agrees that tender of pardon will be in the interest of a successful prosecution of the offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approvers testimony then the trial court has to agree in tendering pardon and that two similarly situated persons have already been granted pardon and made approver and it is the prosecution who has to decide who should be put in the witness box for ensuing a successful prosecution and that marshalling of evidence is essentially a job of prosecution and that the learned court below has committed manifest error by rejecting the prayer of the petitioner and therefore, it is contended to allow the petition. 4. The respondent side has not filed any objection herein this petition. 5. I have heard Mr. M. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, and also heard Mr. M. Phukan, the learned P.P. for the state respondent. 6. Mr. 4. The respondent side has not filed any objection herein this petition. 5. I have heard Mr. M. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, and also heard Mr. M. Phukan, the learned P.P. for the state respondent. 6. Mr. Biswas, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner had made an inculpatory statement and that the prosecution side also approved the petitioner for being an approver. Mr. Biswas further submits that there are sufficient materials for declaring the petitioner as an approver and that the learned court below has committed manifest illegality by dismissing the petition. Mr. Biswas, therefore, contended to allow the petition by setting aside impugnd order. Mr. Biswas also referred following case laws in support of his submission:- (i) "Commander Pascal Fernandes, Lt. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.", reported in AIR 1968 SC 594 (ii) "Jasbir Singh vs. Vipin Kumar Jaggi", reported in AIR 2001 SC 2734 ; (iii) Bangaru Laxman vs. State Through by CBI reported in (2012) 1 SCC 500 ; (iv) Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 42; (v) R. Dinesh Kumar @ Deena vs. State reported in (2015) 7 SCC 497 7. Per contra, Mr. M. Phukan, learned P.P. submits that the learned court below has considered the statement of the petitioner under section 164 Cr.P.C. and found the same to be exculpatory and thereafter, rejected the petition and that this court may consider as to whether it is the requirement of law or not. 8. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the grounds mentioned therein and the documents placed on record. Also I have carefully gone through the cases laws referred by Mr. Biswas. Perused also the impugned order. 9. A careful perusal of the impugned order reveals that on receipt of the application filed by the petitioner, the learned court below had furnished a copy of the said petition to the prosecution asking it to submit its statements on the request of the petitioner. Then the prosecution side filed an application for recording the statement of the petitioner under section 164 Cr.P.C., and accordingly the learned Special Judge has got the statement of the petitioner by the learned Addl. Then the prosecution side filed an application for recording the statement of the petitioner under section 164 Cr.P.C., and accordingly the learned Special Judge has got the statement of the petitioner by the learned Addl. C.J.M., Kamrup (M) and furnished a copy of the same to the prosecution so as to enable it to furnish its statement/opinion upon the application of the petitioner. 10. Thereafter, the prosecution side had filed its opinion and thereafter considering the opinion of the prosecution side and also the statement of the accused/petitioner under section 164 Cr.P.C. and further considering three case laws i.e. (i) "Commander Pascal Fernandes, Lt. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.", reported in AIR 1968 SC 594 (ii) "Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi", reported in AIR 2001 SC 2734 ; (iii) Bangaru Laxman vs. State Through by CBI reported in (2012) 1 SCC 500 , so referred by the learned counsel for the accused/petitioner, and thereafter considering the relevant provision of law, arrived at a finding that the court may tender pardon to a person who was directly or indirectly involved with the offence and the person is bound to make true disclosure of the whole circumstances with in his knowledge. 11. The learned court below also found that the petitioner, in his statement under section 164 Cr.P.C., had not clearly disclosed a full and true disclosure of the whole facts and circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned and that the materials collected by the investigating agency is much more then what he had disclosed in his statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. and that it is the condition precedent for the purpose of approver that he first disclose his involvement with the offence and then he disclose what role he played and what other accused persons did. It had also held that the prosecution side had cited 359 persons as prosecution witness to prove the offences allegedly committed by the accused persons and that three accused persons have already been pardoned to be approver in the case in hand and with the help of other witnesses cited by the prosecution and the three approvers the prosecution can easily be able to establish what the proposed approver reveals. And as the petitioner had failed to make full and true disclosure of the facts and as the materials, collected by the Investigating Officer, are much more what he has revealed in his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. and therefore rejected the prayer of the petitioner. The learned court below has further found that the case laws referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not help him as the accused had failed to fulfill the requirements of section 5(2) of the P.C. Act. 12. In order to decide correctness or otherwise of the impugned order with greater precision, let it be examined some of the case laws which deal with the issue. In case of "Commander Pascal Fernandes, Lt. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.", reported in AIR 1968 SC 594 at para 11, 12, 14 and 15, it was observed as under :- "11. It follows that the powers of the Special Judge are not circumscribed by any condition except one, namely, that the action must be with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to an offence. The pardon so tendered is also a condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor. The disclosure must be complete as to himself and as to any other person concerned as principal or abettor. ..." "12. There can be no doubt that the Section is enabling and its terms are wide enough to enable the Special Judge to tender a pardon to any person who is supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence. This must necessarily include a person arraigned before him. But it may be possible to tender pardon to a person not so arraigned. The power so conferred can also be exercised at any time after the case is received for trial and before its conclusion. There is nothing in the language of the Section to show that the Special Judge must he moved by the prosecution. He may consider an offer by an accused as in this case. The action, therefore, was not outside the jurisdiction of the Special Judge in this case." "14. There is nothing in the language of the Section to show that the Special Judge must he moved by the prosecution. He may consider an offer by an accused as in this case. The action, therefore, was not outside the jurisdiction of the Special Judge in this case." "14. The next question is whether the Special Judge acted with due propriety in his jurisdiction. Here the interests of the accused are just as important as those of the prosecution. No procedure or action can be in the interest of justice if it is prejudicial to an accused. There are also matters of public policy to consider. Before the Special Judge acts to tender pardon, he must, of course, know the nature of the evidence the person seeking conditional pardon is likely to give, the nature of his complicity and the degree of his culpability in relation to the offence and in relation to the co-accused. What is meant by public policy is illustrated by a case from Public Commission Court (Reg. v. Robert Dunne, (1851) 5 Cox Cr. Cas 507) in which Torrens, J. on behalf of himself and Perrin, J. observed as follows : "From what I can see of this case, this witness Bryan, who has been admitted as an approver by the Crown is much the more criminal of the two on his own showing : .......... I regret that this witness, Bryan, has been admitted as evidence for the Crown and thus escaped being placed upon his trial. It is the duty of magistrates to be very cautious as to whom they admit to give evidence as approvers, and they should carefully inquire to what extent the approver is mixed up with the transaction, and if he be an accomplice, into the extent of his guilt." "15. In this case the Special Judge made no effort to find out what Jagasia had to disclose. The English law and practice is (a) to omit the proposed approver from the indictment, or (b) to take his plea of guilty on arraignment, or (c) to offer no evidence and permit his acquittal, or (d) to enter a nolle prosequi. In our criminal jurisdiction there is a tender of a pardon on condition of full disclosure. Section 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is enabling. In our criminal jurisdiction there is a tender of a pardon on condition of full disclosure. Section 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is enabling. Without recourse to it an accused person cannot be examined as a witness in the same case against another accused. To determine whether the accused's testimony as an approver is likely to advance the interest of justice, the Special Judge must have material before him to show what the nature of that testimony will be. Ordinarily it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused, out of several, may be tendered pardon. But even where the accused directly applies to the Special Judges he must first refer the request to the prosecuting agency. It is not for the Special Judge to enter the ring, as a veritable director of prosecution. The power which the Special Judge exercises is not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency, and must, therefore, be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. The State may not desire that any accused be tendered pardon because it does not need approver's testimony. It may also not like the tender of pardon to the particular accused because he may be the brain behind the crime or the worst offender. The proper course for the Special Judge is to ask for a statement from the prosecution on the request of the prisoner. If the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of a successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approver's testimony, it will indubitably agree to the tendering of pardon. The Special Judge (or the Magistrate) must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety of tendering pardon in the circumstances of the case. The learned Special Judge did not bear these considerations in mind and took on himself something from which he should have kept aloof. All that he should have done was to have asked for the opinion of the Public Prosecutor on the proposal." (Emphasis supplied) 13. The aforesaid decision, and also the decision in Suresh Chandra Bahri (supra) once again came to be considered by the Apex Court in case of "Jasbir Singh (supra) and after considering the above referred decision in case of Commander Pascal Fernandes, Lt. The aforesaid decision, and also the decision in Suresh Chandra Bahri (supra) once again came to be considered by the Apex Court in case of "Jasbir Singh (supra) and after considering the above referred decision in case of Commander Pascal Fernandes, Lt. (supra), at para 19, it was observed as under :- "19. ... It was not for the Sessions Judge to have considered the possible weight of the approvers evidence, even before it was given. In any case, the evidence of an approver does not differ from the evidence of any other witness except that his evidence is looked upon with great suspicion. But the suspicion may be removed and if the evidence of an approver is found to be trustworthy and acceptable then that evidence might well be decisive in securing a conviction (see Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (1994 AIR SCW 3420 : AIR 1994 SC 2420 : 1994 Cri LJ 3271) (supra). The Sessions Judge could not and indeed should not have assessed the probable value of the possible evidence of the respondent No. 1 in anticipation and wholly in the abstract." (Emphasis supplied) 14. Section 306(1) of the Code of Criminal procedure, provides that with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person, supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. 15. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the discussion made herein above, is that -making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge, relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor and such disclosure must be complete as to himself and as to any other person concerned as principal or abettor, is a condition precedent to tender pardon to an accused. 16. 16. In the case in hand, the learned court below has found and held that the petitioner had failed to make true disclosure of the facts as the materials collected by the Investigating Officer are much more what he had revealed in his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., and therefore, rejected the prayer of the petitioner. 17. It is fact that in the case of Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State Of Bihar : 1994 AIR 2420, while dealing with the object of section 306 Cr.P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “The dominant object is that the offenders of the heinous and grave offences do not go unpunished, the Legislature in its wisdom considered it necessary to introduce this section and confine its operation to cases mentioned in Section 306 of the Code. The object of Section 306 therefore is to allow pardon in cases where heinous offence is alleged to have been committed by several persons so that with the aid of the evidence of the person granted pardon the offence may be brought home to the rest. The basis of the tender of pardon is not the extent of the culpability of the person to whom pardon is granted, but the principle is to prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment in heinous offences for lack of evidence. There can therefore be no objection against tender of pardon to an accomplice simply because in his confession, he does not implicate himself to the same extent as the other accused because all that Section 306 requires is that pardon may be tendered to any person believed to be involved directly or indirectly in or privy to an offence.” 18. In the instant case the learned court below, however, had assessed the statement of the petitioner under section 164 Cr.P.C. as not inculpatory, in comparison to the materials collected by the I.O. during investigation. But, the factual matrix herein this case is quite different from that of the case in Suresh Chandra Bahri (supra). It is, however, not the case that there is no witness to prove the offences against the petitioner. The prosecution side has 359 witnesses and three approvers, who have already been granted pardon, and with them it would have easily been able to establish what the petitioner had revealed. It is, however, not the case that there is no witness to prove the offences against the petitioner. The prosecution side has 359 witnesses and three approvers, who have already been granted pardon, and with them it would have easily been able to establish what the petitioner had revealed. Therefore, the ratios laid down in the cases referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to the considered opinion of this court, would not come into aid of the petitioner. 19. What is transpired from the discussion made herein above can be recapitulated as under:- (i) The petitioner had failed to make full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to everyone person concerned, whether as principal or abettor. The disclosure, so made by him, concerning himself and concerning other persons, is incomplete; (ii) It is not the case that without the evidence of the petitioner the prosecution side will not be able to prove its case and with rejection of the petition the object of the section stands frustrated. There are 359 witnesses and three approvers, with the help of whom the prosecution side could establish the charges easily. (iii) The learned court below had assessed the evidence of the petitioner as not inculpatory, and though the same is backed by any legal provision, yet, the learned court below had not dismissed the petition on this count. And moreover, this cannot be ground to interfere with the impugned order by exercising its revisional jurisdiction. 20. In the result, I find the impugned order, rejecting the prayer of the petitioner, suffers from no infirmity or illegality, requiring any interference of this court. Thus, I find no merit in this revision petition, and accordingly, same stands dismissed. 21. The parties have to bear their own costs.