JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J. 1. Instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, lays challenge to order dated 25.4.2022 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Nalagarh in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 19-NL/14 of 2022, affirming order dated 7.4.2022 passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh in Misc. Civil Application No. 186/6 of 21 in Civil Suit No. 235/1 of 21, whereby an application filed under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with S.151 CPC, filed by the respondent/plaintiff (hereinafter, ‘plaintiff’) praying for injunction against the petitioners/defendants (hereinafter, ‘defendants’) came to be allowed. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record, are that the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction (Annexure P-1) against the defendants, claiming therein himself to be owner and co-sharer in possession in the suit land, as per respective shares, as mentioned in enclosed copy of Jamabandi. In nutshell, the plaintiff claimed that suit land measuring 33-08-00 Bigha bearing Khasra Nos. 207, 216, 217, 289, 303, 304, 319,320, 321, 324, 325, 402 and 403, Kita 13 situate in Village Malkumajra, HB No. 184, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, (hereinafter ‘suit land’) is jointly owned and possessed by the co-sharers. Plaintiff averred that till the time, suit land is partitioned by metes and bounds, defendant, who has started construction over specific portion of suit land is required to be restrained from doing so, till the time, suit property is partitioned by metes and bounds. Alongwith suit, plaintiff also filed an application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 CPC, praying therein to restrain the defendants from raising any construction over the suit land during the pendency of the suit. 3. Defendants contested the prayer in the application by filing reply to the application and written statement to the plaint, wherein they claimed that the parties to suit are eight brothers including them and they have joint land measuring 21-6 Bigha, inherited by them from their ancestors. Defendants claimed that the suit land in Malkumajra was given to all of them by one Smt. Paro (their maternal aunt) by executing a Will. It is further averred by the defendants that four brother including plaintiff settled at Village Thana and four brothers Shiv Ram (defendant), Dalip, Shri Hari Chand and Shri Sher Singh in Village Malkumajra. Defendants claimed that the suit land in Malkumajra was given to all of them by one Smt. Paro (their maternal aunt) by executing a Will. It is further averred by the defendants that four brother including plaintiff settled at Village Thana and four brothers Shiv Ram (defendant), Dalip, Shri Hari Chand and Shri Sher Singh in Village Malkumajra. Defendants averred that they raised construction of houses over joint land in respective villages but no objection was ever raised by them at the time of raising construction by co-sharers and now when, defendants have started construction over Khasra No. 320, as old house has outlived its life, with mala-fide intention, present suit has been filed, on wrong facts, with a view to harass them. Defendants claimed that share of defendant No. 1 is to the extent of 2 Bigha in the suit land, whereas, he is proposing to raise construction over 5 Biswa of land, as such, he cannot be restrained from completing the construction, especially when all the co-sharers have raised construction over joint land. Defendants also denied that the proposed construction over Khasra No. 320 is detrimental to the rights of the co-sharers and shall cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff, whereas, no prejudice shall be caused to the plaintiff and other co-shares if he is permitted to complete the construction over small portion of suit land. 4. Learned trial Court, having taken note of aforesaid pleadings, allowed the application filed by the plaintiff and directed the parties to maintain status quo qua nature, possession and further construction over the suit property, till final disposal of the main suit. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order passed by learned trial Court, defendants filed an appeal under Order 43 rule 1 CPC before learned Additional District Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, praying therein to set aside the aforesaid impugned order, thereby directing the parties to maintain status quo. However, fact remains that the appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 25.4.2022. In the aforesaid background, the defendants have approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the order restraining the defendants from raising construction over suit land, till the final disposal of the suit. 6. Mr. However, fact remains that the appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 25.4.2022. In the aforesaid background, the defendants have approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the order restraining the defendants from raising construction over suit land, till the final disposal of the suit. 6. Mr. Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the defendants, vehemently argued that there is overwhelming evidence on record suggestive of the fact that other co-sharers have already raised construction on their respective shares and no objection was ever raised by the defendants, as such, learned court below, after having noticed the conduct of the parties, ought not have accepted plaintiff’s prayer to restrain the defendants from raising construction, who otherwise are suffering huge loss due to restraint order because, the construction material collected on the spot, is being damaged. Mr. Bhardwaj, further argued that it has specifically come in the pleadings that the parties to the lis have lands in two different villages and both are till date un-partitioned, but yet parties with consent of each other, have already raised construction on the portions of lands in their respective possession. 7. While placing reliance upon judgment passed by this court in CMPMO No. 211 of 2022, titled Bhajna Nand vs. Bhagrat Ram decided on 23.8.2022, judgment dated 14.7.2022 passed by this court in Dharam Prakash vs. Jeet Ram, CMPMO No. 431 of 2020 and judgment passed by Coordinate Bench in Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu Devi, 2016 (1) Shim. LC 207 : (2015) ILR H.P. 1312, learned counsel for the defendants argued that one of the co-owners cannot be restrained from raising construction on un-partitioned land, on the ground that the joint land is yet to be partitioned, especially when there is material on record to show that other co-owners have already raised construction on the specific portions of lands in their possession. Learned counsel for the defendants further argued that bare perusal of the aforesaid judgments, clearly reveals that the conduct of party seeking restraint order is of utmost importance alongwith other relevant factors viz. prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. Learned counsel for the defendants further argued that bare perusal of the aforesaid judgments, clearly reveals that the conduct of party seeking restraint order is of utmost importance alongwith other relevant factors viz. prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. He submitted that since in this case, it stands established on record that the plaintiff has raised construction on one portion of land, which is yet to be partitioned between the parties, he is estopepd from raising any objection qua construction, if any, being raised by the defendants on joint land. He further submitted that otherwise also, there is no material to suggest that construction, if permitted, during pendency of suit, would be prejudicial to the interest of plaintiff because, in joint land, defendants have share of more than 2 Bigha but he is raising construction only on 5 Biswa of land, meaning thereby sufficient land is already lying vacant on the spot, which can ultimately fall in the share of plaintiff during partition. 8. To the contrary Mr. O.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiff, while making this court peruse pleadings adduced on record by the parties, argued that there is no evidence, be it ocular or documentary, suggestive of the fact that the plaintiff has ever raised any construction on the land situate at Malkumajra, whereas, as per own pleadings of the defendants, construction by plaintiff has been raised on the land situate in Village Thana. He further submitted that parties to lis have two sets of land in two different villages. Land measuring 33-8 Bigha is situate in village Malkumajra, which is jointly owned and possessed by them as well as other co-sharers, whereas, eight brothers including plaintiff and defendants have another chunk of land in village Thana measuring 21 Bigha 6 Biswa, inherited by them from their ancestors. Mr. Sharma vehemently argued that since land at Malkumajra is still un-partitioned inter se parties, and plaintiff has not raised any sort of construction over land in Village Malkumajra, no illegality can be said to have been committed by learned courts below, while restraining the defendants from raising construction on the suit land during the pendency of the suit. Mr. Sharma vehemently argued that since land at Malkumajra is still un-partitioned inter se parties, and plaintiff has not raised any sort of construction over land in Village Malkumajra, no illegality can be said to have been committed by learned courts below, while restraining the defendants from raising construction on the suit land during the pendency of the suit. Lastly learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that otherwise also petition under 227 of the Constitution of India, laying therein challenge to the findings given by learned Additional District Judge, against order passed by learned trial Court in application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 CPC, is not maintainable. 9. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Before ascertaining correctness of rival submissions made on behalf of learned counsel for the parties, this court finds it necessary to deal with specific question raised by the plaintiff, with regard to maintainability of petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, laying therein challenge to the judgment of learned Additional District Judge in appeal filed against order passed on an application filed under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2. 11. At this juncture, it would be apt to take note of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Garmet Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181 , wherein it has been specifically held that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as a Court of First Appeal to re-appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. It has been further held in the afore judgment that supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised where there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion arrived at by the Courts below. Relevant part of the judgment reads as under: “15. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised where there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion arrived at by the Courts below. Relevant part of the judgment reads as under: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, Para 6) “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 12. Aforesaid exposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly reveals that, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot act as court of First Appeal and as such, cannot re-appreciate the evidence on facts while ascertaining the correctness of the order impugned in such proceedings. However, this Court would be justified in exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in such like cases where the findings are not based upon the evidence available on record or same are so perverse that no reasonable person could possibly come to such a conclusion as has been arrived by the court. 13. However, this Court would be justified in exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in such like cases where the findings are not based upon the evidence available on record or same are so perverse that no reasonable person could possibly come to such a conclusion as has been arrived by the court. 13. Now being guided by the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India, this court proceeds to ascertain on the basis of material available on record whether findings returned by learned District Judge while affirming the order passed by the learned trial court dismissing the application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC are based upon material/evidence adduced on record by the respective parties or same is totally contrary to the record and the evidence. 14. No doubt, until partition is complete, parties are to be treated as co-owners in joint land. It is well settled that possession of one of the co-sharers is possession of all in the eye of law, unless the person, who has been in exclusive possession asserts his title, in himself, to the exclusion of other co-sharers, which may amount to his ouster. All the co-owners have equal rights and coordinate interest in the property though their shares may be either fixed or indeterminate. Every co-owner has a right to enjoy the possession equally to that of co-owner. It has been repeatedly held by Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this court that a person, who has been in the possession of joint property, is holding the property not only for himself, but also in favour of other co-sharers. Similarly, by now it is well settled that mere fact that one of the party is recorded as co-owner of the suit land, cannot deprive or suppress the right of other co-owners to utilize the land by raising construction. Issue with regard to rights and liabilities of the co-sharers has been aptly dealt with by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ashok Kapoor (supra). Relevant paras of aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: “46. Issue with regard to rights and liabilities of the co-sharers has been aptly dealt with by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ashok Kapoor (supra). Relevant paras of aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: “46. On consideration of the various judicial pronouncements and on the basis of the dominant view taken in these decisions on the rights and liabilities of the co-sharers and their rights to raise construction to the exclusion of others, the following principles can conveniently be laid down: (i) a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights in the common property absolutely and simply because he is a co-owner unless any act of the person in possession of the property amounts to ouster prejudicial or adverse to the interest of the co-owner out of possession. (ii) mere making of construction or improvement of, in, the common property does not amount to ouster. (iii) if by the act of the co-owner in possession the value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out of possession can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the diminution of the value and utility of the property. (iv) if the acts of the co-owner in possession are detrimental to the interest of other co-owners, a co-owner out of possess ion can seek an injunction to prevent such act which is detrimental to his interest. (v) before an injunction is issued, the plaintiff has to establish that he would sustain, by the act he complains of some injury which materially would affect his position or his enjoyment or an accustomed user of the joint property would be inconvenienced or interfered with. (vi) the question as to what relief should be granted is left to the discretion of the Court in the attending circumstances on the balance of convenience and in exercise of its discretion the Court will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience. 47. The discretion of the Court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima-facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction. 47. The discretion of the Court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima-facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction. (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's right or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff. (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands.” 15. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that suit land is joint amongst the parties to the lis, rather, such fact stands duly established from revenue record placed on record. Similarly, there is no dispute that defendant No. 1 is proposing to raise construction on a part of suit land situate in Village Malkumajra. No doubt, a co-sharer can raise construction over joint land with the consent of the other co-sharers or get the joint land partitioned. Similarly, if one of the co-sharers has raised construction over joint land, then he cannot restrain remaining co-sharers from raising construction over that land on the basis of equity. As per defendants, parties have two sets of lands, one in Village Thana and another in Village Malkumajra i.e. suit land. Plaintiff and other 3 co-sharers out of total 8 have raised construction on joint land at village Thana and 3 of them have already raised construction on suit land at village Malkumajra. 16. In nutshell case of the defendants is that since plaintiff has already raised construction on joint land in Village Thana, which is yet to be partitioned inter se parties, he cannot restrain defendants from raising construction at village Malkumajra, on the basis of principles of equity. It is admitted case of parties that plaintiff has no house on joint land in Malkumajra, where construction is proposed to be raised by the defendants on un-partitioned land. 17. It is admitted case of parties that plaintiff has no house on joint land in Malkumajra, where construction is proposed to be raised by the defendants on un-partitioned land. 17. Mere fact that the plaintiff has already raised construction on joint land at village Thana, is not sufficient to permit defendants from raising construction on the land situate in village Malkumajra, which is yet to be partitioned inter se co-sharer including plaintiff and defendants. Had the plaintiff raised construction on certain portions of land situate in village Malkumajra, defendant No. 1 would have been justified in claiming that since plaintiff has arleady raised construction on unpartitioned land, he cannot restrain him from raising construction on the same on the ground that land is yet to be partitioned in metes and bounds. 18. Here facts are totally different. No doubt, parties to lis have joint land in two villages, one at Village Thana and another at Malkumajra. In Thana, plaintiff alongwith few co-sharers has already raised construction but the fact remains that he has not raised construction on the land in Malkumajra, which is subject matter of suit and on which land, defendant No. 1 is proposing to raise construction on the un-partitioned land. Defendants cannot derive any benefit from construction raised by the plaintiff in other village. Nature, value utility of land in two villages is different. Every co-sharer has right to protect his share in every inch of joint land. No co-sharer can deny right on the ground that he has already taken share in another set of joint property, where there is nothing to show that as per some agreement/settlement, one of the parties has left his/her share in one set of land. 19. Record reveals that distance between Thana and Malkumajra is 10 kms. Similarly, land situate in Thana is ancestral property of the parties/co-sharers, whereas, suit land situate in Village Malkumajra has devolved upon the parties, on account of Will executed by their Aunt, meaning thereby nature of the two properties is not only different but the same exist at different places. Hence, defendants cannot be permitted to take plea that since plaintiff has raised construction on one set of land in Village Thana, he cannot be permitted to restrain them (defendants) from raising construction at Malkumajra, on which land, admittedly plaintiff has not raised any construction till date. 20. Hence, defendants cannot be permitted to take plea that since plaintiff has raised construction on one set of land in Village Thana, he cannot be permitted to restrain them (defendants) from raising construction at Malkumajra, on which land, admittedly plaintiff has not raised any construction till date. 20. As per pleadings, four brothers, Pola, Diwan Chand, Hakam alias Haku and Ram Lok have settled in Village Thana, whereas, defendant Hari Chand, Sher Singh etc. have settled in Malkumajra. In both the villages, brothers of defendant No. 1 have raised construction on joint land but admittedly no construction has been raised on joint land in Malkumajra by plaintiff rather, there is old construction on the suit land at Malkumajra by the defendant No. 1. 21. Since, defendants have not been able to rebut on record that the land in Malkumajra is joint inter se parties and the plaintiff has not raised construction, if any, on the land at Malkumajra, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned court below, while restraining defendants from raising construction on suit land, till final disposal of the suit. 22. By now it is well settled that before grant of injunction, Court must be satisfied that the party praying for relief has a prima-facie case and balance of convenience is in its favour. Besides above, while granting injunction, if any, Court is also required to consider that whether the refusal to grant injunction would cause irreparable loss to such a party. Apart from aforesaid well established parameters/ingredients, conduct of the party seeking injunction is also of utmost importance, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and Others vs. The Coca Cola Co. and Others, AIR 1995 SC 2372 . 23. Apart from aforesaid well established parameters/ingredients, conduct of the party seeking injunction is also of utmost importance, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and Others vs. The Coca Cola Co. and Others, AIR 1995 SC 2372 . 23. But in the case at hand, since defendants have not been able to establish on record that the plaintiff has raised any kind of construction on the land situate in Malkumajra, nothing adverse can be said to be with regard to conduct of plaintiff, who fairly admitted his having raised construction on the land in village Thana, which is also un-partitioned inter se parties but since suit land is far away from land in village Thana, construction, if any, raised by the plaintiff in village Thana on joint land cannot be made a ground to deny relief craved by him qua the suit land in village Malkumajra. 24. In the case at hand, plaintiff has successfully made out three ingredients, prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and as such, application having been filed under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 CPC, for restraining the defendants, rightly came to be allowed. 25. The existence of prima-facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima-facie case is not to be confused with prima-facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Satisfaction that there is a prima-facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury but means only that the Injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury but means only that the Injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunction is expected to exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. The court has to exercise discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. Reliance in this regard is placed upon much celebrated case of Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 , relevant paras of which read as under: “...the phrases “prima-facie case” and “balance of convenience” and “irreparable loss” are not rhetoric phrases for incantation but words of width and elasticity, intended to meet myriad situations presented by men's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances and should always be hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injury to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused. The existence of prima fade right and infraction of the enjoyment of him property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima-facie case is not to be confused with prima-facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima-facie case is a substantial question raised, bona-fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima-facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. Prima-facie case is not to be confused with prima-facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima-facie case is a substantial question raised, bona-fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima-facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury but means only that the Injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. The court has to exercise discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 26. Consequently in view of the detailed discussion made herein above and law taken into consideration, this court finds no illegality in the order passed by learned Additional District Judge, Nalagarh and the same is upheld, as a result whereof, present petition fails and is accordingly dismissed alongwith all pending applications. Interim directions, if any, stand vacated.