ORDER : The petitioner herein claims ownership and possession of Ac.3.80 cents of land in Sy.No.396 and Ac.4.62 cents of land in Sy.No.435 of Kattamanchi Revenue Village, Chittoor District. This land is said to have been purchased from the 2nd respondent, by way of a deed of sale dated 29.10.1982, registered as document No.7208 of 1982, registered with the Sub-Registrar, Chittoor. 2. The petitioner traces the title of this land in the following manner. 3. The 2nd respondent, who was the owner of the aforesaid land admeasuring Ac.8.42 cents had leased out this land to one M. Pachiappa Mudaliar, by way of a public auction held on 10.09.1971, on an annual rent of Rs.1700/-, for a period of six years. This lease also obtained the approval of the Commissioner, Endowments Department. As M. Pachiappa Mudaliar had defaulted in payment of the lease amounts, O.S.No.344 of 1975 was filed by the 2nd respondent, before the District Munsiff Court, Chittoor for recovery of the lease amount and for possession of the property. While, the said suit was pending, M. Pachiappa Mudaliar inducted the petitioner into possession of the said property. Thereafter, the petitioner entered into a fresh lease with the 2nd respondent, for a period of six years, from 19.12.1979 to 18.12.1985 on an annual lease of Rs.4,525/-. This was approved by the Commissioner, Endowments vide proceedings in L.Dis.No.A2.A2/18920/80-2 dated 22.04.1980. Thereafter, the petitioner had also paid an amount of Rs.17,427/- to the 2nd respondent towards the arrears of lease payable by M. Pachiappa Mudaliar. Thereafter, this payment was ratified by the Commissioner, Endowments in proceedings vide ROC.No.A2/18920/80-1, dated 29.04.1980. Permission was also accorded to withdraw O.S.No.344 of 1975 and the same was also withdrawn. 4. The petitioner expressed his willingness to the 2nd respondent to purchase the property at the prevailing market rate. Thereupon, the Assistant Commissioner, who was the then person in charge of the Mutt, had addressed a letter to the Commissioner, Endowments Department vide ROC.No.226/1982-A, dated 25.03.1982 recommending the sale of the property under Section 74(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Act, 1966 at the rate of Rs.15,000/- per acre. This proposal was approved by the Commissioner, Endowments Department vide proceedings in ROC.No.M2-24149/82, dated 04.05.1982 and the said approval was also published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and also in Andhra Prabha daily newspaper on 08.06.1982. This proposal was approved by the Commissioner, Endowments Department vide proceedings in ROC.No.M2-24149/82, dated 04.05.1982 and the said approval was also published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and also in Andhra Prabha daily newspaper on 08.06.1982. On the basis of this approval, the 2nd respondent- Mutt sold the land to the petitioner following directions given in G.O.Rt.No.1427 Revenue (Endowments III) Department dated 24.08.1982. It also appears that there were further proceedings of the Commissioner, Endowments in ROC.No.M2/24149/82 dated 09.09.1982 and orders of the erstwhile High Court of A. P. dated 14.10.1982 in W.P.M.P.No.10901 of 1982 in W.P.No.3621 of 1982. 5. As these lands had been kept in the prohibitory list under Section 22(a)(i)(c) to the Registration Act, the petitioner along with two other persons had filed W.P.No.9903 of 2015 for deleting the said lands from the prohibitory list. This writ petition came to be disposed of along with a batch of cases with certain directions. The petitioner then approached the Commissioner, Endowments for No objection Certificate for alienation of the said land. As no orders were being passed on this representation, the petitioner filed Contempt Case No.2337 of 2016 after which, the Commissioner, Endowments issued proceedings in Memo No.M1/26631/2016 dated 03.04.2017 which had been filed by the 2nd respondent. 6. At this stage, the 2nd respondent had filed O.A.NO.394 of 2017 before the Andhra Pradesh Endowments Tribunal for a declaration that the land, purchased by the petitioner, belongs to the 2nd respondent and for a consequential direction of delivery of vacant possession of the property, to the 2nd respondent along with payment of damages. 7. The contentions raised by the 2nd respondent in the above O.A.No.394 of 2017 was that the sale of land to the petitioner was done in collusion with the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, who had sold away the property to the petitioner against the interest of the 2nd respondent-Mutt and consequently, the said sale requires to be disregarded on the ground of fraud and collusion. 8. The petitioner has approached this Court for a Writ of Prohibition requiring this Court to declare that the Endowments Tribunal, Pedda Kakani has no jurisdiction to entertain O.A.No.394 of 2017. 9. The petitioner had also filed W.P.No.25177 of 2017 which had been allowed by this Court. 10. Dr. 8. The petitioner has approached this Court for a Writ of Prohibition requiring this Court to declare that the Endowments Tribunal, Pedda Kakani has no jurisdiction to entertain O.A.No.394 of 2017. 9. The petitioner had also filed W.P.No.25177 of 2017 which had been allowed by this Court. 10. Dr. M. Suri Babu learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the sale of the property had been done after complying with all the requirements of the provisions of the Act, 1966 and as such, there cannot be any claim for disregarding the deed of sale executed in favour of the petitioner. He would submit that while challenging the sale of the property to the petitioner, the 2nd respondent has not taken any steps for impleading the party who executed the deed and as such, the application is bad for non-joinder. He would also submit that the 2nd respondent cannot move an application at this belated stage and after such delay as the deed of sale was executed in the year 1982 while the present O.A has been filed in the year 2017 which is about 35 years after the execution of the deed of sale. He would further submit that the prayer in the application itself is misconceived as no relief has been sought for setting aside the deed of sale, without which, the question of declaring the property to be Charitable and Religious Endowments or for delivery of possession would not arise. He would further submit that such a prayer could not have been made before the Endowment tribunal as the relief of setting aside a sale deed would available only in a properly constituted suit, before a civil court, under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 11. Dr. Majji Suri Babu, relying upon the Judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 24.12.2019 in W.P.No.17713 of 2017 in the case of Anam Charitable Trust vs Assistant Commissioner would contend that once endowment property has been conveyed, by way of a deed of sale, the same would cease to be endowment property and consequently, the Endowments Tribunal would have no jurisdiction in relation to the said land. 12. 12. Sri V. Venu Gopala Rao learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the 2nd respondent submitted that the sale of the property by the person in charge is not permissible in view of the various provisions of the Endowments Act. He submits that only the Matadhipathi of the Mutt can execute a deed of sale or alienation of Mutt property. He relied upon the provisions of Section 2(17), Section 6(d) and Section 47 of the Endowments Act, 1988 to contend that a sale by any person, except the Matadhipathi, is not binding on the Mutt. It is further contended that as the sale was not done with proper authority, the provisions of Section 80 of the Endowments Act would apply, nullifying and invalidating the said unauthorized sale. He would submit that Section 87 of the Endowments Act empowers the tribunal to look into the question of whether the property in question continues to be Endowment property or not. 13. Sri V.Venu Gopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd respondent answering the contention of the petitioner that there was no prayer for setting aside the deed of sale, contends that no such prayer is required as the deed of sale itself is void and nonest in law and consequently, does not require to be challenged. He relied upon the Judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2017 (3) ALD 260 . CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT: 14. The petitioner seeks the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition in the present writ petition. The scope of such a writ has been set out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India., in the following terms: 5. The jurisdiction for grant of a writ of prohibition is primarily supervisory and the object of that writ is to restrain courts or inferior tribunals from exercising a jurisdiction which they do not possess at all or else to prevent them from exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the object is to confine courts or tribunals of inferior or limited jurisdiction within their bounds. In other words, the object is to confine courts or tribunals of inferior or limited jurisdiction within their bounds. It is well settled that the writ of prohibition lies not only for excess of jurisdiction or for absence of jurisdiction but the writ also lies in a case of departure from the rules of natural justice (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 114). It was held for instance by the Court of Appeal in King v. North [1927 (1) KB 491] that as the order of the Judge of the Consistory Court of July 24, 1925 was made without giving the vicar an opportunity of being heard in his defence, the order was made in violation of the principles of natural justice and was therefore an order made without jurisdiction and the writ of prohibition ought to issue. But the writ does not lie to correct the course, practice or procedure of an inferior tribunal, or a wrong decision on the merits of the proceedings. It is also well established that a writ of prohibition cannot be issued to a court or an inferior tribunal for an error of law unless the error makes it go outside its jurisdiction (See Regina v. Comptroller General of Patents and Design [1953 (2) WLR 760, 765] ) and Parisienne Basket Shoes Proprietary Ltd. v. Whyte [59 CLR 369]. A clear distinction must therefore be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the manner in which it is exercised. If there is want of jurisdiction then the matter is coram non judice and a writ of prohibition will lie to the court or interior tribunal forbidding it to continue proceedings therein in excess of its jurisdiction. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had taken the view that a Writ of Prohibition would be available only where there is excess of jurisdiction/absence of jurisdiction and where there is a departure from rule of natural justice. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court expanded the scope of Writ of Prohibition in Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. Thallapaka Ananthacharyulu., in the following manner: 14. On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court expanded the scope of Writ of Prohibition in Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. Thallapaka Ananthacharyulu., in the following manner: 14. On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior court or tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern the exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial discipline of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used “as a cloak of an appeal in disguise”. Lax use of such a power would impair the dignity and integrity of the subordinate court and could also lead to chaotic consequences. It would undermine the confidence of the subordinate court. It was not even argued that there was total lack of jurisdiction in the civil court. It could not be denied that the civil court, before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the maintainability of the suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction. The civil court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred by Section 14 of the said Act or on the principles of res judicata/estoppel. Thus unless there was some very cogent or strong reason the High Court should not have prevented the court of competent jurisdiction from deciding these questions. In other words, the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide these questions. In the impugned judgment no reason, much less a cogent or strong reason, has been given as to why the civil court could not be allowed to decide these questions. In other words, the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide these questions. In the impugned judgment no reason, much less a cogent or strong reason, has been given as to why the civil court could not be allowed to decide these questions. The impugned judgment does not state that the civil court had either proceeded to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or that it had acted in violation of the rules of natural justice or that it had proceeded to act under law which was ultra vires or unconstitutional or proceeded to act in contravention of the fundamental rights. The impugned judgment does not indicate as to why the High Court did not consider it expedient to allow the civil court to decide on questions of maintainability of the suit or its own jurisdiction. The impugned judgment does not indicate why the civil court be not allowed to decide whether the suit was barred by virtue of Section 14 of the said Act or on the principles of res judicata/estoppel. To be remembered that no fundamental right is being violated when a court of competent jurisdiction is deciding, rightly or wrongly, matters before it. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above judgement, had added two more grounds, for issuance of a Writ of Prohibition, namely, where the Inferior Court or Tribunal proceeds to act under a law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional or where the Inferior Court or Tribunal proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. It must also be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court after expanding the scope of a Writ of Prohibition had cautioned that a Writ of Prohibition can be issued only in the rarest of the rare cases. A petition filed for issuance of a Writ of Prohibition, has to be construed strictly. The consideration of the Court would be restricted to the extent of verifying whether all or any of the four grounds mentioned above arise in the case and nothing more. The question of whether the proceeding before the lower Tribunal or Court would succeed or not is alien to a proceeding for issuance of a Writ of Prohibition. A Writ of Prohibition cannot be considered as if it is an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. The question of whether the proceeding before the lower Tribunal or Court would succeed or not is alien to a proceeding for issuance of a Writ of Prohibition. A Writ of Prohibition cannot be considered as if it is an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. The first three grounds of the Endowments Tribunal acting under a law which is ultra vires or unconstitutional or acting in contravention of fundamental rights or violation of principles of natural justice do not arise in the present case. 18. In the present case, the petitioner seeks the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition on the grounds of limitation, non joinder of parties, non-inclusion of necessary relief and lack of jurisdiction. 19. The question of limitation and laches is an issue which can be dealt with by the Endowments Tribunal and the said issue does not relate to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The second question of non-joinder of parties is also a matter which can be looked into by the Tribunal and does not raise any issue of lack of jurisdiction. 20. The question of non-inclusion of the relief of setting aside the date of sale and the question of whether the said deed of sale takes the land out of the purview of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (for short ‘The Act, 1966’) and the Endowments Tribunal would have to be considered in the present case. 21. Section 87 of the Act, 1966 is grants jurisdiction to the Endowments tribunal to decide the following disputes and matters. 87. 21. Section 87 of the Act, 1966 is grants jurisdiction to the Endowments tribunal to decide the following disputes and matters. 87. Power of Endowments Tribunal to decide certain disputes and matters:- (1) The Endowments Tribunal having jurisdiction shall have the power, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the person concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question- (a) Whether an institution or endowment is a charitable institution or endowment; (b) Whether an institution or endowment is a religious institution or endowment; (c) Whether any property is an endowment, if so whether it is a charitable endowment or a religious endowment; (d) Whether any property is a specific endowment; (e) Whether any person is entitled by custom or otherwise to any honor, emoluments or perquisites in any charitable or religious institution or endowment and what the established usage of such institution or endowment is in regard to any other matter; (f) Whether any institution or endowment is wholly or partly of a secular or religious character and whether any property is given wholly or partly for secular or religious uses; or (g) Whether any property or money has been given for the support of an institution or endowment which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or the performance of any service or charity connected with such institution of endowment or the performance of a charity which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or where any property or money given is appropriated partly to secular uses and partly to religious uses, as to what portion of such property or money shall be allocated to secular or religious uses; (h) Whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or Endowment. (2) ……………… (3) ………………. (4) ………………. (5) ……………….. 22. Dr.Majji Suri Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that in view of the deed of sale executed in favour of the petitioner dated 20.10.1982, the land had ceased to be Endowment land and consequently, the Endowments Tribunal would not have jurisdiction over the said land. (2) ……………… (3) ………………. (4) ………………. (5) ……………….. 22. Dr.Majji Suri Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that in view of the deed of sale executed in favour of the petitioner dated 20.10.1982, the land had ceased to be Endowment land and consequently, the Endowments Tribunal would not have jurisdiction over the said land. It is also contended that the Endowments Tribunal does not have the power to set aside the deed of sale as, such a power is vested only with the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. He relies upon the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.17713 of 2017. Countering this proposition, Sri V. Venu Gopala Rao the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the Mutt would contend that the deed of sale is null and void as it violates Section 80 and other provisions of the Act. He contends that once a document is null and void, there is no necessity for seeking a declaration that the said deed of sale is null and void or for setting aside the said deed of sale. He would submit that the Judgment of the learned Single Judge relied upon by the petitioner, would not be applicable to the present case and as the said Judgment arose in the peculiar circumstances of the case in which the Judgment had been rendered. 23. The question whether the relief of setting aside a null and void document is required or whether a party can merely seek a declaration of right and title over a property, without seeking to set aside a null and void document, executed in relation to such a property has been considered by the Courts. The erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in the case reported in 2017 (3) ALD 260 had held that where a document is null and void, there is no need for obtaining a declaration against the said document or for seeking the relief of setting aside the said document. 24. The Judgment of the learned Single Judge, relied upon by the petitioner, is a case where endowment property had been alienated, by way of a deed of sale, to a Charitable Trust, after obtaining all necessary clearances under the provisions of the Act. 24. The Judgment of the learned Single Judge, relied upon by the petitioner, is a case where endowment property had been alienated, by way of a deed of sale, to a Charitable Trust, after obtaining all necessary clearances under the provisions of the Act. Thereafter, the said alienation was challenged on the ground that the endowment property had been alienated to the Charitable Trust, for setting up an Educational Institution and since the Charitable Trust was not setting up an Educational Institution and intends to use the said land for other purposes, the same was not permissible and that the deed of sale should be set aside. This contention was negatived by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the deed of sale was an absolute deed of sale and any condition of future use of the land, sought to be relied upon by the authorities, would not be permissible as the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act clearly stipulate that any conditions attached to an alienation of property are not enforceable and the said conditions would fail. In the said circumstances, the learned Single Judge had taken the view that subsequent non compliance of any alleged conditions would not render the deed of sale invalid or null and void. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge had taken the view that the land had ceased to be endowment land and consequently, the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction over the property. This judgement does not lay down a general proposition of law that every transaction of alienation of Endowment property would move the said property out of the purview of the Endowment Act. Such a generalization of the judgement would run contrary to the provisions of Section 80 of the Endowments Act, 1987. 25. In the present case, the contention is that the very sale of the land under the deed of sale dated 29.10.1982 is violative of the provisions of the Act, 1966 rendering the said document null and void. This is a question which would have to be answered by the Tribunal. If the Tribunal were to hold that the said deed of sale is null and void, the contention of Sri V. Venu Gopala Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Mutt that there is no requirement for cancellation of the deed of sale would have to be upheld. If the Tribunal were to hold that the said deed of sale is null and void, the contention of Sri V. Venu Gopala Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Mutt that there is no requirement for cancellation of the deed of sale would have to be upheld. However, if the Tribunal were to come to the conclusion that the application for declaration filed by the Mutt is hit by limitation or by any lacuna in the framing of the application or joinder of parties or on the ground that all the necessary permissions had been obtained and there is no violation of the provisions of the Act, 1966, the application would have to fail. 26. In such circumstances, this court cannot hold that the Endowment tribunal is devoid of jurisdiction and consequently this petition has to fail and is accordingly dismissed. 27. This court has not gone into the merits of the case or the objections raised by the petitioner. All these issues and all such other issues that may be raised by the parties are left open for a decision by the Endowment Tribunal , which shall dispose of O.A. No. 394 of 2017 before it within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of this order. Miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.