JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 994 of 2022 1. This Interlocutory Application has been filed for condoning the delay of 239 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 2. No counter affidavit to the Interlocutory Application has been filed on behalf of respondents. 3. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 4. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 5. Accordingly, I.A. No. 994 of 2022 is allowed and delay of 239 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. 6. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, has been preferred against the order/judgment dated 21.02.2019 passed in W.P. (L) No. 6007 of 2010 by the learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby and whereunder while dismissing the writ petition, learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the Award dated 17.01.2010 passed by Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, by which the reference has been answered against the writ petitioner-workman declining to make necessary correction in his date of birth. 7. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition, are as under: The workman, namely, Maheshi Saw was appointed by the authority of a private coal company in the year 1963 in Angarpathra Colliery and Form 'B' register was filled up in which his date of birth has been recorded as 20.03.1946. In the Identity Card also the date of birth was recorded as 20.03.1946. It is further case of the workman that he had obtained license of Electrician from the Electricity Board, Bihar at Patna in which his date of birth was recorded as 20.03.1946. The concerned workman claims that date of birth of the elder brother, who is also employed in Angarpathra Colliery, is recorded as July, 1944 and therefore, the workman being the younger brother could not have born prior to his elder brother. According to writ petitioner-appellant, though in all service excerpts his date of birth was recorded as 20.03.1946 but the respondent-management accepted his date of birth as September, 1938 stated to be recorded in Form B register of Angarpathra Colliery. Accordingly, he was served with letter of superannuation dated 05.05.1998 informing that he has to superannuate w.e.f. 15.09.1998 on attaining the age of superannuation. Accordingly, he was served with letter of superannuation dated 05.05.1998 informing that he has to superannuate w.e.f. 15.09.1998 on attaining the age of superannuation. Accordingly, he superannuated from service. The dispute finally culminated into reference, being Reference Case No. 294 of 2000, for adjudication of the lis on the following reference: “Whether the action of the management of M/s. BCCL, West Mudidih Project, in retiring Sri Maheshi Shaw w.e.f. 15.09.1998 is justified ? If not, to what relief is the concerned workman entitled ? ” The Tribunal taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties passed the Award dated 17th January, 2010 answering the reference against the workman holding that the action of the management of M/s BCCL, West Mudidih Project in retiring Maheshi Shaw w.e.f. 15.09.1998 is justified and the concerned workman is not entitled to any relief. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner approached this Court invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing W.P. (L) No. 6007 of 2010 but the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition refused to interfere with the award dated 17.01.2010, against which, the instant intracourt appeal has been filed. 8. Mr. Shekhar Prasad Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that date of birth of the elder brother of the writ petitioner, who was working in the same colliery, was mentioned as July, 1944 then how the date of birth of the younger brother, the petitioner, would be September, 1938. According to learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner when the year of date of birth of the elder brother of the writ petitioner was mentioned as 1944 in service excerpts of the company there is no possibility of taking the date of birth of the petitioner six years prior than his elder brother i.e. 1938. It has been submitted that his date of birth as per Identity Card and the service excerpt, e.g., Form B is 20.03.1946 but taking his date of birth to be September, 1938, a notice of superannuation dated 05.05.1998 was served upon informing the petitioner to the effect that he is going to superannuate w.e.f. 15.09.1998 on attaining the age of superannuation and accordingly, he superannuated from service. Accordingly, submission has been made that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from material irregularity and as such the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law, but, without appreciating the aforesaid fact since the writ petition has been dismissed, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be justified and the same is fit to be quashed and set aside by allowing the instant intra-court appeal. 9. Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents defended the order passed by the learned Single Judge and submitted that the Award has rightly been passed taking into consideration the date of birth recorded in the Form B registered where the date of birth of the petitioner has been recorded as September, 1938. It has been submitted that the date of birth recorded in the Form B register is the conclusive piece of evidence while determining the age of the workman and taking it into consideration the Tribunal had passed the Award answering the reference against the workman, which cannot be said to suffer from error. It has further been submitted that in the service excerpt, due to inadvertence, the date of birth of the workman-petitioner was recorded as 01.07.1937 which was corrected by the workman as 01.07.1938 and to authenticate the same the workman-petitioner put his signature on the same, therefore, it is not available for him to raise the issue of date of birth at later stage alleging his date of birth to be 20.03.1946. In the backdrop of aforesaid facts, submission has been made that taking into consideration these facts since the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition, which requires no interference by this Court. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 11. The undisputed fact in this case is that the writ petitioner joined the services sometimes in the year 1963 in Angarpathra Colliery, wherefrom he was transferred to West Mudidih Colliery. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 11. The undisputed fact in this case is that the writ petitioner joined the services sometimes in the year 1963 in Angarpathra Colliery, wherefrom he was transferred to West Mudidih Colliery. The case of the petitioner is that at the time of employment his date of birth was mentioned in Form B as 20.03.1946 and on transfer to West Mudidih, in Last Pay Certificate his date of birth has been mentioned as 20.03.1946 whereas the case of the management-company is that in service excerpts including Form B mentioned his date of birth as 01.07.1938. The dispute culminated to reference, being Reference Case No. 294 of 2000, which was answered against the workman. The Tribunal, on appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties, came to the conclusion, as would appear from paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge and statement made by workman-petitioner before the Tribunal, that in the service excerpt which was prepared in the year 1987 his date of birth was recorded as 01.07.1937 which was corrected by the petitioner as 01.07.1938 and in token thereof, he put his signature on the same. For ready reference, paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment is quoted hereunder as : “6. It is the further case that the workman was transferred to West Mudidih Colliery and in the IPC, his date of birth has been indicated as September, 1938. In the service excerpt which was prepared in the year 1987 the date of birth of the concerned workman was mentioned as 01.07.1937 due to inadvertence which was corrected by the workman as 01.07.1938 and in token of his acceptance had put his signature on the same. The management had issued a letter dated 05.05.1998 informing the workman that he was to superannuate w.e.f. 15.09.1998 on the basis of his date of birth recorded in Form 'B' register as September, 1938. The management had issued a letter dated 05.05.1998 informing the workman that he was to superannuate w.e.f. 15.09.1998 on the basis of his date of birth recorded in Form 'B' register as September, 1938. The management further claims that the concerned workman had raised the dispute after his superannuation and he had never shown his inclination to challenge his recorded date of birth during the course of his employment.” Thus, it is evident that in the L.P.C (Last Pay Certificate), Exhibit M-1, produced by the management before the Tribunal, the date of birth of the workman-petitioner was mentioned as 01.07.1938, which was confirmed by the management of Angarpathra colliery verifying from Form B that the date of birth of the concerned workman as 01.07.1938. Therefore, admitted fact is that in the Form B the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 01.07.1938. So far date of birth as mentioned in Identity Card of the workman-petitioner is concerned, in examination-in-chief and cross-examination the workman-petitioner admitted that by making manipulation date of birth was mentioned as 20.03.1946. Further, in cross-examination, the workman-petitioner has admitted that the certificate of Electrician was obtained by him after joining the service, therefore, that piece of evidence was not taken into consideration by the management. So far opinion of medical board alleged to have assessed the date of birth of the petitioner as 20.03.1946 is concerned, such report was not produced before the Tribunal. 12. The Tribunal in view of such documentary and oral evidence answered the reference against the workman holding that the workman is not entitled to get any relief. 13. The Award was questioned before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge taking into consideration the factual aspects more particularly self-declaration of the age of the petitioner to be 01.07.1938 and further date of birth in the Form B to be 01.07.1938, which has a statutory force and is conclusive proof of date of birth of petitioner, hold that action of the management in retiring the petitioner w.e.f. 15.09.1998 was on justifiable grounds. 14. The position of law is well settled that date of birth mentioned in Form B is said to be conclusive evidence to determine the age of the petitioner-workman. 15. 14. The position of law is well settled that date of birth mentioned in Form B is said to be conclusive evidence to determine the age of the petitioner-workman. 15. The learned Single Judge taking into consideration the aforesaid facts has declined to interfere with the Award in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which according to our considered view is the correct view taken by learned Single Judge taking into consideration the settled position of law about the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India showing interference into the finding recorded by the Tribunal while passing the Award as has been held in Syed Yakoob vs. [14] Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477. Paragraph no. 7 of the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow: “7.The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph no. 21 as under: “21.With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of [16] writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos. 12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos. 66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at paragraph 17 as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. It is thus, evident from bare perusal of the judicial pronouncement, as referred hereinabove, that the award if passed by the tribunal based upon the cogent evidence, it could not be proper for the writ Court to re-appreciate the evidence by substituting the view already taken by the Tribunal while answering the reference, otherwise the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will be said to be exercising the appellate jurisdiction. The writ Court can interfere with the award only in case if there is perversity of finding or award is based on erroneous evidence. According to our considered view, after going through the award, it cannot be said that the award passed by Tribunal while answering the reference is based upon the perverse finding or on the extraneous consideration of the evidence produced by the parties rather according to our considered view the award is based upon consideration of the documentary as well as oral evidence produced before it. 16. This Court, in view of the aforesaid settled position of law and considering the reasons assigned by the Tribunal as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge showing no interference with the award, is of the view that order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference by this Court. 17. Accordingly, the instant intra-court appeal fails and is dismissed.