JUDGMENT : This writ petition is filed by the petitioner challenging Exhibit P10 order passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, Thiruvananthapuram in Appeal No.401/2014 dated 11th July, 2016, whereby the appeal filed by the 3rd respondent herein was allowed and the impugned order passed by the Secretary of the Perambra Grama Panchayat -1st respondent issued under Section 235W (3) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act 1994 directing the 3rd respondent to demolish a hut was set aside, holding that for construction of a hut, no permit is required otherwise than as provided under section 235P of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. It was also held that no permit is necessary in the matter of construction of a hut as provided under rule 10(xii) of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011. It is thus challenging the legality and correctness of the order, the writ petition is filed. 2. Petitioner has a basic contention that in the appeal before the Tribunal, petitioner was not made a party and that the petitioner was a necessary party in the said proceedings since the complaint before the Secretary was filed by him. The necessary facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows; 3. According to the petitioner, the 3rd respondent viz., Kunhikannan, S/o. Kanaran, Thandorappara P.O., Kozhikode, constructed an unauthorised thatched shed in front of petitioner's commercial building, partly blocking its entry on 11.10.2005; that construction was done substantially covering petitioner's building, its passage visibility, light and air, which is evident from Exhibit P1 series of photographs produced by the petitioner; that the 3rd respondent erected the shed in violation of the prevailing Municipal Building Rules, evident from Exhibit P2 complaint, the inspection report of the Secretary of the Perambra Grama Panchayat, Exhibit P3 show cause notice and Exhibit P4 reply filed by the 3rd respondent to the said notice. 4. According to the petitioner, the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat has issued a notice dated 14.3.2014 to demolish and remove the illegal structure, pursuant to Exhibit P9 direction issued by the Deputy Director of Panchayat. It is also pointed out that the 3rd respondent has challenged the said order before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions suppressing material facts and excluding the petitioner from the party array, and secured Exhibit P10 order interfering with the order of the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat. It is also pointed out that the 3rd respondent has challenged the said order before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions suppressing material facts and excluding the petitioner from the party array, and secured Exhibit P10 order interfering with the order of the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat. It is also submitted that Exhibit P10 order was passed contrary to the facts and especially the finding that the shed was constructed 15 years back. However, the records would show that the illegal structure was constructed in the year 2005. That apart it is contended that the construction made by the 3rd respondent is hit by section 220 (b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and therefore liable to be demolished. 5. The Grama Panchayat has filed a detailed counter affidavit submitting that the bunk shop put up by the 3rd respondent is situated in an extent of 0.27 Ares of property belonging to the 3rd respondent ; that 2 cents of land belonging to the 3rd respondent was earlier acquired for construction of the bus stand and it was in the remaining land that the 3rd respondent had put up a thatched shed for running his small pan shop. That part, it was submitted that the shed is constructed before the coming into force of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011; that since the Panchayat is satisfied that there is no violation of the Building Rules and that the 3rd respondent has every right to have possession and enjoyment of the property, has not proceeded further; that on enquiry it is understood that no construction has been carried out in the plot except installation of a hawker's cart provided with a roof of plastic and that the Panchayat has not taken further action in the complaint and the complaint was also closed. 6. Anyhow a fresh petition was filed by the petitioner on 3.5.2013 to demolish the shed and consequent to which, an enquiry was conducted and it was found that the said shop is not blocking the way to the petitioner's building and since the shed was constructed 15 years back, no further action need to be taken by the Panchayat, which fact was informed to the petitioner on 3.7.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint before the Deputy Director of Panchayat with the same allegation and the Deputy Director of Panchayat, as per an order dated 17.1.2014 (Exhibit P9), directed the Panchayat to take legal steps in the matter and in compliance with the directions issued by the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Kozhikode, a fresh provisional order under Section 235W (1) and (2) of Act 1994 was issued by the Panchayat, which was followed by a confirmation order dated 14.3.2014. It is thus challenging the order passed by the Panchayat, 3rd respondent approached the Tribunal and has secured a favourable order. The impugned order passed by the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat is produced by the petitioner as Exhibits P15 & P16 respectively. These are the basic background facts available to find out whether there is any illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal. 7. I have heard, Sri. Shyam Padman for the writ petitioner, learned Standing Counsel Shri.P.C.Sasidharan for the Perambra Grama Panchayat, and learned Government Pleader Sri.K.M.Faizal for the Deputy Director of Panchayat and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 8. The question emerging for consideration is whether any permit is required for the construction of a shed/hut ? In fact, section 235P of Act 1994 deals with Application to construct or reconstruct huts and sub-section (1) thereto specifies that Every person who proposes to construct or reconstruct a hut in any land lying adjacent to the roads referred to in clause (b) of section 220 of Act 1994, with in a Village Panchayat area shall send to the Secretary, -(a) a site plan of the land, and (b) an application for permission to execute the work. 9. Now the question is, what is the implication of Section 220 (b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj, 1994 in regard to construction of a hut? 9. Now the question is, what is the implication of Section 220 (b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj, 1994 in regard to construction of a hut? It deals with Prohibition of constructions in or over public roads, etc., which stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act no person shall, (a) build any wall or erect any fence or other obstruction or projection or make any encroachment whatsoever, whether permanent or temporary, in or over any public road; (b) construct any building or structure other than a compound wall in any land abutting any National Highway, State Highway, District roads or any other roads notified by the village panchayat within a distance of three metres from the boundary of his land abutting the road. 10. It would suffice to say, on a conjoint reading of section 235P and section 220(b) of Act, 1994, one could arrive at a definite conclusion that a permit is required for the construction of a hut, only if the consequences of section 220 (b) is standing on the way. There is no case for the petitioner that the hut is constructed by the side of a National Highway, State Highway, District roads or any other roads notified by the Village Panchayat and that the 3rd respondent has constructed the hut in or over a public road or encroaching into any public road. That apart rule 10(xii) deals with constructions for which permits are not necessary, which specifies that notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules, no building permit shall be necessary for executing construction of huts, except huts adjacent to roads mentioned in section 235P of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. That apart section 235Y of Act, 1994 dealing with certain buildings or sheds exempted, specifies that any building constructed and used, or intended to be constructed and used, exclusively for the purpose of a plant-house; meter house, not being a dwelling house, or sheds which are used exclusively for keeping fuel, or fire wood for the domestic use of its owner or for keeping agricultural implements, tools, rubbish or other materials or for watching crops or kennel shed intended to keep not more than four dogs or cattle shed intended to keep not more than four cattle and its one calf each or poultry shed intended to keep not more than twenty hen, duck etc. or any other shed of temporary nature shall stand exempted from the provisions other than Sections 220 (b) and 235 E. Section 235E prohibits construction of doors, ground floor, windows and bars so as to open outwards. 11. Therefore, on a deeper analysis of the aforesaid provisions, it would be clear that unless and until a fetter is created as provided in the aforesaid provisions, no permit is required for the construction of a hut. It was taking into account the aforementioned provisions alone, the Tribunal has interfered with Exts. P15 and P16 order passed by the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat under sections 235W (3) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. 12. Considering the aforesaid aspects and the law in regard to the construction of a hut/shed, I am of the considered opinion that interference made by the Tribunal with the order passed by the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat can never be said to be bad , arbitrary or illegal; and on an analysis of the pleadings put forth by the petitioner in the writ petition, I am also of the view that petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the order passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. It is true, the petitioner who was the complainant before the Secretary, has a contention that he was not even made a party to the proceedings. True, there is force in the said contention, because that would have been a reasonable ground for interfering with the order of the Tribunal, being arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. But in the instant case, I am of the considered opinion that, even if the order of the Tribunal is set aside and sent back, that would be a mere useless formality, since in the facts, circumstances, and the law involved in the case, petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in his favour, which is by now a well settled legal position also, by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.C.Mehta v. Union of India and Others [(1999) 2 SCC 237] wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “17. We shall initially refer to two cases where discretion was exercised not to grant relief and the first one was a case where relief was refused even though there was breach of natural justice. We shall initially refer to two cases where discretion was exercised not to grant relief and the first one was a case where relief was refused even though there was breach of natural justice. The first one is Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. [ AIR 1966 SC 828 : (1966) 2 SCR 172 ] There the Panchayat Samithi, in exercise of its statutory powers passed a resolution on 25-8-1960 to locate a primary health centre at Dharmajigudem. Later, it passed another resolution on 29-5-1961 to locate it at Lingapalem. On a representation by the villagers of Dharmajigudem, the Government passed orders on 7-3-1962 setting aside the second resolution dated 29-5-1961 and thereby restoring the earlier resolution dated 25-8-1960. The result was that the health centre would continue at Dharmajigudem. Before passing the orders dated 7-3-1962, no notice was given to the Panchayat Samithi. This Court traced the said order of the Government dated 7-3-1962 to Section 62 of the Act and if that were so, notice to the Samithi under Section 62(1) was mandatory. Later, upon a review petition being filed, the Government passed another order on 18-4-1963 cancelling its order dated 7-3-1962 and accepting the shifting of the primary centre to Lingapalem. This was passed without notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem. This order of the Government was challenged unsuccessfully by the villagers of Dharmajigudem in the High Court. On appeal by the said villagers to this Court, it was held that the latter order of the Government dated 18-4-1963 suffered from two defects, it was issued by the Government without prior show-cause notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem and the Government had no power of review in respect of government orders passed under Section 62(1). But that there were other facts which disentitled the quashing of the order dated 18-4-1963 even though it was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. This Court noticed that the setting aside of the latter order dated 18-4-1963 would restore the earlier order of the Government dated 7-3-1962 which was also passed without notice to the affected party, namely, the Panchayat Samithi. It would also result in the setting aside of a valid resolution dated 29-5-1961 passed by the Panchayat Samithi. This Court refused relief and agreed that the High Court was right in not interfering under Article 226 even if there was violation of natural justice. It would also result in the setting aside of a valid resolution dated 29-5-1961 passed by the Panchayat Samithi. This Court refused relief and agreed that the High Court was right in not interfering under Article 226 even if there was violation of natural justice. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed (at SCR p. 189) as follows: “Both the orders of the Government, namely, the order dated 7-3- 1962, and that dated 18-4-1963, were not legally passed: the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act to review an order made under Section 62 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to the representatives of Dharmajigudem village.”(emphasis supplied) His Lordship concluded as follows: “In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated 18-4-1963? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order — it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case.” The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law. 18. We would next refer to another case, where, though there was no breach of the principles of natural justice, this Court held that interference was not necessary, if the result of interference would be the restoration of another order which was not legal. In Mohd. 18. We would next refer to another case, where, though there was no breach of the principles of natural justice, this Court held that interference was not necessary, if the result of interference would be the restoration of another order which was not legal. In Mohd. Swalleh v. IIIrd ADJ [ (1988) 1 SCC 40 ] which arose under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the prescribed authority dismissed an application filed by the landlord and this was held clearly to be contrary to the very purpose of Section 43(2)(rr) of the Act. The District Court entertained an appeal by the landlord and allowed the landlord's appeal without noticing that such an appeal was not maintainable. The tenant filed a writ petition in the High Court contending that the appeal of the landlord before the District Court was not maintainable. This was a correct plea. But the High Court refused to interfere. On further appeal by the tenant, this Court accepted that though no appeal lay to the District Court, the refusal of the High Court to set aside the order of the District Judge was correct as that would have restored the order of the prescribed authority, which was illegal. 19. Learned Senior Counsel for Bharat Petroleum contended that once natural justice was violated, the Court was bound to strike down the orders and there was no discretion to refuse relief and no other prejudice need be proved. 20. It is true that in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66, HL] it has been held that breach of the principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to grant relief and that no further de facto prejudice need be shown. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this Court in several cases but we might point out that this Court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [ (1980) 4 SCC 379 ]. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this Court in several cases but we might point out that this Court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [ (1980) 4 SCC 379 ]. After stating (at SCC p. 395, para 24) that “principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed” and that “non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”, Chinnappa Reddy, J. also laid down an important qualification as follows: (SCC p. 395, para 24) “As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs.” (emphasis supplied) 21. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice.” Upshot of the above discussion is that petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the order of the Tribunal or otherwise. Needless to say, the writ petition fails, accordingly it is dismissed.