JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The subject matter of challenge in this intra-court appeal, instituted under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, is the judgment rendered on 08.07.2019 by the learned Single Judge, dismissing the instant Writ Petition Civil, WP(C) No.6166/2018. The appellants herein are the petitioners in the WP(C) and the respondents herein are the respondents in the WP(C). 2. Heard Sri.D.Sreekumar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in the WA/petitioners in the WP(C), Sri.Sunil Cyriac, learned Counsel appearing for R1 & R2 (Co-operative Society concerned), Sri. Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 3 to 5 herein and Sri.Shaji Thomas, learned Advocate appearing for contesting respondent No.6 herein. 3. The prayers in the instant Writ Petition (Civil), WP(C) No.6166/2018 are as follows: “i) to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records leading to the issuance of Exts-P14 and P15 and quash the same; ii) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing respondents 1 to 3 to permit the petitioners to continue as Attenders in the 1st respondent society.; iii) to grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of this case.” 4. The proceedings under challenge in the above writ proceedings is Ext.P15 dated 14.02.2018, issued by the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, whereby the resolutions of the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, selecting and appointing the appellants/petitioners to the post of attender, in the said respondent Cooperative Society, have been rescinded, by invoking the powers under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Society Rules (KCS Rules), on the ground that the said appointments of the appellants, as per Exts.P3 and P4, have been made as against non-sanctioned posts and also have been made beyond the vacancies notified in Ext.P9 selection notification and also beyond the validity period of the ranked list, stipulated in Ext.P9 selection notification. 5. 5. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, have rendered the impugned judgment in the above WP(C), and held that, after consideration of facts and circumstances of this case, the abovesaid impugned proceedings, as per Ext.P15, is not liable for interference and that the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar has jurisdictional competence to issue proceedings under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, to rescind resolutions of the Co-operative Society concerned, where the decision of the selection process is vitiated by grave irregularities and illegalities. It is the abovesaid verdict of the learned Single Judge that is under challenge in the instant intra-court appeal. A reference to the facts of this case would be necessary. 6. The 1st respondent Co-operative Society had published Ext.R-3(a) selection notification dated 09.05.2013 in certain newspapers, whereby applications were invited for selection and appointment to certain posts mentioned therein, including to the post of Attender/Record Keeper, in the scale of pay of Rs.7350-19,600/-and it was specifically stipulated that the vacancies in that post, notified to be filled up, as per the said selection notification, is limited to 2 posts. Clause 5 of Ext.R-3(a) selection notification also clearly stipulated that the validity of the rank list, for the abovesaid selection, will be limited to the period of 2 years from the date of its publication. Further, it is seen that, after conduct of selection process, Ext.P1 rank list dated 29.06.2013 was published for the abovesaid post of Attender / Record Keeper, in which the two appellants herein have been included therein, as rank numbers 4 & 6 respectively, out of the 6 candidates included in the said rank list. Further, it appears that candidates having Rank nos.1 & 2, at Ext.P1 ranklist, were selected and appointed as per resolution dated 29.06.2013, issued with effect from 01.07.2013, as per the decision of the 1st respondent Co-operative Society. Further, it appears that, going by the classification of the 1st respondent Society, at that point of time, only two sanctioned posts of Attender could have been filled up. Since the first two ranking candidates from Ext.P1 were already appointed to the existing two posts, which were the notified posts, vacancies could have arisen only consequent to their promotion. Further, Rule 185 would stipulate that a minimum period of 3 years is required for promoting personnel in the category of Attender or sub-staff to the next category of Junior Clerk. Further, Rule 185 would stipulate that a minimum period of 3 years is required for promoting personnel in the category of Attender or sub-staff to the next category of Junior Clerk. However, it appears that the 1st respondent had issued Ext.P2 proceedings dated 18.10.2014, appointing both the appellants as Attenders, with effect from 01.11.2014, with a consolidated pay of Rs.10,000/-. Obviously, Ext.P2 appointments were made to non-existing and non-sanctioned posts. As per the averments in the counter affidavit filed by R6, it is seen that the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar had issued proceedings dated 04.03.2015, whereby the abovesaid appointment, as per Ext.P2, on consolidated pay basis, in favor of the appellants, were rescinded and cancelled and set aside. This aspect of the matter is also stated in paragraph No.4 of the impugned Ext.P15 proceedings. Thereafter, it appears that the 1st respondent decided to promote the two regularly appointed Attenders to the next higher category post, with effect from 01.07.2016. Further, it is to be noted that the 2 year validity period of Ext.P1 ranklist had expired on 28.06.2015. Later, the 2nd respondent had issued proceedings, “extending” the validity period of Ext.P1 ranklist, for a further period of one year from 28.06.2015, which appears to be upto 27.06.2016. Thereupon, the 1st respondent had issued resolution, appointing the 2 appellants herein as Attenders, in the regular scale of pay, as per Exts.P3 and P4, both issued on 28.06.2016. Further, it appears that the two regular Attenders, appointed from Ext.P1 rank list, were actually promoted to the next higher category post, only on 01.07.2016. Thereafter, it appears that the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar had secured a report from the Assistant Registrar/valuation Officer, regarding the legality and propriety of the appointments of the appellants, as per Exts.P3 and P4. Based on the said report, the 3rd respondent had issued notice dated 14.11.2016 (produced as Ext.P5 in Ext.P10 WP(C) No.6116/2017), to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, to show cause as to why the appointments of the appellants, as per Exts.P3 and P4, should not be rescinded, as the same are illegal and ultra vires. It appears that the said notice was not issued by the 3rd respondent to the appellants. It appears that the said notice was not issued by the 3rd respondent to the appellants. Further, it is seen that, immediately after receiving the said notice dated 14.11.2016, the 1st respondent Co-operative Society had terminated the appointments of the appellants, even before the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar had taken a final decision in the matter. Thereupon, the appellants had approached this Court by filing the afore mentioned Writ Petition (Civil), WP(C) No.6116/2017. The learned Single Judge of this Court, as per Ext.P10 judgment dated 23.03.2017, held that the unilateral action of the 1st respondent Society, to cancel the appointments of the appellants, merely on receipt of the notice dated 14.11.2016 (Ext.P5 therein), issued by the 3rd respondent, is improper and unreasonable and that accordingly, the decision of the 1st respondent Society, to cancel the appointments of the appellants were set aside by this Court. However, liberty was accorded to the 3rd respondent, Joint Registrar to finalize the action on the abovesaid matter, referred to in the notice dated 14.11.2016 (Ext.P5 therein), in accordance with law, if he insists to do so, and after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants herein as well. 7. Thereafter, it appears that there was some delay on the part of the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar to finalize action in the matter. Thereupon, the contesting respondent No.6, who is a member of the Managing Committee of the 1st respondent Society, had sent Ext.P11 letter dated 12.04.2017, requesting the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar to finalize the action contemplated, in terms of Rule 176, on the abovesaid matter, without any further delay. Thereupon, the 3rd respondent had issued Ext.P12 notice dated 03.05.2017 to the appellants as well as the 1st respondent Bank. 8. After hearing the appellants and the 1st respondent Bank and after considering the objections of the appellants, as per Ext.P13, the 3rd respondent had issued the impugned Ext.P15 proceedings dated 14.02.2018, rescinding the resolutions of the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, appointing the appellants as Attenders, in terms of Exts.P3 & P4. 8. After hearing the appellants and the 1st respondent Bank and after considering the objections of the appellants, as per Ext.P13, the 3rd respondent had issued the impugned Ext.P15 proceedings dated 14.02.2018, rescinding the resolutions of the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, appointing the appellants as Attenders, in terms of Exts.P3 & P4. The main ground stated by the 3rd respondent in Ext.P15 is that the appointments of the appellants by the 3rd respondent, as per Exts.P3 and P4, are highly illegal and ultra vires, inasmuch as appointments have been made after the expiry of the validity period of the rank lists, mentioned in Ext.P1 selection notification and further that, the said impugned appointments are far in excess of the vacancies notified in Ext.R-3(a) and further that, the appointments were made, as per Exts.P3 and P4, at a time when there were no sanctioned posts in existence, as both the sanctioned posts in question were then occupied by the earlier appointees from Ext.P1 rank list, who were actually promoted only subsequently, with effect from 01.07.2016. 9. One of the prime contentions urged by the appellants is that the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar has no jurisdiction, in terms of Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, to interfere with the selection and appointment, arising out of Ext.R-3(a) Selection Notification, which has led to Ext.P1 rank list and Exts.P3 & P4 appointment orders etc, inasmuch as the sole jurisdictional authority in that regard is the Co-operative Arbitration Court, in terms of Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, (KCS Act). Further, contentions are also raised that the grounds for interference, stated in Ext.P1, are not tenable. 10. The abovesaid issue has been considered in detail, as per the common judgment dated 12.02.2013, rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in WA Nos.313 and 364 of 2010. Therein, it was found that the selection and appointment process by direct recruitment, to the post of Attender/Peon in the Co-operative Society therein, were vitiated by illegalities, inasmuch as the statutory guidelines issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, by virtue of the mandate contained in Rule 182(5), regarding conduct of selection, examination and interview, were violated by the said Co-operative Society concerned. Therein also, the Joint Registrar had rescinded the resolution, on the ground that the impugned decision of the Co-operative Society, in making such appointments, by way of direct recruitment, are vitiated by illegalities and irregularities and that therefore, Rule 176 could be aptly invoked in that case. The contra contention was that the Joint Registrar could not have exercised jurisdiction under Rule 176 and the aggrieved party should have set in motion adjudicatory process, in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act, before the Co-operative Arbitration Court concerned. After elaborate consideration and after examining the provisions contained in Section 69 of the KCS Act, the Division Bench of this Court held that a complaint of that nature, directed against the irregularities and illegalities in selection and appointment process of direct recruitment in Co-operative Societies, cannot be the subject matter of challenge in Section 69 proceedings, inasmuch as the aggrieved parties or the affected parties cannot be said to be any one of the permissible parties, as envisaged in Clauses (a) to (h) of Section 69(1). The persons who were aggrieved by the abovesaid selection process had directly approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (Civil), which were allowed by the learned Single Judge, on the ground that the statutory mandate of Rule 182(5) of the KCS Rules have been blatantly violated, in effectuating the said selection process. Thereupon, the selected persons had challenged the judgment in the WP(C) by filing the said Writ Appeal, on the ground that the said complaint should have been adjudicated only in Section 69 proceedings and that a writ under Article 226 would not ordinarily lie, as against a Co-operative Society. The Division Bench, after elaborate consideration, held that such a dispute will not come within the permissible parameters of Section 69, inasmuch as the persons aggrieved by such selection process or the affected persons concerned cannot be said to be any one of the permissible parties as envisaged in Clauses (a) to (h) of Section 69(1) and hence, the Division Bench of this Court held, in WA No.313/2010, that the remedy, in terms of Section 69, could not have been invoked by the aggrieved persons. However, it was found that there has been a flagrant violation of the statutory guidelines issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, which has got statutory backing, in terms of Rule 182(5) of the KCS Rules and that since the impugned selection process has been effectuated in violation of the statutory mandate, writ remedy is maintainable, going by the Rulings of the Full Bench of this Court in KC. John v. Liquidator [ 2006 (1) KLT 11 (FB)] etc, wherein, the Division Bench of this Court had upheld the interference made in the selection process in that case. Being aggrieved by the abovesaid verdict of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, the aggrieved parties had approached the Apex Court, which resulted in the judgment of the Apex Court in Akalakkunnam Village Service Co-operative Bank Ltd & Anr v. Binu.N. & Ors. [ (2014) 9 SCC 294 ]. The Apex Court has categorically held therein, more particularly in paragraph Nos.9 & 10 therein, after examining the provisions contained in Section 69, that such a dispute, related to the alleged irregularities in selection process of direct recruitment to the post involved therein, could not have been the subject matter of challenge in Section 69 proceedings. Further, as the statutory mandate has been violated, in finalization of the selection process, the decision of this Court in interfering with the said selection process was upheld by the Apex Court. Now, it is well settled by the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court in Akalakkunnam Village Service Co-operative Bank's case supra, [ (2014) 9 SCC 294 ], that the remedy in terms of Section 69, cannot be invoked in a case involving alleged illegalities and irregularities in selection and appointment process by way of direct recruitment. However, it is by now well settled, by the decision of the Apex Court in the decision in K.A.Annamma v. Secretary, Cochin Co-operative Hospital Society Ltd [ (2018) 2 SCC 729 ], that service disputes of in-service employees of Co-operative Societies, regulated by the provisions contained in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules thereunder, could be adjudicated before the Co-operative Arbitration Court, in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act. However, it has also been held therein that, in case an employer of a Co-operative Society would fulfills the definition of a workman, as per the ID Act, etc, then such an employee will also have the option either to approach the Co-operative Arbitration Court under Section 69 of the KCS Act or to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, constituted as per the Industrial Disputes Act. Some of these aspects have been noted in a recent judgment of the Full Bench of this Court, in the reference order dated 30.08.2022 in WP(C) No.28826/2019 and connected cases, wherein it has been inter alia observed in paragraphs 110 and 111 thereof as follows: “110. These cases arose out of the judgments of this Court concerning irregularities in the selection by way of direct recruitment to certain posts in the Co-operative Societies concerned therein, on the ground that the impugned selection was in violation of the guidelines issued by the Registrar under Rule 182(5) of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules. The learned Single Judge of this Court held, that the selection notification and the impugned selection process, for direct recruitment, in those cases were in violation of the guidelines and circulars issued by the Registrar under Rule 182(5) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, and hence, had quashed the selection notification and impugned selection process, and directed the Co-operative Bank to conduct selection afresh, after inviting applications, in accordance with the guidelines and circulars issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, in terms of the above said statutory rules. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge was confirmed in Writ Appeal and the matter was taken up before the Apex Court, which led to the aforecited decision. 111. The decision of this Court that the impugned action of the Co-operative Societies, being in contravention of the statutory guidelines, could be interdicted, etc. was upheld by the Apex Court. In that case, what was involved was the violation of guidelines and circulars issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, in terms of the mandate contained in Rule 182(5) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, in the matter of selection by way of direct recruitment of open market candidates, to the posts covered in that Rule. In other words, it has been held that the impugned action of the Society could be interdicted where it is in breach or contravention of the statutory norms. In other words, it has been held that the impugned action of the Society could be interdicted where it is in breach or contravention of the statutory norms. Incidentally, it has also been held therein that the dispute regarding the alleged selection irregularities, committed by the Co-operative Society, in direct recruitment of open market candidates, cannot be the subject matter of dispute adjudication, in terms of Sec.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. None of the present cases before this Full Bench raises the said issue, inasmuch as these cases are concerned with service disputes of in-service employees of the Co-operative Society and not alleged selection irregularities in direct recruitment of open market candidates. The jurisdictional competence of the adjudicatory forum, under Sec.69 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, to enter service disputes of in-service employees is now well settled, in terms of the legal position enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforecited K. A. Annamma's case supra [ (2018) 2 SCC 729 ].” 11. So, it is now well settled that the jurisdiction under Section 69 of the KCS Act may not be available in a case involving alleged irregularities and illegalities in the selection process, for direct recruitment in Co-operative Societies, in view of the abovesaid aspects. Then, the issue is as to whether any other remedy is provided in terms of the KCS Act or the KCS Rules for meeting with such an eventuality. Rule 176 of the KCS Rules provides as follows: “176. Registrars power to rescind resolution:-Notwithstanding anything contained in the bye-laws of a registered, it shall be competent for the Registrar to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society.” 12. The Full Bench of this Court in the decision in Aji v. State of Kerala [ (1995) 1 KLT 363 (FB)] has held, in paragraph no.6 thereof, that the State Government has no power under any of the provisions of the KCS Act or the KCS Rules to interfere with the selection process of a Cooperative Society, as there is no provision in those Rules which directly authorizes the Government to interfere with the selection process of the Society. However, the Full Bench has held, in paragraph no.11 thereof, that it is not possible to hold that the Registrar's power is limited to supervision of financial dealings of a Society. Further that, Rule 176 clothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting or any Society or of the Committee of any Society, if it appears to him that such a resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the Society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the Society. Thus, the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society and he is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand and the contention, that the Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of the society, is not tenable. It may be pertinent to refer to paragraphs 6 & 11 of the abovesaid decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Aji's case supra, which read as follows: “6. At the outset, it has to be stated that the Government has no power under any provisions of the Act or rules to interfere with the selection process of a cooperative society. As there is no provision under the Act or Rules which authorises the Government to interfere with the selection process of the society, Ext. P-5 order cannot be sustained. In Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala ( 1992 (1) KLT 381 ) a Division Bench of this Court held that Government has no such power. As there is no provision under the Act or Rules which authorises the Government to interfere with the selection process of the society, Ext. P-5 order cannot be sustained. In Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala ( 1992 (1) KLT 381 ) a Division Bench of this Court held that Government has no such power. In Kottayam Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala ( 1988 (1) KLT 827 ) it was held that there cannot be an assumption that the Government has got the powers to intervene in the day-to-day administration of the co-operative society. In the said decision it was made clear that Government cannot restr11. It is not possible to hold that Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of the financial dealings of the society. Rule 176 clothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultravires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Byelaws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. Thus the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Contention that Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of the society is not tenable.ain bank from conducting interview for appointment of clerks. With regard to the power of the Court in Government in issuing Ext. P-5 order, counsel on both sides conceded the position that it cannot do it. 11. It is not possible to hold that Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of the financial dealings of the society. With regard to the power of the Court in Government in issuing Ext. P-5 order, counsel on both sides conceded the position that it cannot do it. 11. It is not possible to hold that Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of the financial dealings of the society. Rule 176 clothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultravires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. Thus the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. Registrar is vested 11. It is not possible to hold that Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of the financial dealings of the society. Rule 176 clothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultravires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. Thus the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Contention that Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of the society is not tenable. with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Contention that Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of the society is not tenable.” 13. The Full Bench of this Court in Aji's case supra was mainly concerned with allegations of irregularities in selection process, in direct recruitment wherein applications were invited and written test was conducted and interview was scheduled and complaints were filed against the said selection process, in which the Government directly intervened. 14. The Full Bench of this Court in Aji's case supra was mainly concerned with allegations of irregularities in selection process, in direct recruitment wherein applications were invited and written test was conducted and interview was scheduled and complaints were filed against the said selection process, in which the Government directly intervened. 14. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case in Purushothaman v. Registrar [ (1996) 2 KLT 26 (DB)], also dealt with the powers of the Joint Registrar/Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, for interfering in alleged irregularities of such selection process. In the said case, allegations of corruption and fraud and malpractice were alleged against the Managing Committee of the Bank and the report of the criminal investigation also revealed that the persons secured selection through back door methods etc. The Division Bench, in paragraph Nos. 8 & 9 in Purushothaman's case supra, held that, on an analysis of Rule 176, it can be seen that a Registrar can rescind a resolution only on the existence of the 4 circumstances mentioned therein. But, if the consequence of the decision under Rule 176 could result in cancellation of the appointment, then the same will result in adversarial consequences and therefore, in such cases, the notified Registrar will have to grant opportunity of being heard to the affected persons concerned before a decision is taken. It is not possible to hold that the Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of financial dealings of the society. Rule 176 clothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultravires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Byelaws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interests of the society. Thus, the position is abundantly clear, that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. The Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Hence the contention that the Registrar's power is limited only to supervising the financial dealings of the society is not tenable. Thus, the position is abundantly clear, that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. The Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Hence the contention that the Registrar's power is limited only to supervising the financial dealings of the society is not tenable. However, it has also been held, in paragraph no.11 thereof, that, where there is large scale fraud committed in the selection process of the Co-operative Society and candidates have been selected, by adopting back door methods, then the principles of natural justice may not be pressed by the candidates, who were parties to the fraud etc. (see paragraphs 8, 9 & 11 of Purushothaman's case supra) 15. Further, a Division Bench of this Court, in the case in Ibey Susan Isaac v. Anicadu Service Co-operative Bank Ltd, Pathanamthitta & Another [ (2013) 2 KHC 399 (DB)], dealt with a case of selection to posts of peons by direct recruitment conducted by the Co-operative Society mentioned therein. The Division Bench has held, in paragraph no.4 thereof that selection and appointment has been made after conducting the written examination and interview, as per the guidelines issued by the Registrar and that a circular produced as Ext.A5 therein has laid down the guidelines for selection and appointment, specifically prescribing that the notifications inviting applications should specifically mention the number of vacancies available. Further that, there is no rule enabling the Co-operative Society to prepare a rank list, pursuant to the selection notification therein and to make appointments to vacancies which arose in excess of the notified vacancies also from the ranklist so prepared, keeping the ranklist alive for a specified period etc. Hence, it was held that the appointment made by the respondent Co operative Society therein to the 4th post of Peon in the said Bank is clearly unsustainable and that the Joint Registrar, by issuing the impugned order at Ext.P10 therein, was justified in doing so and that the interference made by the learned Single Judge, with the said decision of the Joint Registrar, was held to be not sustainable. It will be profitable to refer to the contents of paragraph no.4 of the abovesaid decision of the Division Bench in Ibey Susan Isaac's case supra [ 2013 (2) KHC 399 (DB)], which reads as follows: “4. We have heard learned Special Government Pleader (Co-operative Societies) also. It will be profitable to refer to the contents of paragraph no.4 of the abovesaid decision of the Division Bench in Ibey Susan Isaac's case supra [ 2013 (2) KHC 399 (DB)], which reads as follows: “4. We have heard learned Special Government Pleader (Co-operative Societies) also. On a consideration of the arguments raised we are inclined to agree with the counsel for the appellant. In view of the decisions quoted by the leamed counsel for the appellant, two of which relate to appointments in Co operative Societies themselves, it is settled law that in the absence of any Rules for preparation of a rank list and appointment to vacancies which arose subsequent to the notification from the rank list during the currency of the rank list, no appointments can be made to vacancies in excess of the notified vacancies Reliance by the learned Single Judge on the decision in Kodakara Farmers Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Neena, 2010 (1) KHC 540 : 2010 (1) KLT 541 is clearly inapposite. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that decision was in the context of the sub-rules (1) to (4) of R.182 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, which specifically provide for preparation of a rank list and appointment to vacancies, which arose during the currency of the rank list from the rank list so prepared, which is applicable only to selection made by the Co-operative Service Examination Board to posts covered by S.80B of the Cooperative Societies Act. The post of peon has not been brought within the purview of the Examination Board under S.80B. The interpretation put to sub-rule (5) of R. 182 by the counsel for the 1st respondent does not appeal to us. Under R. 182(5) a separate procedure has been prescribed for selection to the post not covered by S.80(3)(a) and S.80B of the Co-operative Societies Act. The selection and appointment has to be made after conducting the written examination and interview as per the guidelines issued by the Registrar. The Registrar has in fact issued Ext. A5 circular laying down the guidelines for selection and appointment which specifically prescribe that the notification inviting applications should specifically mention the number of vacancies available. The selection and appointment has to be made after conducting the written examination and interview as per the guidelines issued by the Registrar. The Registrar has in fact issued Ext. A5 circular laying down the guidelines for selection and appointment which specifically prescribe that the notification inviting applications should specifically mention the number of vacancies available. That circular does not postulate preparation of a rank list and keeping it alive for a specified period and making appointments to subsequent vacancies arising during the currency of the rank list, in excess of the notified vacancies, from the rank list prepared. Therefore evidently there is no Rule enabling the 1st respondent bank to prepare a rank list pursuant to Ext. P1 notification and to make appointments to vacancies, which arose in excess of the notified vacancies also from the rank list so prepared keeping the rank list alive for a specified period. Therefore the appointment made by the 1st respondent to the 4th post of Peon in the 1st respondent bank is clearly unsustainable. As such Ext. P10 order of the Joint Registrar is perfectly valid and proper. Consequently quashing of that order by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable. Accordingly we allow the appeal setting aside the judgment dated 11/03/2010 of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) 6384/10 and restoring Ext. P10 order of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The Writ Appeal is allowed as above. ” 16. Therefore, the upshot of the above discussion is that now, it is well settled that the complaints, relating to alleged irregularities and illegalities in the selection and appointment process of direct recruitment to Co-operative Societies, is not amenable to adjudication in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act, before the Co-operative Arbitration Court. However, the notified Registrar has got the jurisdictional competence, in terms of Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, to interfere with such illegalities and irregularities in the selection process for direct recruitment, provided the 4 conditions, stipulated in Rule 176, are satisfied. However, the Joint Registrar is ordinarily bound to give reasonable opportunity of being heard to both the selected and appointed candidates as well as the Co-operative Society concerned before a decision is taken. However, the Joint Registrar is ordinarily bound to give reasonable opportunity of being heard to both the selected and appointed candidates as well as the Co-operative Society concerned before a decision is taken. Where the selection and appointment is made as against vacancies in excess of the notified vacancies, as per the selection notification or the selection and appointment is made to non-sanctioned posts etc, there cannot be any doubt that the Joint Registrar will have jurisdiction to interfere, in terms of Rule 176. 17. Counsel for the appellants would rely on the decision of the Division Bench, rendered in the case in Sivaprabha v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies and Anr., in the judgment rendered by this Court on 16.07.2018, in WA No.2119/2016, to contend that even in cases of selection irregularities in direct recruitment process, the jurisdiction that is available is only the one as per Rule 69. Reliance is also placed on a judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court in the case in Jayarani v. Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies [ 2016 (4) KLT 653 ]. A reading of the judgment in Sivaprabha's case supra, (WA No.2119/2016), does not fully make it clear as to whether the appointment process therein was in relation to direct recruitment or in the case of promotion of in-service employees etc. The judgment in WA No.2119/2016 has arisen out of the judgment dated 19.07.2016, rendered by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.8805/2010. A reading of the judgment in WP(C) No.8805/2010 would clearly indicate that the said case involved selection irregularities in direct recruitment to the post of Attender and Sales man in the Cooperative Society concerned therein. The learned Single Judge held, in the judgment in WP(C) No.8805/2010, that jurisdiction is available to the Joint Registrar, in terms of Rule 176, to interfere with such a matter. However, the Division Bench of this Court, as per the judgment rendered on 16.07.2018 in WA No.2119/2016 (Sivaprabha's case supra), has held that, even in such a case, the remedy to be invoked is the one in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act before the Co-operative Arbitration Court. However, the Division Bench of this Court, as per the judgment rendered on 16.07.2018 in WA No.2119/2016 (Sivaprabha's case supra), has held that, even in such a case, the remedy to be invoked is the one in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act before the Co-operative Arbitration Court. After examining the case laws on the point, it is to be noted that the judgment has been rendered on 16.07.2018 in WA No.2119/2016, without noticing the afore cited judgment rendered by the Apex Court on 20.08.2014 in Akalakkunnam Village Service Co-operative Bank's case (supra) [ 2014 (9) SCC 294 ] as well as the afore cited decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Aji's case (supra) [ 1995 (1) KLT 363 (FB)] (paragraph 11 thereof). Hence, it is only to be held that the legal position stated by the Division Bench of this Court, in the judgment dated 16.07.2018 in WA No.2119/2016 (Sivaprabha's case (supra)), does not reflect the correct legal position. So also, it has been held inter alia, in paragraph Nos.24 & 25 of the judgment rendered on 03.03.2016 by the learned Single Judge in Jayarani's case (supra) [ 2016 (4) KLT 653 ], that, even in a case of selection irregularities of direct recruitment, the jurisdiction that should be invoked is the one as per Section 69 of the KCS Act and not in terms of Rule 176 of the KCS Rules. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge, rendered on 03.03.2016, has not noted the judgment rendered by the Apex Court on 20.08.2014 in Akalakunnam Village Service Co-operative Bank's case (supra) [ 2014 (9) SCC 294 ]. Hence, it is only to be held that the said decision of the learned Single Judge, as contained in paragraphs 24 & 25 thereof, does not reflect the correct legal position, as the same has not noted the afore cited decision of the Apex Court in Akalakkunnam case (supra) as well as the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Aji's case (supra). Reliance has also been placed by the appellants on a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Prakasini v. Joint Registrar [ 2006 (1) KLT 199 ] to contend the afore decision that the sole jurisdiction that is available in such cases is the one in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act. Reliance has also been placed by the appellants on a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Prakasini v. Joint Registrar [ 2006 (1) KLT 199 ] to contend the afore decision that the sole jurisdiction that is available in such cases is the one in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act. A reading of the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge in Prakasini's case (supra) [ 2006 (1) KLT 199 ] would make it clear that the dispute therein was in relation to inter se seniority of in-service employees and that therefore it has been rightly held that the jurisdiction that is available is the one in terms of Section 69 of the KCS Act and that therefore, the said legal position, laid down in Prakasini's case supra, does not have any application to the facts of this case, which involves selection irregularities in direct recruitments. 18. In a case where the allegations of illegalities and irregularities in direct recruitment are those which can be discerned and determined on the basis of records and indisputable facts, then what is required in Rule 176 adjudication is only a summary enquiry, after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the selected candidates as well as the Co-operative Society concerned. However, there could be cases where allegations of malpractices, corruption, fraud etc are made in the selection process and the same would require some amount of proper enquiry and a mere summary enquiry may not suffice. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment case has rightly held that a detailed enquiry would be required in such cases. In such cases, it would be open to the notified Registrar to ensure the conduct of an inspection or enquiry, as contemplated in Section 66, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction and ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the allegations in that regard. Copies of such enquiry report should then be given to the affected persons and thereafter, it is for the Joint Registrar to take a decision under Rule 176, after hearing all the affected persons, as to the veracity or otherwise of such allegations. In the facts of this case, we are not concerned with such a scenario. 19. Copies of such enquiry report should then be given to the affected persons and thereafter, it is for the Joint Registrar to take a decision under Rule 176, after hearing all the affected persons, as to the veracity or otherwise of such allegations. In the facts of this case, we are not concerned with such a scenario. 19. Coming to the facts of this case, it can be seen that the appellants were included only as Rank Nos.4 & 6 among the 6 candidates included in Ext.P1 ranklist dated 29.06.2013. Ext.R3-(a) Selection notification dated 09.05.2013 has clearly stipulated that the notified vacancies are only 2 and further that the validity of the ranklist will be only up to 2 years therefrom. From a reading of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ibey Susan's case supra [ 2013 (2) KHC 399 (DB)] (paragraph No.4), it is seriously open to doubt as to whether the 1st respondent Co-operative Society could have stipulated that the validity period of the rank list could be two years, so as to fill up the vacancies arising during the currency of the rank list. For the time being, we will assume that the first respondent has power in that regard to stipulate the two year validity period of the rank list. Ext.P1 ranklist has thus, expired on 28.06.2015. There are no provisions in the KCS Rules or in any circulars issued by the Joint Registrar, empowering the 1st respondent to further extend the ranklist for a period of one year after the expiry of the first two year period. So, the action of the 1st respondent, in extending the validity of the ranklist for a further period of one year, is certainly illegal and unreasonable. Further, both the existing sanctioned vacancies were the two notified vacancies in Ext.R-3(a). Both those vacancies were filled up by appointing the first two rank holders from Ext.P1 and so, the sanctioned vacancies were exhausted by the said appointment process. The present appointments, as per Exts.P3 and P4, are certainly in excess of the notified vacancies. Further, when the appointments were made, as per Exts.P3 and P4 on 28.06.2016, there were no vacancies available in the post of Attender, inasmuch as the two regular incumbents in the post of Attenders were promoted only subsequently on 01.07.2016. The present appointments, as per Exts.P3 and P4, are certainly in excess of the notified vacancies. Further, when the appointments were made, as per Exts.P3 and P4 on 28.06.2016, there were no vacancies available in the post of Attender, inasmuch as the two regular incumbents in the post of Attenders were promoted only subsequently on 01.07.2016. Hence, it can be seen that the appellants were given appointment orders, as per Exts.P3 & P4 as against non-existing and non-sanctioned vacancies. These are simple factual aspects that can be ascertained from the records about which there can be no dispute. Hence, the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar has afforded opportunity of hearing to both the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, as well as to the appellants. So, a conduct of summary enquiry, with an opportunity of hearing to the affected persons, would fulfill the norms of fair and reasonable procedure. Hence, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the well considered decision of the 3rd respondent, as reflected in Ext.P15. 20. A contention is advanced by the Counsel for the Appellants that the impugned action, as per Ext.P15, has been triggered only by the unilateral intervention made by R6, by sending Ext.P11 letter to the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar and that the 6th respondent was also a member of the Managing Committee of the Society and that he had participated in the meeting of the Managing Committee, pursuant to which the appellants were appointed, in terms of Exts.P3 & P4. This is strongly denied by the counsel for R6. The counsel for the 1st respondent would point out that Ext.R3-(b) is a resolution dated 28.06.2016, pursuant to which a decision was taken to appoint the appellants, as per Exts.P3 & P4, and that the in the said meeting of the Managing Committee, R6 had not participated. Further, the learned Senior Government Pleader had filed memo dated 08.07.2019, at the writ petition stage, furnishing the instructions given by the respondent Joint Registrar, and that, after ascertaining the records of the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, as a matter of fact, R6 had not participated in the Managing Committee meeting of the Co-operative Society, which had taken the decision to appoint the appellants, as per Exts.P3 & P4. That apart, it is to be noted that R6 had only sent Ext.P7 letter, intimating the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar, that he has now proceeded further in the matter. The intervention, said to have been made by R6, cannot be the basis to challenge the legality and correctness of the decision of the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar, as per Ext.P15. The contesting respondent No.6 was a member of the Managing Committee of the Society and he certainly has the locus to make such a request. At any rate, the request made by him, as per Ext.P11, cannot be the basis to interfere with Ext.P15 decision of the 3rd respondent Joint Registrar, as the legality of the same has to be determined independent of that. Hence, we are constrained to overrule the abovesaid contention of the appellants as well. 21. We are told that the services of the appellants has been duly terminated, in compliance with Ext.P14. Hence, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the well considered verdict of the learned Single Judge in this WP(C). The plea of the appellants fail and accordingly the Writ Appeal will stand dismissed.