ORDER : J.J. Munir, J. 1. This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ-C No.57359 of 2013 dated January 17, 2022 dismissing the petitioner-appellant's writ petition and affirming an order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Allahabad in Appeal No. 8114 of 2013. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, by the order under challenge before the learned Single Judge, has reversed an appellate order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad in Appeal No. 23 of 2009 under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short "RDDBFI Act") and restored the auction sale dated October 13, 2009 in DRC No. 213 of 2002 by the Recovery Officer attached to the Tribunal in favour of Respondent No. 4 to this appeal, Ramu Jaiswal. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the petitioner-appellant purchased through a registered sale deed dated July 28, 1995 land comprising Arazi No. 286, situate at Village Kukradeo, District Kanpur Dehat from Harish Kumar son of Bhagwandas. Harish Kumar shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the judgment-debtor'. Upon the land being purchased by the petitioner, he established a small-scale industry. The property above described and purchased by the petitioner shall hereinafter be called 'the property in dispute'. Prior to execution of the sale deed in the petitioner-appellant's favour by the judgment-debtor, the latter had mortgaged his one-fourth share in the property in dispute in favour of Central Bank of India, Branch Sisamau, Kanpur Nagar in order to secure a loan that he had availed. The judgment-debtor had defaulted in the repayment of loan that he owed the Bank. The Bank filed Application No. 580 of 2000 for recovery of its outstandings amounting to Rs.10,68,844/- which was decided against the judgment-debtor by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. DRC No. 215 of 2002 was issued against the judgment-debtor in proceedings for enforcement of the certificate. 3. On April 2, 2009 the Recovery Officer fixed a date for holding the auction, scheduling it on June 10, 2009 at 11:00 a.m. On the said date, the auction could not be held. DRC No. 215 of 2002 was issued against the judgment-debtor in proceedings for enforcement of the certificate. 3. On April 2, 2009 the Recovery Officer fixed a date for holding the auction, scheduling it on June 10, 2009 at 11:00 a.m. On the said date, the auction could not be held. The Recovery Officer thereupon got a sale proclamation published in Amar Ujala Hindi Daily issue dated October 11, 2009 scheduling the auction for October 13, 2009 at 11:00 a.m. The order to do so was passed by the Recovery Officer on August 19, 2009. On October 13, 2009 the auction was held, with only one bidder, that is to say, Ramu Jaiswal/ Respondent No.4, who purchased the property in dispute for a sum of Rs.93,500/-. The petitioner-appellant challenged the aforesaid auction sale dated October 13, 2008 by preferring Misc. Appeal No. 23 of 2009 under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad (for short 'the Tribunal'). The confirmation in the auction sale was stayed by an interim order passed by the Tribunal on November 12, 2009 subject to deposit of Rs.92,200/- which the petitioner made good. The respondent No. 4, Ramu Jaiswal made an application for impleadment in the aforesaid appeal, but it appears that the application was dismissed for non-prosecution. The order of the Tribunal dated April 8, 2013 to which allusion would be made a little later, however, shows that the fourth respondent, who shall hereinafter be called 'the auction purchaser' appears to have been heard by the Tribunal and his case was considered in Appeal No. 23 of 2009, which was allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated April 8, 2013 on the ground that the right of redemption, that the petitioner had purchased from the judgment-debtor, would continue up to confirmation of the sale and the sale was not binding, so long as it was not confirmed. It was also held that the petitioner had already deposited the amount, for which the property in dispute was sold in favour of the fourth respondent. There was a further direction to refund the sale price to the auction purchaser, together with simple interest @ 10% per annum from the date of sale till full payment was made by the petitioner-appellant. 4. There was a further direction to refund the sale price to the auction purchaser, together with simple interest @ 10% per annum from the date of sale till full payment was made by the petitioner-appellant. 4. Upon an appeal carried to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad (for short 'the Appellate Tribunal') from the order of the Tribunal dated April 8, 2013, the Appellate Tribunal vide its order dated September 12, 2013 allowed the fourth respondent's appeal and set aside the order made by the Tribunal, reviving the order of the Recovery Officer, affirming the sale in favour of the auction purchaser. It was this order of the Appellate Tribunal that the petitioner-appellant had questioned before this Court in Writ-C No.57359 of 2013 that came up before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has upheld the determination of the Appellate Tribunal, restoring the auction sale in favour of the fourth respondent. 5. Aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the instant appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. 6. Heard Mr. Deepak Kumar Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, Mr. Gyan Prakash Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3 and Mr. S.K. Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Padmaker Pandey, learned counsel for Respondent No. 4. 7. The records have been carefully perused, including the affidavits that were exchanged before the learned Single Judge, together with the annexed documents. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant has assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that his right to challenge the auction sale held by the Recovery Officer under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act is in no way restricted by the provisions of Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short "the 1961 Act"). He submits that the provisions of Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act that make the provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the 1961 Act applicable with necessary modifications to recovery of debt due under the former Act, adjudged by the Tribunal have to be harmoniously construed with the provisions of Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act. 9. He submits that the provisions of Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act that make the provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the 1961 Act applicable with necessary modifications to recovery of debt due under the former Act, adjudged by the Tribunal have to be harmoniously construed with the provisions of Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act. 9. It is emphasized that the provisions of Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act make every order of the Recovery Officer appealable and that right cannot be curtailed for a judgment-debtor or other person aggrieved by order of the Recovery Officer, or even a person whose interest are affected by a sale held by the Recovery Officer, by subjecting the rights of any of the person(s) above named to the rigors of Rule 60 or 61 framed under the Second Schedule to the Transfer of Property Act. It is not that in every case where a sale is held and a person's right adversely affected by it, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant that an application under Rule 60 or 61 of the Rules framed under the Second Schedule has to be made in the first instance to the Recovery Officer and failing there, an appeal would lie to the Tribunal under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant submits that if such a construction were placed on the provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the RDDBFI Act, it would be whittle down the scope of the remedy under Section 30, which is available to any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer and is cast in the widest possible terms. 11. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant that the learned Single Judge has completely misapplied the provisions of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, which are not at all attracted to the facts of the present case. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has misconstrued a sale of the mortgagor's interest in favour of the petitioner-appellant by the judgment-debtor as creation of a second charge which the sale is not. He submits that the sale in favour of the petitioner-appellant can co-exist with the bank's charge based on the equitable mortgage. 12. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has misconstrued a sale of the mortgagor's interest in favour of the petitioner-appellant by the judgment-debtor as creation of a second charge which the sale is not. He submits that the sale in favour of the petitioner-appellant can co-exist with the bank's charge based on the equitable mortgage. 12. The learned counsel for respondent No.4 has supported the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge on both counts of its reasoning. The learned Single Judge has expressed opinion that a sale by the Recovery Officer in execution of a recovery certificate issued under RDDBFI Act has to be done in accordance with Rules 54 to 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act. It is submitted that the said rules are applicable by virtue of provision of Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. It is pointed out that the provisions of the Second and Third Schedule to the 1961 Act being applicable as far as possible, with necessary modifications for recovery of a debt due under the RDDBFI Act, those provisions have to be strictly complied with. The crux of the submissions that the learned Counsel for respondent No.4 has come up with and which has been the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal also, in one part, is that the petitioner-appellant having not preferred any objection(s) before the Recovery Officer, either under Section 60 or 61 of the Rules framed under the 1961 Act, his appeal from the order of the Recovery Officer holding the auction sale was not competent. 13. In order to appreciate the contention of learned Counsel for parties, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the RDDBFI Act, that read : "29. Application of certain provisions of Income-tax Act.--The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income-tax: Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the "assessee" shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under this Act. 30. 30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making such inquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive)." 14. Again, the provisions of Rules 54, 56, 57, 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act, that provide the mechanism for the recovery of tax envisaged under Section 222 and 276 of the 1961 Act, are extracted hereinbelow : "54. Mode of making proclamation.--(1) Every proclamation for the sale of immovable property shall be made at some place on or near such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the proclamation shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and also upon a conspicuous part of the office of the Tax Recovery Officer. (2) Where the Tax Recovery Officer so directs, such proclamation shall also be published in the Official Gazette or in a local newspaper, or in both; and the cost of such publication shall be deemed to be costs of the sale. (3) Where the property is divided into lots for the purpose of being sold separately, it shall not be necessary to make a separate proclamation for each lot, unless proper notice of the sale cannot, in the opinion of the Tax Recovery Officer, otherwise be given. 55. Time of sale.--No sale of immovable property under this Schedule shall, without the consent in writing of the defaulter, take place until after the expiration of at least thirty days calculated from the date on which a copy of the proclamation of sale has been affixed on the property or in the office of the Tax Recovery Officer, whichever is later. 56. 56. Sale to be by auction.--The sale shall be by public auction to the highest bidder and shall be subject to confirmation by the Tax Recovery Officer: Provided that no sale under this rule shall be made if the amount bid by the highest bidder is less than the reserve price, if any, specified under clause (cc) of rule 53. 57. Deposit by purchaser and resale in default.--(1) On every sale of immovable property, the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay, immediately after such declaration, a deposit of twenty-five per cent on the amount of his purchase money, to the officer conducting the sale; and, in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be resold. (2) The full amount of purchase money payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the Tax Recovery Officer on or before the fifteenth day from the date of the sale of the property. 58. Procedure in default of payment.--In default of payment within the period mentioned in the preceding rule, the deposit may, if the Tax Recovery Officer thinks fit, after defraying the expenses of the sale, be forfeited to the Government, and the property shall be resold, and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claims to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may subsequently be sold. 59. Authority to bid.--(1) Where the sale of a property, for which a reserve price has been specified under clause (cc) of rule 53, has been postponed for want of a bid of an amount not less than such reserve price, it shall be lawful for an Assessing Officer, if so authorised by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner in this behalf, to bid for the property on behalf of the Central Government at any subsequent sale. (2) All persons bidding at the sale shall be required to declare, if they are bidding on their own behalf or on behalf of their principals. In the latter case, they shall be required to deposit their authority, and in default their bids shall be rejected. (2) All persons bidding at the sale shall be required to declare, if they are bidding on their own behalf or on behalf of their principals. In the latter case, they shall be required to deposit their authority, and in default their bids shall be rejected. (3) Where the Assessing Officer referred to in sub-rule (1) is declared to be the purchaser of the property at any subsequent sale, nothing contained in rule 57 shall apply to the case and the amount of the purchase price shall be adjusted towards the amount specified in the certificate. 60. Application to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit.--(1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale, on his depositing-- (a) the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, with interest thereon at the rate of one and one-fourth per cent for every month or part of a month], calculated from the date of the proclamation of sale to the date when the deposit is made; and (b) for payment to the purchaser, as penalty, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, but not less than one rupee. (2) Where a person makes an application under rule 61 for setting aside the sale of his immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule. 61. (2) Where a person makes an application under rule 61 for setting aside the sale of his immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule. 61. Application to set aside sale of immovable property on ground of non-service of notice or irregularity.--Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, such Income-tax Officer as may be authorised by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner in this behalf, the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale of the immovable property on the ground that notice was not served on the defaulter to pay the arrears as required by this Schedule or on the ground of a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale: Provided that--(a) no sale shall be set aside on any such ground unless the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of the non-service or irregularity; and (b) an application made by a defaulter under this rule shall be disallowed unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in the execution of the certificate." 15. The learned Counsel for respondent No.4 has emphasized that there was no application by the petitioner-appellant before the Recovery Officer to whom the provisions of Rules 54 to 61 framed under the 1961 Act are applicable, seeking to exercise his right as a person whose interests were affected by the sale under Rule 60, or under Rule 61 on the ground that notice was not served on the defaulter to pay the arrears, as required by the Schedule or that there was a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. The petitioner, from the order of auction sale dated October 13, 2009 had straightway appealed to the Tribunal under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, which was, therefore, not maintainable. 16. In addition, it has also been argued that upon initiation of recovery proceedings by the Recovery Officer attached to the Tribunal, the petitioner-appellant had filed objections that were rejected by the Recovery Officer vide order dated October 28, 2006, which remain unchallenged. 16. In addition, it has also been argued that upon initiation of recovery proceedings by the Recovery Officer attached to the Tribunal, the petitioner-appellant had filed objections that were rejected by the Recovery Officer vide order dated October 28, 2006, which remain unchallenged. The learned Single Judge has accepted the petitioner-appellant's contention on this score, firstly on the reasoning that after the auction proceedings were held ending in favour of the fourth respondent on October 13, 2009, the petitioner did not take any steps to repay the outstanding loan. Rather, the earlier challenge that he had laid to the proceedings before the Recovery Officer on October 18, 2010 remained unfruitful. Now, so far as the order dated October 28, 2006 rejecting the petitioner-appellant's objections to the recovery proceedings on the ground of his independent rights as the mortgagor's transferee are concerned, the same does not impair the petitioner-appellant's right to challenge after the auction sale was held, as that is the statutory right of the petitioner-appellant under Rules 60 and 61 of the Rules framed under the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act. That right accrues only after the auction sale is held and not earlier. Therefore, the finality attached to the order dated October 28, 2006, so far as the present cause of action is concerned, post auction is not at all relevant. The learned Single Judge has particularly emphasized the point that the proclamation for sale is governed by Rules 54, 55, 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in C.N. Paramasivam and another v. Sunrise Plaza through Partner and others, (2013) 9 SCC 460 to remark that the rules are mandatory in character and their breach would render the auction non-est in the eyes of law. But, relying on C.N. Paramasivam (supra) the learned Single Judge has further held that the Rules being mandatory in nature, the petitioner-appellant would get a right to ask the sale to be set aside under Rule 60, provided he made an application to set aside the same within 30 days of the auction sale upon depositing the amount specified in the sale proclamation together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The learned Single Judge has held that here the petitioner-appellant never moved an application under the said Rule and challenged the auction sale by filing an appeal, where an interim order was passed, directing him to deposit an amount equal to that for which the auction sale was made. It was remarked that the petitioner-appellant's case is based on an advantage that he seeks to derive out of the said interim order, or so, the petitioner-appellant's argument proceeds. The learned Single Judge has then held that it would be relevant to note that the petitioner-appellant has never taken any steps or deposited any amount towards the outstanding loan to show his bona fides before the interim order was passed. It has been held that the petitioner-appellant has not exercised his right, if any, as provided under the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act and therefore, the submission that there was no adherence to those Rules by the Recovery Officer, is not available to the petitioner-appellant. 17. On the above count, it appears that the learned Single Judge was of opinion that the right of appeal under Section 30 could not be exercised by the petitioner-appellant, unless as a person whose interest was affected by the sale, he had made an application to the Recovery Officer within 30 days of the auction sale, asking the sale to be set aside by making the necessary deposits under Section 60, or made an application in terms of Rule 61. He could not have simply appealed under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act without making either an application under Rule 60 or 61 before the Recovery Officer. 18. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge on this score does not appeal to us, because it is not that the provisions of the relevant Rules for recovery under the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act are applicable in derogation of the right of a person aggrieved by any order of the Recovery Officer made under the RDDBFI Act, to prefer an appeal under Section 30 of the said Act to the Tribunal. An appeal under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act can be preferred by a person aggrieved by the Recovery Officer's orders, notwithstanding the fact that he has not invoked the provisions of Rule 60 or 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act. An appeal under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act can be preferred by a person aggrieved by the Recovery Officer's orders, notwithstanding the fact that he has not invoked the provisions of Rule 60 or 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act. This is so because Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act opens with a non-obstante clause that gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Section 30 of the said Act. It is Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, extracted hereinabove, that makes provisions of Second Schedule of the 1961 Act applicable to proceedings for recovery under the RDDBFI Act. The application of the Rules, including Rules 60 and 61 of the Rules under the Second Schedule of the 1961 Act to a recovery under the RDDBFI Act cannot, therefore, be construed in a manner so as to derogate from the plenary right of a person aggrieved by the Recovery Officer's order of any kind to appeal to the Tribunal. 19. The aforesaid question fell for consideration very recently before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sarang Avinash Kamtaker v. Alpha Organic and others, MANU/MH/1202/2022, where considering an identical contention, the Division Bench held : "22. So far as the contention raised by learned Counsel on behalf of Kamtekar that Alpha Organic failed to invoke the provisions of Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule of the IT Act, in the absence of which, the Appeal is not tenable, we find that the DRAT for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 12 rightly came to the conclusion that the said contention on behalf of Kamtekar deserves to be rejected. Rule 60 of the Second Schedule of the IT Act provides for setting aside of the sale of the immovable property by deposit of the amount specified in the proclamation of sale and interest thereon along with penalty for payment to the purchasers within 30 days from the date of the sale. Rule 61 provides for setting aside the sale on ground of non-service of notice or irregularity. Section 30 (1) of the RDDB & FI Act provides for an Appeal. Rule 61 provides for setting aside the sale on ground of non-service of notice or irregularity. Section 30 (1) of the RDDB & FI Act provides for an Appeal. It reads thus:- "30(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal." 23. Section 30 (1) starts with a non-obstante clause. The DRAT in support of its conclusion that Section 30 (1) overrides Section 29 of the RDDB & FI Act, took support from the observation of this Court in Hill Properties Ltd. (supra). We may usefully refer to paragraph 29 of the said decision which reads thus:- "29. Section 30 as now substituted by Act 1 of 2000 begins with a non-obstante clause. A person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer may within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 30 a power is given to set aside or modify an order made under Sections 25 to 28. Section 30 co-jointly with Section 29 would mean that irrespective of the Appellate remedy provided in Part VI of IInd Schedule (Rule 86) to the I.T. Act an Appeal would lie to the Tribunal in respect of orders made under the Second Schedule to the I.T. Act. We may clarify that considering the language of Rule 11(6) an appeal would not lie under Rule 86 of the Second Schedule. Therefore, under Section 30 even if an appeal as provided under Rule 86 is not available because of Rule 11(6) making the order of the Recovery Officer conclusive, nevertheless Section 30 of the Act provides a remedy by way of Appeal against the order passed under the IInd Schedule. We may clarify here that Section 20 is a provision for Appeal from an order of the Tribunal, when Section 30 is a provision for appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer." 24. Section 30 thus provides for an appellate forum against any orders of the Recovery Officer which may not be in accordance with law. We may clarify here that Section 20 is a provision for Appeal from an order of the Tribunal, when Section 30 is a provision for appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer." 24. Section 30 thus provides for an appellate forum against any orders of the Recovery Officer which may not be in accordance with law. The contention of learned Counsel on behalf of Kamtekar that unless the provisions of Rules 60 and 61 are resorted to, the Appeal under Section 30 is not maintainable can only be stated to be rejected." 20. The aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court follows an earlier decision in Hill Properties Limited v. Union Bank of India & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 10362. 21. The same issue fell for consideration before the Madras High Court in Nazims Continental and others v. The Indian Overseas Bank, Triplicane Branch, Madras and others, 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 862, where it was held : "20. In view of the provisions of law and finding of the Court and discussions made above, we hold that the recovery officer has also jurisdiction to entertain an application under rules 60, 61 and 62 of Part-III of 2nd Schedule to the Income Tax Act and in case any person is aggrieved against such order, may prefer appeal u/s 30 of the Act, 1993. As the defaulter or any person whose interests are affected by sale is supposed to pay the pre-deposit amount under Rule 60 and a defaulter required to pay pre-deposit amount under Rule 61 except the person whose interests are affected due to non-service of notice on defaulter to pay the arrears or material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale should apply under Rule 61 or the purchaser, who may file application under Rule 62, who are not liable to pre-deposit any amount, in such case, for preferring an appeal u/s 30 of Act, 1993, against an order of recovery officer under Rules 60, 61 or 62, no pre-deposit amount required to be deposited. 21. Section 30 starts with non obstante clause, as evident from the said provision and quoted hereunder:-- "30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer. 21. Section 30 starts with non obstante clause, as evident from the said provision and quoted hereunder:-- "30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making such enquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive)." In the case of Union of India v. I.C. Lala ( AIR 1973 SC 2204 ), Supreme Court held that non obstante clause does not mean that the whole of the said provision of law has to be made applicable or the whole of the other law has to be made inapplicable. It is the duty of the Court to avoid the conflict and construe the provisions to that they are harmonious. 22. Mode of recovery of debt is prescribed u/s 25 of DRT Act, as quoted hereunder:-- "25. Modes of recovery of debts.- The Recovery Officer shall, on receipt of the copy of the certificate under sub-section (7) of section 19, proceed to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by one or more of the following modes, namely:-- (a) attachment and sale of the movable or immovable property of the defendant; (b) arrest of the defendant and his detention in prison; (c) appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant." From the aforesaid provision it will be evident that apart from attachment and sale of movable or immovable property of the defendant, the recovery officer, under the said provision, may proceed to recover the amount of debt by arresting the defendant and his detention in prison or by appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant. Those two provisions made under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 25 cannot be challenged before the Recovery Officer under II or III Schedule of Income Tax Act. Those two provisions made under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 25 cannot be challenged before the Recovery Officer under II or III Schedule of Income Tax Act. Therefore, except by preferring an application (appeal) u/s 30 against the order of recovery officer, any aggrieved person has no other option. It cannot be said that for sale of movable or immovable property as made under II Schedule to Income Tax. Act, including Rules 60 or 61 or 62 of Part-III of II Schedule, then by way of appeal only u/s 30 could be preferred and no such appeal could be preferred directly against the order of attachment and sale of movable or immovable property of the defendant, if recovery officer pass such order u/s 25. Therefore, we hold that against the order of attachment and sale of movable or immovable property of defendant, who are the defendants before the Tribunal, an aggrieved person, instead of moving application under Rule 60 of 61 or 62, may also prefer an application (appeal) u/s 30 of the Act, 1993. Therefore, there being a concurrent jurisdiction, DRT u/s 30 and recovery officer under Rules 60, 61 and 62 of Part-III of II Schedule of Income Tax Act in regard to movable property and jurisdiction of Tribunal under Part-II of II Schedule of Income Tax Act in regard to movable property, application of any defendant cannot be entertained by Tribunal u/s 30 without pre-deposit of the amount in terms with Rules 60 or 61 bypassing the jurisdiction of the recovery officer under the aforesaid provisions of II Schedule of Income Tax Act. Further, the auction purchaser being not a defendant in the original application u/s 19, cannot file an appeal u/s 30 against the order of recovery officer, if it intends to prefer an application, if under the provision of Rule 62 of Part-III of II Schedule to Income Tax Act." (emphasis by Court) 22. The aforesaid position of the law makes it pellucid that it is not imperative for a defaulter or any person whose interest is affected by the sale held by the Recovery Officer acting under the RDDBFI Act to take resort to the provisions of Section 60 or 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act. The aforesaid position of the law makes it pellucid that it is not imperative for a defaulter or any person whose interest is affected by the sale held by the Recovery Officer acting under the RDDBFI Act to take resort to the provisions of Section 60 or 61 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act. Doing a harmonious constructions of the provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the RDDBFI Act, the right of a person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer under the aforesaid Act cannot be confined in the manner that he must of necessity invoke Rule 60 of 61 by making an application before the Recovery Officer in the first instance and against the order of the Recovery Officer, come up in appeal under Section 30. If that were done, it would whittle down the scope of the appellate powers of the Tribunal against all orders of the Recovery Officer, that include an order of attachment, auction and sale prior to its confirmation. If the challenge is laid on grounds completely different from those envisaged under Rule 60 of the Rules framed under the Second Schedule of the 1961 Act, there may not be any requirement of deposit at all. The challenge may be on grounds like those envisaged under Rule 61 of the Rules aforesaid or on any other ground. 23. Mindful of the fact that the petitioner-appellant was claiming to redeem the mortgagor's interest, akin to an objection under Rule 60, the Tribunal directed the petitioner-appellant to deposit the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as the one for which the recovery was ordered. The petitioner-appellant, accordingly, deposited a sum of Rs.92,200/- on 13.11.2009. The Tribunal, therefore, permitted the petitioner-appellant, who had stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor-mortgagor through a registered sale deed of the mortgagor's estate, to exercise the equity of redemption and set aside the sale, subject to the condition that the petitioner-appellant would have to bear all expenses of the sale, pay poundage fees and further pay 10% simple interest to the auction purchaser till payment was made. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that since the petitioner-appellant had not followed the procedure prescribed under Rule 60 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act, he could not ask the auction sale, not yet confirmed, to be set aside through an appeal under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act. 24. The other principle on which the learned Single Judge has held against the petitioner-appellant is that 'property once mortgaged is always mortgaged'. That principle is applicable to preserve and keep intact the mortgagee's estate. It does not militate against the mortgagor's right to redeem or transfer his interest in favour of a third party, who would then acquire as part of the mortgagor's estate the equity of redemption. 25. The learned Single Judge has proceeded to conclude against the petitioner-appellant on another facet of the right that the petitioner-appellant acquired from the judgment-debtor through the registered sale deed of July 28, 1995. The learned Single Judge held as follows : "14. There is another issue which would also be relevant for adjudication of present case that Section 48 of TP Act, 1882 provides that no right will be created by way of second charge on the property without discharging the first charge." 26. Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short "TP Act") reads : "48. Priority of rights created by transfer.--Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immoveable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created." 27. In the opinion of this Court, in applying the principle of priority amongst transferees to infer that the sale deed dated July 28, 1995 could not have been executed by the judgment-debtor so long as he had not rid the property of the mortgage, subject to which he had availed the loan from the Bank, the learned Single Judge was not right because Section 48 of the TP Act gives priority to an earlier right or clogs a later created right, if the two sets of rights cannot exist together or be exercised to their full extent together. The sale of the mortgagor's right, which could be no more than the right to redeem after paying off the mortgage debt, is in no way one that cannot co-exist with the mortgagee's interest or charge on the property held by the mortgagor's transferee. The sale by the mortgagor would not in any way impair the mortgagee's right or militate against his security unless it could be shown that the transfer in fact would impair it. This could be the case, if the mortgagor were to transfer the right to a person or entity, who under the law would take it free from all encumbrance. The sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner-appellant does not in any manner rid the property of the bank's encumbrance, traceable to the mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is only a change of hand or name or identity of the mortgagor with no impairment of the security. 28. However, all that Section 48 of the TP Act postulates is that the purchaser of the mortgagor's interest would take it as much subject to the mortgage as the original owner. An indication of this principle in the context of Section 48 of the TP Act is discernible in the remarks of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sh. Ishar Dass Malhotra v. Sh. Dhanwant Singh and others, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 284, which say : "8. ........ It will thus be seen that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is like any other mortgage and there is a transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. The question, therefore, of the subsequent purchaser having bought the property subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds bona fide, with or without notice, is of no relevance. The subsequent purchaser cannot avoid the mortgage by leading evidence to show that he made all reasonable inquiries to find out if the property was subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or not. S.48 of the T.P. Act does not admit of any such exception. The subsequent purchaser cannot avoid the mortgage by leading evidence to show that he made all reasonable inquiries to find out if the property was subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or not. S.48 of the T.P. Act does not admit of any such exception. According to this section, when a person purports to create, by transfer at different times, rights in or over the same immovable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created. Further, proviso to S.48 of the Registration Act enacts that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds shall take effect as against any mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered relating to the same property. Thus, a subsequent sale cannot have priority over a mortgage by deposit of title deeds created before the sale......" (emphasis by Court) 29. The principle embodied in Section 48 of the TP Act is succinctly stated in Nagalinga Nadar v. K. Mehrunisa Begum, 1979 SCC OnLine Mad 146, where it was held : "17. There is yet another objection raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent, according to whom, no question of bona fide purchase by the appellant without notice would arise at all, in view of S. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is his contention that the question of bona fide purchase or other acquisition of title without notice are confined to cases, which have all been provided for under the Transfer of Property Act under Ss. 39, 41, 43, 53, 53-A and 100 and inasmuch as S. 48 is not one of them, the appellant cannot claim that he is a bona fide purchaser from the second respondent without notice. 39, 41, 43, 53, 53-A and 100 and inasmuch as S. 48 is not one of them, the appellant cannot claim that he is a bona fide purchaser from the second respondent without notice. S. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act runs thus: "Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immovable property and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall; in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees; be subject to the rights previously created:" It is not in dispute that the mortgage had been earlier created by the second respondent in favour of the first respondent on 17th January, 1966 and the sale had later been effected by the second respondent in favour of the appellant on 10th January, 1973. It is also seen that the first respondent's rights as mortgagee over the property and the rights of the appellant as a purchaser of the property free from encumbrance cannot co-exist or be exercised to their full extent together and there is no special contract or binding reservation. It would therefore follow that the sale in favour of the appellant is subject to the mortgage in favour of the first respondent. In this connection, the learned counsel for the first respondent invited our attention to the decision in Arunachala Asari v. Sivan Perumal Asari, AIR 1970 Mad 226 . Though the question that arose therein was with reference to the question of priority with reference to S. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act and Ss. 47 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act, Ramamurthy, J. dealt with the true scope of S. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act. At page 533, the learned Judge observed thus: "S. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is founded upon the equally important principle that no man can convey a better title than what he has. If a person had already effected a transfer, he cannot derogate from his grant and deal with the property free from the rights created under the earlier transaction. His prior title as absolute and free owner is curtailed or diminished by rights already created under the earlier transcation. If a person had already effected a transfer, he cannot derogate from his grant and deal with the property free from the rights created under the earlier transaction. His prior title as absolute and free owner is curtailed or diminished by rights already created under the earlier transcation. S. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is absolute in its terms and does not contain any protection or reservation in favour of a subsequent transferee who has no knowledge of the prior transfer. Knowledge or no-knowledge, a subsequent transferee cannot claim any priority as against an earlier transferee. Whenever the Legislature desires to protect the rights of a transferee in good faith for consideration, specific provision to that effect is made--Vide for instance, S. 27 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and Ss. 38 to 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, In all other cases, the well settled rule that a man cannot derogate from his grant will have to be applied." (emphasis by Court) 30. Thus, the view of the learned Single Judge that Section 48 of the TP Act would lead to the result that no right can be created in favour of the petitioner-appellant does not accord with the law. The prior transfer that is a mortgage in favour of the bank can certainly coexist with a transfer of mortgagor's estate or interest in favour of the petitioner-appellant by the judgment-debtor. It is just that the petitioner-appellant will hold it subject to the mortgagee's interest to secure repayment of his debt. That has been ensured in the present case by the petitioner-appellant under orders of the Tribunal since set at naught by the Appellate Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. The Tribunal, in our view, was right in saying that it is always open to the mortgagor or a purchaser of the charged property, to redeem the property by paying off the creditor. The Tribunal has rightly remarked that the right of redemption of mortgage is a statutory right, which can only be extinguished in one of the ways mentioned in paragraph 2 of Section 60 of the TP Act. 31. There is another reason why the learned Single Judge would have thought that Section 48 of the TP Act would hinder creation of any right in favour of the petitioner-appellant. 31. There is another reason why the learned Single Judge would have thought that Section 48 of the TP Act would hinder creation of any right in favour of the petitioner-appellant. This is because he considered the transfer to the petitioner-appellant during the subsistence of the bank's mortgage a second charge without discharging the first charge. What was transferred to the petitioner-appellant was not at all any kind of a mortgagee's interest or created a further charge on the property already mortgaged with the Bank. It was, in fact, transfer of the larger estate of the mortgagor, which cannot be called a charge on the property. Therefore also, in our opinion, the view taken by the learned Single Judge and the Appellate Tribunal does not commend to us. In the opinion of this Court, the law entitles the petitioner-appellant to exercise his right that he has purchased from the judgment-debtor, that is the right to redeem the mortgaged property to the same extent and the manner in which the judgment-debtor could have done. 32. However, while setting aside the auction sale, the interest of the auction purchaser also have to be protected, keeping in view the spirit of Rule 60 of the Rules framed under the Second Schedule of the 1961 Act, and also, in order to adjust equities. This the Court proposes to do by awarding an appropriate rate and term of interest to the auction purchaser payable by the petitioner-appellant. 33. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition stands allowed. The order dated 19.09.2013 passed by the Appellate Tribunal is hereby quashed and the order dated 08.03.2013 passed by the Tribunal setting aside the auction sale dated 13.10.2009 is restored with the modification that the auction purchaser-respondent no.4 shall be entitled to refund of the purchase price deposited by him with the Recovery Officer from the petitioner-appellant together with compound interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date it was deposited by the auction purchaser with the Recovery Officer till deposit in these terms is made by the petitioner-appellant with the Recovery Officer.