JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Jitendera S. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prabhu Dayal Agrawal, learned counsel for the State and Mr. P.S. Dayal, learned counsel for the informant. 2.This petition has been filed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Argora P.S. Case No. 245 of 2019 registered under sections 406, 420, 323, 341, 384, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal code, pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Ranchi. 3. Complainant Deepak Sahu has filed a complaint petition before the court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi and same has been registered as Complaint Case No. 3247 of 2018 and thereafter same has been sent to the Argora Police Station under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for institution of First Information Report wherein it has been alleged that the accused persons made contact with the complainant at the residence of the complainant and they told to the complainant in the presence of the witnesses that they are interested to sale their land bearing Khata Nio. 15, Plot No. 1427, Thana No. 228, Mouza Pundag. Thereafter the accused persons shown the documents regarding the ownership of the land to the complainant in presence of witnesses and after seeing the said documents of landed property of all accused persons the complainant became ready to purchase the same in his name and thereafter the complainant started making payment as advance to all accused persons in different dates and also issued money receipt after taking the amount in favour of complainant. It is further stated that all accused persons jointly received a sum of Rs. 17,24,700/- from the complainant in the name of sale-purchase of said land with a promise to execute sale deed in favour of complainant on or before year, 2015. It is further alleged that after repeatedly request made by the complainant to execute the sale deed in his favour, the accused persons started delaying practice. In the month of December, 2017 complainant came to know that the accused persons are trying to sale out the said land to other persons and they have also received the advance amount from the said persons. Thereafter the complainant went to take the possession of the said land then the accused persons accepted that they have received advance amount for the said land from the other persons and after taken a huge amount of Rs. Thereafter the complainant went to take the possession of the said land then the accused persons accepted that they have received advance amount for the said land from the other persons and after taken a huge amount of Rs. 17,24,700/- they did not execute the sale deed in the favaour of complainant. Thereafter the complainant told the accused persons that he will go to lodge a case against them then they promised to return the entire amount of Rs. 17,24,700/- with interest on or before the month of May, 2018. It is further alleged that after lapse of promised period when the accused persons did not return the amount of the complainant and sale out the entire land to different persons. On 03.06.2018 a meeting was held between the parties wherein the accused persons denied to return the complainant’s amount and also refused to execute the sale deed of the said land in favour of the complainant. 4. Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the complaint which is civil in nature, the learned court without application of mind has sent the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the police to register and investigate the case which is against the mandate of law. To buttress his argument he relied on judgement in the case of “Priyanka Srivastava & Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others” reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 . On the same point, he further relied on judgment in the case of “Babu Venkatesh & Others Vs. State of Karnataka & Another” (Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2022) reported in 2022 (2) JLJR SC 1. Referring to the complaint petition, he further submits that the entire allegation is with regard to transaction of land and without taking recourse under the civil law, criminal law has been put in motion against the petitioners who are owner of the land. According to him in the case in hand there is no application of judicial mind in sending the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. By referring section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., he further submits that procedure has been prescribed to examine the complainant and postponement of issue of process. He further submits that there are series of agreements between the petitioner and complainant who is power of attorney holder of the petitioner and many land has been transacted on the said power of attorney. He further submits that there are series of agreements between the petitioner and complainant who is power of attorney holder of the petitioner and many land has been transacted on the said power of attorney. On these grounds, he submits that the F.I.R. is fit to be quashed. 5. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Dayal, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 submits that complaint has been filed and Magistrate is required to proceed under section 202 Cr.P.C. He further submits that learned Magistrate has rightly sent the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. He further submits that Priyanka Srivastava (supra) case is not applicable in the case in hand. According to him in that case there was direct prayer to send the matter under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and in that view of the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court interfered with the matter and quashed the proceeding. So far as case of Babu Venkatesh (supra) is concerned, he submits that fact of the case in hand is different from that case. In that case civil suit was going on and subsequently, affidavit has not been filed, therefore the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the proceeding. He further submits that at this stage, the court is not required to roam to look into other documents to come to the conclusion that no case is made out. To buttress his argument he relied on judgement in the case of “M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.” reported in 2021 (3) JBCJ 10(SC). He relied on Direction Nos. i to vii at para 23 of the said judgment which are quoted here-in-below:- “23. (i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;” 6. Learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 further submits that there is no prayer of quashing of order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. On these grounds, he submits that at this stage, no interference is required by this Court. 7.Mr. Prabhu Dayal Agrawal, learned counsel for the State submits that it is discretionary power of the Magistrate to apply his mind and send the complaint to the police for further investigation. 8.In the light of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the Court has gone through the materials on record. Seeing the complaint, it transpires that for non-execution of sale deed, complaint has been filed. Looking into the entire complaint, further it transpires that the complaint is not affidavit. Once the complaint is filed, the Magistrate is empowered to proceed in terms of section 200 Cr.P.C. and he is having three options;(i) to examine the complaint himself by way of solemn affirmation and proceed. (ii) he may in such a situation refer the matter to the police under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and (iii) by such other person as in terms of sub section 1 of section 202 Cr.P.C. 9.In the case in hand admittedly the learned court below has not examined the complaint that is why the complainant has not been called upon to make his statement on Solemn Affirmation. The learned court below referred the matter to the police under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Referring the matter under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. judicial mind of the court is required. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there should be application of mind while passing an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In that case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with several judgments and law has been laid down in para 27, 29, 30 and 31. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there should be application of mind while passing an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In that case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with several judgments and law has been laid down in para 27, 29, 30 and 31. In para 27 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. It has been held that the application which has been filed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must be affidavited to show that the person who has filed the complaint may be responsible. There was no prior invocation in terms of section 154 Cr.P.C. 10. The another aspect of the matter is that once the complaint has been referred under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and the same has been registered whether the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under section 482 Cr.P.C. can quash the entire proceeding or not. Seeing the burden upon the Magistrate, if on a reading of complaint he finds the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and that the forwarding of the complaint to the police station for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. will be conducive and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into the matter and considering this aspect of the matter whether High Court is required to quash the criminal proceeding when the entire allegation is hazy and not reflected. The stage of cognizance would arise only after investigation is concluded it can be safely said that this is premature of filing of this petition. Reference may be made to the case of “HDFC Securities Limited & Others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another” reported in (2017) 1 SCC 640 , in which section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held in para 9, 10, 24 and 27 as under:- “9. On the contrary, before the High Court it was submitted on behalf of Respondent 2 that an order under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code requiring investigation by the police does not cause any injury of irreparable nature which requires quashing of the investigation. On the contrary, before the High Court it was submitted on behalf of Respondent 2 that an order under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code requiring investigation by the police does not cause any injury of irreparable nature which requires quashing of the investigation. It is further stated that the stage of cognizance would arise after the investigation report is filed. Therefore, the application filed by the appellants before the High Court is nothing but premature and thus there is no need for exercising the powers of the High Court either under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code. Further contention of the respondent before the High Court was that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code should be sparingly used. 10. The High Court held that the direction given to the police by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code for carrying out the investigation into the complaint and to submit a report, cannot give a right to the appellants for quashing the same since such an order would be based absolutely on speculations upon the report not filed. Further, it would result in prejudging the complaint. In these circumstances, the High Court dismissed the said application. ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 24. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent submitted that the complaint has disclosed the commission of an offence which is cognizable in nature and in the light of Lalita Kumari case, registration of FIR becomes mandatory. We observe that it is clear from the use of the words “may take cognizance” in the context in which they occur, that the same cannot be equated with “must take cognizance”. The word “may” gives discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and that the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter, which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. It is settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, do not disclose the commission of an offence. ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 27. It appears to us that the appellants approached the High Court even before the stage of issuance of process. In particular, the appellants challenged the order dated 4-1-2011 passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants after summarising their arguments in the matter have emphasised also in the context of the fundamental rights of the appellants under the Constitution, that the order impugned has caused grave inequities to the appellants. In the circumstances, it was submitted that the order is illegal and is an abuse of the process of law. However, it appears to us that this order under Section 156(3) CrPC requiring investigation by the police, cannot be said to have caused an injury of irreparable nature which, at this stage, requires quashing of the investigation. We must keep in our mind that the stage of cognizance would arise only after the investigation report is filed before the Magistrate. Therefore, in our opinion, at this stage the High Court has correctly assessed the facts and the law in this situation and held that filing of the petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 CrPC, at this stage are nothing but premature. Further, in our opinion, the High Court correctly came to the conclusion that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 CrPC should be sparingly used.” 11.There are allegations of inducement. The learned Magistrate has sent the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) there was complaint on the allegation of inducement and in absence of affidavit, bank officers were called upon to face the trial in that scenario the Hon’ble Supreme Court interfered in the case of Priyanka Srivastava(supra). Identical was the situation in the case of “Babu Venkatesh” (supra) as in that case civil proceeding was going on and complaint was filed. In the case in hand complaint has been filed and no prayer was made to send the same under Section 156(3). The learned Magistrate applying his mind sent the same to police. Identical was the situation in the case of “Babu Venkatesh” (supra) as in that case civil proceeding was going on and complaint was filed. In the case in hand complaint has been filed and no prayer was made to send the same under Section 156(3). The learned Magistrate applying his mind sent the same to police. Once the complaint filed the learned Magistrate is required to follow Section 200 Cr.P.C. and he has done so as discussed herein above. 12.In the case of “Ramdev Food Products Limited Vs. State of Gujrat” reported in 2015 6 SCC 439 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Paragraph Nos. 22 and 25 of the said judgment is quoted here-in-below:- “22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that: 22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. 22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of sufficient ground to proceed”. Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari may fall under Section 202. 22.3. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case. ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 25. We are of the view that the maxim does not apply for interpretation of Section 202(3) for the reasons that follow. In our view, the correct interpretation of the provision is that merely negating the power of arrest to a person other than police officer does not mean that police could exercise such power. The emphasis in the provision is to empower such person to exercise other powers of in charge of a police station than the power of arrest. As regards the power of police to arrest, there are express provisions dealing with the same and power of police to arrest is not derived from or controlled by Section 202(3). The emphasis in the provision is to empower such person to exercise other powers of in charge of a police station than the power of arrest. As regards the power of police to arrest, there are express provisions dealing with the same and power of police to arrest is not derived from or controlled by Section 202(3). The said power is available under Section 41 or under a warrant. The power remains available subject to conditions for exercise thereof. For example, it can be exercised if cognizable offence is committed in the presence of a police officer [Section 41(1)(a)]. Under Section 202, since the Magistrate is in seisin of the matter and has yet to decide “whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”, there is no occasion for formation of opinion by the police about credibility of available information necessary to exercise power of arrest as the only authority of the police is to give report to Magistrate to enable him to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed. Power of arrest is not to be exercised mechanically.” 13. In the case of Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. reported in (2008) 2 SCC 409 , Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 12 to 18 as under:- “12. Thus in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan this Court observed: (SCC p. 631, para 11) “11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.” 13. The same view was taken by this Court in Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi (JT vide para 17). We would further clarify that even if an FIR has been registered and even if the police has made the investigation, or is actually making the investigation, which the aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a person can approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can order a proper investigation and take other suitable steps and pass such order(s) as he thinks necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. All these powers a Magistrate enjoys under Section 156(3) CrPC. 14. Section 156(3) states: “156. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” The words “as abovementioned” obviously refer to Section 156(1), which contemplates investigation by the officer in charge of the police station. 15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII CrPC. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. 16. The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent power and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide Section 173(8). 16. The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent power and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide Section 173(8). Hence the Magistrate can order reopening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report, vide State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha (SCC : AIR para 19). 17. In our opinion Section 156(3) CrPC is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an FIR and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) CrPC, though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. 18. It is well settled that when a power is given to an authority to do something it includes such incidental or implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of that thing. In other words, when any power is expressly granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in the grant, even without special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. Thus where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary for its execution.” 14. In the case of Ramdev Food Products Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Magistrate can either direct for registration of case under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to take cognizance. The guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Venkatesh (supra) and Priyanka Srivastava (supra) have got scheme of the Code which provide exercise of discretion by the Magistrate guided by interest of justice from case to case as held in para 22.3 of Ramdev Food Products Limited(supra). 15. In view of the above discussions, reasons and analysis and looking into the law laid down in the case of H.D.F.C. Securities Limited (supra) and Ramdev Food Products Limited (supra), the Court comes to the conclusion that this petition is premature and accordingly, this criminal miscellaneous application is dismissed. 16. 15. In view of the above discussions, reasons and analysis and looking into the law laid down in the case of H.D.F.C. Securities Limited (supra) and Ramdev Food Products Limited (supra), the Court comes to the conclusion that this petition is premature and accordingly, this criminal miscellaneous application is dismissed. 16. The interim order dated 09.06.2022 is vacated.