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2022 DIGILAW 771 (TS)

A. Narsimha Reddy v. Mahender Agarwal

2022-12-02

G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY

body2022
ORDER : G. Anupama Chakravarthy, J. 1. IA No. 2 of 2021 is filed seeking to condone the delay of 58 days in filing the application for setting aside the order dated 06.11.2020 and for restoring the second appeal. IA No. 3 of 2021 is filed seeking to set aside the order dated 06.11.2020 and to restore the second appeal. 2. IA No. 4 of 2021 is filed seeking to condone the delay of 3,066 days in filing the application for bringing on record the LRs. of deceased/appellant No. 1. IA No. 5 of 2021 is filed seeking to set aside the abatement caused due to the death of appellant No. 1, who died on 16.03.2012. IA No. 6 of 2021 is filed to bring on record the LRs. of deceased/appellant No. 1 as appellant Nos. 3 to 6. IA No. 7 of 2021 is filed by proposed appellant No. 5 seeking permission to represent appellant Nos. 3, 4 and 6 as their Power of Attorney. 3. IA No. 8 of 2021 is filed seeking to condone the delay of 730 days in filing the application for bringing on record the LRs. of deceased/appellant No. 2 as appellant Nos. 7 to 10. IA No. 9 of 2021 is filed seeking to set aside the abatement caused due to the death of appellant No. 2, who died on 05.09.2018. IA No. 10 of 2021 is filed to bring on record the LRs. of deceased/appellant No. 2 as appellant Nos. 7 to 10 and IA No. 11 of 2021 is filed by appellant No. 7 seeking permission to represent appellant Nos. 8 to 10 as their Power of Attorney. 4. Heard learned Counsel for petitioners/appellants as well as the learned Counsel for respondents. Perused the record. 5. It is pertinent to mention that initially, the suit was filed for perpetual injunction, which was being dismissed by the Trial Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful plaintiffs have preferred appeal and the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court and passed decree in favour of the plaintiffs. Now, the defendants have filed the present second appeal. 6. The entire case of the appellants/defendants is that the 1st appellant and the 2nd appellant, who are related to each other, are the owners and possessors of Acs. 4-36 gts. of land in Sy. Now, the defendants have filed the present second appeal. 6. The entire case of the appellants/defendants is that the 1st appellant and the 2nd appellant, who are related to each other, are the owners and possessors of Acs. 4-36 gts. of land in Sy. No. 161/A situated at Kardanoor Village of Patancheruvu Mandal, Medak District, having purchased the same from one A. Surya Reddy vide registered sale deed dated 19.12.1995, bearing Document No. 5661/1995. The said Surya Reddy has alienated the same with the participation of his elder son A. Venkat Reddy, to the appellants under an unregistered agreement of sale dated 25.05.1982 after receiving the sale consideration and also delivered physical possession of land to them and further executed registered General Power of Attorney to the appellants on 02.06.1982 and the appellants, being the Attorneys of A. Surya Reddy, executed the registered sale deed on 19.12.1995. 7. It is the further contention of the petitioners in LA Nos. 4 to 7 and 8 to 11 of 2021 that appellant No. 1/A Narasimha Reddy and appellant No. 2/V. Raghuma Reddy died on 16.03.2012 and 05.09.2018 respectively, leaving behind their legal representatives i.e., the petitioners/proposed appellants herein and that being the legal heirs, they were not aware of the litigation and it has come to their knowledge only on 09.01.2021 when the respondent alongwith his associates have come to the property to dispossess them and the other purchasers alleging that he had judgment in his favour. It is also the specific plea of the petitioners (in all the interlocutory applications) that they were not aware about any proceedings either in the suit or in the appeal, whatsoever, whether pending or disposed of and after coming to their knowledge, they preferred these interlocutory applications. 8. In order to support his contentions, the learned Counsel for petitioners has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in The Commissioner, Mysore Urban-Development Authority v. S.S. Sarvesh, wherein, their Lordships have held in Paras 19 to 22 as under: "19. Indeed, this case reminds us of the subtle observations of the learned Judge Vivian Bose, J., which His Lordship made in one of the leading cases of this Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 . 20. Indeed, this case reminds us of the subtle observations of the learned Judge Vivian Bose, J., which His Lordship made in one of the leading cases of this Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 . 20. Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Bench, in his distinctive style of writing made the following observations while dealing with the case arising out of Order 9 and reminded the Courts of their duty while deciding the case. The observations are apt and read as under. "A Code of Procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends : not a panel enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly denned they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle." 21. Keeping the aforementioned statement of law in consideration and applying the same to the facts of this case, we have no hesitation in allowing this appeal and set aside the impugned order. 22. In our view, the Courts below should have seen that the first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and, therefore, the appellant authority was entitled for an opportunity to prosecute their appeal on merits. If the appellant's Advocate did not appear may be for myriad reasons, the Court could have imposed some cost on them for restoration of their appeal to compensate the respondent (plaintiff) instead of depriving them of their valuable right to prosecute the appeal on merits. If the appellant's Advocate did not appear may be for myriad reasons, the Court could have imposed some cost on them for restoration of their appeal to compensate the respondent (plaintiff) instead of depriving them of their valuable right to prosecute the appeal on merits. This is what Justice Vivian Bose has reminded to the Courts while dealing with the cases of this nature in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 , to do substantial justice to both the parties to the lis. Indeed, dismissal of the appeal in default and dismissal of the appeal on merits makes a difference. The former dismissal is behind the back of the litigant and latter dismissal is after hearing the litigant. The latter is always preferred than the former." 9. The learned Counsel for petitioners has also relied on another judgment of the Apex Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma (dead) by LRs. and others, 2008 (6) ALD 63 (SC), wherein, their Lordships have held in Paras 9, 14 and 15 as under: "9. What should be the approach of Courts while considering applications under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, has been indicated in several decisions. It may be sufficient to refer to two of them. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , this Court reiterated the following classic statement from Krishna v. Chathappan, 1890 ILR 13 Mad. 269: "...Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant". In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : 1998 (5) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 26-3, this Court held: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the Superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the Superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such Superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice.......Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation." 14. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation." 14. If, as in this case, the appeal was admitted in 1993 and did not come up for hearing till 2005, and the respondent died in-between, the Court should not punish the appellant for his ignorance of the death of respondent, by refusing to set aside the abatement. Lack of diligence or negligence can be attributed to an appellant only when he is aware of the death and fails to take steps to bring the legal representatives on record. Where the appellant being unaware of the death of respondent, does not take steps to bring the legal representatives on record, there can be no question of any want of diligence or negligence. 15. In this case, the appeal was not being listed periodically by the High Court. Neither the Counsel for the deceased second respondent in the High Court, nor the legal representatives of the deceased respondent reported her death to the High Court. There was no notice of death to the appellant. The appellant is an institution which acts through its Managing Committee. During the relevant period, there was transition of management from a Court Receiver to an elected Managing Committee. An affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellant that its new Committee was unaware of the pendency of the appeal. Being unaware of the pendency of appeal is equivalent to being unaware of the death of a respondent. This may happen in two circumstances. First is where the appellant himself is dead and his LRs. have newly come on record. Second is where the appellant is an institution or company and a new Committee or Board of Management takes over its management. In such an event, even if they knew about the death of a person, they may not know the significance or relevance of death of such a person with reference to a pending appeal if they do not know about the appeal. In such an event, even if they knew about the death of a person, they may not know the significance or relevance of death of such a person with reference to a pending appeal if they do not know about the appeal. As the appeal had already been admitted in 1993, and as hearing dates were not fixed periodically, the new Committee had no way of knowing that the appeal was pending, that Bhargavi Amma was a party to the appeal and that the Legal Representatives of the deceased Bhargavi Amma (second respondent before the High Court) had not been brought on record. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the delay was satisfactorily explained. The High Court ought to have condoned the delay, set aside the abatement and permitted the appellant to bring the legal representatives of the deceased respondent on record." 10. Accordingly, he prayed to condone the delay in filing the applications to bring on record the legal representatives of appellant Nos. 1 and 2. 11. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed for condoning the abnormal delay in filing the applications to bring on record the legal representatives of appellant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e., IA Nos. 2 and 8 of 2021 respectively, and further contended that the petitions are to be dismissed, as it is the specific contention of proposed appellants that the first and second appellants are the joint owners and possessors of the property, they were looking after the entire litigation and even after the death of the 1st appellant, the 2nd appellant alone has pursued the matter and did not make any effort to bring on record the LRs. of the deceased/1st appellant. It is specifically contended by the learned Counsel for respondent that there are catena of judgments of the Apex Court, which clearly reveal that liberal approach cannot be made while considering the applications filed for condonation of delay and if such applications are allowed in a casual manner, the purpose of enacting the legislation itself will be defeated. 12. It is specifically contended by the learned Counsel for respondent that there are catena of judgments of the Apex Court, which clearly reveal that liberal approach cannot be made while considering the applications filed for condonation of delay and if such applications are allowed in a casual manner, the purpose of enacting the legislation itself will be defeated. 12. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for respondent has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others, 2010 (5) ALD 97 (SC) : (2010) 8 SCC 685 , wherein, their Lordships have held in Paras 3, 9, 25, 26, 32, 33, 37, 39 and 40 as under: "3. During the pendency of the appeal on 28th November, 2007, the sole petitioner died. From the record, it appears that no steps were taken to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased appellant for a considerable period of time on record. Somewhere on 15th April, 2010, IA No. 1 of 2010 has been filed alongwith IA No. 2 of 2010 praying for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal heirs on record. As is evident from the above narrated facts, the appellant died on 28th November, 2007 while the present applications have been filed on or about 15th April, 2010. Thus, there is delay of 778 days in filing these applications.... 9.... The applicant, who seeks aid of the Court for exercising its discretionary power for condoning the delay, is expected to state correct facts and not state lies before the Court. Approaching the Court with unclean hands itself, is a ground for rejection of such application..... 25. We may state that even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. 32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the Legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. 33. Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the Legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. 37. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma (dead) by LRs. and others, 2008 (6) ALD 63 (SC). In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22, CPC alongwith an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In Paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under:- "(i) The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant." (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the Courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the Court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The Courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The Courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a Court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, Courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The Courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. For example, Courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The Courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of Courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects. (v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, Courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the Court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his Counsel about the listing of the appeal. We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equi-Bench of this Court in the case of Katari Suryanaryana (supra). 39. On an analysis of the above principles, we now revert to the merits of the application in hand. As already noticed, except for a vague averment that the legal representatives were not aware of the pendency of the appeal before this Court, there is no other justifiable reason stated in the one page application. We have already held that the application does not contain correct and true facts. Thus, want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. There is no reason or sufficient cause shown as to what steps were taken during this period and why immediate steps were not taken by the applicant, even after they admittedly came to know of the pendency of the appeal before this Court. 40. It is the abnormal conduct on the part of the applicants, particularly Har-Inder Singh, who had appeared as AW4 in the trial and was fully aware of the proceedings, but still did not inform the Counsel of the death of his father. 40. It is the abnormal conduct on the part of the applicants, particularly Har-Inder Singh, who had appeared as AW4 in the trial and was fully aware of the proceedings, but still did not inform the Counsel of the death of his father. The cumulative effect of all these circumstances is that the applicants have miserably failed in showing any 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay of 778 days in filing the application in question." 13. Learned Counsel for respondent has also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, 2014 (1) ALD 21 (SC) : (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, their Lordships have held in Paragraphs 31 and 32 as under: "31. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice. 32. The plea of lack of knowledge in the present case really lacks bona fide. The Division Bench of the High Court has failed to keep itself alive to the concept of exercise of judicial discretion that is governed by rules of reason and justice. It should have kept itself alive to the following passage from N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : 1998 (5) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 26-3 (SCC Pp. 127-28, Para 11): "The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time." We have painfully re-stated the same". 14. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time." We have painfully re-stated the same". 14. Counsel for respondents has further relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, (2012) 12 SCC 693 , wherein, it is held in Paras 9 and 10 as under: 9. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 , this Court reversed the order passed by the High Court for condonation of 565 days delay in filing of an appeal by the State against the decree passed by the Subordinate Court and observed: "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 10. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (4) ALD 35 (SC) : (2012) 5 SCC 157 , this Court referred to some of the judicial precedents and observed: "What needs to be emphasized is that even through a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost." "What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 15. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 15. The learned Counsel for respondent has further relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2014 (1) ALD 33 (SC) : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein, their Lordships have held in Paras 10 to 12 and 15 as under: "10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 1993, this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lessor degree of proof that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide : Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100 and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and others v. Gobardhan Sao and others, AIR 2002 SC 1201 ) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute." 15. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute." 15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the Legislature. 16. The aforesaid judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for respondent are squarely applicable to the case of the respondent, as in the present case, there is gap of six years between the deaths of the 1st appellant and the 2nd appellant. Admittedly, the first appeal is the valuable right of the appellant, but the present case is a second appeal, where substantial question of law has to be formulated by the High Court under Section 100 of CPC. 17. It is also pertinent to mention that this Court has dismissed the second appeal on 06.11.2020, by categorically holding that the appeal is of the year 2004 and when it was listed on 04.11.2020, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for appellants that the 1st appellant died long back, but no steps, whatsoever, have been taken to bring the LRs. of the 1st appellant within the statutory period of limitation, and therefore, the appeal was abated insofar as the 1st appellant is concerned, as on 04.11.2020. of the 1st appellant within the statutory period of limitation, and therefore, the appeal was abated insofar as the 1st appellant is concerned, as on 04.11.2020. There was a specific finding of the learned Judge that though sufficient opportunity was given, there was no representation on behalf of the 2nd appellant, and thus, observed that the 2nd appellant was not interested in prosecuting the case, and therefore, dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution as far as the 2nd appellant is concerned. Admittedly, as on the date of dismissal of the second appeal, the 2nd appellant was no more as the interlocutory application itself reveals that the 2nd appellant died on 05.09.2018. 18. Though it is contended by the learned Counsel for petitioners that they are not aware of the litigation pending before the Court, nothing barred the 2nd appellant from filing an application under Order 22 to bring on record the LRs. of the 1st appellant immediately after the death of the 1st appellant in the year 2012 itself. Admittedly, the 2nd appellant died on 05.09.2018. No reason is assigned by the petitioners as to why the 2nd appellant has not filed any petition before the Court to bring the LRs. of the 1st appellant on to the record. Hence, the version of the petitioners cannot be considered and the purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Limitation Act cannot be forfeited by having a liberal approach in condoning the abnormal/huge delay in the applications in IA Nos. 4 and 8 of 2021. 19. It is pertinent to mention here that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. The length of delay is no matter, but acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. In the present case, the delay is not a day or two. There is delay of 3,066 days in filing the application to bring on record the LRs. of appellant No. 1 and 730 days delay in filing application for bringing on record the LRs. of appellant No. 2. The petitioners have kept quiet for such long periods of time without filing the petitions for setting aside the abatement and have come up the present applications, seeking the Court to condone the said inordinate delays. of appellant No. 1 and 730 days delay in filing application for bringing on record the LRs. of appellant No. 2. The petitioners have kept quiet for such long periods of time without filing the petitions for setting aside the abatement and have come up the present applications, seeking the Court to condone the said inordinate delays. Though reasons for each day's delay need not be specifically mentioned, but, atleast proximate or reasonable cause should be shown for condoning such inordinate delay. Admittedly, no party can approach the Court at their whims and fancies. In the present case, the reasons assigned by the petitioners for condoning the delay, are not at all tenable and the same do not come under the expression "sufficient cause". 20. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 2007 SC 2624 , wherein, their Lordships at Para (6), held as follows: "There is no dispute in regard to the delay of 3,320 days in filing the petition for setting aside the award. When a mandatory provision is not complied with and when the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the Court cannot condone the delay, only on the sympathetic ground. The orders passed by the learned Sub-Judge and also by the High Court are far from satisfactory. No reason whatsoever has been given to condone the inordinate delay of 3,320 days. It is well considered principle of law that the delay cannot be condoned without assigning any reasonable, satisfactory, sufficient and proper reason. Both the Courts have miserably failed to comply and follow the principle laid down by this Court in catena of cases. We, therefore, have no other option except to set aside the order passed by the Sub-Judge and as affirmed by the High Court. We accordingly set aside both the orders and allow this appeal." 21. Therefore, IA Nos. 4 and 8 of 2021 are hereby dismissed. IA No. 2 of 2021 is filed to condone the delay of 58 days in restoring the second appeal by setting aside the dismissal order dated 06.11.2020 and IA No. 3 of 2021 is filed to restore the second appeal on to the file. But in view of dismissal of IA Nos. 4 and 8 of 2021 are hereby dismissed. IA No. 2 of 2021 is filed to condone the delay of 58 days in restoring the second appeal by setting aside the dismissal order dated 06.11.2020 and IA No. 3 of 2021 is filed to restore the second appeal on to the file. But in view of dismissal of IA Nos. 4 and 8 of 2021, as already the second appeal is abated against the appellants, all the other applications i.e., IA Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of 2021 also stand dismissed.