JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.83/2011 on the file of Subordinate Judge's Court, Alappuzha. 2. The appellant is the first defendant. The suit was one for specific performance of contract. (Parties would hereinafter be referred as per their status before the trial court). 3. Plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant for the purchase of plaint schedule property for a total sale consideration of Rs.13 lakhs on 20.09.2010. On the date of agreement Rs.1,50,000/-was paid as advance sale consideration and the time of six months was stipulated for execution of the agreement. On 01.10.2010, Rs.6,50,000/-was further paid by the plaintiff towards part of sale consideration. On the next day, i.e. on 02.10.2010 first defendant shifted his residence from the property and plaintiff was put in possession and thereafter plaintiff and family have been residing in the plaint schedule property. Plaintiff invested a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-for maintenance of the house. Plaintiff repeatedly demanded the defendant to execute the agreement and he has been ready to perform his part of the contract always by paying the balance sale consideration. But the first defendant was not willing to perform his part and finally a registered notice dated 09.12.2010 was issued to the first defendant expressing the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to execute the agreement. On 15.12.2010, first defendant and his henchmen came to the house and intimidated the plaintiff and family and attempted to drive them out of the house. Immediately, O.S.No.875/2010 was filed before the Munsiff’s Court seeking for permanent injunction. As per letter dated 11.03.2011 plaintiff demanded the defendant to be present before the Sub Registry Office, Kalavoor on 16.01.2011 to execute the sale deed. But the defendant did not turn up. Plaintiff has got sufficient means to complete the transaction. Hence the suit. 4. Subsequently plaint was amended impleading defendants 2 to 4 for the reason that first defendant availed a loan from the second defendant and committed default in repaying the amount. Second defendant initiated revenue recovery proceedings against the first defendant and he failed to clear off the debt. When the defendants 2 to 4 initiated revenue recovery proceedings plaintiff filed O.S.No.573/2012 for injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. Subsequently the plaintiff cleared off the debt due to the second defendant also. Second defendant initiated revenue recovery proceedings against the first defendant and he failed to clear off the debt. When the defendants 2 to 4 initiated revenue recovery proceedings plaintiff filed O.S.No.573/2012 for injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. Subsequently the plaintiff cleared off the debt due to the second defendant also. Thereafter as per order dated 12.02.2015 in I.A.No.150/2015 plaint schedule was amended incorporating 5 cents and excess land and the building and other improvements comprising in re-survey No.121/4/1. 5. First defendant filed written statement stoutly denying the allegations in the plaint. Suit has been filed suppressing the material facts and plaintiff is not entitled to get any decree by way of equity or discretion. Agreement executed is admitted. Receipt of Rs.1,50,000/-on the date of agreement towards advance and Rs.6,50,000/-subsequently towards part of sale consideration is also admitted. There was no transfer of possession of property in pursuance of the agreement and on humanitarian consideration plaintiff was allowed to occupy the building. It is denied that plaintiff invested Rs.1,50,000/-for maintenance of the house. Plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of contract. O.S.No.875/2010 was a frivolus suit. The defendant was not informed to be present before the Sub Registry Office on 16.01.2011. Plaintiff was not having the balance sale consideration for executing the sale deed. The house in the plaint schedule property is the only house of the first defendant and family. He was compelled to sell his property to discharge his huge debt due to loss in business. Amount was due from him to Union Bank of India, State Bank of Travancore, Canara Bank as well as Kerala State Financial Enterprises (K.S.F.E.). At the time of execution of the agreement, the title deed of the plaint schedule property was mortgaged with K.S.F.E. So he was forced to take a building on rent after disposing the sole property due to threat from numerous creditors. The proposed price in the agreement is very low and the property would have fetched at least Rs.18 lakhs at the time of execution of agreement and at the time of filing written statement it would have fetched minimum Rs.25 lakhs. The specific performance is not allowable since it will result in undue enrichment to the plaintiff and undue loss and injury to the defendant. First plaintiff is liable to vacate the plaint schedule premises. The specific performance is not allowable since it will result in undue enrichment to the plaintiff and undue loss and injury to the defendant. First plaintiff is liable to vacate the plaint schedule premises. The building as amended in the plaint schedule is not standing in the plaint schedule property. Almost half of the building is in the purambokku property lying on the south which is vested with the Panchayath. So the plaint schedule property is not identifiable and hence plaintiff is not legally entitled to get any decree of specific performance. Hence a counter claim is also sought for directing the plaintiff to vacate from the plaint schedule property and surrender vacant possession to the defendants. 6. Plaintiff filed written statement to the counter claim contending that plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. It is further contended that plaintiff never took any undue advantage of any situation and defendant offered to sell the property and on negotiation plaintiff agreed to purchase the property and the agreement was executed. It is denied that the property would have fetched Rs.18 lakhs at the time of execution of agreement and Rs.25 lakhs at the time of filing written statement. According to the plaintiff, defendant willfully kept away from executing the sale deed and written statement has been filed without any bona fides. 7. Second defendant filed written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable as against them. Second defendant is not a necessary party to the suit. The suit has been filed to cause delay in recovery proceedings initiated by this defendant through additional 3rd and 4th defendants. The plaint schedule property is mortgaged with the 2nd defendant in February, 2010 as security for a loan availed by the first defendant and original title deed is deposited with the second defendant. The first defendant defaulted repayment and hence revenue recovery proceedings has been initiated against him. Hence there is no cause of action, according to the second defendant, as against them to the plaintiff. 8. Additional 4th defendant filed written statement contending about the amount of Rs.88,020/-due from the first defendant to the second defendant and the authority of the first defendant to enter into such agreement is further disputed. It is contended that due to the residence of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property obstruction will be caused to the revenue recovery proceedings. Additional 4th defendant filed written statement contending about the amount of Rs.88,020/-due from the first defendant to the second defendant and the authority of the first defendant to enter into such agreement is further disputed. It is contended that due to the residence of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property obstruction will be caused to the revenue recovery proceedings. No notice as provided under law has been sent for instituting the suit against the defendants. 9. PW1 examined and Exts.A1 to A7 marked from the side of the plaintiff. DWs 1 and 2 examined and Exts.B1 to B9 marked from the side of the first defendant. There was no evidence from the side of defendants 2 to 4. 10. On evaluating the facts and circumstances and evidence adduced, the learned Sub Judge, Alappuzha decreed the suit as prayed for. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree the appellant/first defendant approaches this Court in this Regular First Appeal. 12. Notice was issued to the respondents. Respondents 1 and 2 appeared through respective counsel. Respondents 3 and 4 appeared through learned Government Pleader. Lower court records were called for and both sides were heard. 13. Appellant/first defendant assailed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on various counts. According to the learned counsel, this is a case where the court should not have exercised the discretion while granting specific performance of contract in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Plaintiff was never willing to execute his part of agreement and the first defendant had several liabilities and out of compulsion to settle the liabilities the agreement was executed by him and while ordering specific performance of the contract it would cause undue hardship to the first defendant. It is also his contention that defendant has no title over the entire plaint schedule property and a portion of the schedule property is purambokku vested with the Panchayat and a decree for specific performance with respect to a property belonging to the panchayat ought not have been ordered. It is also his contention that the plaint schedule property originally was only 5 cents of land and amendment was effected on 07.02.2015 after the period of limitation including the building and excess land and that amendment ought not have been allowed since it was barred by limitation. It is also his contention that the plaint schedule property originally was only 5 cents of land and amendment was effected on 07.02.2015 after the period of limitation including the building and excess land and that amendment ought not have been allowed since it was barred by limitation. He would also contend that plaintiff was not having sufficient funds for the due execution of the agreement and Exts.A6 savings passbook produced by the plaintiff would not prove his capacity or fund to execute the agreement as stipulated in the agreement. He also contends about I.A.No.1/2022 filed by the defendant for accepting additional documents, for which counter has been field by the plaintiff. That petition has been considered and dismissed by separate order. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff on the other hand would contend that court below rightly found in favour of the plaintiff and granted a decree for specific performance of contract and plaintiff already deposited the entire sale value before the court and hence there is no reason whatsoever to interfere with findings entered into by the court below. He would further contend that for the first notice sent by the plaintiff, there was no reply. It is also his contention that the title deed of the plaintiff was pledged in the Kerala State Financial Enterprises and suppressing that fact agreement was executed and pending the proceedings recovery proceedings were also initiated by the K.S.F.E and hence the plaintiff was forced to clear the liability of the first defendant towards the K.S.F.E. So a criminal complaint was also filed by him against the defendant for cheating him by executing the agreement with respect to a property with regard to which there is already a liability due to K.S.F.E. It is also his contention that there was no unlawful enrichment to the plaintiff since he himself has sold his house and appurtenant land for purchasing the plaint schedule property. Now himself and family also have no place of abode and it is after receiving Rs.8 lakhs, on the next day possession of the property was handed over to him by the first defendant in pursuance of the agreement. The subsequent amendment carried out in the plaint schedule is in tune with the sale agreement and that has been rightly allowed by the trial court and hence according to him it relates back to the date of the suit. The subsequent amendment carried out in the plaint schedule is in tune with the sale agreement and that has been rightly allowed by the trial court and hence according to him it relates back to the date of the suit. In short, according to plaintiff there is no reason whatsoever to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the court below. 15. Based on the above, the following points were raised for consideration: (1) Whether the trial court went wrong in exercising the discretion for ordering specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement? (2) Whether the specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement ordered with respect to the plaint schedule property, which includes Panchayat purambokku also is legally sustainable especially because the Panchayat is not a party to the proceedings? (3) Whether the amendment of the plaint schedule property introduced on 07.02.2015 beyond the period of limitation is legally sustainable? 16. Point No.1: The records in this case would go to show that the suit was once decreed ex parte as against the first defendant and the petition filed by the first defendant to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the trial court and against which first defendant filed F.A.O.No.87/2016 before this Court and this Court set aside the decree and an amount of Rs.3,00,000/-was deposited by the first defendant before the trial court for setting aside the ex parte decree, as per the submission of the learned counsel for the first defendant. 17. The first question is with regard to the correctness of exercising the discretionary power for ordering specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement by the court below. Ext.A1 agreement was executed on 20.09.2010 by receiving Rs.1,50,000/-towards advance sale consideration and further he received Rs.6,50,000/-on 01.10.2010 towards part of sale consideration and from the next day i.e. on 02.10.2010 onwards plaintiff is in occupation of the plaint schedule building and property. According to the plaintiff, the possession was handed over by the first defendant in pursuance of the agreement after receiving the major portion of sale consideration. But, according to the first defendant, it was only on a humanitarian consideration that plaintiff was permitted to occupy the house. It has also come out that the plaintiff cleared the liability of Rs.1,54,880/-of the first defendant towards the second defendant and the remaining balance sale consideration Rs.3,45,120/-has been deposited by the plaintiff before the court on 01.01.2016. But, according to the first defendant, it was only on a humanitarian consideration that plaintiff was permitted to occupy the house. It has also come out that the plaintiff cleared the liability of Rs.1,54,880/-of the first defendant towards the second defendant and the remaining balance sale consideration Rs.3,45,120/-has been deposited by the plaintiff before the court on 01.01.2016. The total sale consideration agreed between the parties is Rs.13 lakhs and the first defendant did not dispute the execution of the agreement and according to him the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is also his contention that he is a poor lottery vendor and physically challenged person and agreed to sell the plaint schedule property due to heavy financial liabilities with the Union Bank of India, State Bank of Travancore and Canara Bank and Kerala State Financial Enterprises. 18. In order to prove the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff, he produced copy of notice Ext.A4 dated 09.12.2010 sent by him to the first defendant. He also produced the savings bank passbook Ext.A6 drawn on Government Servants Co-operative Bank Ltd. A-208, Alappuzha to prove his means. Ext.A6 would show that an amount of Rs.3,90,191/-was in his account as on 11.12.2010 and only on 01.12.2012 Rs.14,000/-has been withdrawn from that and another Rs.2,80,000/-withdrawn on 12.12.2012. 19. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would also contend that balance sale consideration was planned to be raised by selling the gold ornaments. So Ext.A6 passbook and the evidence of PW1 would prove that he had the capacity or funds to pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time of the agreement. Even though plaintiff produced copy of another lawyer notice Ext.A5 alleged to have been sent to the first defendant stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.5 lakhs and is willing to execute the sale deed and he would be present at Sub Registry Office, Kalavoor on 16.03.2011 and directing him to take necessary steps for executing the sale deed and to be present before the Sub Registry Office on that date, no document could be produced by the plaintiff to prove that the said notice has been actually sent to the first defendant and has been received by him. So the fact that an amount of Rs.8 lakhs out of total sale consideration of Rs.13 lakhs has been paid and subsequently he cleared the liability towards the second defendant K.S.F.E and further the deposit of balance sale consideration before the trial court would speak in volumes about the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. 20. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff is in occupation of the plaint schedule property from 02.10.2010 onwards when he paid Rs.6,50,000/-. Though the first defendant took a vain attempt to establish that the plaintiff was permitted to occupy the plaint schedule house on humanitarian consideration, that seems to be not acceptable since even admittedly by the defendant after the plaintiff was permitted to occupy the plaint schedule property himself and family shifted to a rented house. So that itself would go to show that the intention of the first defendant was to put the plaintiff in possession of the plaint schedule building in pursuance of the agreement after receiving Rs.8 lakhs in total towards the sale consideration. It has also come out in evidence that the plaintiff sold his residential house prior to this agreement to raise funds. So the contention of the first defendant that he was a poor physically challenged lottery vendor and there is unlawful enrichment if the specific performance is ordered cannot be accepted in this particular case because plaintiff is not in a better position than the first defendant. 21. Even though the defendant contended that he entered into the agreement to sell the plaint schedule property due to his heavy financial liability with Union Bank of India, State Bank of Travancore, Canara Bank and Kerala State Financial Enterprises, apart from the debt due to the K.S.F.E to the tune of Rs.1,53,000/-alleged to have been cleared by the plaintiff, the first defendant could not produce any document or other materials apart from his bald averments in the plaint and his proof affidavit to prove his financial liabilities to the other banks. So, in effect, as has been rightly found by the court below, first defendant could not establish that he agreed to sell the plaint schedule building out of heavy financial difficulties. So, in effect, as has been rightly found by the court below, first defendant could not establish that he agreed to sell the plaint schedule building out of heavy financial difficulties. It is also to be noted that in spite of the fact that he received Rs.8 lakhs towards sale consideration from the plaintiff, he was not even prepared to clear off the debt due to the K.S.F.E and after the institution of the suit the plaintiff was forced to clear off the liability in order to prevent the revenue recovery proceedings against the plaint schedule property. So that itself would show the bona fides of the plaintiff. So the contention of the first defendant that he was forced to sell the plaint schedule property due to heavy financial liabilities due to various banks etc has been rightly negatived by the court below. 22. It is also to be noted that first defendant suppressed the liability to the K.S.F.E prior to the execution of agreement and due to that plaintiff filed criminal complaint against him. It is admitted by DW1 that it is he who dictated the terms of agreement to DW2 the scribe, inspite of that, liability to the K.S.F.E has not been revealed in Ext.A1. 23. From the above facts and circumstances, the contention of the defendant that the court should not have exercised the discretionary relief in ordering specific performance is not at all sustainable. 24. Point:No.2: The next aspect is with regard to the defective title of the first defendant with respect to the plaint schedule property. According to the first defendant, he has title over only 5 cents of property and the rest of the property is Panchayat purambokku and hence specific performance ordered by the court below without impleading the Panchayat as a party is illegal and unsustainable. But in this context the learned counsel for the plaintiff relies on M.K. Marattukulam v. Hemchand [ 1988 (2) KLT 166 : 1988 (2) KLJ 96 : 1988 KHC 402] wherein it has been held that only parties bound to carry out the agreement to be impleaded as parties in a suit for specific performance. But in this context the learned counsel for the plaintiff relies on M.K. Marattukulam v. Hemchand [ 1988 (2) KLT 166 : 1988 (2) KLJ 96 : 1988 KHC 402] wherein it has been held that only parties bound to carry out the agreement to be impleaded as parties in a suit for specific performance. It is also held that on the ground that vendors title is defective or that there are other parties entitled to the property is not at all a reason to refuse the prayer for specific performance if the purchaser is willing to take such title vendor has. 25. In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal & Ors [ 2005 (6) SCC 733 : AIR 2005 SC 2813 : 2005 KHC 1311] it has been held that necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or parties claiming under them, or a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor with or without notice of the contract. 26. In Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson & Ors. [ 2020 (13) SCC 773 : AIR 2019 SC 3577 : 2019 KHC 6689] a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court while dealing with Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and impleadment of parties in a suit for specific performance of contract, it has been held that third party or stranger to contract are not necessary parties and cannot be added in suit for specific performance of contract to sell to find out who is in possession of contracted property. In that case the appellant sought to be impleaded in a suit for specific performance as an additional defendant on the ground that pending the proceedings despite an order of injunction against alienation or transfer of suit property the original defendant executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant and he filed an application during the pendency of the suit for impleadment as defendant in the suit. 27. In the present case, one of the main contentions of the learned counsel for the first defendant is that major portion of the house is situated in purambokku which is vested with the Panchayat as per Section 218 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and hence the Panchayat is a necessary party to the suit. 27. In the present case, one of the main contentions of the learned counsel for the first defendant is that major portion of the house is situated in purambokku which is vested with the Panchayat as per Section 218 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and hence the Panchayat is a necessary party to the suit. But, as has been rightly found by the court below, in the additional written statement filed by the first defendant he has specifically contended that almost half of the building is situated in purambokku property and he agreed to sell the schedule property to the plaintiff and further in the affidavit sworn in by the first defendant also he admitted that the plaint schedule property includes purambokku and the procedures in respect of first defendant's application for assignment of purambokku land were almost completed. So fully knowing the fact that the plaint schedule property includes purambokku land also the agreement was executed. So, even if the plaint schedule property includes purambokku, as has been held in M.K.Marattukulam, referred above, if the purchaser is willing to purchase the property with the defective title, the specific performance cannot be denied for the defective title of the vendor. So the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that the plaint schedule property includes purambokku land vested with the Panchayat is also not a ground as has been rightly found by the court below to refuse the claim of specific performance. 28. Point:No.3: The next contention advanced by the learned counsel is with respect to the amendment of the plaint schedule property effected on 07.02.2015, which, according to him, is beyond the period of limitation and hence the court below ought not have allowed the amendment application for amending the plaint schedule. 29. On verifying the plaint, as rightly contended by thelearned counsel, originally the plaint schedule property has been described as 5 cents purayidam and the trees standing therein comprised in old survey No.375/2/1 and resurvey No.121/4/1. But by the subsequent amendment plaintiff amended the plaint schedule as 5 cents and excess land and the building MGPW XII/20A and the improvements and the trees standing therein. The agreement for sale Ext.A1 was entered into between the parties on 20.09.2010 with a stipulation to execute the agreement within six months from the date of agreement. Obviously that period will expire on 20.03.2011. The agreement for sale Ext.A1 was entered into between the parties on 20.09.2010 with a stipulation to execute the agreement within six months from the date of agreement. Obviously that period will expire on 20.03.2011. The period of limitation for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement is three years from 20.03.2011. So obviously the amendment carried out in the year 2015 is barred by limitation. 30. As per Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court has got the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. 31. In this context the learned counsel drew my attention to Sundara Iyer Sthanunatha Iyer v. Anantharaman Pillai Chidambaram Pillai [ 1956 KLT 453 ] wherein it has been held while dealing with Section 3 of the Limitation Act that even though the plea of limitation was not raised in the pleadings the court is bound to consider the question of limitation. So that would enable the first defendant to raise the plea of limitation in allowing the amendment of the plaint schedule which was introduced after the period of limitation. 32. The learned counsel for the first defendant also relies on Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan & Ors [2001 KHC 1029]. That was a case in which the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants and his agents and subordinates from demolishing the compound wall in the suit property and it is alleged that during the pendency of the suit defendants entered into the plaintiff's house unauthorizedly and demolished the compound wall. In view of the subsequent developments appellant filed application for amendment of the plaint. But the trial court rejected the prayer and revision petition filed before the High Court was dismissed for the reason that if it is allowed it would introduce a new case and cause of action. It is also observed that amendment sought for is barred by limitation. Against which, the plaintiff approached the Apex Court and while disposing the same it has been held that whether the amendment sought would be barred by limitation and the plea of limitation being a disputed one, can be made subject matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. 33. Against which, the plaintiff approached the Apex Court and while disposing the same it has been held that whether the amendment sought would be barred by limitation and the plea of limitation being a disputed one, can be made subject matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. 33. Learned counsel also relies on Pankaja & Anr. v. Yellappa (Dead) By LRs & Ors. [ (2004) 6 SCC 415 ] to support the proposition of law that an application for amendment of pleadings should not be disallowed merely because it is opposed on the ground that the same is barred by limitation, on the contrary application will have to be considered bearing in mind the discretion that is vested with the court in allowing or disallowing such amendment in the interest of justice. It is also held that the plea of limitation being a disputed fact could be made a subject matter of issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. 34. So, all the above decisions would only lay down the proposition that even though the amendment sought would be barred by limitation the court can allow the amendment and the plea of limitation can be left open as subject matter of the issue. So also in Pankaja & Anr. v. Yellappa (Dead) By LRs & Ors. [ (2004) 6 SCC 415 ] the Apex Court quoted T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity Board & Ors. [ (2004) 3 SCC 392 ]. In paragraph No.16 of the said judgment the Apex Court held that the application for amendment of the pleadings should not be disallowed merely because it is opposed on the ground that the same is barred by limitation, on the contrary, application will have to be considered bearing in mind the discretion that is vested with the Court in allowing or disallowing such amendment in the interest of justice. So also in Alkapuri Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Jayantibhai Naginbhai [ (2009) 3 SCC 467 : 2009 (1) KLT Suppl. 1232 (SC)] in paragraph 16 it has been held that the question as to whether an application for amendment should be allowed inspite of delay and laches in moving the same, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case wherefor a judicial evaluation would be necessary. The decision reported in Pankaja has also been quoted therein. 1232 (SC)] in paragraph 16 it has been held that the question as to whether an application for amendment should be allowed inspite of delay and laches in moving the same, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case wherefor a judicial evaluation would be necessary. The decision reported in Pankaja has also been quoted therein. In that decision Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu [ (2002) 7 SCC 559 ] has been quoted in paragraph No.17, which reads as follows: “10. An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation-back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the court on the date of which the application seeking the amendment was filed.” 35. In this context it is to be noted that the suit has been filed for specific performance of contract as per Ext.A1 agreement which was produced along with the suit. In Ext.A1 there is specific description of plaint schedule property as property comprised in re-survey No.121/4/1 and 5 cents and excess land and the building No.MGPW XII/20A building and other improvements therein. Originally when the suit was filed the plaintiff described the plaint schedule property as 5 cents purayidam and the trees standing therein. It appears that the resurvey number has also been wrongly shown as 121/4 whereas in the agreement the resurvey number has been clearly shown as 121/4/1 of Komalapuram Village, Block No.3. So when the court allowed the amendment sought and amended the plaint schedule as 5 cents and excess within the boundaries it would relates back to the date of filing of the suit. Moreover, apart from the description of the property and extent, there is clear description of the boundaries of four sides. So even if there is some difference with regard to the extent originally shown, the description of boundaries would prevail and that would also be a clear identification of the plaint schedule property including the excess land. So the subsequent amendment introduced after the period of limitation can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the defendant. 36. So even if there is some difference with regard to the extent originally shown, the description of boundaries would prevail and that would also be a clear identification of the plaint schedule property including the excess land. So the subsequent amendment introduced after the period of limitation can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the defendant. 36. In the present case, while allowing the petition for amendment, learned Sub Judge has not made any specific direction that the amendment will not relate back to the date of suit. So naturally the amendment effected would relate back to the date of suit. So it will not be barred by limitation. 37. An application for amendment of the pleadings is not to be disallowed on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. It is well within the discretion of the court to decide whether inspite of the bar of limitation the proposed amendment to be allowed to secure the ends of justice. In that event court can also ensure that no prejudice is caused to the opposite side in allowing the amendment. 38. Based on the above it is concluded that the trial court has appreciated the facts and circumstances and evidence adduced in a correct perspective and there is no reason what so ever to interfere with the same. In the result, appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and hence dismissed with cost. The amount of Rs.3,00,000/ alleged to have been deposited before the court below by the appellant/defendant as per the direction of this court shall be returned to him.