JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. The husband filed a petition for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Decree of divorce was granted by the learned District Judge on ground of desertion. Feeling aggrieved, wife has challenged the judgment and decree dissolving marriage between the parties. 2. Marriage between the parties was solemnized on 05.05.1995 according to Hindu rites and customs. Two sons were born to the parties from this wedlock on 01.06.2000 and 29.01.2002, respectively. On 15.07.2008, the respondent-husband moved for divorce alleging desertion and cruelty at the end of appellant-wife. Gist of his case was that appellant had been repeatedly withdrawing from the matrimonial society on one pretext or the other. At the time of marriage, the respondent was working at Panchkula (Haryana). The appellant-wife wanted him to work at Darlaghat. She used to go to her paternal home saying that she would live with the respondent only in case he starts working at Darlaghat. Under her persistent pressure, he left his stable job at Panchkula but could not succeed in getting new job at Darlaghat. The appellant-wife picked quarrels with the respondent-husband without any rhyme or reason. She was in habit of assaulting their minor children. The respondent-husband started running a shop at Batal-Ghati. The appellant-wife did not mend her ways. She practically lived in her paternal home leaving children with the respondent. She did not even attend the functions of their children at matrimonial home. The respondent-husband quoted several instances where intervention of Gram Panchayat was sought to resolve the issues between the parties. He further alleged that in the year 2001 with the intervention of Gram Panchayat, the appellant joined the company of the respondent, but thereafter again withdrew from his society. She hurled threats to involve the respondent and his family members in various cases. She also advanced threats of committing suicide as well as to cause harm to their children. The respondent-husband pleaded that in February, 2005 also, the appellant left her matrimonial home without any rhyme or reason. He sought intervention of Gram Panchayat on 21.02.2005 and 06.03.2005. The appellant-wife joined his society on 06.03.2005, but soon thereafter her behavior became abusive. She finally left her matrimonial house on 25.05.2005. She did not join respondent’s company thereafter despite intervention by the Gram Panchayat as well as efforts made by the respondent. He sought intervention of Gram Panchayat on 21.02.2005 and 06.03.2005. The appellant-wife joined his society on 06.03.2005, but soon thereafter her behavior became abusive. She finally left her matrimonial house on 25.05.2005. She did not join respondent’s company thereafter despite intervention by the Gram Panchayat as well as efforts made by the respondent. While leaving respondent’s company, the appellant also left their children with the respondent. On the basis of above allegations, dissolution of marriage was prayed by the respondent-husband on count of cruelty and desertion. 3. The appellant-wife did not deny living separately from the respondent and their minor children ever since 25.05.2005. Her case, however, was that she had been working as an Anganwari Assistant. She had financially supported the respondent-husband by raising loan of Rs. 30,000/- to provide him a motor-cycle. She had also borne the expenses during delivery of couple’s children. She denied the allegations of abusive behavior, hurling threats to the respondent-husband or his family members, to commit suicide or to cause harm to the children. The appellant also stated that she used to stay in her matrimonial home in the absence of the respondent. The respondent-husband had failed to maintain her. Her in-laws used to check her movements regarding her visits to her parental home. She pleaded that the respondent used to taunt her for bringing insufficient dowry. The appellant-wife denied the allegations of desertion and cruelty and stated that she had shown her willingness to join respondent’s company. Prayer was made for dismissing the petition. 4. The parties led evidence in support of their pleadings. After considering entire material available on record, learned District Judge held that respondent-husband had been able to prove desertion by the appellant-wife and accordingly ordered for dissolving their marriage vide judgment and decree dated 23.12.2011. Assailing this judgment and decree, the wife has filed this appeal. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. In my considered view, no case for interference with the impugned judgment and decree is made out. 5(i) The allegation of the respondent-husband was that the appellant-wife had shunned his company repeatedly without any justifiable cause. With great difficulty and with the intervention of the elders and the Gram Panchayat, many times in past, the disputes between the couple, more particularly leaving of matrimonial home by the appellant-wife for no rhyme and reason, were resolved. 5(i) The allegation of the respondent-husband was that the appellant-wife had shunned his company repeatedly without any justifiable cause. With great difficulty and with the intervention of the elders and the Gram Panchayat, many times in past, the disputes between the couple, more particularly leaving of matrimonial home by the appellant-wife for no rhyme and reason, were resolved. Efforts were made to draw the appellant-wife again in the sanctity of the institution of marriage and into her matrimonial home. Even thereafter the appellant did not improve her behavior. She kept hurling threats not only to the respondent-husband and his family members but also threatened to commit suicide and to cause harm to their minor children. The evidence led by the respondent-husband demonstrates that he had established his case. 5(ii) The respondent-husband appeared in the witness box as PW-2. He reiterated that on 01.06.2001, while the birthday function of their minor son was being celebrated at his home, the appellant-wife used filthy language, humiliated the respondent & his family members and misbehaved in presence of villagers & neighbours. She thereafter withdrew from respondent’s society. The respondent-husband moved an application to the Gram Panchayat in this regard with a request to intervene. Copy of this application dated 12.06.2001 has been proved on record by PW-1 Tulsi Ram, Panchayat Secretary of the concerned Gram Panchayat. While appearing in the witness box, the respondent-husband also stated that he sought intervention of the Gram Panchayat on 21.02.2005 and 06.03.2005 regarding matrimonial issues with the appellant-wife. The respondent’s application dated 21.02.2005 was proved by PW-1 Tulsi Ram. PW-1 also proved on record a written compromise dated 06.03.2005 (Ex. P-3) executed between the parties before the Gram Panchayat as well as the application dated 06.03.2005 (Ex. P-4), whereby the parties agreed to live together. PW-1 has also proved copy of applications dated 26.07.2005 (Ex. P-7) and dated 24.05.2006 (Ex.P-6). The respondent-husband has also examined Anil Kumar (PW-4) and Dev Raj (PW-5), who supported respondent’s case and stated that in their presence, the appellant-wife had misbehaved with the respondent-husband and his family members. That she was of abusive nature from the very beginning. She used to withdraw from respondent’s society every now and then. She used to humiliate the respondent and his family members and created scenes in front of her in-laws’ home. That she was of abusive nature from the very beginning. She used to withdraw from respondent’s society every now and then. She used to humiliate the respondent and his family members and created scenes in front of her in-laws’ home. They also supported the claim of the respondent that appellant had withdrawn from respondent’s society since May, 2005. The father of the respondent, Chet Ram also appeared as PW-7 and narrated his version of his son’s plight in the marriage. This witness also claimed that after the appellant had withdrawn from respondent’s company on 25.05.2005, the respondent had again made an effort for re-conciliation and for bringing his wife (appellant) to the matrimonial home. 5(iii) The evidence also shows that the respondent-husband vide letters dated 11.08.2006 (Ex. P-8) and dated 11.09.2006 (Ex. P-11) had requested appellant-wife’s employer (department) to adjust the appellant (Anganwari Assistant) nearby her matrimonial house. On his (husband’s) request, the department had even offered to adjust the appellant nearby her matrimonial home. The department had supplied this information vide Ex. P-15. However, the appellant vide letter dated 25.11.2006 (Ex. RX-1) expressed her inability to accept transfer nearby her matrimonial home. 5(iv) The appellant-wife had appeared in the witness box alongwith three other witnesses in support of her defence. The gist of her evidence was that she was ready to join the company of the respondent, but it was the respondent-husband who was not interested in her company. That she was taunted for bringing insufficient dowry. She highlighted that the respondent failed to maintain her as well as their children. She admitted that she had been living separately from her husband & children w.e.f. 25.05.2005 in her parental home. That she was working as an Anganwari Assistant at Anganwari Centre, near to her parental home. 5(v) In (2022) 5 SCC 459 , Debananda Tamuli Vs. Kakumoni Kataky, petition for divorce was filed by the appellant-husband on ground of desertion after more than 2 years of staying separately from the wife. Respondent-wife’s evidence did not establish any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home. Her evidence did not disclose any effort made by her to resume matrimonial relationship. She had not filed any petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Allowing the appeal, the Apex Court held as under :- “7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. Her evidence did not disclose any effort made by her to resume matrimonial relationship. She had not filed any petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Allowing the appeal, the Apex Court held as under :- “7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani (supra) which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act No.68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: “13. Divorce.— (1) ………… 3 [Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.” 8. The reasons for a dispute between husband and wife are always very complex. Every matrimonial dispute is different from another. Whether a case of desertion is established or not will depend on the peculiar facts of each case. It is a matter of drawing an inference based on the facts brought on record by way of evidence. 9. Now, coming to the facts of the case, there is no dispute that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 17th June 2009 and that they stayed together only till 30th June 2009. The petition for divorce was filed on 9th September 2011. 9. Now, coming to the facts of the case, there is no dispute that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 17th June 2009 and that they stayed together only till 30th June 2009. The petition for divorce was filed on 9th September 2011. As per clause (ib) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of HM Act, the desertion must be for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the institution of the petition. In her affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief filed on 24th June 2015, the respondent stated that after she became aware of the serious illness of the appellant’s mother, she came to Tezpur on 19th December 2009. She stayed with her sister-in-law. According to the respondent, on 20th December 2009, the appellant told her to leave Tezpur. Therefore, she left Tezpur. After she was informed about the death of the appellant’s mother, she came back to Tezpur and visited the appellant’s house on 21st December 2019, and left on the next day. In the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, it is not even the case made out by the respondent that she came to Tezpur intending to resume the matrimonial relationship. 10. The perusal of the respondent’s evidence does not disclose any effort made by her to resume the matrimonial relationship. She has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. As can be seen from the evidence on record, the appellant is carrying on business at Tezpur. The respondent is working as a Lecturer in University Law College at Gauhati. There is no dispute that from 1st July 2009 till date, they are staying separately. 11. Merely because on account of the death of the appellant’s mother, the respondent visited her matrimonial home in December 2009 and stayed there only for one day, it cannot be said that there was a resumption of cohabitation. She has not stated that she came to her matrimonial home on 21st December 2009 with the intention to resume cohabitation. The intention on the part of the respondent to resume cohabitation is not established. Thus, in the facts of the case, the factum of separation has been proved. From the evidence on record, an inference can be drawn that there was animus deserendi on the part of the respondent. She has not pleaded and established any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home. Thus, in the facts of the case, the factum of separation has been proved. From the evidence on record, an inference can be drawn that there was animus deserendi on the part of the respondent. She has not pleaded and established any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home. 12. Thus, in our considered view, the ground of desertion under clause (ib) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of HM Act has been made out as the desertion for a continuous period of more than two years before the institution of the petition was established in the facts of the case. But, after having carefully perused the evidence on record, we find that no case is made out to disturb the findings recorded by the Courts on the issue of cruelty.” The evidence oral and documentary led by the parties in the instant case clearly establishes that the parties had been living separately w.e.f. 25.05.2005. The respondent had been the one to take steps for salvaging his marriage with the intervention of the family members and the Gram Panchyat. The appellant though joined the company of her husband intermittently only to leave her matrimonial home after a few months. The respondent-husband has been able to prove desertion on part of the appellant-wife. He had filed the petition for divorce after more than 2 years of staying separately. Respondent’s evidence is absolutely silent regarding any efforts made by her to resume cohabitation with her husband. The appellant’s claim of being ready and willing to join the respondent’s company is falsified not only from the documents available on record upto 25.05.2005, but also from the events which took place thereafter. The documentary evidence available on record demonstrates that respondent-husband had made effort to bring the appellant-wife in the confines of matrimonial home by requesting even her employer to transfer her nearer to her matrimonial home vide his written requests dated 11.08.2006 (Ex.P8) and 11.09.2006 (Ex.P-11). Even though the appellant’s employer department vide Ex. P-15 had expressed its willingness to accept the respondent-husband’s request, yet the appellant-wife (Anganwari Assistant) declined to be transferred away from her parental home. 5(v) In (2020) 14 SCC 657 Munish Kakkar Vs. Nidhi Kakkar, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of a situation where parties were living separately for about two decades and engaged in multifarious litigations. P-15 had expressed its willingness to accept the respondent-husband’s request, yet the appellant-wife (Anganwari Assistant) declined to be transferred away from her parental home. 5(v) In (2020) 14 SCC 657 Munish Kakkar Vs. Nidhi Kakkar, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of a situation where parties were living separately for about two decades and engaged in multifarious litigations. Neither there was any consent nor willingness of the parties for living together. Exercising power under Article 142 of Constitution of India, the Court put a quietus to the dispute holding that marriage between them had irretrievably broken down and thus granted decree of divorce. Relevant paras from the judgment read as under :- 10. Insofar as the aspect of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is concerned, it was opined that since that did not form part of statutory law in India, that could not be treated as a ground. 14. It is no doubt true that the divorce legislations in India are based on the ‘fault theory’, i.e., no party should take advantage of his/her own fault, and that the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, as yet, has not been inserted in the divorce law, despite a debate on this aspect by the Law Commission in two reports. 18. No doubt there is no consent of the respondent. But there is also, in real terms, no willingness of the parties, including of the respondent to live together. There are only bitter memories and angst against each other. This angst has got extended in the case of the respondent to somehow not permit the appellant to get a decree of divorce and “live his life”, forgetting that both parties would be able to live their lives in a better manner, separately, as both parties suffer from an obsession with legal proceedings, as reflected from the submissions before us. 19. We may note that in a recent judgment of this Court, in R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, to which one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) is a party, divorce was granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, after examining various judicial pronouncements. It has been noted that such powers are exercised not in routine, but in rare cases, in view of the absence of legislation in this behalf, where it is found that a marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably. It has been noted that such powers are exercised not in routine, but in rare cases, in view of the absence of legislation in this behalf, where it is found that a marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably. That was a case where parties had been living apart for the last twenty-two (22) years and a re-union was found to be impossible. We are conscious of the fact that this Court has also extended caution from time to time on this aspect, apart from noticing that it is only this Court which can do so, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. If parties agree, they can always go back to the trial court for a motion by mutual consent, or this Court has exercised jurisdiction at times to put the matter at rest quickly. But that has not been the only circumstance in which a decree of divorce has been granted by this Court. In numerous cases, where a marriage is found to be a dead letter, the Court has exercised its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to bring an end to it. 20. We do believe that not only is the continuity of this marriage fruitless, but it is causing further emotional trauma and disturbance to both the parties. This is even reflected in the manner of responses of the parties in the Court. The sooner this comes to an end, the better it would be, for both the parties. Our only hope is that with the end of these proceedings, which culminate in divorce between the parties, the two sides would see the senselessness of continuing other legal proceedings and make an endeavour to even bring those to an end.” It is an admitted position in the case that the appellant-wife had left her matrimonial home on 25.05.2002. She even left couple’s minor children with her husband. Ever since this date, she is staying in her parental house. She has thwarted all attempts of the respondent-husband for resuming cohabitation. The parties have been living separately for the last 17 years. Under such circumstances, there is no point in dragging a dead relationship. It can be deduced that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. Ever since this date, she is staying in her parental house. She has thwarted all attempts of the respondent-husband for resuming cohabitation. The parties have been living separately for the last 17 years. Under such circumstances, there is no point in dragging a dead relationship. It can be deduced that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. The endeavours made for re-conciliation between the parties even during the pendency of this appeal have not borne any positive result. In the given facts and circumstances of the case and in light of evidence on record, the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge dissolving marriage between the parties on ground of desertion, does not suffer from any error or infirmity. Hence, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.