JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. Petitioner, by the instant writ petition, has raised challenge to the order dated 16 March 2022, passed by the first respondent, Principal Secretary, Vigilance Department, Lucknow, rejecting the representation of the petitioner pursuant to the directions issued by this Court. 3. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition, briefly stated, is that petitioner is a civil servant and at the time of the alleged incident was posted as District Magistrate, Moradabad. It appears that a complaint dated 23 January 2017, came to be filed for alleged corrupt practices committed by the petitioner in discharge of his duty, accordingly, decision was taken to initiate vigilance enquiry and criminal prosecution against the petitioner pursuant to an enquiry report. Aggrieved, petitioner approached this Court by filing a petition being Writ Petition No. 32018 (M/B) of 2019. The relief claimed by the petitioner, noted in the order of the writ Court reads thus: “This petition has been filed for quashing the impugned open inquiry report conducted by opposite party No.2 in pursuance of the unauthorized complaint made by the opposite party No.4, as contained in Annexure No.2 to the writ petition, contrary to the government orders dated 9.5.1997, 1.8.1997, 19.4.2012 and 24.5.2012 which is the basis of initiating the criminal prosecution against the petitioner, submitted by opposite party No.2, before opposite party No.1.” 4. The writ petition came to be disposed of directing the Chief Secretary to decide the representation of the petitioner in light of Government Orders. The relevant portion of the order dated 08 January 2020 is extracted: “In the present case, vigilance inquiry has been conducted directly without adhering to the provisions of the Government Orders. The Government Orders clearly mention that first of all the complaints of the complainants should be ascertained preferably it is a normal procedure that class-I officers or other officers who are holding responsible posts, if a complaint is made against such persons, an affidavit should accompany the complaint. The first action is to be taken by the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority to the effect that a show cause notice should be given and in case it so pleases departmental inquiry can be initiated. The first action is to be taken by the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority to the effect that a show cause notice should be given and in case it so pleases departmental inquiry can be initiated. It is very interesting to note that even in the complaint and the impugned sanction order, the impugned action taken by the opposite parties, the charge is not very clear. There is no charge of corruption, embezzlement or any other financial loss to the State Government. There has been no money transaction, there is no allegation of bribe, there is no allegation of any nepotism or malafide intentions. At this juncture, the petitioner has submitted that his sole contention is on the premise that he has never been given any opportunity of hearing in the inquiry as it was required in the departmental procedure to explain his case. He has not been able to produce relevant documents and the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court feels that interest of justice will be satisfied if the petitioner is given a chance to represent his case before the Chief Secretary. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner will move a detailed representation before the Chief Secretary annexing all the relevant documents including the Government Orders and the provisions of the Constitution, his defence and the objections against the complainant and his complaint. This shall be done within a maximum period of fifteen days from today. In case, such a representation is moved by the petitioner before the Chief Secretary, U.P., he will examine it and pass appropriate speaking orders after considering all the reasons which have been enumerated in the representation. It is provided that the opposite parties will not proceed against the petitioner till the representation is decided. The decision so taken shall be communicated to the petitioner. With these observations the writ petition stands disposed of.” 5. It is provided that the opposite parties will not proceed against the petitioner till the representation is decided. The decision so taken shall be communicated to the petitioner. With these observations the writ petition stands disposed of.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order, has made the following submissions: (i) that a vigilance enquiry cannot be directly initiated on a fictitious complaint bypassing the various Government Orders issued from time to time to protect the officers against malicious complaint; (ii) that pursuant to Government Order dated 14 April 1981, the complaint, as far as possible, should be investigated by an officer who is two rank higher; (iii) that on a complaint made against a Class-I officer, before taking cognizance of the matter, an affidavit shall be called from the complainant and after verifying and ascertaining the identity of the complainant, the complaint should be entertained; (iv) that the mandate of Government Order dated 19 April 2012, specifically directs that the earlier Government Orders be strictly complied before entertaining a complaint; (v) that in view of Government Order dated 24 May 2012, it is mandated that departmental proceedings should be initiated and if culpability of the government officer is found then in that event decision should be taken to lodge F.I.R.; (vi) that Government Order dated 6 August 2018, reiterated that the complaints received against the government officers should be dealt with as per earlier Government Orders dated 9 May 1997, 1 August 1997 and 19 April 2012; (vii) that the aforenoted Government Orders have not been considered nor complied while deciding the representation of the petitioner; (viii) that the State Government has adopted pick and choose policy while dealing with the complaints filed against the government servants; (ix) that the basis for initiating vigilance enquiry by lodging F.I.R. is a report of Senior Superintendent of Police, Moradabad, obtained flouting the Government Orders. 6. In rebuttal, learned Standing Counsel submits that petitioner while posted as District Magistrate indulged in acts of corruption while discharging official duty, which was duly enquired into by the Revenue authorities and the Senior Superintendent of Police, duly noted in the impugned order. The Government Orders are directory and not mandatory, in any case, upon discreet enquiry and departmental enquiry petitioner has been found of have indulged in corrupt practices in discharge of his official function causing huge loss to the State Exchequer. The Government Orders are directory and not mandatory, in any case, upon discreet enquiry and departmental enquiry petitioner has been found of have indulged in corrupt practices in discharge of his official function causing huge loss to the State Exchequer. In the circumstances, it is not open for the petitioner to take recourse under the Government Orders to escape the consequences. The writ petition being devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 7. Rival submissions fall for consideration. 8. The short question involved is as to whether a vigilance enquiry can be initiated on a complaint bypassing the various Government Orders, issued from time to time, by the State Government or in the alternative whether the vigilance enquiry initiated by the State Government would vitiate for want of compliance of the Government Orders dealing with complaints received against the government servant. 9. I have perused the impugned order with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties. The impugned order is a lengthy order and the objections raised by the petitioner in both the representations has been dealt with in detail. In para 8 of the impugned order, it is noted that petitioner while posted as District Magistrate, Moradabad, from 22 September 2015 to 28 April 2015, pursuant to directions of the Government, a six member committee headed by the petitioner was constituted for the construction of a jail premises at 40.334 hectare. The committee submitted a report to the State Government through, the Divisional Commissioner, proposing that land be purchased at four times the circle rate at Rs. 97,80,000/-per hectare. In the proposal at serial no. 14 gata no. 1168 (kha), admeasuring 1.319 hectare land was included, however, no reference was made that the land vested with Waqf Al Aulad. In other words the land vesting with the Waqf was made a part of the proposal for purchase at the proposed rate, thereafter, an order on the proposal was obtained by the petitioner misleading the Divisional Commissioner. 10. In para 9 of the impugned order, the objection of the petitioner that the proposal identifying the land suggested by the committee was duly approved by the Divisional Commissioner, therefore, petitioner alone is not responsible for any irregularity or corrupt practice. 10. In para 9 of the impugned order, the objection of the petitioner that the proposal identifying the land suggested by the committee was duly approved by the Divisional Commissioner, therefore, petitioner alone is not responsible for any irregularity or corrupt practice. The State negated the contention of the petitioner, as noted in the impugned order, that since the committee headed by the District Magistrate was assigned the role of purchase of land, whereas, the Divisional Commissioner was only required to approve the rate proposed by the committee. The Commissioner has no role in identification of the plots suggested by the committee. The Commissioner was misled as the property belonging to Waqf and Sri Saumya Jain was included for purchase, whereas, the properties of Waqf and Sri Saumya Jain were situated outside the proposed project. It is noted in the impugned order that the property of the Waqf is out side the project at about 500 meter to one kilometer distance. The inclusion of the properties was willful and deliberate at behest of the petitioner against the provision of the Government Orders to cause loss to the State Exchequer. It is further noted in the impugned order that the proposal was placed before the petitioner by the revenue authorities on 23 January 2017, wherein, it was clearly indicated that sale and purchase of the Waqf property is prohibited under the Waqf Act, 1995. But despite the objection property of the Waqf was included in the proposal. 11. It appears from the facts noted in para 12 of the impugned order that the revenue authorities prepared a report which was false stating that the Waqf property and that belonging to Sri Saumya Jain and others are in the vicinity of the proposed jail, whereas, the properties are situated 500 meter to one kilometer away from the jail land. In para 13, it is noted that petitioner as the Chairman of the committee approved and consented to the illegal proposal that the land vesting in Waqf can be purchased/exchanged which is in violation of Section 51 of the Waqf Act, 1995. Thereafter, the properties belonging to Sri Saumya Jain and others were also initiated for purchase/exchange and the entire process was completed hurridly with seven days. 12. Thereafter, the properties belonging to Sri Saumya Jain and others were also initiated for purchase/exchange and the entire process was completed hurridly with seven days. 12. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the subordinate revenue authorities (Sub Divisional Officer) for purchase/exchange of Waqf property came to be challenged by the U.P. Sunni Central Board, in a petition being Writ-C No. 3750 of 2018. This Court observed and held that the exchange of Waqf property could not have taken place under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, accordingly, directed an enquiry to be conducted. Pursuant thereof, the order of the Sub Divisional Officer came to be set aside on rehearing the matter. It is noted in para 15 of the impugned order that the exchange of the land vesting in the Waqf with the land of Sri Saumya Jain Trust and others was illegal and was accordingly set aside. 13. In para 16 of the impugned order it is categorically noted that the revenue authorities in their proposal submitted to the petitioner, the Chairman, had categorically noted that in view of the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995, the Waqf land cannot be sold/exchanged. The land vesting in Gram Sabha/Government land in the same Gram Sabha could only be exchanged. Petitioner willfully and deliberately did not bring to the notice of the Divisional Commissioner that the proposal approved by the committee included the exchange/purchase of Waqf property with the land belonging to Sri Saumya Jain Trust and others. The land proposed was located 500 meter to one kilometer away from the project and was small scattered plots. This fact was not placed before the Divisional Commissioner. In para 18 of the impugned order, the vigilance enquiry was also ordered against the then Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar, District Moradabad, for his involvement in the exchange of land in violation of the Act 2006. 14. In para 18 of the impugned order, it is noted that after fact finding enquiry in the incident an vigilance enquiry was ordered. It is further noted that the U.P. Vigilance Establishment is the qualified investigating agency and is competent to enquire into the conduct of a government servant in view of Section 2(2) of the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965. It is further noted that the U.P. Vigilance Establishment is the qualified investigating agency and is competent to enquire into the conduct of a government servant in view of Section 2(2) of the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965. In para 23 of the impugned order, it is noted that the U.P. Vigilance Establishment collected sufficient documentary material, prima facie, disclosing the culpability of the petitioner in acts of corruption while discharging official duty. In that event the consequence is prosecution of the officer under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 15. The impugned order further notes that while disposing of the second representation dated 16 August 2021, filed by the petitioner, in para 4 it is noted that under the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulation) Act, 1986, the District Magistrate is competent authority and on the direction of the petitioner the then Additional District Magistrate (City), Moradabad, released/abated the property without hearing the Development Authority. After vesting in the State the land was duly transferred to the Moradabad Development Authority way back in 1993. Thereby, causing huge loss to the State Exchequer. It is noted that the lands in dispute was declared surplus in 1986, which was duly taken into possession on 30 March 1990, by the Supervisor Kanoongo, Pakwada and Naib Tehsildar, thus, vesting in the State. It is further noted in the impugned order that this was done in connivance with the owners of the land for extraneous consideration. In para 8, it is noted that the subsequent District Magistrate on being informed of the illegal proceedings, passed orders declaring the order of abatement/release illegal, thereby, protecting the State from huge loss. 16. In para 9, it has been categorically noted that the allegations of corrupt practices against the petitioner has been leveled upon a fact finding enquiry and it is not based on the complaint of the complainant Sri Dushyant Raj Chaudhary. In para 15, it is admitted that on a complaint the fact finding enquiry was got conducted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Moradabad, and based on the enquiry, an open enquiry was directed to be conducted by the Vigilance Establishment. In para 15, it is admitted that on a complaint the fact finding enquiry was got conducted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Moradabad, and based on the enquiry, an open enquiry was directed to be conducted by the Vigilance Establishment. In the open enquiry, sufficient material was collected with regard to the culpability of the petitioner and other revenue authorities, accordingly, F.I.R. being Case Crime No. 1084 of 2018, under Sections 7 and 13(1)A read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, and Sections 409, 120-B I.P.C., was lodged with Police Station Civil Line, Moradabad. 17. In para 16 of the impugned order, it is noted that in compliance of the writ Court order, before initiating prosecution a committee was constituted by the Divisional Commissioner, headed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration), alongwith Additional District Magistrate (Administration), Moradabad, Additional Secretary Moradabad Development Authority, Moradabad. The committee submitted a report on 1 August 2017, to the Divisional Commissioner and the report prima facie discloses that petitioner and other revenue officers to be involved in corrupt practices. Accordingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide order dated 3 August 2017, directed the District Magistrate Moradabad, to lodge F.I.R. and requested the State Government to take appropriate action against the delinquent officers, including, the petitioner. The departmental enquiry was in terms of the writ Court order and in compliance of the respective Government Orders. 18. The crux of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Government Orders issued from time to time governing enquiry on a complaint filed against the government servant was not complied in the given facts. Hence, it is urged that the directions for initiating vigilance enquiry and prosecution is bad not being in conformity with the mandate of the Government Orders. 19. It would be apposite to peruse the Government Orders being relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, which briefly stated, provides thus: (a) Government Order dated 14 April 1981, addressed to all the Head of the departments, directing that on receiving complaint against a government servant, it should be ensured that during the discreet enquiry the copy of the complaint should not be supplied to the delinquent government servant and neither the name of the complainant should be disclosed. Upon disclosure, the purpose of the enquiry and secrecy gets compromised. Upon disclosure, the purpose of the enquiry and secrecy gets compromised. In other words, the delinquent employee should not be made aware of the complaint or the enquiry. If possible the enquiry should be got conducted by an officer two rank higher. (b) Government order dated 9 May 1997, is addressed to all the Principal/Secretaries and Secretaries. The Government order notes that against Class-I officers fraudulent and false complaints are being received. Accordingly, the Government Order to safeguard the interest of Class-I officers, inter alia, provides: (i) complaints received on the letter pad of Member of Parliament and/or Legislative Assembly, before proceeding on the complaint, the contents should be got verified from the Members; (ii) on complaints received from other sources/persons, before proceeding to enquire, an affidavit of the complainant and the material/evidence in support of complaint must be obtained. (c) Government Order dated 01 August, 1997, provides the procedure for entertaining and acting on the complaints of subordinate officers. The procedure is similar to the Government Order dated 9 May 1997. (d) Government Order dated 19 April 2012, came to be issued on the directions of the writ Court order passed in Kumdesh Kumar Sharma Versus State of U.P. (Writ Petition No. 4372(SS) of 2011) dated 3 January 2012. The Government directed all the Secretaries/Head of departments/Commissioners to strictly comply the Government Order dated 9 May 1997 and 1 August 1997 while dealing with complaints received against government servants. The direction was again reiterated vide Government Order dated 6 August 2018. (e) With regard to lodging of F.I.R. it is provided in Government Order dated 19 July 2005, and reiterated by Government Order dated 24 May 2012, that disciplinary proceedings/departmental enquiry, in the first instance, should be initiated against the government servant and upon a prima facie finding being returned in the enquiry with regard to the culpability of the officer, F.I.R. thereafter should be directed to be lodged. 20. On bare perusal of the Government Orders, it is evident that the directions/instructions provided therein is to shield the government servant from frivolous and false complaints. But, at the same time, the government orders nowhere restricts the State authority from carrying out a discreet/confidential enquiry having regard to the nature of allegations made in the complaint, though, the whereabouts of the complainant, his identity or affidavit is not available. But, at the same time, the government orders nowhere restricts the State authority from carrying out a discreet/confidential enquiry having regard to the nature of allegations made in the complaint, though, the whereabouts of the complainant, his identity or affidavit is not available. It is always open for the competent authority/Government to conduct discreet enquiry on any information received depending upon the nature of allegations. Even in a case where the complaint is not supported by an affidavit or material documents the Government is not prohibited to initiate a fact finding enquiry. The directions in the Government Orders, primarily, seeks to protect the government servants from the onslaught of frivolous complaints. But that would certainly not mean that the government servants can take shelter under the Government Orders to escape enquiry and prosecution for their corrupt acts. It is not open to the government servant to contend that the vigilance enquiry would vitiate for the reason of defect, either with the fact finding enquiry/departmental enquiry initiated on a fictitious complaint. The relevant consideration that would weigh with the Government to direct vigilance enquiry is that the fact finding enquiry reveals prima facie culpability of the government servant in acts of corruption. The mandate of the Government Orders is directory and not mandatory. It therefore follows that any defect in the fact finding enquiry would not vitiate the consequential vigilance enquiry or order of sanction for prosecution against the government officer, provided there is, prima facie, material to support the allegations against the government servant. 21. A provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the proceeding to which it relates illegal and void, while a provision is directory if its observance is not necessary to the validity of the proceeding, and a statute may be mandatory in some respects and directory in others. The difference between mandatory and directory statutes is one of effect only. If the violation or omission is invalidating, the statute is mandatory; if not, it is directory. 22. The Supreme Court of India has been stressing time and again that the question whether statute is mandatory or directory is not capable of generalization and that in each case the court should try and get at the real intention of the legislature by analyzing the entire provisions of the enactment and the scheme underlying it. 23. 22. The Supreme Court of India has been stressing time and again that the question whether statute is mandatory or directory is not capable of generalization and that in each case the court should try and get at the real intention of the legislature by analyzing the entire provisions of the enactment and the scheme underlying it. 23. In Chandrika Prasad Yadav v State of Bihar, 2004 6 SCC 331 , it was held that, the question as to whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not depend upon the phraseology used therein. The principle as regards the nature of the statute must be determined having regard to the purpose and object the statute seeks to achieve. 24. The principle, though applicable to a provision of a statute, applied to the Government Orders under consideration, it is evident that the intent and purpose of the Government Orders is to shield and protect the Government servants from false and vexatious complaints. The Government Orders, however, do not mandate that in the event of non compliance of the provisions therein would vitiate the fact finding enquiry, followed by the vigilance enquiry and prosecution, provided there is material to support the decision of the Government. 25. Further, the Government Order dated 19 July 2005, reiterated by Government Order dated 24 May 2012, provides that before lodging an F.I.R. against the government servant, a disciplinary proceedings/departmental enquiry should necessarily be conducted and in the enquiry culpability of the government servant is found only then F.I.R. should be lodged. In the facts in hand a departmental enquiry, headed by Additional Commissioner was constituted returning a prima facie finding with regard to the involvement and culpability of petitioner and other revenue authorities noted in the impugned order. In any case, as noted herein above, the tenor of Government Orders is directory, therefore, any defect in the fact finding enquiry or departmental enquiry would have no bearing on the vigilance enquiry/prosecution. 26. In any case, as noted herein above, the tenor of Government Orders is directory, therefore, any defect in the fact finding enquiry or departmental enquiry would have no bearing on the vigilance enquiry/prosecution. 26. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 , though the facts therein are not similar but an analogy can be drawn, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that since the directions issued by the Court in Vineet Narain and others v. Union of India, 1998 (1) SCC was not followed by the CBI and Chief Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) before filing of the charge sheet, the consequential proceedings of prosecution would be a nullity. The Supreme Court declined to quash the proceedings merely on the defect of not complying the directions. 27. The High Court held that in terms of directions issued in Vineet Narain (supra), CVC is not entrusted with the responsibility of CBI function. CBI was to report to CVC about all cases taken up by it for investigation; progress of the investigation; cases in which charge-sheets are filed and their progress. CBI was bound to place the final results of its investigation along with all material collected before the CVC for the purposes of review. CBI had not placed before the CVC the results of its investigations and had by-passed it by filing a charge-sheet before the Special Judge. The High Court in view of the mandate in Vineet Narain (supra) not being complied by the CBI allowed the writ petition and quashed the cognizance taken by the Special Judge and all consequential proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court. 28. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, 1955 SCR 1150 , the Court was called upon to consider the effect of investigation having been done by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police contrary to the mandate of Section 5(4) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Court held as follows: “…...Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. The Court held as follows: “…...Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial.” 29. Supreme Court referring Prabhu v. Emperor, AIR 1944 SC 73 and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, AIR 1950 PC 26 , held that if cognizance is in fact taken on a police report initiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial, which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice and that an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial. 30. Further, Sub-clause (3) (b) of Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, prohibits that no court shall stay the proceeding under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction for prosecution. Section 19 (3)(b) is extracted: “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction 1 [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)]— (a) ……………………... (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) ……….. (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;” 31. In the given facts, it is noted in the impugned order that on the directions of the writ Court the departmental enquiry came to be set up duly constituted by the Divisional Commissioner, headed by the Additional Commissioner, alongwith two other members. In the given facts, it is noted in the impugned order that on the directions of the writ Court the departmental enquiry came to be set up duly constituted by the Divisional Commissioner, headed by the Additional Commissioner, alongwith two other members. On a prima facie finding returned by the departmental enquiry committee petitioner along with other revenue officers were found involved in acts of corruption in the discharge of their functions with regard to purchase/exchange/release/abatement of parcel of land. The petitioner had misled the Divisional Commissioner, as well as, the State Government in purchase/exchange of land which included Waqf land and land belonging to a private trust. 32. The sale and exchange of waqf property is prohibited under Section 51 of the Waqf Act, 1995. Section 51 is extracted: “51. Alienation of wakf property without sanction of Board to be void.-(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in the wakf deed, any gift, sale, exchange or mortgage of any immovable property which is wakf property, shall be void unless such gift, sale, exchange or mortgage is effected with the prior sanction of the Board: Provided that no mosque, dargah or khangah shall be gifted, sold, exchanged or mortgaged except in accordance with any law for the time being in force. Provided……………..” 33. The impugned order further flags the incident of corruption committed by the petitioner being the Chairman or the competent authority under the Ceiling Act. Further, in ceiling proceedings, the land that had vested in the State upon possession and subsequently transferred to the Moradabad Development Authority was directed to be released/abated in favour of the land lord for extraneous consideration without notice to the Development Authority. 34. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that no pecuniary loss was caused to the State Government as the orders were subsequently reversed or recalled would have no bearing. 35. As per Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, any public servant attempts to render service for gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act or showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour in exercise of his official function is punishable. Section 7 is extracted: “7. 35. As per Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, any public servant attempts to render service for gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act or showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour in exercise of his official function is punishable. Section 7 is extracted: “7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.—Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than 1 [three years] but which may extend to 2 [seven years] and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations.—(a) …………………. (b) “Gratification.” The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. 36. Further, Section 13 provides for criminal misconduct by a public servant. If a public servant habitually accepts or agrees to accept gratification is said to have committed the offence of criminal misconduct. Section 13 is extracted: 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or 37. The impugned order reflects that petitioner was habitual in accepting gratification other than legal remuneration. It is alleged that in purchase of land for construction of jail and thereafter in ceiling proceedings petitioner showed favour to benefit a party for extraneous consideration. 38. The impugned order reflects that petitioner was habitual in accepting gratification other than legal remuneration. It is alleged that in purchase of land for construction of jail and thereafter in ceiling proceedings petitioner showed favour to benefit a party for extraneous consideration. 38. Further, under the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965, the State Government is competent to get the offences investigated by a special police force. 39. The Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965, inter alia, to make provision for the constitution, superintendence and administration of the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment as a special police force. 40. Section 2 provides for constitution and powers of the Vigilance Establishment. Sub-section (1) reads thus: “Constitution and powers of the Vigilance Establishment.-(1) Not withstanding anything in the police Act 1861, the State Government may constitute a special police force to be called the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment for the investigation of offences notified under the section 3. (2) …….” 41. Section 3 confers powers upon the Vigilance Establishment to investigate the offences notified in the Gazettee by the State Government. Section 3 reads thus: “3. Offences to be investigated by the Vigilance Establishment. The State Government may by notification in the Gazette, specify the offence or classes of offences which are to by investigated by the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment.” 42. In exercise of powers conferred under section 3 of Vigilance Act 1965, the Governor of U.P. notified on 12 February 1965 the offences and class of offences which may be investigated by the U.P. Vigilance Establishment, which, inter alia, includes offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 43. Having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the State-respondents are justified in directing vigilance enquiry and granting sanction for prosecution. The finding of culpability of the petitioner is writ large from the departmental enquiry. The mandate of the Government Orders have necessarily been complied. Any defect in the fact finding enquiry, rank of the officer or complaint being fictitious and not supported by an affidavit would have no bearing on the vigilance enquiry or the sanction for prosecution. 44. The writ petition being devoid of merit, accordingly, is dismissed. 45. No costs.