JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. T.T. Tara, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. U. Bori, learned Public Prosecutor for the State, appearing for respondent nos. 1, 3 and 4 and Mr. D. Panging, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 5. 2. By filing this composite petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner, who is one of the accused, has prayed for quashing of the FIR lodged by the respondent no. 5, being EOW ME C.R. No. 6/13 under Sections 403, 406, 408, 423, 465, 467, 468, 471, 475, 477A, 34, 120B IPC, which is being investigated by E.O.W. Unit- III, Crime Branch, Mumbai. 3. From the materials available on record, specifically from Annexure-P/11 of this application, it is made to appear that the complaint statement dated 17.05.2013, given by one Mr. Jaysingh Liladhar Ashar, an employee of the respondent no. 5, i.e. Gammon India Ltd., which was recorded by the investigating agency, has been treated as an FIR. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appearing parties are ad idem at the Bar. 4. The complaint statement is lengthy consisting of 16 typed pages. Therefore, this order is not burdened with the narration of the entire complaint. It would suffice to mention that the sum and substance of the FIR is that about 15-16 instances have been narrated of how the petitioner in connivance and involvement of some others, named therein, had prepared false bills, fabricated and manufactured bills, and fake bills and submitted them along with supporting documents and obtained approval from the Head Office of the respondent no. 5 at Mumbai and misappropriated money of his employer, i.e. respondent no. 5, which was transferred from Mumbai. It is not in dispute that the said money pertained for the contract work which was being executed by the respondent no. 5 at Seppa, located in East Kameng District in Arunachal Pradesh. The amount misappropriated would roughly add-up to Rs.2,93,28,494/-. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to voluminous documents appended to the writ petition to project that the petitioner had not misappropriated any money from his employer. 5 at Seppa, located in East Kameng District in Arunachal Pradesh. The amount misappropriated would roughly add-up to Rs.2,93,28,494/-. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to voluminous documents appended to the writ petition to project that the petitioner had not misappropriated any money from his employer. It was also projected that some under-ground elements had served demand notice to him, for which he was absent from the work-site and had also applied for police protection and that on his complaint, some under-ground elements were also arrested. It was also projected that the petitioner was also ill at the relevant point of time, but when he had resumed his duty, he was served with show cause notice and he also came to know that the respondent no. 5 had lodged an FIR against the petitioner. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner had meticulously referred to the contents of 19 voluminous annexures of about 176 pages and 31 grounds on which this application was presented. It was also submitted that the petitioner was illegally framed by his employer company, i.e. the respondent no. 5 to hide their inability to pay various contractors and suppliers, most of whom had filed suits for recovery of money from the respondent no. 5, which would justify that the petitioner had made genuine purchases of material, equipment, etc., and genuinely availed services from various vendors and suppliers. It was also submitted that the money receipts obtained from vendors and service providers, including Geology and Mining Department of the State of Arunachal Pradesh would be a testimony of lawful transactions made by the petitioner in his capacity as empowered employee of the respondent no. 5, holding a valid Power of attorney for discharging his assigned duties. It may be mentioned herein that no purpose would be served in burdening this order by narration of contents of voluminous documents and list of events/ dates. The reason therefore, is assigned in the later part of the order. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the provisions of Sections 177 to 188 of the Cr.P.C. and it was submitted that the investigating agency at Mumbai would not have any territorial jurisdiction to investigate the allegations, for which cause of action had arisen in Seppa, located in this State. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the provisions of Sections 177 to 188 of the Cr.P.C. and it was submitted that the investigating agency at Mumbai would not have any territorial jurisdiction to investigate the allegations, for which cause of action had arisen in Seppa, located in this State. It was submitted that merely by projecting that approvals were made from Mumbai and money was transferred from Mumbai would not be a valid ground for the investigating agencies at Mumbai taking up the investigation outside their territorial jurisdiction. It was also submitted that as per instructions provided to him, even the Mumbai Police had expressed that the site where alleged offence had taken place was at Seppa, for which they would not make any substantial progress in investigation during last 9 (nine) years. Therefore, it was prayed that the Court would be pleased to quash the said FIR/ complaint and his alternative submission was to the effect that if the Court was not inclined to quash the FIR/ complaint, the Court would order transfer the investigation and trial from Mumbai to Seppa. It was also submitted that if investigation is done at Seppa, it would be convenient for the witnesses. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following cases, viz., (i) Kaushik Chatterjee v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2020) 10 SCC 92 , (ii) Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640 , (iii) M/s. KBM Enterprise & Anr. v. National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd., W.P.(C) 3071/2021, decided by this Court on 02.07.2021, (iv) Basant Kumar Agarwal & Anr., State of Assam & Ors., 2018 (3) GLT 721. 7. The learned PP has submitted that as per the written instructions dated 25.05.2021, received from the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Economic Offence Wing, Mumbai is to the effect that due to order dated 23.09.2014, from this Court, there is no progress in the investigation for last 8 years, for which justice to complainant is delayed, and that as the place where offence was committed was at Seppa, in order to give justice to the complainant and for conducting speedy investigation, they had no objection to transfer the investigation of the case to Seppa with the consent of the High Court. 8. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent no.5 had submitted that it is too well settled proposition of law that while examining a case for quashing of FIR, no other material produced by the accused, except the contents of the FIR can be examined by the High Court. It was further submitted that in the FIR statement has been made in many places regarding the manner in which by relying on manufactured documents, the petitioner had obtained financial sanction from Head Office of the respondent no.5 company at Mumbai, from where funds were transferred and the petitioner had misappropriated the money. It was also submitted that the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner were not applicable in this case, because the case of M/s. KBM Enterprises (supra), related to cause of action in relation to civil remedy and the other three cases did not relate to jurisdiction of police and investigating agencies to carry out investigation, but those were authorities on the issue relating to the place of trial. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 had placed reliance on the following cases, viz., (i) State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, (ii) Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & anr., (1999) 8 SCC 728 , (iii) Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), (iv) Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Meghalaya & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 323 [herein after referred to as “Navinchandra N. Majithia (2)”], (v) M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315. 9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to assign the reasons for (i) not burdening this order with the contents of the lengthy FIR, and (ii) for not narrating the contents of other voluminous documents produced by the petitioner. In this regard, in the statement before the investigating agency, which is referred to as the FIR in this case, statement has been made at several places that manufactured/ false/ fake bills were sent by the petitioner to Mumbai; approval for payment was made at Mumbai; and that money for payment were sanctioned and transferred from Mumbai office of the respondent no. 5, which was withdrawn by the petitioner, who was appointed as the Project Manager, and misappropriated. 5, which was withdrawn by the petitioner, who was appointed as the Project Manager, and misappropriated. In so far as not narrating the contents of voluminous documents produced by the petitioner is concerned, the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka V. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners (P) Ltd., (2009) 11 SCC 529 , held to the effect that materials furnished by defence cannot be looked into for the purpose of quashing of FIR/ complaint and can be entertained only at the time of trial. Therefore, when a document cannot be looked into by the Court at this stage, no purpose would be achieved by narrating the contents of 176 pages of documents annexed to this instant application by the petitioner. 10. It is no longer res-integra that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rare cases. The said principles have been reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in several cases including the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). Therefore, as per settled proposition of law, while examining an FIR/complaint which is sought to be quashed, the Court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/ complaint. Quashing of a FIR/complaint should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. In the case of State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1222, the Supreme Court of India had observed that normally the criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducing the mini-trial. As held by this Court the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 11. It is also well settled that a police before whom an FIR disclosing cognizable case is lodged, the police cannot refuse to register the same. In this regard, the case of Satvinder Kaur (supra), Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), and Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), reiterate the same principle. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 11. It is also well settled that a police before whom an FIR disclosing cognizable case is lodged, the police cannot refuse to register the same. In this regard, the case of Satvinder Kaur (supra), Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), and Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), reiterate the same principle. The observations made by in the case of Satvinder Kaur (supra), was reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in para-25 of the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra). The said para is quoted below:- 25. In the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 , the question of quashing of FIR on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the police to investigate the offence came up for consideration. Construing the provision of Sections 154, 162, 177 and 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code this Court held that if the investigating officer finds that the crime was not committed within his territorial jurisdiction he can forward the FIR to the police station concerned, but this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. Disapproving the order of the Delhi High Court quashing the FIR at the investigation stage on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction this Court observed: (SCC p. 736, para 14) “14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations.” 12. In the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), the Supreme Court of India had observed as follows:- 9. “Investigation” is defined in Section 2(h) of the Code as including “all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf”. Hence no proceedings outside the provision of the Code can be dragged into the contours of investigation. In other words, any proceedings falling outside the ambit of the Code will not be regarded as investigation for the purpose of the Code. Under the scheme of the Code, investigation commences with lodgment of information relating to the commission of an offence. If it is a cognizable offence, the officer in charge of the police station to whom the information is supplied orally has a statutory duty to reduce it to writing and get the signature of the informant. He shall enter the substance of the information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, in a book prescribed by the State in that behalf. The officer-in-charge has no escape from doing so if the offence mentioned therein is a cognizable offence, whether or not such offence was committed within the limits of that police station. But when the offence is non-cognizable, the officer in charge of the police station has no obligation to record it if the offence was not committed within the limits of his police station. 10. Section 156(1) of the Code says that the said police officer can investigate any cognizable offence covered by the said FIR, if the said offence could be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over the local area of that police station. If the offence was committed outside the limit of such police station, the officer in charge of the police station can transmit the FIR to the police station having such territorial jurisdiction. Various States have formulated rules for effecting transfer of such FIR in such contingencies. 11. Investigation thereafter would commence and the investigating officer has to go step by step. Various States have formulated rules for effecting transfer of such FIR in such contingencies. 11. Investigation thereafter would commence and the investigating officer has to go step by step. The Code contemplates the following steps to be carried out during such investigation: “(1) Proceeding to the spot; (2) ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; (3) discovery and arrest of the suspected offender; (4) collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of — (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial; and (5) formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and, if so, taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under Section 173.” (Vide H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 and State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali, AIR 1959 SC 707 .)” 13. In light of the discussions above, it would not be appropriate to quash the FIR at this nascent stage, when the investigating agency at Mumbai has not been able to investigate the complaint statement/ FIR in view of stay order operating in this case. 14. In the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the 3- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India had reiterated that the police has a right to investigate the cognizable cases, while giving their conclusion to the following effect:- “80. 14. In the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the 3- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India had reiterated that the police has a right to investigate the cognizable cases, while giving their conclusion to the following effect:- “80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied. 15. In respect of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the case of Kaushik Chatterjee (supra), deals with the jurisdiction of the Courts with reference to the provisions of Sections 177 to 184 and 219 to 221 of the Cr.P.C., and is not an authority on quashing of FIR on the point of lack of jurisdiction of police to investigate. The case of Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra) is also not an authority on the point which is being examined in this case. The said case was decided on different factual matrix because in the said case, an FIR was lodged in Shillong and therefore, the Bombay High Court had refused to entertain the writ petition for quashing as the FIR was lodged in Shillong. Hence, the Supreme Court was deciding the issue of jurisdiction of High Court to exercise the power of quashing. In the case of M/s. KBM Enterprise (supra), this Court was of the opinion that as some cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Delhi, the forum convenience was High Court of Delhi. The said issue does not arise in this case. In the case of M/s. KBM Enterprise (supra), this Court was of the opinion that as some cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Delhi, the forum convenience was High Court of Delhi. The said issue does not arise in this case. In the case of Basant Kumar Agarwal (supra), this Court had examined the FIR and held that it did not contain any whisper regarding any fraudulent and dishonest intention leading to the dispatch of goods and that the allegations made in the FIR, even if accepted at its face value, do not constitute any offence and therefore, the FIR was quashed. However, in the present case, the reading of the FIR prima facie discloses existence of a prima facie case for investigating the complaint/ FIR. Thus, none of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner would help the petitioner in any manner. 16. Therefore, it would not be permissible to quash the FIR/ complaint and thereby prevent the concerned police and/or the investigating agency from investigating cognizable offence. In this regard, the contents of complaint are prima facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence, which would constitute sufficient reason to allow the police and/or any other investigating agency to investigate the case. The Court has exercised restraint from examining how far it would succeed in trial, as such an enquiry cannot be conducted into at this juncture because the investigation is still in its nascent stage because of the fact that no investigation could be made by the police because of interim orders of this Court. Therefore, no case has been made out for quashing the FIR. 17. The statement by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, giving their no objection to have the investigation transferred at Seppa appears to be actuated by the fact that for about 9 years now, the investigation had been stalled and therefore the police appear to have made such a statement to ensure speedy justice to the respondent no. 5. Nonetheless, it has been indicated in this order, what the police can do if in course of investigation they find that the offence was committed outside their jurisdiction. 18. Therefore, no case has been made out to quash the impugned complaint statement/ FIR dated 17.05.2013. Therefore, this application stands dismissed. 19. The respondent no. 5. Nonetheless, it has been indicated in this order, what the police can do if in course of investigation they find that the offence was committed outside their jurisdiction. 18. Therefore, no case has been made out to quash the impugned complaint statement/ FIR dated 17.05.2013. Therefore, this application stands dismissed. 19. The respondent no. 5 shall be at liberty to produce a certified copy of this order before the investigating agency. 20. Before parting with the records, it would be appropriate to observe that as the Court is not called upon to exercise superintending jurisdiction over any subordinate Courts or Tribunals, this application is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, as prayer for quashing can be entertained under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not inclined to invoke powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the prayer for quashing of FIR as efficacious alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which has nonetheless, been invoked by the petitioner. Therefore, the Registry shall close this application as a writ petition and re-register this application as a Criminal Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and thereafter treat this quashing application as dismissed. 21. The parties are left to bear their own cost.